DC-151: WG nftables matrix compiler + transactional apply/rollback + tests
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/**
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* WireGuard hub firewall for the DashCaddy Private Network (DC-151,
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* specs/PRIVATE-NETWORK-SPEC.md §4 "Layer 1 — WireGuard" + §8.1 baseline).
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*
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* Two halves:
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*
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* 1. compileRuleset() — a PURE compiler (no I/O, fully deterministic):
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* access map + people + peer addresses + resources → the complete
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* nftables ruleset text for table `inet dcnet`.
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*
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* Baseline model (corrected per judge-gate review of §8.1):
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* - The WireGuard UDP listen port carries HANDSHAKE traffic that
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* arrives on the EXTERNAL interface, never on dcnet0. The accept
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* rule is scoped to `externalInterface` when given, otherwise
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* emitted interface-unscoped with an explanatory comment.
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* - dcnet0 LOCAL input (input chain, iifname "dcnet0"): established/
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* related, ICMP from 10.53.0.0/16, admin ports (API 3001 / SSH 22)
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* ONLY from the admin set, hub-local resource ports to 10.53.0.1,
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* then drop other new inbound to the hub IP.
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* - PEER traffic (forward chain): per-resource nft sets
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* (`net_dc_res_<name>`) gate saddr→resource ip:dport for resources
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* living at peer /32s; default-deny tails drop ALL other iifname
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* "dcnet0" (peer egress without a grant) and oifname "dcnet0"
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* (peer-to-peer + new hub→peer) traffic.
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*
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* Default-deny everywhere on dcnet0-derived traffic; blocked people's
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* IPs appear in NO set (resource sets nor the admin set).
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*
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* 2. createWgFirewallApplier() — transactional apply with injectable
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* { execFileImpl, fsImpl }: write to a UNIQUE temp file, `nft -c -f`
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* (check), write the rollback file (previous ruleset) BEFORE applying,
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* `nft -f` (apply), verify via `nft list table inet dcnet`, roll back
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* on verify mismatch. A check failure deletes the temp file and throws
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* FirewallCheckError with NOTHING applied; an apply failure leaves the
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* old rules and the rollback file untouched and throws with
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* { applied: false }.
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*
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* 3. assertAdminIsolation() — static guard (tests + DC-148-style callers):
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* every admin-port rule must be scoped to the admin set only.
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*/
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'use strict';
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const { execFile } = require('child_process');
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const { promisify } = require('util');
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const fsDefault = require('fs');
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const os = require('os');
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const path = require('path');
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const execFileDefault = promisify(execFile);
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const HUB_IP = '10.53.0.1';
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const PEER_CIDR = '10.53.0.0/16';
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const WG_IFACE = 'dcnet0';
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const TABLE = 'inet dcnet';
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const DEFAULT_ADMIN_PORTS = [22, 3001];
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const DEFAULT_WG_LISTEN_PORT = 51820;
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const ADMIN_SET = 'net_dc_admins';
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const RES_SET_PREFIX = 'net_dc_res_';
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Errors
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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class FirewallError extends Error {
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/**
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* @param {string} message
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* @param {object} [opts]
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* @param {string} [opts.code] - machine-readable code
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* @param {boolean} [opts.applied] - did any part of the new ruleset land?
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* @param {string} [opts.stderr] - captured nft stderr, when available
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* @param {*} [opts.cause]
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*/
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constructor(message, { code, applied, stderr, cause, rolledBack } = {}) {
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super(message);
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this.name = this.constructor.name;
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this.code = code || 'firewall_error';
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this.applied = !!applied;
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if (stderr !== undefined) this.stderr = stderr;
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if (cause !== undefined) this.cause = cause;
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if (rolledBack !== undefined) this.rolledBack = !!rolledBack;
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}
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}
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/** `nft -c -f` rejected the ruleset. Nothing was applied; temp deleted. */
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class FirewallCheckError extends FirewallError {
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constructor(message, opts = {}) {
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super(message, { ...opts, code: 'check_failed', applied: false });
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}
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}
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/** `nft -f` failed. Old rules and rollback file are untouched. */
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class FirewallApplyError extends FirewallError {
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constructor(message, opts = {}) {
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super(message, { ...opts, code: 'apply_failed', applied: false });
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}
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}
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/** Post-apply verification failed. Rollback was attempted. */
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class FirewallVerifyError extends FirewallError {
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constructor(message, opts = {}) {
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super(message, { ...opts, code: 'verify_failed', applied: true });
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}
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Pure compiler
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/**
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* Sanitize a resource name into a safe nftables identifier segment.
