Commit Graph
9 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
DashCaddy Loop 8105bed3fb [glm-grade=A] fix(csrf): tag browser auto-retry as [CSRF-debug], keep [CSRF] for real probes (DC-058)
Background: every time dashcaddy-api restarts, the first POST from a
dashboard browser tab hits the missing-CSRF-cookie branch. The
status/js/globals.js secureFetch() wrapper catches the 403 and
auto-retries with a fresh token, so the WARN line is misleading noise.

Live evidence (DNS2, 2026-08-18 10:35:32Z container restart):
  [CSRF] Missing CSRF cookie: POST /api/v1/backups/schedule from 100.121.150.22
  [CSRF] Missing CSRF cookie: POST /api/v1/backups/schedule from 100.121.150.22
  [CSRF] Missing CSRF cookie: POST /api/v1/backups/schedule from 172.17.0.1

Fix: if X-CSRF-Token header is ALSO present, tag the log line [CSRF-debug]
(operator can grep it out as expected noise — the secureFetch retry will
self-heal). A request with NEITHER cookie NOR header (curl probe, exploit
scanner, broken client) keeps the [CSRF] tag.

Threat model: forging a header without the cookie just produces a
different 403 (Invalid CSRF token) — the timingSafeEqual check on lines
248-260 of csrf-protection.js is unchanged. This is a log-only fix.

Tests: 4 new in __tests__/csrf-protection.test.js under
'DC-058: browser-auto-retry vs real-probe log tagging'. Full suite
1982/1982 green on DNS2 worktree.

GLM-5.3 judge (60s, 2 tool calls, sha 084672c parent 2f76b83):
GRADE=A — log tag branched only on headerToken presence with identical
403 body, headerToken read for tag-detection only (still validated via
timingSafeEqual at lines 248-260), 33 csrf tests + 33 regression tests
all pass. SHIP.
2026-08-18 04:17:50 -07:00
Krystie 503de258b8 [grade=pending] QA sprint: commit 103 at-risk files from multi-agent sprint work
Committed by Hermes autonomous QA sprint 2026-08-13.
These files were modified during the Aug 12 sprint but never committed.
2026-08-12 17:34:10 -07:00
Hermes 9b9711bf24 DC-057: close checkout-to-license contract drift (grade B)
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Canonical product catalog at src/billing/catalog.js shared by Stripe
Checkout client (src/billing/stripe-client.js), webhook bridge
(scripts/stripe-license-bridge.js), and pricing page
(status/pricing/index.html). One-time payment keyed by productId at
$20/$50/$70/$99 — no more monthly/annual subscription drift.

Bridge resolves duration via metadata.productId (single contract),
requires payment_status === 'paid' before fulfillment (rejects
unpaid/no_payment_required/missing with ack 200), handles
async_payment_succeeded for ACH/SEPA delayed-payment flow. License
persisted to fulfillment-store BEFORE email — SMTP failure path serves
the persisted code via the new /api/v1/billing/lookup/:sessionId
endpoint (the documented customer recovery path).

Layer-1 (event-id) + layer-2 (session-id) idempotency prevent
duplicate issuance. Checkout return URLs derived from
STRIPE_PUBLIC_ORIGIN or STRIPE_ALLOWED_HOSTS (not raw Host header) —
closes host-header-poisoning + session-ID-leak attack class.

1498/1498 Jest tests pass (62 suites), zero new ESLint warnings
introduced. Test files:
  - stripe-license-bridge.test.js (24 tests)
  - billing-lookup.test.js (8 tests, HTTP-level)
  - bridge-lookup-http.test.js (5 tests, uses exported createServer)
  - pricing-page-catalog.test.js (9 tests, per-tier consistency)
  - checkout-origin.test.js (6 tests, host injection rejection)
  - stripe-client.test.js (rewrite for productId + mode:payment)

Bridge code refactored: handleWebhook decomposed into verifySignature +
parseEventBody + checkEventIdempotency + fulfillCheckout +
ensureLicensePersisted (under ESLint complexity=20 cap). New
createServer()/createRequestHandler() factories guarded by
require.main === module.

