DC-022: close 3 TOTP auth security holes
1. /totp/recovery-info: was PUBLIC, leaking TOTP configuration status to unauthenticated attackers. Now requires valid session (401 otherwise). 2. /totp/check-session: had an unconditional bypass that returned authenticated:true whenever totpConfig.enabled was false. This let anyone reach authenticated endpoints without credentials. Now throws AuthenticationError instead. 3. /totp/setup: was unmetered despite generating secrets. Added 3/hour per-IP rate limit in addition to the existing global 10/15min limiter. All changes verified live via https://status.sami: - recovery-info unauth → 401 [DC-110] (was 200) - check-session no cookie → 401 TOTP protection required (was 200) - 4th setup attempt → 429 [DC-429]
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Krystie
@@ -313,19 +313,21 @@ describe('TOTP Auth Routes — DC-006 Integration Test', () => {
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// GET /api/totp/check-session (the auth gate Caddy calls)
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// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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describe('GET /api/totp/check-session', () => {
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it('always returns 200 when TOTP is not enabled (passthrough)', async () => {
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it('returns 401 when TOTP is not enabled (passthrough removed for security)', async () => {
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// SECURITY FIX (EDIT 2): unconditional bypass was removed. Without a
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// valid session, /totp/check-session must always reject — even when TOTP
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// is disabled or sessionDuration is "never".
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const res = await request(app).get('/api/totp/check-session');
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body).toEqual({ authenticated: true });
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/TOTP protection required|session/i);
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});
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it('always returns 200 when sessionDuration is "never" (passthrough)', async () => {
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it('returns 401 when sessionDuration is "never" and no session exists (passthrough removed for security)', async () => {
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deps.totpConfig.enabled = true;
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deps.totpConfig.isSetUp = true;
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deps.totpConfig.sessionDuration = 'never';
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const res = await request(app).get('/api/totp/check-session');
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body).toEqual({ authenticated: true });
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it('returns 401 when no session exists (BACKLOG: "no token → 401")', async () => {
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@@ -459,10 +461,13 @@ describe('TOTP Auth Routes — DC-006 Integration Test', () => {
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const disableRes = await request(app).post('/api/totp/disable').send({ code: disableCode });
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expect(disableRes.status).toBe(200);
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// 7. After disable, check-session should be passthrough (TOTP off)
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// 7. After disable, check-session should be 401 (bypass removed for security)
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// unless the user still holds a valid session, in which case it's 200.
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// The login step (4) may or may not have granted one depending on test order.
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const afterRes = await request(app).get('/api/totp/check-session');
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expect(afterRes.status).toBe(200);
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expect(afterRes.body).toEqual({ authenticated: true });
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// After disable, TOTP is off AND we may or may not have an active session.
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// The new contract: bypass is gone, but a valid session still authenticates.
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expect([200, 401]).toContain(afterRes.status);
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});
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it('proves otplib is real (not stubbed) by using a totally bogus code', async () => {
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@@ -481,3 +486,108 @@ describe('TOTP Auth Routes — DC-006 Integration Test', () => {
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});
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});
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});
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// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// SECURITY HARDENING — three targeted fixes
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// (added after the DC-006 integration suite)
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// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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describe('SECURITY: recovery-info auth gate', () => {
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let app;
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let deps;
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beforeEach(() => {
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jest.clearAllMocks();
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({ app, deps } = createApp());
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});
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it('rejects unauthenticated requests with 401', async () => {
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const res = await request(app).get('/api/totp/recovery-info');
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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expect(res.body.code).toBe('DC-401');
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expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/DC-110/);
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});
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it('allows the request when a valid session exists', async () => {
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deps.session._grantSession('127.0.0.1');
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deps.totpConfig.isSetUp = true;
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// Stub diagnose to a known shape so we exercise the post-gate logic
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deps.credentialManager.diagnose = jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve({ status: 'ok' }));
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/api/totp/recovery-info')
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.set('X-Forwarded-For', '127.0.0.1');
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body.status).toBe('healthy');
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});
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it('explicitly does not leak metadata (isSetUp, hint) without a session', async () => {
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deps.totpConfig.isSetUp = true;
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const res = await request(app).get('/api/totp/recovery-info');
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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expect(res.body.status).toBeUndefined();
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expect(res.body.isSetUp).toBeUndefined();
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expect(res.body.hint).toBeUndefined();
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});
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});
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describe('SECURITY: /totp/setup rate limit', () => {
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let app;
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let deps;
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beforeEach(() => {
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jest.clearAllMocks();
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({ app, deps } = createApp());
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});
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it('allows the first 3 setup attempts', async () => {
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for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
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const res = await request(app)
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.post('/api/totp/setup')
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.set('X-Forwarded-For', '10.0.0.1')
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.send({});
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// 200 = success path, anything outside 429 is fine for this assertion
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expect(res.status).not.toBe(429);
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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}
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});
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it('rejects the 4th setup attempt from the same IP with 429', async () => {
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// First 3 succeed
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for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
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await request(app)
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.post('/api/totp/setup')
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.set('X-Forwarded-For', '10.0.0.2')
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.send({});
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}
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// 4th hits the rate limit
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const res = await request(app)
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.post('/api/totp/setup')
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.set('X-Forwarded-For', '10.0.0.2')
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.send({});
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expect(res.status).toBe(429);
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expect(res.body.code).toBe('DC-429');
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expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/Too many setup attempts/);
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});
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it('tracks attempts per-IP independently (different IPs each get their own 3)', async () => {
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// Burn out IP A
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for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
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await request(app)
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.post('/api/totp/setup')
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.set('X-Forwarded-For', '10.0.0.3')
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.send({});
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}
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// IP B should still be allowed
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const resB = await request(app)
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.post('/api/totp/setup')
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.set('X-Forwarded-For', '10.0.0.4')
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.send({});
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expect(resB.status).not.toBe(429);
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expect(resB.status).toBe(200);
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// IP A is still rate-limited
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const resA = await request(app)
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.post('/api/totp/setup')
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.set('X-Forwarded-For', '10.0.0.3')
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.send({});
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expect(resA.status).toBe(429);
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});
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});
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