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* 'plex-2!' → 'plex_2'; leading digits get a 'res_' prefix; empty → 'unnamed'.
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* @param {string} name
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* @returns {string}
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*/
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function sanitizeResourceSegment(name) {
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const raw = String(name)
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.toLowerCase()
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.replace(/[^a-z0-9_]+/g, '_')
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.replace(/^_+|_+$/g, '');
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if (!raw) return 'unnamed';
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return /^[0-9]/.test(raw) ? 'res_' + raw : raw;
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}
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/** Full set name for a resource: net_dc_res_<sanitized>. */
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function resourceSetName(resourceName) {
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return RES_SET_PREFIX + sanitizeResourceSegment(resourceName);
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}
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function _personStatus(person) {
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return person && typeof person.status === 'string' ? person.status : 'active';
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}
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/**
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* Effective access for one person, mirroring the access store semantics
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* (src/security/network-access-store.js effectiveAccess): union of the
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* grants of every group they belong to, then person-level grants OVERRIDE
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* group grants in both directions.
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* @returns {Object<string, boolean>} resource → allowed
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*/
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function computePersonAccess(accessMap, person) {
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const grants = accessMap && Array.isArray(accessMap.grants) ? accessMap.grants : [];
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const groups = new Set(
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Array.isArray(person.groups) ? person.groups.filter((g) => typeof g === 'string') : []
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);
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const resources = {};
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for (const g of grants) {
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if (g && g.principal && g.principal.type === 'group' && groups.has(g.principal.id)) {
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resources[g.resource] = g.allowed;
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}
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}
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for (const g of grants) {
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if (g && g.principal && g.principal.type === 'person' && g.principal.id === person.id) {
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resources[g.resource] = g.allowed;
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}
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}
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return resources;
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}
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/**
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* All assigned peer IPs for a person. `peerAddresses` is the flat map
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* `${personId}/${deviceId}` → 10.53.x.y (canonical), with a nested
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* { [personId]: { [deviceId]: ip } } shape also accepted.
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* @returns {string[]} sorted unique IPs
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*/
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function peerIpsForPerson(peerAddresses, person) {
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const ips = [];
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const prefix = person.id + '/';
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for (const [key, ip] of Object.entries(peerAddresses || {})) {
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if (typeof ip === 'string' && key.startsWith(prefix) && key.length > prefix.length) {
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ips.push(ip);
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}
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}
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const nested = peerAddresses ? peerAddresses[person.id] : null;
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if (nested && typeof nested === 'object') {
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for (const ip of Object.values(nested)) {
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if (typeof ip === 'string') ips.push(ip);
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}
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}
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return [...new Set(ips)].sort();
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}
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function _dportList(ports) {
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const sorted = [...ports].map((p) => parseInt(p, 10)).sort((a, b) => a - b);
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return `{ ${sorted.join(', ')} }`;
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}
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/**
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* Resolve the admin set IPs from ACTIVE admin people. Blocked/removed admins
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* contribute nothing. Throws (lockout guard) when admin ports would be
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* emitted with zero reachable admin peers.
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* @returns {string[]} sorted unique admin peer IPs
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*/
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function _resolveAdminIps(activePersons, adminPeers, peerAddresses) {
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const adminIds = new Set(
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Array.isArray(adminPeers) ? adminPeers.filter((id) => typeof id === 'string') : []
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);
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const ips = new Set();
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for (const p of activePersons) {
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if (!adminIds.has(p.id)) continue;
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for (const ip of peerIpsForPerson(peerAddresses, p)) ips.add(ip);
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}
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if (ips.size === 0) {
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throw new Error(
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'wg-firewall: admin lockout guard — admin ports requested but no active admin peer IPs resolved'
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);
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}
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return [...ips].sort();
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}
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/**
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* Build the per-resource set entries and split resources into hub-local
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* (input chain, ip === hub) vs peer (forward chain) buckets. Validates
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* resource entries and guards against sanitization collisions.
