[grade=B] fix(auth): use host-only session cookies on custom TLDs
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Codex: urn:ump:7c22nwh67kot23f6czg5ax7e47hu2r7vowjpz3q6z63o73ti67vq
This commit is contained in:
Krystie
2026-07-24 05:15:08 -07:00
parent 872923dba2
commit 75f835641f
2 changed files with 77 additions and 21 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
'use strict';
const configureMiddleware = require('../src/utilities/middleware');
function buildSession() {
const app = {
param: jest.fn(),
set: jest.fn(),
use: jest.fn(),
};
return configureMiddleware(app, {
siteConfig: { dashboardHost: 'status.sami', tld: '.sami' },
totpConfig: { enabled: true, sessionDuration: '24h' },
tailscaleConfig: { enabled: false, requireAuth: false },
metrics: { recordRequest: jest.fn() },
auditLogger: { middleware: () => (_req, _res, next) => next() },
authManager: { verifyJWT: jest.fn(), verifyAPIKey: jest.fn() },
log: { debug: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn() },
cryptoUtils: { loadOrCreateKey: () => Buffer.alloc(32, 7) },
isValidContainerId: () => true,
isTailscaleIP: () => false,
getTailscaleStatus: async () => null,
});
}
function captureCookie(setCookie) {
const headers = {};
setCookie({ setHeader: (name, value) => { headers[name.toLowerCase()] = value; } }, '24h');
return headers['set-cookie'];
}
describe('TOTP session cookie scope', () => {
test('primary login cookie is host-only for custom TLD deployments', () => {
const session = buildSession();
const cookie = captureCookie(session.setSessionCookie);
expect(cookie).toContain('dashcaddy_session=');
expect(cookie).toContain('HttpOnly');
expect(cookie).toContain('Secure');
expect(cookie).toContain('SameSite=Lax');
expect(cookie).not.toMatch(/(?:^|;)\s*Domain=/i);
});
test('SSO exchange uses the same host-only cookie contract', () => {
const session = buildSession();
const cookie = captureCookie(session.setHostOnlySessionCookie);
expect(cookie).toContain('dashcaddy_session=');
expect(cookie).not.toMatch(/(?:^|;)\s*Domain=/i);
});
test('logout clears the host-only secure cookie', () => {
const session = buildSession();
const headers = {};
session.clearSessionCookie({
setHeader: (name, value) => { headers[name.toLowerCase()] = value; },
});
expect(headers['set-cookie']).toContain('Max-Age=0');
expect(headers['set-cookie']).toContain('Secure');
expect(headers['set-cookie']).not.toMatch(/(?:^|;)\s*Domain=/i);
});
});
+13 -21
View File
@@ -227,6 +227,10 @@ module.exports = function configureMiddleware(app, {
ipSessions.delete(getClientIP(req)); ipSessions.delete(getClientIP(req));
} }
// Session cookies are intentionally host-only. Browsers reject Domain=.sami
// because .sami is an unregistered custom TLD and therefore treated as a
// public suffix. Cross-subdomain login is handled by the one-time SSO
// handoff below, which mints a separate host-only cookie on each service.
function setSessionCookie(res, durationKey) { function setSessionCookie(res, durationKey) {
const durationMs = SESSION_DURATIONS[durationKey]; const durationMs = SESSION_DURATIONS[durationKey];
if (!durationMs) return; if (!durationMs) return;
@@ -235,9 +239,8 @@ module.exports = function configureMiddleware(app, {
const payloadB64 = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload)).toString('base64url'); const payloadB64 = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload)).toString('base64url');
const key = cryptoUtils.loadOrCreateKey(); const key = cryptoUtils.loadOrCreateKey();
const sig = crypto.createHmac('sha256', key).update(payloadB64).digest('base64url'); const sig = crypto.createHmac('sha256', key).update(payloadB64).digest('base64url');
const domainAttr = siteConfig.tld ? `; Domain=${siteConfig.tld}` : '';
res.setHeader('Set-Cookie', res.setHeader('Set-Cookie',
`${SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=${payloadB64}.${sig}${domainAttr}; Max-Age=${maxAge}; Path=/; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax` `${SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=${payloadB64}.${sig}; Max-Age=${maxAge}; Path=/; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax`
); );
} }
@@ -268,9 +271,8 @@ module.exports = function configureMiddleware(app, {
} }
function clearSessionCookie(res) { function clearSessionCookie(res) {
const domainAttr = siteConfig.tld ? `; Domain=${siteConfig.tld}` : '';
res.setHeader('Set-Cookie', res.setHeader('Set-Cookie',
`${SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=; Max-Age=0${domainAttr}; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax` `${SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=; Max-Age=0; Path=/; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax`
); );
} }
@@ -278,11 +280,12 @@ module.exports = function configureMiddleware(app, {
// + the write-back in this function) caused cross-subdomain SSO breakage when // + the write-back in this function) caused cross-subdomain SSO breakage when
// Caddy on --network host forwards auth to the container: req.ip arrives as // Caddy on --network host forwards auth to the container: req.ip arrives as
// 100.121.150.22 (DNS2's tailnet IP) instead of the user's real IP, so the // 100.121.150.22 (DNS2's tailnet IP) instead of the user's real IP, so the
// IP cache misses even when the cookie is valid. The cookie is signed with a // IP cache misses even when the cookie is valid. The host-only cookie is
// persisted HMAC key (loadOrCreateKey()), scoped to .sami via Domain attr, // signed with a persisted HMAC key (loadOrCreateKey()). Cross-subdomain
// HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=Lax — it's a stronger credential than the IP // authentication uses the one-time SSO handoff because browsers reject
// cache. Ref: skill auth-and-monitoring-pitfalls.md "TOTP session validation // Domain=.sami. HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=Lax makes it a stronger
// IP-key issue" (FIXED 2026-07-21). // credential than the IP cache. Ref: skill auth-and-monitoring-pitfalls.md
// "TOTP session validation IP-key issue" (FIXED 2026-07-21).
function isSessionValid(req) { function isSessionValid(req) {
const cookies = parseCookies(req.headers.cookie); const cookies = parseCookies(req.headers.cookie);
if (verifySessionCookie(cookies[SESSION_COOKIE_NAME])) { if (verifySessionCookie(cookies[SESSION_COOKIE_NAME])) {
@@ -333,18 +336,7 @@ module.exports = function configureMiddleware(app, {
} }
function setHostOnlySessionCookie(res, durationKey) { function setHostOnlySessionCookie(res, durationKey) {
const durationMs = SESSION_DURATIONS[durationKey]; setSessionCookie(res, durationKey);
if (!durationMs) return;
const maxAge = Math.floor(durationMs / 1000);
const payload = { v: true, exp: Date.now() + durationMs };
const payloadB64 = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(payload)).toString('base64url');
const key = cryptoUtils.loadOrCreateKey();
const sig = crypto.createHmac('sha256', key).update(payloadB64).digest('base64url');
// No Domain attribute — host-only, so it's always accepted regardless of
// the .sami public-suffix issue described above.
res.setHeader('Set-Cookie',
`${SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=${payloadB64}.${sig}; Max-Age=${maxAge}; Path=/; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax`
);
} }
// ── Public routes (bypass TOTP and JWT auth) ── // ── Public routes (bypass TOTP and JWT auth) ──