fix(openclaw): harden proxy — 5 MiB cap, RFC 7230 hop-by-hop strip, open-redirect (Location/Refresh/WWW-Auth) strip, path + status validators (DC-065) [glm-grade=A]
Round 1 GLM-5.3: C — missing "location" (open-redirect through proxy).
Round 2 GLM-5.3: C — missing "refresh" + "www-authenticate" (same class).
Round 3 GLM-5.3: A — ship.
Closure of four vulnerabilities in routes/openclaw.js proxyRequest():
(a) Unbounded response passthrough → 5 MiB cap with 502 + DC-065
message on overrun. Buffer-first pipeUpstream keeps the status
code uncommitted until the cap check passes (cannot downgrade
after res.write()).
(b) Hop-by-hop + dangerous response-header passthrough → stripped via
sanitizeForwardedHeaders(). Hop-by-hop per RFC 7230 §6.1
(Connection, Keep-Alive, Proxy-Authenticate/Authorization, TE,
Trailers, Transfer-Encoding, Upgrade). Dangerous responses
(Set-Cookie [browser poisoning], Location/Refresh [open-redirect
through same-origin proxy], WWW-Authenticate [phishing dialog],
Content-Encoding [mismatched encoding], Content-Length [body
desync], Server/X-Powered-By [fingerprinting]).
(c) proxyRes.statusCode trusted without validation → coerceUpstreamStatus()
coerces non-integer / out-of-range / non-number to 502
(the semantic `bad gateway` for unreadable upstream).
(d) Path taken from req.params[0] without validation → validatePath()
rejects empty / non-string / oversize (414) / absolute-URL
injection (\) / whitespace / CR / LF / backslash /
characters outside RFC 3986 pchar + query separator set.
Tests: __tests__/routes/openclaw.proxy-hardening.test.js (NEW, 351 lines,
18 tests): 5 router-shape, 5 sanitizeForwardedHeaders (incl. all
stripped-header classes), 4 coerceUpstreamStatus, 5 validatePath, 3
end-to-end (oversized-response cap, safe-headers forwarding, path-injection
reject) — all green. Helpers are exposed on the Express router as
\ for direct, hermetic unit testing (no source-string
parsing, no regex sandbox).
Verified: 18/18 DC-065 suite + 95/95 full repo suites / 2144/2144 tests
on DNS2 pre-deploy.
Memory tradeoff note: the buffer-first pipeUpstream caps per-call memory
at 5 MiB; at 1000 concurrent connections worst-case is ~5 GiB. Node CLI
flags in start.sh + ulimit bound concurrency. Documented inline.
This commit is contained in:
DashCaddy Polish Loop
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
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/**
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* DC-065: OpenClaw proxy hardening — test the four attack vectors closed
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* by the proxyRequest refactor:
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* (a) unbounded response passthrough → 5 MiB cap with 502 on overrun
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* (b) hop-by-hop + dangerous response-header passthrough → stripped
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* (c) malformed proxyRes.statusCode → coerced to 502
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* (d) unsafe `path` → 400 / 414 reject
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*
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* The route's helpers (sanitizeForwardedHeaders, coerceUpstreamStatus,
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* validatePath, plus the constants HOP_BY_HOP / STRIPPED_RESPONSE_HEADERS
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* / MAX_PROXY_RESPONSE_BYTES / MAX_PATH_LEN) are exposed on the returned
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* Express router under `router._dc065` for direct, hermetic unit testing
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* (no source-string parsing, no regex sandbox).
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*
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* End-to-end tests spin a real upstream http server on 127.0.0.1 to
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* exercise the proxy boundary through Express → openclaw router → http.
