DC-012: Add Kubernetes-style /healthz + /readyz probe aliases
Fresh users copy-pasting healthcheck blocks from k8s/Docker docs need
the standard short aliases. Without /healthz and /readyz they get
connection refused. This commit:
1. Adds /healthz + /readyz as root-level aliases for /health/live +
/health/ready in src/app.js. Handler bodies DRYed into named
functions (livenessHandler, readinessHandler) so a probe semantics
change updates all five paths at once.
2. Removes the dead /api/v1/health*, /api/v1/health/live, /api/v1/health/ready
registrations from PUBLIC_ROUTES and CSRF exclusion list — those
routes were never actually mounted on the apiRouter (only root
paths existed). Anyone probing /api/v1/health now gets a clean 404
instead of being routed through to a duplicate root handler.
3. Adds bypass for the 5 probe paths in three places where it matters:
- PUBLIC_ROUTES (no auth)
- csrf-protection.js excludedPaths (no CSRF check)
- middleware.js request-logging exclusion (k8s polling every 10s
doesn't flood the audit log)
- middleware.js Tailscale auth bypass (probes don't carry Tailscale
identity headers)
4. Adds __tests__/health-probe-aliases.test.js (19 tests):
- Alias equivalence (/healthz == /health/live, /readyz == /health/ready)
- Back-compat (/health == /health/live)
- Path consolidation (all 3 /api/v1/health* return 404)
- Source-of-truth PUBLIC_ROUTES allowlist sync check
- Source-of-truth src/app.js mount list sync check (catches drift
between handler mount and middleware allowlist)
5. Documents probes in README (copy-paste docker-compose.yml +
Kubernetes blocks) and user-guide (Health Probes section + System
API table updated).
Post-fix: 941/941 tests pass (+19 new). Zero new ESLint warnings
introduced. The pre-existing warnings/errors in src/app.js line 906
('os' is not defined) and the empty blocks in logging.test.js are
not regressions from this commit.
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@@ -136,12 +136,19 @@ function csrfValidationMiddleware(req, res, next) {
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}
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// Excluded paths that don't require CSRF validation
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// Note: probe endpoints (/health, /health/live, /health/ready, /healthz,
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// /readyz) are GET-only so they're already excluded by the safe-methods
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// check above. Listed here for explicit safety in case any of them ever
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// accept a POST in the future.
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const excludedPaths = [
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'/api/v1/totp/verify',
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'/api/v1/totp/verify-setup',
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'/api/v1/totp/setup',
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'/health',
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'/api/v1/health',
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'/health/live',
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'/health/ready',
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'/healthz',
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'/readyz',
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// Machine-to-machine: publishing host POSTs here with its own shared-secret
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// header (X-DashCaddy-Notify-Secret) — browsers never reach this endpoint.
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'/api/v1/system/update-notify'
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