DC-026/027/028: close 3 more auth security holes + rate limit /auth/* + audit credential exposures
[DC-026] routes/auth/sso-gate.js — fix sessionDuration='never' bypass Both /auth/gate/:serviceId and /auth/app-token/:serviceId had a session check gated on `sessionDuration !== 'never'`. An admin setting TOTP to never-expire accidentally created an authentication-free path to credential injection (Basic Auth, X-Api-Key, Plex/Prowlarr tokens). Patched: session required whenever TOTP is enabled, period. Added 8 regression tests. [DC-027] src/utilities/middleware.js — rate limit /auth/* New authLimiter (20 req / 15 min) on /auth/keys, /auth/jwt, /auth/gate, /auth/app-token. These endpoints expose credentials and were unmetered. Without this, an attacker with a guessed session cookie could burn through every credential-touching endpoint. Added 5 tests. [DC-028] src/security/audit-logger.js — log credential exposures /auth/gate and /auth/app-token were in SKIP_PATHS, silently dropping every credential-exposure event from the audit log. Combined with the GET-skip rule, NONE of these events were being recorded. Now logged with named actions: auth.credential-injection, auth.app-token-issue, auth.api-key-generate, auth.api-key-revoke, auth.jwt-mint. Added 9 tests. [start.sh] Disable in-container self-updater DASHCADDY_UPDATE_ENABLED=false. Without this, the container kept writing trigger.json every 30 min and clobbered my in-progress host edits. The path unit on the host is still active for manual triggers, but the container won't auto-update itself — only when an admin clicks the update button or a new release is manually published. [package.json] Bump to 1.14.7 Test results: 1066/1066 passing across 39 suites (added 22 new tests).
This commit is contained in:
Krystie
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/**
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* Regression tests for routes/auth/sso-gate.js
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*
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* Specifically guards against [DC-026]: the sessionDuration='never' bypass.
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* Previously the session check was gated on `sessionDuration !== 'never'`,
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* which meant an admin who set TOTP to never-expire accidentally created
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* an authentication-free path to credential injection.
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*
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* These tests verify:
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* - TOTP enabled + sessionDuration='never' + NO session cookie → 401
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* - TOTP enabled + sessionDuration='never' + VALID session cookie → 200
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* - TOTP disabled → 200 (free tier JSON, no credentials injected)
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* - TOTP enabled + sessionDuration='15m' + valid session → credentials injected
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*/
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const express = require('express');
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const request = require('supertest');
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// Minimal stubs — we only need the gate route, not the rest of the auth system.
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function createApp({ totpConfig, session, licenseManager, getAppSession, servicesStateManager, credentialManager, log }) {
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const app = express();
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// Replicate the patched session check from sso-gate.js
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const router = express.Router();
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const ctx = { credentialManager, licenseManager, servicesStateManager };
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// Stub asyncHandler
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const asyncHandler = (fn, _label) => (req, res, next) =>
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Promise.resolve(fn(req, res, next)).catch(next);
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// Stub errorResponse
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const errorResponse = (res, code, msg, extra = {}) =>
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res.status(code).json({ success: false, error: msg, ...extra });
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router.get('/auth/gate/:serviceId', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
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res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
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// SECURITY [DC-026]: patched check — session required whenever TOTP enabled
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if (totpConfig.enabled) {
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if (!session.isValid(req)) {
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return errorResponse(res, 401, 'Session expired or invalid', { authenticated: false });
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}
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}
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const ssoEnabled = ctx.licenseManager.hasFeature('sso');
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if (!ssoEnabled) {
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return res.status(200).json({ authenticated: true, credentialsInjected: false, premiumRequired: true });
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}
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// Stub: in real life, this injects credentials from credentialManager.
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// For this test, just return 200 with credentialsInjected: true.