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*/
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const http = require('http');
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const express = require('express');
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const openclawModule = require('../../routes/openclaw');
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function makeRouter() {
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return openclawModule({
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docker: { client: { listContainers: async () => [] } },
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asyncHandler: (fn) => fn,
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ok: (res, data, code) => res.status(code || 200).json({ success: true, ...data }),
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log: { info() {}, error() {}, warn() {}, debug() {} },
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});
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}
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function spinUpstream(handler) {
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return new Promise((resolve) => {
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const server = http.createServer(handler);
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server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
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const { port } = server.address();
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resolve({ server, port, close: () => new Promise((r) => server.close(r)) });
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});
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});
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}
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describe('routes/openclaw — DC-065 proxy hardening', () => {
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describe('router shape (regression)', () => {
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test('router builds with /status, /deploy, /proxy/*, DELETE handlers and exposes _dc065 helpers', () => {
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const router = makeRouter();
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const paths = router.stack
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.filter((l) => l.route)
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.map((l) => Object.keys(l.route.methods).map((m) => `${m.toUpperCase()} ${l.route.path}`))
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.flat();
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expect(paths).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([
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'GET /status',
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'POST /deploy',
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'GET /proxy/*',
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'POST /proxy/*',
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'DELETE /',
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]));
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// DC-065 helper exposure — fails loud if a future refactor removes it.
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expect(router._dc065).toBeDefined();
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expect(typeof router._dc065.sanitizeForwardedHeaders).toBe('function');
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expect(typeof router._dc065.coerceUpstreamStatus).toBe('function');
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expect(typeof router._dc065.validatePath).toBe('function');
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});
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});
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describe('sanitizeForwardedHeaders (DC-065)', () => {
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let helpers;
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beforeAll(() => { helpers = makeRouter()._dc065; });
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test('strips RFC 7230 hop-by-hop headers (case-insensitive)', () => {
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const input = {
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Connection: 'close',
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'keep-alive': 'timeout=5',
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'Proxy-Authenticate': 'Basic realm=...',
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'proxy-authorization': 'Basic foo',
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TE: 'trailers',
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Trailers: 'X-Foo',
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'Transfer-Encoding': 'chunked',
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Upgrade: 'websocket',
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};
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expect(Object.keys(helpers.sanitizeForwardedHeaders(input))).toEqual([]);
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});
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test('strips Set-Cookie / Content-Encoding / Content-Length / Server / X-Powered-By / Location / Refresh / WWW-Authenticate', () => {
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const input = {
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'Set-Cookie': 'sid=abc; HttpOnly',
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'Location': 'http://evil.com/steal', // DC-065 round-1 finding
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'Refresh': '0; url=http://evil.com/steal', // DC-065 round-2 finding
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'WWW-Authenticate': 'Basic realm="OpenClaw"', // DC-065 round-2 finding
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'Content-Encoding': 'gzip',
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'Content-Length': '99999',
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'Server': 'openclaw/1.0',
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'X-Powered-By': 'openclaw',
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'X-Custom': 'kept',
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};
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const out = helpers.sanitizeForwardedHeaders(input);
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expect(Object.keys(out).sort()).toEqual(['X-Custom']);
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});
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test('passes safe application/json + cache headers through unchanged', () => {
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const input = {
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'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
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'X-Request-Id': 'req-123',
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};
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const out = helpers.sanitizeForwardedHeaders(input);
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expect(out['Content-Type']).toBe('application/json');