Removed 3 stale test files from the rolled-back DC-055 attempt.
2026-08-04 14:18:49 -07:00
Krystie a2a2bee71e fix: match parameterized public auth routes 2026-07-21 21:59:03 -07:00
Krystie d9e61ce1b7 DC-053: Public share links + Tailscale-mediated share (Pro-gated)
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- Share-store: HMAC-signed tokens bound to serviceId+kind, persistent
  signing secret in dataDir/.share-secret, atomic writes, auto-prune
- Routes: admin endpoints gated on licenseManager.isPro() (402 Free);
  public endpoints CSRF-exempt (token IS proof)
- Tailscale path: mints single-use ephemeral pre-auth key, emails
  join link, rolls back share record if createAuthKey throws
- Email-failure path: exposes urlPath for manual delivery fallback
- 53 new tests (24 store + 29 routes), full suite 1372/1372
- Drift-test parser hardened against quoted-word comments
- share-store dataDir resolver handles Proxy/function values

CHANGELOG + BACKLOG updated.
2026-07-21 00:45:46 -07:00
hermes 321334cd33 DC-048: multi-user bootstrap + admin invites (opt-in)
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Implements the user-store + invite-store + admin routes. The whole
system is opt-in via siteConfig.authProviders.email.enabled = true;
single-user TOTP-only installs see zero behavior change.

Backend:
- src/security/user-store.js: users + allowlist + bootstrap sentinel,
  atomic writes, last-admin protection, defensive dataDir resolver.
- src/security/invite-store.js: single-use tokens (SHA-256 hashed on
  disk), TTL, auto-prune, defensive dataDir resolver.
- routes/auth/admin.js: /me, /admin/users (CRUD), /admin/allowlist,
  /admin/invites (CRUD), public /invites/:token (peek + accept).
- routes/auth/index.js: wires userStore, gates admin router on
  email auth being enabled.
- src/auth/providers/email.js: verify() enforces allowlist, creates
  user record, tags req.user; default-enabled flipped to opt-in.
- src/auth/providers/totp.js: bootstraps system@totp.local admin on
  first verify so current DNS2 operator shows in /admin/users.
- src/security/audit-logger.js: middleware adds userId/userEmail/
  userRole/viaProvider to log details when req.user is tagged.
- PUBLIC_ROUTES + CSRF allowlists updated for invite redemption.

Frontend:
- status/js/admin.js: modal overlay with users list (role-edit,
  delete), invite form (email/role/TTL), copy-link button,
  outstanding-invites list with revoke. Exports window.AdminPanel.
- status/js/core/init.js: calls AdminPanel.attachTrigger so the
  Admin button only appears when /me returns isAdmin=true.

Tests: 35 new tests across 3 files (user-store, invite-store, auth
multistore integration). Full suite: 1298/1298 passing.

Docs: BACKLOG.md marks DC-048 done. CHANGELOG.md [Unreleased]
section gets the DC-048 entry.
2026-07-20 17:44:11 -07:00
Hermes Agent c619d3a36b DC-046 DC-047 pluggable auth providers + email magic link
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Pluggable AuthProvider framework for any future auth method (OIDC, SAML,
passkeys) to plug in without touching the auth path again. Two
implementations ship:

  * TOTP — refactored from routes/auth/totp.js into src/auth/providers/totp.js
    as one AuthProvider impl. Legacy /api/v1/totp/* routes stay mounted for
    back-compat; new /api/v1/auth/login/totp/* routes use the new shape.

  * EmailMagicLink — src/auth/providers/email.js. Initiate issues a 32-byte
    base64url token, stores its SHA-256 hash in data/email-tokens.json
    (atomic lockfile-based mutation, automatic TTL cleanup), and delivers via
    nodemailer if providers.email.{host,port,username,password} is set OR
    falls back to log.info('auth', 'email magic link issued', ...) for dev.
    Verify accepts the token, marks it used, creates the same DashCaddy
    session cookie that TOTP uses (single global cookie model).

createAuthProviderRegistry() composes both implementations and exposes
them via /api/v1/auth/login/{methods, :provider/initiate, :provider/verify,
recovery-info} and /api/v1/auth/disable/:provider. PUBLIC_ROUTES + CSRF
exemptions updated to use :provider placeholder (parameterized for future
providers).

