P7 spec rev4: pin provider-contract unblock wording, PKCS8-prefix X25519 private-key extraction, DC-143 authorization-vs-key-expiry distinction

BACKLOG.md

@@ -473,9 +473,11 @@ Tickets DC-046 through DC-049 implement pluggable auth + email magic link. Sami
 - **status:** todo
 - **details:** POST `/network/people/:id/block|unblock|remove`,
   `/network/devices/:id/revoke`. Orchestrates: provider calls, session kill
-  (existing auth store), access-map purge/restore, audit log entries. Block must
+  (existing auth store), access-map purge/restore, audit log entries. Block
-  be fully reversible (snapshots pre-block grants). Remove deletes devices +
+  snapshots pre-block grants; unblock restores the AUTHORIZATION state (grants,
-  person record. Tests: orchestration order (mocked provider), honest unblock
+  status, sessions) — Tailscale device keys, once expired, are irreversible and
+  require re-authentication (reauthRequired=true + user note); WireGuard peers
+  restore immediately. Remove deletes devices + person record. Tests: orchestration order (mocked provider), honest unblock
   semantics (Tailscale: reauthRequired true + note; WireGuard: immediate
   restore), last-admin guard integration, audit entries written.
 

specs/PRIVATE-NETWORK-SPEC.md

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Contract (all async, all return plain JSON, all validated):
 | `createInvite({role, email?})` | POST user-invites (email optional → returns inviteUrl) | mint one-time invite token in store |
 | `revokeInvite(id)` | DELETE user-invite | delete token |
 | `blockPerson(userId)` | expire all device keys + ACL deny | drop peer + firewall deny set |
-| `unblockPerson(userId)` | re-enable + ACL restore | re-add peer |
+| `unblockPerson(userId)` | re-allow at ACL level; expired device keys stay expired (re-auth required, §5) | re-add stored peer (immediate) |
 | `removePerson(userId)` | DELETE devices, revoke invites | remove peer + person record |
 | `revokeDevice(deviceId)` | expire/delete device key | remove single peer |
 | `syncAccess(map, resources)` | compile ACLs → dry-run → push (hash-guarded) | compile nftables → apply → verify |
@@ -178,13 +178,17 @@ Builds on the existing DashCA pipeline (routes/ca.js, DC-076). Changes:
 
 ### 8.2 Key lifecycle (no server-side private-key storage)
 
-- **Client keypairs are generated in the invitee's browser** at redemption time
+- **Client keypairs are generated in the invitee's browser** using WebCrypto
-  using WebCrypto **X25519** — WireGuard requires Curve25519 key material; there
+  **X25519** — WireGuard requires Curve25519 key material; there is NO fallback
-  is NO fallback algorithm (a browser lacking X25519 support gets an explicit
+  algorithm (a browser lacking X25519 support gets an explicit "browser not
-  "browser not supported" error, not a degraded key). Raw key serialization:
+  supported" error, not a degraded key). Serialization (browser-export
-  the browser exports the 32-byte raw key, base64-encoded (standard WireGuard
+  reality): `exportKey('raw', publicKey)` yields the raw 32-byte public key →
-  private-key format, `wg genkey`-compatible). The server receives the base64
+  base64. `exportKey('pkcs8', privateKey)` yields a PKCS#8 wrapper — the page
-  public key (44 chars ending '=') and validates length/charset before use.
+  strips the fixed 16-byte PKCS#8 X25519 prefix (`302e020100300506032b656e0422
+  0420`) to extract the raw 32-byte private key → base64 (`wg genkey`-format;
+  the extraction is pure byte-slicing of a fixed-prefix wrapper, verified by
+  length/constant-prefix assertions before use). The server receives the base64
+  public key (44 chars) and validates length/charset before use.
 - The redemption page posts ONLY the public key to the server; the server
   registers it as a WireGuard peer (10.53.x.y/32) and returns the client
   config (Address, DNS, PublicKey of hub, AllowedIPs = 10.53.0.0/16).