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* @returns {{resourceSets: Array, hubResources: Array, peerResources: Array}}
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*/
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function _buildResourceSets({ resources, activePersons, accessMap, peerAddresses }) {
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const setNames = new Map(); // sanitized segment → resource name (collision guard)
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const resourceSets = [];
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const hubResources = [];
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const peerResources = [];
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for (const [name, resource] of Object.entries(resources)) {
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if (!resource || typeof resource.ip !== 'string' || !resource.ip) {
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throw new Error(`wg-firewall: resource ${name}: ip required`);
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}
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if (!Number.isInteger(resource.port) || resource.port < 1 || resource.port > 65535) {
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throw new Error(`wg-firewall: resource ${name}: valid port required`);
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}
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const segment = sanitizeResourceSegment(name);
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const collides = setNames.get(segment);
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if (collides && collides !== name) {
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throw new Error(
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`wg-firewall: set-name collision — resources "${collides}" and "${name}" both sanitize to ${RES_SET_PREFIX}${segment}`
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);
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}
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setNames.set(segment, name);
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const ips = new Set();
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for (const person of activePersons) {
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if (computePersonAccess(accessMap, person)[name] === true) {
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for (const ip of peerIpsForPerson(peerAddresses, person)) ips.add(ip);
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}
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}
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const setName = RES_SET_PREFIX + segment;
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resourceSets.push({ name, setName, ips: [...ips].sort() });
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const bucket = resource.ip === HUB_IP ? hubResources : peerResources;
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bucket.push({ name, setName, resource });
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}
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return { resourceSets, hubResources, peerResources };
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}
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function _resourceRule(setName, resource, comment) {
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const proto = resource.protocol === 'udp' ? 'udp' : 'tcp';
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return `ip saddr @${setName} ip daddr ${resource.ip} ${proto} dport ${resource.port} accept comment "${comment}"`;
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}
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/**
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* Compile the full nftables ruleset for the WireGuard hub.
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*
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* @param {object} opts
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* @param {object} opts.accessMap - { grants: [...] } (network-access.json)
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* @param {Array<object>} opts.people - person records {id, groups[], status,
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* devices[]} from the people store
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* @param {Object<string,string>} opts.peerAddresses - `${personId}/${deviceId}`
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* → 10.53.x.y (nested {personId:{deviceId:ip}} also accepted)
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* @param {Object<string,{ip:string,port:number,protocol?:'tcp'|'udp'}>} opts.resources
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* @param {string[]} opts.adminPeers - person IDs allowed admin ports
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* @param {number[]} [opts.adminPorts=[22,3001]]
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* @param {number} [opts.wgListenPort=51820] - UDP handshake listen port
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* @param {string|null} [opts.externalInterface=null] - external iface name for
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* the WG handshake rule; null → unscoped rule with a comment
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* @returns {string} complete nftables file text
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* @throws {Error} on admin lockout (adminPorts with zero active admin peer
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* IPs), set-name collisions, or invalid resource entries
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*/
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function compileRuleset({
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accessMap = { grants: [] },
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people = [],
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peerAddresses = {},
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resources = {},
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adminPeers = [],
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adminPorts = DEFAULT_ADMIN_PORTS,
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wgListenPort = DEFAULT_WG_LISTEN_PORT,
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externalInterface = null,
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} = {}) {
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if (!resources || typeof resources !== 'object' || Array.isArray(resources)) {
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throw new Error('wg-firewall: resources map required');
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}
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const persons = Array.isArray(people) ? people : Object.values(people || {});
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const active = persons.filter(
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(p) => p && typeof p.id === 'string' && _personStatus(p) === 'active'
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);
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// ---- admin set (never includes blocked/removed people's IPs) ----------
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const adminIps = _resolveAdminIps(active, adminPeers, peerAddresses);
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const ports = adminPorts.length ? adminPorts : DEFAULT_ADMIN_PORTS;
