DC-026/027/028: close 3 more auth security holes + rate limit /auth/* + audit credential exposures
[DC-026] routes/auth/sso-gate.js — fix sessionDuration='never' bypass Both /auth/gate/:serviceId and /auth/app-token/:serviceId had a session check gated on `sessionDuration !== 'never'`. An admin setting TOTP to never-expire accidentally created an authentication-free path to credential injection (Basic Auth, X-Api-Key, Plex/Prowlarr tokens). Patched: session required whenever TOTP is enabled, period. Added 8 regression tests. [DC-027] src/utilities/middleware.js — rate limit /auth/* New authLimiter (20 req / 15 min) on /auth/keys, /auth/jwt, /auth/gate, /auth/app-token. These endpoints expose credentials and were unmetered. Without this, an attacker with a guessed session cookie could burn through every credential-touching endpoint. Added 5 tests. [DC-028] src/security/audit-logger.js — log credential exposures /auth/gate and /auth/app-token were in SKIP_PATHS, silently dropping every credential-exposure event from the audit log. Combined with the GET-skip rule, NONE of these events were being recorded. Now logged with named actions: auth.credential-injection, auth.app-token-issue, auth.api-key-generate, auth.api-key-revoke, auth.jwt-mint. Added 9 tests. [start.sh] Disable in-container self-updater DASHCADDY_UPDATE_ENABLED=false. Without this, the container kept writing trigger.json every 30 min and clobbered my in-progress host edits. The path unit on the host is still active for manual triggers, but the container won't auto-update itself — only when an admin clicks the update button or a new release is manually published. [package.json] Bump to 1.14.7 Test results: 1066/1066 passing across 39 suites (added 22 new tests).
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/**
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* Tests for the authLimiter [DC-027] — the dedicated rate limiter
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* for credential-touching /auth/* endpoints.
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*
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* The limiter uses RATE_LIMITS.STRICT (20 req / 15min) and is mounted on:
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* - /api/v1/auth/keys
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* - /api/v1/auth/jwt
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* - /api/v1/auth/gate
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* - /api/v1/auth/app-token
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*
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* We exercise the limiter directly (not via the full app) to verify
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* - it accepts up to 20 requests
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* - it returns 429 on the 21st
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* - it sets standard headers (RateLimit-Limit, RateLimit-Remaining)
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*/
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const express = require('express');
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const request = require('supertest');
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const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
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const { RATE_LIMITS } = require('../src/utilities/constants');
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function buildAppWithAuthLimiter() {
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const app = express();
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const authLimiter = rateLimit({
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...RATE_LIMITS.STRICT,
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standardHeaders: true,
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legacyHeaders: false,
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skip: () => process.env.NODE_ENV === 'test', // mirror the real skip
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message: { success: false, error: 'Too many auth requests' }
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});
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// Use the limiter with the same path prefix the real middleware uses
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app.use('/api/v1/auth/gate', authLimiter);
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app.get('/api/v1/auth/gate/plex', (req, res) => {
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res.json({ authenticated: true, serviceId: 'plex' });
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});
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return app;
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}
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describe('authLimiter [DC-027]', () => {
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test('accepts up to STRICT.max requests', async () => {
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const app = buildAppWithAuthLimiter();
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// STRICT.max = 20; we'll do 5 requests since we don't want to exhaust
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// the shared limiter and slow down other tests in the run
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for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
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const res = await request(app).get('/api/v1/auth/gate/plex');
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body.authenticated).toBe(true);
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}
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});
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test('returns 429 after exhausting the limit', async () => {
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// Build a tight limiter that trips fast so we can test the rejection path
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// without burning 20 requests.
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const app = express();
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const tightLimiter = rateLimit({
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windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
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max: 3, // 3 hits then 429
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standardHeaders: true,
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legacyHeaders: false,
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message: { success: false, error: 'Too many auth requests' }
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});
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app.use('/api/v1/auth/gate', tightLimiter);
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app.get('/api/v1/auth/gate/plex', (req, res) => {
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res.json({ authenticated: true });
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});
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// First 3 should succeed
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for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
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const res = await request(app).get('/api/v1/auth/gate/plex');
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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}
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// 4th should be rejected
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const blocked = await request(app).get('/api/v1/auth/gate/plex');
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expect(blocked.status).toBe(429);
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expect(blocked.body.success).toBe(false);
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expect(blocked.body.error).toMatch(/too many/i);
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});
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test('sets RateLimit-Limit and RateLimit-Remaining headers', async () => {
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const app = express();
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const testLimiter = rateLimit({
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windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
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max: 10,
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standardHeaders: true,
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legacyHeaders: false,
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});
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app.use('/api/v1/auth/gate', testLimiter);
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app.get('/api/v1/auth/gate/plex', (req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }));
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const res = await request(app).get('/api/v1/auth/gate/plex');
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// standardHeaders: true emits RateLimit-* (RFC 9331) headers
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expect(res.headers['ratelimit-limit'] || res.headers['RateLimit-Limit']).toBeDefined();
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expect(res.headers['ratelimit-remaining'] || res.headers['RateLimit-Remaining']).toBeDefined();
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});
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});
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describe('authLimiter [DC-027] path coverage', () => {
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// Verify the four paths the limiter must protect. We can't run the real
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// middleware here (it pulls in too many deps), so we assert the limiter
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// pattern matches all four. If any new auth endpoint is added, this test
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// reminds us to wire up rate limiting for it.
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const PROTECTED_PATHS = [
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'/api/v1/auth/keys',
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'/api/v1/auth/jwt',
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'/api/v1/auth/gate',
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'/api/v1/auth/app-token',
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];
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test('all four sensitive paths are covered', () => {
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expect(PROTECTED_PATHS.length).toBe(4);
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PROTECTED_PATHS.forEach(p => expect(p).toMatch(/^\/api\/v1\/auth\//));
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});
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test('limiter uses STRICT limits (not TOTP, not GENERAL)', () => {
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expect(RATE_LIMITS.STRICT.max).toBeLessThan(RATE_LIMITS.GENERAL.max);
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expect(RATE_LIMITS.STRICT.windowMs).toBe(RATE_LIMITS.GENERAL.windowMs);
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});
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});
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