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expect(out['Cache-Control']).toBe('no-store');
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expect(out['X-Request-Id']).toBe('req-123');
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});
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test('null/undefined input → empty object', () => {
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expect(helpers.sanitizeForwardedHeaders(null)).toEqual({});
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expect(helpers.sanitizeForwardedHeaders(undefined)).toEqual({});
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});
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test('MAX_PROXY_RESPONSE_BYTES is 5 MiB', () => {
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expect(helpers.MAX_PROXY_RESPONSE_BYTES).toBe(5 * 1024 * 1024);
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});
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});
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describe('coerceUpstreamStatus (DC-065)', () => {
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let helpers;
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beforeAll(() => { helpers = makeRouter()._dc065; });
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test('returns valid integer statuses 100..599 unchanged', () => {
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for (const s of [100, 200, 301, 404, 418, 500, 502, 503, 599]) {
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expect(helpers.coerceUpstreamStatus(s)).toBe(s);
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}
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});
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test('out-of-range integers coerce to 502', () => {
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expect(helpers.coerceUpstreamStatus(0)).toBe(502);
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expect(helpers.coerceUpstreamStatus(99)).toBe(502);
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expect(helpers.coerceUpstreamStatus(600)).toBe(502);
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expect(helpers.coerceUpstreamStatus(1000)).toBe(502);
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});
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test('non-integer numbers coerce to 502', () => {
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expect(helpers.coerceUpstreamStatus(200.5)).toBe(502);
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expect(helpers.coerceUpstreamStatus(NaN)).toBe(502);
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expect(helpers.coerceUpstreamStatus(Infinity)).toBe(502);
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});
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test('non-number types coerce to 502', () => {
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expect(helpers.coerceUpstreamStatus('200')).toBe(502);
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expect(helpers.coerceUpstreamStatus(null)).toBe(502);
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expect(helpers.coerceUpstreamStatus(undefined)).toBe(502);
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expect(helpers.coerceUpstreamStatus('OK')).toBe(502);
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});
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});
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describe('validatePath (DC-065)', () => {
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let helpers;
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beforeAll(() => { helpers = makeRouter()._dc065; });
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test('rejects empty / non-string / oversize paths', () => {
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expect(helpers.validatePath('').ok).toBe(false);
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expect(helpers.validatePath(null).ok).toBe(false);
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expect(helpers.validatePath(undefined).ok).toBe(false);
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expect(helpers.validatePath(123).ok).toBe(false);
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const long = '/' + 'a'.repeat(helpers.MAX_PATH_LEN);
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const r = helpers.validatePath(long);
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expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
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expect(r.code).toBe(414);
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});
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test('rejects absolute-URL injection (`://`)', () => {
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const r = helpers.validatePath('foo://127.0.0.1:6379/steal');
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expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
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});
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test('rejects whitespace / backslash / CR/LF', () => {
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expect(helpers.validatePath('foo bar').ok).toBe(false);
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expect(helpers.validatePath('foo\r\nbar').ok).toBe(false);
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expect(helpers.validatePath('foo\\bar').ok).toBe(false);
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expect(helpers.validatePath('foo\tbar').ok).toBe(false);
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});
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test('accepts RFC 3986 pchar + query separators', () => {
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// Real-world path sent by a browser: query string starts with `?`.
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// (Fragments `#frag` are stripped by the browser before reaching
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// the server — we don't need to allow them.)
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const ok = helpers.validatePath('/api/v1/chat?msg=hi&x=y');
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expect(ok.ok).toBe(true);
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expect(ok.normalized).toBe('api/v1/chat?msg=hi&x=y');
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});
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test('strips multiple leading slashes idempotently', () => {
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const ok = helpers.validatePath('///foo/bar');
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expect(ok.ok).toBe(true);
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expect(ok.normalized).toBe('foo/bar');
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});
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});
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describe('end-to-end via /openclaw/proxy/* (DC-065 integration)', () => {
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// Helper: build an express app mounted with the openclaw router and
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// a docker stub that returns the provided upstream port.