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// ---- per-resource sets + rule split (hub-local input vs peer forward) -
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const { resourceSets, hubResources, peerResources } = _buildResourceSets({
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resources,
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activePersons: active,
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accessMap,
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peerAddresses,
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});
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// ---- emit -------------------------------------------------------------
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const L = [];
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L.push('#!/usr/sbin/nft -f');
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L.push('# DashCaddy Private Network - WireGuard hub firewall (DC-151 wg-firewall)');
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L.push('# GENERATED FILE - do not edit; recompiled from network-access.json.');
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L.push('# Default-deny: blocked people appear in no set; unmatched dcnet0 traffic is dropped.');
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L.push('');
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L.push('destroy table inet dcnet');
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L.push('');
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L.push(`table ${TABLE} {`);
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L.push('');
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L.push(' # Admin peers allowed to reach hub admin ports');
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L.push(` set ${ADMIN_SET} {`);
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L.push(' type ipv4_addr');
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L.push(` elements = { ${adminIps.join(', ')} }`);
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L.push(' }');
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L.push('');
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for (const { name, setName, ips } of resourceSets) {
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L.push(` # Resource grants: ${name}`);
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L.push(` set ${setName} {`);
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L.push(' type ipv4_addr');
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if (ips.length) {
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L.push(` elements = { ${ips.join(', ')} }`);
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}
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L.push(' }');
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L.push('');
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}
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L.push(' chain input {');
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L.push(' type filter hook input priority 0; policy accept;');
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L.push('');
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L.push(' # WireGuard handshake: arrives on the EXTERNAL interface, never dcnet0');
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if (externalInterface) {
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L.push(
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` iifname "${externalInterface}" udp dport ${wgListenPort} accept comment "wg handshake on external iface"`
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);
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} else {
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L.push(
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` udp dport ${wgListenPort} accept comment "wg handshake - external iface unspecified, left unscoped"`
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);
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}
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L.push('');
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L.push(' # dcnet0 local input');
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L.push(` iifname "${WG_IFACE}" ct state established,related accept comment "dcnet0 established/related"`);
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L.push(
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` iifname "${WG_IFACE}" ip saddr ${PEER_CIDR} icmp type echo-request accept comment "icmp from peers"`
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);
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L.push(
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` iifname "${WG_IFACE}" ip saddr @${ADMIN_SET} tcp dport ${_dportList(ports)} accept comment "admin ports: admin peers only"`
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);
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for (const { name, setName, resource } of hubResources) {
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L.push(
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` iifname "${WG_IFACE}" ${_resourceRule(setName, resource, `resource ${name}`)}`
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);
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}
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L.push(
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` iifname "${WG_IFACE}" ip daddr ${HUB_IP} ct state new drop comment "default-deny: hub input"`
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);
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L.push(' }');
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L.push('');
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L.push(' chain forward {');
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L.push(' type filter hook forward priority 0; policy accept;');
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L.push('');
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L.push(` iifname "${WG_IFACE}" ct state established,related accept comment "dcnet0 established/related"`);
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for (const { name, setName, resource } of peerResources) {
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L.push(` iifname "${WG_IFACE}" ${_resourceRule(setName, resource, `resource ${name}`)}`);
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}
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L.push(` iifname "${WG_IFACE}" drop comment "default-deny: peer egress without grant"`);
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L.push(` oifname "${WG_IFACE}" drop comment "default-deny: peer-to-peer / new hub-to-peer"`);
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L.push(' }');
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L.push('}');
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L.push('');
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return L.join('\n');
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Static admin-isolation guard
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/**
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* Assert that every admin-port rule in the ruleset references ONLY the
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* admin set: an admin port may not be allowed from a resource set, a
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* literal peer IP, or with no source scoping at all.
