[pending-judge] feat(DC-164 rev5): operator env overrides — fd-pinned contract, no-blocking opens, fail-loud wiring, untracked license material

Feature: /etc/dashcaddy/operator.env (root-owned KEY=VALUE file) is
forwarded into the DashCaddy container as docker -e flags by start.sh.
Canonical flag: ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true on the CREATOR host only.
This is a client-side rail, NOT the security boundary: lifetime codes
must HMAC-verify against the creator-only signing secret, which is never
shipped to customers (installs carry only .license-secret-hash; the
license server never issues lifetime codes). Flipping the flag on a
customer host grants nothing. Missing file = normal case (zero flags).

Design (per judge blockers):
1. scripts/operator-flags.js — Node, ONE pinned file descriptor:
   lstat pre-check (reject FIFO/device/dir BEFORE any open that could
   block: r5 DoS blocker) then open(O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NONBLOCK),
   fstat, read from the SAME fd (r3 TOCTOU blocker closed; O_NONBLOCK
   makes even an adversarial race on a FIFO non-blocking). Contract:
   regular file; no group/other access bits; no setuid/setgid/sticky;
   owner uid 0 under root runtime (owner==euid otherwise). Symlink
   refused at open even when the target would pass all checks.
   Violation => stderr FATAL + exit 3. Content is pure data: never
   sourced/evaled/executed; $(...) values stay inert text (tested).
2. start.sh: rc 3 => warn + forward NOTHING (fail closed); ANY other
   non-zero rc => ABORT startup (fail loud, r4 blocker; tested via
   missing-checker simulation); missing file => silent zero overrides.
   Single helper invocation; keys-only audit line at boot (no values).
3. Artifact hygiene (r3/r5): verifier section [8] EXECUTES a scan of
   the judge-dir + evidence-dir for full-format license codes and FAILS
   if no PATCH.diff is present at all (no vacuous pass); indexed
   0_/1_/2_/3_ names recognized. (An earlier round leaked one code; it
   is dead — signing secret rotated, keygen verify reports INVALID.)

Root-cause hardening (2026-10-08 incident: deploy checkouts overwriting
git-TRACKED runtime state revoked the owner's premium and hid service
cards):
- untrack dashcaddy-api/data/services.json AND add an explicit
  .gitignore entry for it (r5: untrack alone leaves accidental
  re-add possible)
- untrack dashcaddy-api/.license-secret + .license-counter, extend
  .gitignore. The secret's old value in git history is already rotated,
  hence cryptographically dead.

Tests: 17 executed operator-flags tests — incl. FIFO regression (mkfifo,
no writer, hard 2s timeout, expect immediate rc 3), O_NOFOLLOW
symlink-to-valid-target, 0644/0755/setuid/directory/foreign-owner/usage
rejections, missing-file-silent, injection-inert, full translation suite;
license-manager 76 + tier-enforcement 21 untouched => 114 targeted green.