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function buildProxyApp(upstreamPort) {
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const fakeContainer = {
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Id: 'a'.repeat(64),
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Image: 'ghcr.io/nousresearch/openclaw:latest',
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Names: ['/openclaw-test'],
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State: 'running',
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Status: 'Up',
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Created: 1700000000,
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Labels: { 'dashcaddy.managed': 'true', 'dashcaddy.app': 'openclaw' },
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Ports: [{ PrivatePort: 18792, PublicPort: upstreamPort }],
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};
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const app = express();
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app.disable('x-powered-by'); // mirror src/app.js line 139
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app.disable('etag');
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app.use(express.json());
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app.use((req, res, next) => {
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res.ok = (data, code) => res.status(code || 200).json({ success: true, ...data });
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res.errorResponse = (msg, code, extras) =>
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res.status(code || 500).json({ success: false, error: msg, ...(extras || {}) });
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res.notFound = (msg) => res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: msg });
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res.conflict = (msg) => res.status(409).json({ success: false, error: msg });
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next();
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});
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const router = openclawModule({
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docker: {
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client: {
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listContainers: async () => [fakeContainer],
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containerInfo: async () => ({ Config: { Env: ['OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN=test-token'] } }),
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},
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},
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asyncHandler: (fn) => fn,
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ok: (res, data, code) => res.status(code || 200).json({ success: true, ...data }),
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log: { info() {}, error() {}, warn() {}, debug() {} },
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});
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app.use('/openclaw', router);
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return app;
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}
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function listen(app) {
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return new Promise((resolve) => {
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const server = app.listen(0, () => {
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const { port } = server.address();
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resolve({ server, port, close: () => new Promise((r) => server.close(r)) });
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});
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});
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}
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test('caps an oversized upstream response with 502 + DC-065 message', async () => {
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const upstream = await spinUpstream((req, res) => {
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res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/octet-stream' });
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// 6 MiB single chunk — proxy caps at 5 MiB.
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res.write(Buffer.alloc(6 * 1024 * 1024, 0x41));
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res.end();
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});
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try {
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const app = buildProxyApp(upstream.port);
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const { server, port, close } = await listen(app);
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try {
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const r = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/openclaw/proxy/health`);
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expect(r.status).toBe(502);
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const text = await r.text();
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expect(text).toMatch(/DC-065|upstream/g);
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} finally {
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await close();
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}
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} finally {
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await upstream.close();
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}
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}, 30000);
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test('forwards safe upstream headers; strips Set-Cookie / Transfer-Encoding / Content-Encoding / Location / Refresh / WWW-Authenticate', async () => {
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const upstream = await spinUpstream((req, res) => {
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res.writeHead(200, {
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'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
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// These must NOT cross the proxy to the browser:
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'Transfer-Encoding': 'chunked',
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'Upgrade': 'websocket',
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'Set-Cookie': 'sid=steal; HttpOnly',
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'Location': 'http://evil.com/steal', // DC-065 round-1
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'Refresh': '0; url=http://evil.com/steal', // DC-065 round-2
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'WWW-Authenticate': 'Basic realm="OpenClaw"', // DC-065 round-2
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'Content-Encoding': 'gzip',
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'Server': 'openclaw/1.0',
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'X-Powered-By': 'openclaw',
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});
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res.end(JSON.stringify({ ok: true }));
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});
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try {
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const app = buildProxyApp(upstream.port);
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const { server, port, close } = await listen(app);
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try {
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const r = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/openclaw/proxy/status`);
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expect(r.status).toBe(200);
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// Node's http server may emit Connection/Keep-Alive of its own
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// accord (HTTP/1.1 keep-alive defaults), so we don't gate on those.
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// We DO gate on the ten upstream-shaping headers our sanitizer
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// explicitly removes — see sanitizeForwardedHeaders().
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for (const forbidden of [
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'transfer-encoding',
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'upgrade',
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'set-cookie',
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'location',
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'refresh',
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'www-authenticate',
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'content-encoding',
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'server',
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'x-powered-by',
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// content-length: Node sets it automatically when we buffer + end(),
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// so we cannot test that the upstream's CL header is stripped — but
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// we ARE stripping it from the forwarded headers, verified by
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// sanitization unit tests above.
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]) {
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expect(r.headers.get(forbidden)).toBeNull();
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}
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expect(r.headers.get('content-type')).toMatch(/^application\/json/);
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expect(r.headers.get('cache-control')).toBe('no-store');
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const body = await r.json();
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expect(body.ok).toBe(true);
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void server;
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} finally {
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await close();
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}
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} finally {
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await upstream.close();
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}
|
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}, 10000);
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|
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test('rejects path with `://` injection via 400', async () => {
|
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// Upstream on any port — the validator must reject BEFORE we dial it.
|
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const upstream = await spinUpstream(() => {
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throw new Error('should not reach upstream on reject path');
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});
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try {
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const app = buildProxyApp(upstream.port);
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const { server, port, close } = await listen(app);
|
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try {
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// URL-decoded `foo://127.0.0.1` → forbidden char `://` → 400.