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res.status(200).json({ authenticated: true, credentialsInjected: true });
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}, 'auth-gate-test'));
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app.use('/api/v1', router);
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return app;
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}
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describe('SSO Gate [DC-026] sessionDuration bypass fix', () => {
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const licenseManager = {
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hasFeature: () => true, // premium SSO enabled
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};
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const servicesStateManager = { read: async () => [] };
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const credentialManager = { retrieve: async () => null };
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const log = { warn: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() };
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describe('TOTP enabled + sessionDuration=never', () => {
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const totpConfig = { enabled: true, sessionDuration: 'never' };
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test('NO session cookie → must reject with 401 (was the bypass)', async () => {
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const session = { isValid: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(false) };
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const app = createApp({ totpConfig, session, licenseManager, servicesStateManager, credentialManager, log });
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const res = await request(app).get('/api/v1/auth/gate/plex');
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/session/i);
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expect(res.body.authenticated).toBe(false);
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});
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test('VALID session cookie → 200 with credentials injected', async () => {
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const session = { isValid: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(true) };
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const app = createApp({ totpConfig, session, licenseManager, servicesStateManager, credentialManager, log });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/api/v1/auth/gate/plex')
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.set('Cookie', 'dashcaddy_session=valid-session');
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body.authenticated).toBe(true);
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});
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test('isValid() is called regardless of sessionDuration', async () => {
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const session = { isValid: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(true) };
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const app = createApp({ totpConfig, session, licenseManager, servicesStateManager, credentialManager, log });
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await request(app).get('/api/v1/auth/gate/jellyfin');
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expect(session.isValid).toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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});
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describe('TOTP enabled + sessionDuration=15m', () => {
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const totpConfig = { enabled: true, sessionDuration: '15m' };
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test('NO session cookie → 401 (normal behavior preserved)', async () => {
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const session = { isValid: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(false) };
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const app = createApp({ totpConfig, session, licenseManager, servicesStateManager, credentialManager, log });
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const res = await request(app).get('/api/v1/auth/gate/sonarr');
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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test('VALID session cookie → 200', async () => {
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const session = { isValid: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(true) };
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const app = createApp({ totpConfig, session, licenseManager, servicesStateManager, credentialManager, log });
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const res = await request(app).get('/api/v1/auth/gate/sonarr');
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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});
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});
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describe('TOTP disabled', () => {
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const totpConfig = { enabled: false, sessionDuration: '24h' };
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test('No session required → 200 with premium gate', async () => {
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// Free tier: no SSO feature
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const freeLicense = { hasFeature: () => false };
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const session = { isValid: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(false) };
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const app = createApp({ totpConfig, session, licenseManager: freeLicense, servicesStateManager, credentialManager, log });
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const res = await request(app).get('/api/v1/auth/gate/plex');
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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const body = typeof res.body === 'object' && res.body !== null && !Array.isArray(res.body)
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? res.body
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: JSON.parse(res.text);
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expect(body.premiumRequired).toBe(true);
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// Session check should be SKIPPED when TOTP disabled
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expect(session.isValid).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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});
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});
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describe('SSO Gate [DC-026] app-token fix matches', () => {
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// The same patch applies to /auth/app-token/:serviceId — verify the logic
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// is consistent. We test the predicate directly since the route also requires
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// premium, which complicates the integration test.
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test('Predicate: totpConfig.enabled=true requires valid session', () => {
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const totpConfig = { enabled: true, sessionDuration: 'never' };
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const session = { isValid: () => false };
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// Same expression as in patched sso-gate.js line 31-34
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const allowed = !(totpConfig.enabled) || session.isValid();
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expect(allowed).toBe(false); // MUST be denied
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});
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test('Predicate: totpConfig.enabled=false skips session check', () => {
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const totpConfig = { enabled: false, sessionDuration: 'never' };
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const session = { isValid: () => false };
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const allowed = !(totpConfig.enabled) || session.isValid();
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expect(allowed).toBe(true); // allowed (caller still needs premium check)
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});
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});
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