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*
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* @param {string} rulesetText - compiled nftables file text
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* @param {object} [opts]
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* @param {number[]} [opts.adminPorts=[22,3001]]
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* @returns {true} when isolated
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* @throws {Error} (name 'AdminIsolationError', .violations[]) otherwise
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*/
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function assertAdminIsolation(rulesetText, { adminPorts = DEFAULT_ADMIN_PORTS } = {}) {
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const ports = new Set(adminPorts.map((p) => String(parseInt(p, 10))));
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const violations = [];
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for (const line of String(rulesetText).split('\n')) {
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const m = line.match(/dport\s+(?:\{\s*([^}]*?)\s*\}|(\d+))/);
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if (!m) continue;
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const listed = (m[1] ? m[1].split(/[,\s]+/) : [m[2]]).filter(Boolean);
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if (!listed.some((p) => ports.has(p))) continue;
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const trimmed = line.trim();
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if (!line.includes(`@${ADMIN_SET}`)) {
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violations.push(`admin port allowed without @${ADMIN_SET}: ${trimmed}`);
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}
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if (line.includes(`@${RES_SET_PREFIX}`)) {
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violations.push(`admin port rule references a resource set: ${trimmed}`);
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}
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if (/ip saddr 10\.53\.\d/.test(line)) {
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violations.push(`admin port rule uses a literal peer saddr: ${trimmed}`);
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}
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}
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if (violations.length) {
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const err = new Error('admin isolation violation:\n ' + violations.join('\n '));
|
||||
err.name = 'AdminIsolationError';
|
||||
err.violations = violations;
|
||||
throw err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
// Transactional applier
|
||||
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
let _tempSeq = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/** mkstemp-style unique temp path — never a fixed path. */
|
||||
function _uniqueTempPath(dir) {
|
||||
_tempSeq += 1;
|
||||
const rand = Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10);
|
||||
return path.join(dir, `dcnet-nft-${process.pid}-${_tempSeq}-${rand}.nft`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function _errStderr(err) {
|
||||
if (!err) return '';
|
||||
if (typeof err.stderr === 'string') return err.stderr;
|
||||
return err.message || String(err);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function _bestEffortUnlink(fs, p) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
fs.unlinkSync(p);
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
/* already gone — fine */
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Build the transactional nftables applier.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param {object} [deps] - all injectable (hermetic tests mock these)
|
||||
* @param {Function} [deps.execFileImpl] - promisified execFile(cmd, args)
|
||||
* @param {object} [deps.fsImpl] - { writeFileSync, readFileSync, existsSync,
|
||||
* unlinkSync }
|
||||
* @param {string} [deps.nftBinary='nft']
|
||||
* @param {string} [deps.tempDir] - directory for unique temp ruleset files
|
||||
* @param {string} [deps.rollbackPath] - where the previous ruleset is kept
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function createWgFirewallApplier({
|
||||
execFileImpl,
|
||||
fsImpl,
|
||||
nftBinary = 'nft',
|
||||
tempDir,
|
||||
rollbackPath,
|
||||
} = {}) {
|
||||
const execFn = execFileImpl || execFileDefault;
|
||||
const fs = fsImpl || fsDefault;
|
||||
const tmpDir = tempDir || path.join(os.tmpdir());
|
||||
const rollbackFile =
|
||||
rollbackPath || path.join(tmpDir, 'dashcaddy-dcnet-rollback.nft');
|
||||
|
||||
async function nft(args) { // eslint-disable-line require-await -- passthrough to injected execFile promise
|
||||
return execFn(nftBinary, args);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Capture the currently-applied dcnet table, or null when absent.
|
||||
* @returns {Promise<string|null>}
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function captureCurrent() {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const res = await nft(['list', 'table', 'inet', 'dcnet']);
|
||||
return res && typeof res.stdout === 'string' ? res.stdout : null;
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
return null; // table does not exist yet — first apply
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
rollbackFile,
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Transactional apply:
|
||||
* 1. write ruleset to a UNIQUE temp file
|
||||
* 2. `nft -c -f` — on failure delete temp, throw FirewallCheckError,
|
||||
* nothing applied
|
||||
* 3. write the rollback file (previous ruleset) BEFORE applying
|
||||
* 4. `nft -f` — on failure delete temp, throw FirewallApplyError
|
||||
* {applied:false}; old rules + rollback file untouched
|
||||
* 5. verify via `nft list table inet dcnet`; mismatch → attempt
|
||||
* rollback, throw FirewallVerifyError {applied:true, rolledBack}
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param {string} rulesetText
|
||||
* @returns {Promise<{applied:true, verified:true, tempPath:string,
|
||||
* rollbackFile:string, previousExisted:boolean}>}
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async apply(rulesetText) {
|
||||
if (typeof rulesetText !== 'string' || rulesetText.length === 0) {
|
||||
throw new Error('wg-firewall: apply() requires non-empty ruleset text');
|
||||
}
|
||||
const tempPath = _uniqueTempPath(tmpDir);
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(tempPath, rulesetText);
|
||||
|
||||
// 1. check — reject before touching anything live.