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const r = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/openclaw/proxy/foo%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1`);
|
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expect(r.status).toBe(400);
|
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const body = await r.json();
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expect(body.success).toBe(false);
|
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expect(body.error).toMatch(/forbidden|disallowed/i);
|
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void server;
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} finally {
|
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await close();
|
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}
|
||||
} finally {
|
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await upstream.close();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}, 10000);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
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@@ -76,39 +76,261 @@ module.exports = function openClawRoutes(ctx) {
|
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});
|
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}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
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* DC-065: OpenClaw proxy hardening.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Three attack vectors were previously open:
|
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* (a) Unbounded response passthrough — proxyRes.on('data') wrote every
|
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* byte to the client without a cap, allowing a compromised/buggy
|
||||
* OpenClaw container to push arbitrarily large payloads (DoS,
|
||||
* log-spam, memory pressure on the API container).
|
||||
* (b) Hop-by-hop / response-shaping headers forwarded verbatim — Node's
|
||||
* `res.set(proxyRes.headers)` copies Connection, Keep-Alive,
|
||||
* Transfer-Encoding, Upgrade, Proxy-Authenticate, Proxy-Authorization,
|
||||
* TE, Trailers, Set-Cookie, Content-Encoding, Content-Length, and
|
||||
* Server. Per RFC 7230 §6.1 the first 8 must NEVER be forwarded;
|
||||
* Set-Cookie can poison the browser session; Content-Encoding
|
||||
* and Content-Length mismatches confuse downstream caches/clients.
|
||||
* (c) `proxyRes.statusCode` treated as a valid HTTP status without
|
||||
* validation — a broken upstream could send `0` or a string, which
|
||||
* res.status() would either accept (silent corruption) or throw
|
||||
* RangeError [ERR_HTTP_INVALID_STATUS_CODE] (Express default
|
||||
* error handler returns HTML).
|
||||
* (d) `path` taken from req.params[0] without validation — an attacker
|
||||
* could pass URL-encoded slashes / `?` / `#` chars / absolute URLs
|
||||
* to redirect the proxy elsewhere on localhost.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The five fixes below close (a)-(d) without changing the on-the-wire
|
||||
* shape of the proxy from a same-origin browser's perspective.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
// RFC 7230 §6.1 hop-by-hop headers that must NEVER be forwarded by a proxy.
|
||||
const HOP_BY_HOP = new Set([
|
||||
'connection',
|
||||
'keep-alive',
|
||||
'proxy-authenticate',
|
||||
'proxy-authorization',
|
||||
'te',
|
||||
'trailers',
|
||||
'transfer-encoding',
|
||||
'upgrade',
|
||||
]);
|
||||
// Headers we deliberately strip from proxied responses for client-safety /
|
||||
// cache-correctness reasons (NOT hop-by-hop, but dangerous to forward).
|
||||
// DC-065 round-1 GLM-5.3 finding: `location` MUST be stripped — a
|
||||
// 3xx response with `Location: http://evil.com/x` would be honored by
|
||||
// the same-origin browser because the proxy response is on
|
||||
// /openclaw/proxy/* (same-origin from the dashboard's perspective) and
|
||||
// the proxy didn't downgrade the status. This is a classic open-redirect
|
||||
// through proxy. We strip Location and let the browser stay put (or,
|
||||
// for clients that depend on redirect-following, they can retry the
|
||||
// upstream directly without our proxy in the path).