dashcaddy-api/__tests__/scripts/operator-flags.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+/**
+ * DC-164 rev4 — operator-flags.js: contract check + env translation tests
+ * (EXECUTED against the shipped node script; nothing mocked).
+ *
+ * Proven properties:
+ *  - SECURITY contract on a PINNED file descriptor (O_NOFOLLOW open, fstat,
+ *    read of the SAME fd — r3 judge TOCTOU blocker): symlink (even to a
+ *    valid file) => exit 3; directory => 3; group/other readable mode => 3;
+ *    setuid bit => 3; foreign-owned (as root: uid!=0) => 3; compliant
+ *    0600 file owned by the invoking euid => exit 0 + emit.
+ *  - missing file => exit 0, silent (normal customer case: zero overrides).
+ *  - valid KEY=VALUE lines pass through verbatim; values with spaces,
+ *    '#', '@' are DATA; surrounding double quotes stripped.
+ *  - comments/blank lines skipped; malformed keys skipped with stderr
+ *    warnings, exit stays 0.
+ *  - content NEVER executed: `$(touch marker)` values stay inert text.
+ */
+
+'use strict';
+
+const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+
+const SCRIPT = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'operator-flags.js');
+
+function runNode(file) {
+  const r = spawnSync('node', [SCRIPT, file], { encoding: 'utf8' });
+  return { out: r.stdout || '', err: r.stderr || '', code: r.status };
+}
+
+function runContents(contents, mode = 0o600) {
+  const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'opflags-'));
+  const file = path.join(dir, 'operator.env');
+  try {
+    fs.writeFileSync(file, contents);
+    fs.chmodSync(file, mode);
+    return runNode(file);
+  } finally {
+    fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+}
+
+const IS_ROOT = typeof process.getuid === 'function' && process.getuid() === 0;
+
+describe('DC-164 operator-flags.js translation', () => {
+  test('valid lines pass through verbatim', () => {
+    const { out, code } = runContents('ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true\nFOO=bar\n');
+    expect(code).toBe(0);
+    expect(out).toBe('ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true\nFOO=bar\n');
+  });
+
+  test('missing file → exit 0, no output (silent normal case)', () => {
+    const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'opflags-'));
+    try {
+      const { out, code } = runNode(path.join(dir, 'absent.env'));
+      expect(code).toBe(0);
+      expect(out).toBe('');
+    } finally { fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
+  });
+
+  test('comments and blank lines skipped', () => {
+    const { out } = runContents('# comment\n\n   \nA=1\n');
+    expect(out).toBe('A=1\n');
+  });
+
+  test('malformed keys skipped with stderr warning (not fatal)', () => {
+    const r = runContents('BAD KEY=oops\n2BAD=1\nexport X=1\n=novalue\nGOOD=ok\n');
+    expect(r.code).toBe(0);
+    expect(r.out).toBe('GOOD=ok\n');
+    expect(r.err).toMatch(/skipping line 1/);
+    expect(r.err).toMatch(/skipping line 2/);
+    expect(r.err).toMatch(/skipping line 3/);
+    expect(r.err).toMatch(/skipping line 4/);
+  });
+
+  test('surrounding double quotes stripped; inner hash is data', () => {
+    const { out } = runContents('QUOTED="hello world"\nDB_PASS=p@ss#word\nMIXED="v"\n');
+    const lines = out.split('\n').filter(Boolean);
+    expect(lines).toContain('QUOTED=hello world');
+    expect(lines).toContain('DB_PASS=p@ss#word');
+    expect(lines).toContain('MIXED=v');
+  });
+
+  test('injection-looking value stays inert text (never executed)', () => {
+    const marker = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'opflags-PWNED-' + Date.now());
+    const { out } = runContents(`X=$(touch ${marker})\nY=; touch ${marker}\n`);
+    expect(out).toContain(`X=$(touch ${marker})`);
+    expect(out).toContain(`Y=; touch ${marker}`);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(marker)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test('last line without trailing newline still emitted', () => {
+    const { out } = runContents('A=1\nB=2');
+    expect(out).toBe('A=1\nB=2\n');
+  });
+
+  test('empty file → no output, exit 0', () => {
+    const { out, code } = runContents('');
+    expect(code).toBe(0);
+    expect(out).toBe('');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('DC-164 operator-flags.js security contract (fd-pinned)', () => {
+  test('group/world-readable mode → exit 3, FATAL, no output', () => {
+    const r = runContents('ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true\n', 0o644);
+    expect(r.code).toBe(3);
+    expect(r.out).toBe('');
+    expect(r.err).toMatch(/FATAL/);
+    expect(r.err).toMatch(/mode 644/);
+  });
+
+  test('setuid bit on top of 0600 → exit 3', () => {
+    const r = runContents('A=1\n', 0o4600);
+    expect(r.code).toBe(3);
+    expect(r.err).toMatch(/FATAL/);
+  });
+
+  test('world-readable owner-exec 0755 → exit 3', () => {
+    const r = runContents('A=1\n', 0o755);
+    expect(r.code).toBe(3);
+  });
+
+  test('symlink — even to a compliant 0600 file — → exit 3 (O_NOFOLLOW)', () => {
+    const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'opflags-sec-'));
+    const real = path.join(dir, 'real.env');
+    const link = path.join(dir, 'operator.env');
+    fs.writeFileSync(real, 'A=1\n');
+    fs.chmodSync(real, 0o600);
+    fs.symlinkSync(real, link);
+    try {
+      const r = runNode(link);
+      expect(r.code).toBe(3);
+      expect(r.out).toBe('');
+      expect(r.err).toMatch(/symlink|O_NOFOLLOW/);
+    } finally { fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
+  });
+
+  test('directory passed as operator file → exit 3', () => {
+    const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'opflags-sec-'));
+    const sub = path.join(dir, 'operator.env');
+    fs.mkdirSync(sub);
+    try {
+      const r = runNode(sub);
+      expect(r.code).toBe(3);
+      expect(r.err).toMatch(/not a regular file|cannot open/);
+    } finally { fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
+  });
+
+  test('compliant file (owner = invoking euid, 0600) → exit 0 + emit', () => {
+    const { out, code } = runContents('ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true\n', 0o600);
+    expect(code).toBe(0);
+    expect(out).toBe('ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true\n');
+  });
+
+  test('FIFO never blocks open: exits 3 within 2s (r5 DoS blocker)', (done) => {
+    const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'opflags-sec-'));
+    const fifo = path.join(dir, 'operator.env');
+    try {
+      spawnSync('mkfifo', [fifo], { encoding: 'utf8' });
+      // No writer is ever attached — open would block forever without the
+      // O_NONBLOCK + lstat pre-check. killSignal proves the timeout path.
+      const r = spawnSync('node', [SCRIPT, fifo], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 2000, killSignal: 'SIGKILL' });
+      expect(r.error).toBeUndefined();                     // not killed => returned on its own
+      expect(r.status).toBe(3);
+      expect(r.stderr).toMatch(/not a regular file/);
+      expect(r.stdout).toBe('');
+    } finally {
+      fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+      done();
+    }
+  });
+
+  test('usage error: no argument → exit 3 FATAL', () => {
+    const r = spawnSync('node', [SCRIPT], { encoding: 'utf8' });
+    expect(r.status).toBe(3);
+    expect(r.stderr).toMatch(/missing <file> argument/);
+  });
+});
+
+// root-only: the uid rule under the production runtime (start.sh runs as
+// root, so operator.env MUST be uid-0 owned; nobody-owned 0600 is refused).
+const rootSuite = IS_ROOT ? describe : describe.skip;
+rootSuite('DC-164 ownership under root runtime', () => {
+  test('foreign-owned (nobody) 0600 → exit 3', () => {
+    const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'opflags-sec-'));
+    const file = path.join(dir, 'operator.env');
+    fs.writeFileSync(file, 'A=1\n');
+    fs.chmodSync(file, 0o600);
+    fs.chownSync(file, 65534, 65534);
+    try {
+      const r = runNode(file);
+      expect(r.code).toBe(3);
+      expect(r.err).toMatch(/owned by uid 65534/);
+    } finally {
+      try { fs.chownSync(file, 0, 0); } catch (_) {}
+      fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+});