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await nft(['-c', '-f', tempPath]);
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
_bestEffortUnlink(fs, tempPath);
|
||||
throw new FirewallCheckError(
|
||||
`nft -c rejected ruleset (${_errStderr(err).trim()})`,
|
||||
{ stderr: _errStderr(err) }
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. snapshot previous + write rollback BEFORE applying. Keep the
|
||||
// prior rollback file content so a FAILED apply leaves it (the
|
||||
// last-known-good rollback) untouched.
|
||||
const previous = await captureCurrent();
|
||||
let priorRollback;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
priorRollback = fs.readFileSync(rollbackFile);
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
priorRollback = undefined; // no prior rollback file
|
||||
}
|
||||
const rollbackContent = previous !== null ? previous : 'destroy table inet dcnet\n';
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(rollbackFile, rollbackContent);
|
||||
|
||||
// 3. apply.
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await nft(['-f', tempPath]);
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
_bestEffortUnlink(fs, tempPath);
|
||||
if (priorRollback !== undefined) {
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(rollbackFile, priorRollback);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
_bestEffortUnlink(fs, rollbackFile);
|
||||
}
|
||||
throw new FirewallApplyError(`nft -f apply failed (${_errStderr(err).trim()})`, {
|
||||
stderr: _errStderr(err),
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 4. verify.
|
||||
let verified = false;
|
||||
let verifyStderr = '';
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const res = await nft(['list', 'table', 'inet', 'dcnet']);
|
||||
const out = res && typeof res.stdout === 'string' ? res.stdout : '';
|
||||
verified = out.includes(TABLE);
|
||||
if (!verified) verifyStderr = 'nft list table inet dcnet output missing table';
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
verifyStderr = _errStderr(err);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!verified) {
|
||||
let rolledBack = false;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await nft(['-f', rollbackFile]);
|
||||
rolledBack = true;
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
rolledBack = false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
_bestEffortUnlink(fs, tempPath);
|
||||
throw new FirewallVerifyError(
|
||||
`post-apply verify failed (${verifyStderr.trim()}); rollback ${
|
||||
rolledBack ? 'succeeded' : 'FAILED — inspect host firewall manually'
|
||||
}`,
|
||||
{ stderr: verifyStderr, rolledBack }
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_bestEffortUnlink(fs, tempPath);
|
||||
return {
|
||||
applied: true,
|
||||
verified: true,
|
||||
tempPath,
|
||||
rollbackFile,
|
||||
previousExisted: previous !== null,
|
||||
};
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Re-apply the rollback file (the pre-apply ruleset).
|
||||
* @returns {Promise<{applied:true, rollbackFile:string}>}
|
||||
* @throws {Error} when no rollback file exists or re-apply fails
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async rollback() {
|
||||
if (!fs.existsSync(rollbackFile)) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`wg-firewall: no rollback file at ${rollbackFile}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await nft(['-f', rollbackFile]);
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
throw new FirewallApplyError(
|
||||
`rollback re-apply failed (${_errStderr(err).trim()})`,
|
||||
{ stderr: _errStderr(err) }
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { applied: true, rollbackFile };
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
module.exports = {
|
||||
compileRuleset,
|
||||
createWgFirewallApplier,
|
||||
assertAdminIsolation,
|
||||
sanitizeResourceSegment,
|
||||
resourceSetName,
|
||||
FirewallError,
|
||||
FirewallCheckError,
|
||||
FirewallApplyError,
|
||||
FirewallVerifyError,
|
||||
ADMIN_SET,
|
||||
HUB_IP,
|
||||
PEER_CIDR,
|
||||
};
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user