|
||||
// DC-065 round-2 GLM-5.3 finding: `refresh` and `www-authenticate` are
|
||||
// in the same class and were also leaking. `Refresh: 0; url=...` is
|
||||
// honored by a meaningful subset of browsers (older Chrome, Firefox,
|
||||
// Safari, mobile WebViews) as an open-redirect primitive. `WWW-
|
||||
// Authenticate: Basic realm=...` pops a native browser auth dialog on
|
||||
// the dashboard's origin (phishing/UX attack). Both stripped.
|
||||
const STRIPPED_RESPONSE_HEADERS = new Set([
|
||||
'set-cookie', // upstream browser poisoning
|
||||
'location', // round-1 GLM finding — open-redirect through proxy
|
||||
'refresh', // round-2 GLM finding — same-class open-redirect primitive
|
||||
'www-authenticate', // round-2 GLM finding — phishing via browser auth prompt
|
||||
'content-encoding', // we send raw bytes; mismatched encoding breaks clients
|
||||
'content-length', // node auto-computes; forwarding can desync with body
|
||||
'server', // upstream fingerprinting
|
||||
'x-powered-by', // upstream fingerprinting
|
||||
]);
|
||||
// 5 MiB is a generous cap for a chat / gateway UI; anything larger is
|
||||
// either a misconfigured upstream or an attack. Picked to match the
|
||||
// express.json({ limit }) default in src/utilities/middleware.js.
|
||||
const MAX_PROXY_RESPONSE_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
|
||||
// Allowed chars in the downstream `path` segment: alphanumerics, `-`, `_`,
|
||||
// `.`, `~`, `/`, `?`, `&`, `=`, `:`, `@`, `+`, `,`, `;` (RFC 3986 pchar +
|
||||
// query/fragment separators). Anything else → 400.
|
||||
const ALLOWED_PATH_RE = /^[a-zA-Z0-9._~/?&=:@+,;%\-]*$/;
|
||||
// Maximum total `path` length (reasonable for a gateway UI endpoint).
|
||||
const MAX_PATH_LEN = 1024;
|
||||
|
||||
function sanitizeForwardedHeaders(rawHeaders) {
|
||||
const out = {};
|
||||
for (const name of Object.keys(rawHeaders || {})) {
|
||||
const lower = name.toLowerCase();
|
||||
if (HOP_BY_HOP.has(lower)) continue;
|
||||
if (STRIPPED_RESPONSE_HEADERS.has(lower)) continue;
|
||||
out[name] = rawHeaders[name];
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function coerceUpstreamStatus(rawStatus) {
|
||||
// Status must be an integer in 100..599. Anything else → 502 (the proxy
|
||||
// failed to interpret the upstream response, which is exactly what 502
|
||||
// semantically means: bad gateway).
|
||||
if (
|
||||
typeof rawStatus !== 'number'
|
||||
|| !Number.isInteger(rawStatus)
|
||||
|| rawStatus < 100
|
||||
|| rawStatus > 599
|
||||
) {
|
||||
return 502;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return rawStatus;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function validatePath(path) {
|
||||
if (typeof path !== 'string') return { ok: false, code: 400, msg: 'path must be a string' };
|
||||
if (path.length === 0) return { ok: false, code: 400, msg: 'path is empty' };
|
||||
if (path.length > MAX_PATH_LEN) return { ok: false, code: 414, msg: 'path too long' };
|
||||
// Reject absolute-URL injection (`://`), backslashes (Windows path-style
|
||||
// smuggling), CRLF (header injection on rare downstream), and any char
|
||||
// outside the RFC 3986 pchar/query/fragment set.
|
||||
if (/[\s\\]|:\/\//.test(path)) return { ok: false, code: 400, msg: 'path contains forbidden characters' };
|
||||
if (!ALLOWED_PATH_RE.test(path)) return { ok: false, code: 400, msg: 'path contains disallowed characters' };
|
||||
// Strip a single leading slash so we can rebuild as `${targetBase}/${path}`
|
||||
// idempotently (targetBase already has a trailing `:PORT` form).
|
||||
return { ok: true, normalized: path.replace(/^\/+/, '') };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// DC-065: expose helpers via the router for direct unit testing. The
|
||||
// router is an Express Router; any property we add here stays private
|
||||
// to the module and is read by __tests__/routes/openclaw.proxy-hardening
|
||||
// .test.js without going through Express.
|
||||
router._dc065 = {
|
||||
HOP_BY_HOP,
|
||||
STRIPPED_RESPONSE_HEADERS,
|
||||
MAX_PROXY_RESPONSE_BYTES,
|
||||
ALLOWED_PATH_RE,
|
||||
MAX_PATH_LEN,
|
||||
sanitizeForwardedHeaders,
|
||||
coerceUpstreamStatus,
|
||||
validatePath,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
function proxyRequest(req, res, targetBase, path, token) {
|
||||
const pathCheck = validatePath(path);
|
||||
if (!pathCheck.ok) {
|
||||
return errorResponse(res, pathCheck.code, pathCheck.msg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const headers = {};
|
||||
if (token) headers['Authorization'] = 'Bearer ' + token;
|
||||
headers['X-Forwarded-For'] = req.ip;
|
||||
headers['X-Forwarded-Proto'] = req.protocol;
|
||||
|
||||
const url = targetBase + '/' + path;
|
||||
const url = targetBase + '/' + pathCheck.normalized;
|
||||
const method = req.method;
|
||||
|
||||
// Stream the upstream response through `res` with a byte-size cap. On
|
||||
// overrun we abort the proxyReq and reply with 502 Bad Gateway. The
|
||||
// accumulated bytes are tracked per-call; if MAX_PROXY_RESPONSE_BYTES
|
||||
// is exceeded, we close the upstream and tear down the client response.
|
||||
function pipeUpstream(proxyReq) {
|
||||
// Buffer-first response proxy: collect chunks in memory until either
|
||||
// the upstream finishes or MAX_PROXY_RESPONSE_BYTES is exceeded. Then
|
||||
// emit a single Express response with sanitized headers + the
|
||||
// buffered body, or a 502 if the cap fired. Two reasons for the
|
||||
// buffer-first approach:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 1. Once res.status() is called and headers are flushed (which
|
||||
// happens on the first res.write), the status code is locked.
|
||||
// Streaming the body through res.write lets a malicious
|
||||
// upstream send 1 byte of 200 OK + N bytes of garbage; we can't
|
||||
// retroactively downgrade to 502. Buffering lets us inspect
|
||||
// the full response before committing to a status.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 2. Synchronous status/header/body emission is cheaper than
|
||||
// backpressure-aware chunked writes for a proxy that
|
||||
// specifically serves JSON-RPC + small payloads (OpenClaw's
|
||||
// gateway chat API is not a streaming use case).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Memory cost: MAX_PROXY_RESPONSE_BYTES per concurrent proxy
|
||||
// request. At 5 MiB and Node's default 1000 concurrent connections
|
||||
// (server.maxConnections defaults to Infinity), worst-case is ~5
|
||||
// GiB. We cap concurrency in start.sh via Node CLI flags; see
|
||||
// ulimit + --max-old-space-size settings.
|
||||
const chunks = [];
|
||||
let totalBytes = 0;
|
||||
let capped = false;
|
||||
let finishedEarly = false;
|
||||
proxyReq.on('response', function(proxyRes) {
|
||||
// Pre-check: if upstream claimed a Content-Length above the cap,
|
||||
// reject before consuming any body bytes. This is the common case
|
||||
// — most well-behaved upstreams declare length up-front.
|
||||
const declaredLength = parseInt(proxyRes.headers['content-length'], 10);
|
||||
if (Number.isFinite(declaredLength) && declaredLength > MAX_PROXY_RESPONSE_BYTES) {
|
||||
capped = true;
|
||||
proxyReq.destroy();
|
||||
return errorResponse(res, 502, '[DC-065] upstream Content-Length ' + declaredLength + ' exceeds ' + MAX_PROXY_RESPONSE_BYTES + '-byte proxy cap');
|
||||
}
|
||||
proxyRes.on('data', function(chunk) {
|
||||
if (capped || finishedEarly) return;
|
||||
totalBytes += chunk.length;
|
||||
if (totalBytes > MAX_PROXY_RESPONSE_BYTES) {
|
||||
capped = true;
|
||||
proxyReq.destroy();
|
||||
if (!finishedEarly) {
|
||||
finishedEarly = true;
|
||||
if (!res.headersSent && !res.writableEnded) {
|
||||
errorResponse(res, 502, '[DC-065] upstream response exceeded ' + MAX_PROXY_RESPONSE_BYTES + '-byte proxy cap');
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
chunks.push(chunk);
|
||||
});
|
||||
proxyRes.on('end', function() {
|
||||
if (capped) return;
|
||||
finishedEarly = true;
|
||||
const body = Buffer.concat(chunks);
|
||||
const safeHeaders = sanitizeForwardedHeaders(proxyRes.headers);
|
||||
try { res.set(safeHeaders); } catch (_) { /* noop if socket closed */ }
|
||||
const safeStatus = coerceUpstreamStatus(proxyRes.statusCode);
|
||||
try {
|
||||
res.status(safeStatus);
|
||||
res.end(body);
|
||||
} catch (_) { /* socket may be closed */ }
|
||||
});
|
||||
proxyRes.on('error', function() {
|
||||
if (!finishedEarly) {
|
||||
finishedEarly = true;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
if (!res.headersSent) res.status(502).end();
|
||||
else res.end();
|
||||
} catch (_) { /* socket may be closed */ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
proxyReq.on('error', function(e) {
|
||||
if (!finishedEarly) {
|
||||
finishedEarly = true;
|
||||
if (!res.headersSent && !res.writableEnded) {
|
||||
errorResponse(res, 502, e.message);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
proxyReq.setTimeout(15000, function() {
|
||||
proxyReq.destroy();
|
||||
if (!finishedEarly && !res.headersSent && !res.writableEnded) {
|
||||
finishedEarly = true;
|
||||
errorResponse(res, 504, 'gateway timeout');
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (['POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH'].includes(method)) {
|
||||
const body = JSON.stringify(req.body);
|
||||
headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';
|
||||
headers['Content-Length'] = Buffer.byteLength(body);
|
||||
|
||||
const proxyReq = http.request(url, { method: method, headers: headers }, function(proxyRes) {
|
||||
res.set(proxyRes.headers);
|
||||
res.status(proxyRes.statusCode);
|
||||
proxyRes.on('data', function(d) { res.write(d); });
|
||||
proxyRes.on('end', function() { res.end(); });
|
||||
});
|
||||
proxyReq.on('error', function(e) { errorResponse(res, 502, e.message); });
|
||||
proxyReq.setTimeout(15000, function() { proxyReq.destroy(); errorResponse(res, 504, 'gateway timeout'); });
|
||||
const proxyReq = http.request(url, { method: method, headers: headers });
|
||||
pipeUpstream(proxyReq);
|
||||
proxyReq.on('error', function() { /* surface handled in pipeUpstream */ });
|
||||
proxyReq.write(body);
|
||||
proxyReq.end();
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
const proxyReq = http.get(url, { headers: headers }, function(proxyRes) {
|
||||
res.set(proxyRes.headers);
|
||||
res.status(proxyRes.statusCode);
|
||||
proxyRes.on('data', function(d) { res.write(d); });
|
||||
proxyRes.on('end', function() { res.end(); });
|
||||
});
|
||||
proxyReq.on('error', function(e) { errorResponse(res, 502, e.message); });
|
||||
proxyReq.setTimeout(15000, function() { proxyReq.destroy(); errorResponse(res, 504, 'gateway timeout'); });
|
||||
const proxyReq = http.get(url, { headers: headers });
|
||||
pipeUpstream(proxyReq);
|
||||
proxyReq.on('error', function() { /* surface handled in pipeUpstream */ });
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user