Test fix: src/utilities/middleware.js PUBLIC_ROUTES and csrf-protection.js
both switched to the :provider form because the prior literal 'totp'
wouldn't match the parameterized mount path Express 4.22 produces.

Test fix: __tests__/public-routes-drift.test.js extractMountPath() was
broken for Express 4.22's new ^/path/?(?=/|$) source format (no \?\?
terminator in the literal-mount case). Rewrote the parser to normalize
escaped slashes + trailing lookaheads instead of relying on regex
matching against the raw source.

New: __tests__/auth-provider-registry.test.js — 9 tests covering registry
composition, getProvider round-trip, listEnabled no-secrets-leak guarantee,
enabled-flag respect, listAll vs listEnabled distinction, email provider
dev-console fallback (token written to JSON store + log.info with
deliveredVia: 'dev-console' + response masked), verify rejects unknown
tokens via AuthenticationError.

Tests: 1241/1241 passing across 46 suites (was 1232; +9 new).

DNS2 deploy: this commit + bump VERSION to 1.16.0 + publish tarball to
get.dashcaddy.net + docker build + bash start.sh. The image-layer migration
from DC-050 also runs on first container recreate post-merge.
2026-07-20 01:40:33 -07:00
Hermes 8ec6c0ca6a DC-012: Add Kubernetes-style /healthz + /readyz probe aliases
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Fresh users copy-pasting healthcheck blocks from k8s/Docker docs need
the standard short aliases. Without /healthz and /readyz they get
connection refused. This commit:

1. Adds /healthz + /readyz as root-level aliases for /health/live +
   /health/ready in src/app.js. Handler bodies DRYed into named
   functions (livenessHandler, readinessHandler) so a probe semantics
   change updates all five paths at once.

2. Removes the dead /api/v1/health*, /api/v1/health/live, /api/v1/health/ready
   registrations from PUBLIC_ROUTES and CSRF exclusion list — those
   routes were never actually mounted on the apiRouter (only root
   paths existed). Anyone probing /api/v1/health now gets a clean 404
   instead of being routed through to a duplicate root handler.

3. Adds bypass for the 5 probe paths in three places where it matters:
   - PUBLIC_ROUTES (no auth)
   - csrf-protection.js excludedPaths (no CSRF check)
   - middleware.js request-logging exclusion (k8s polling every 10s
     doesn't flood the audit log)
   - middleware.js Tailscale auth bypass (probes don't carry Tailscale
     identity headers)

4. Adds __tests__/health-probe-aliases.test.js (19 tests):
   - Alias equivalence (/healthz == /health/live, /readyz == /health/ready)
   - Back-compat (/health == /health/live)
   - Path consolidation (all 3 /api/v1/health* return 404)
   - Source-of-truth PUBLIC_ROUTES allowlist sync check
   - Source-of-truth src/app.js mount list sync check (catches drift
     between handler mount and middleware allowlist)

5. Documents probes in README (copy-paste docker-compose.yml +
   Kubernetes blocks) and user-guide (Health Probes section + System
   API table updated).

Post-fix: 941/941 tests pass (+19 new). Zero new ESLint warnings
introduced. The pre-existing warnings/errors in src/app.js line 906
('os' is not defined) and the empty blocks in logging.test.js are
not regressions from this commit.
2026-06-25 17:16:16 -07:00
Hermes 7bc2a207f3 DC-005: Fix all 138 broken test paths after src/ refactor
After the DC-005 module reorganization (41 files moved into src/ subdirs),
138 test suites failed because the refactor script's path-rewrite logic
missed three categories:

1. Files inside src/ doing 'require("./src/...")' — should be 'require("../...")'
2. Files in src/X/Y/ doing 'require("../../../src/...")' — should be 'require("../../...")'
3. Test files in __tests__/ with leftover 'require("../../../src/...")' paths

Root cause: the original refactor script ran before all files were moved,
so it computed relative paths against stale filesystem state.

Result:
- 30/30 test suites pass
- 879/879 tests pass (was: 18/30 suites, 614/687 tests)

Also fixed:
- routes/apps/restore.js: wrong responses import path
- routes/*/*.js: '../../src/utilities/X' → '../src/utilities/X' (depth 2 routes)
2026-06-13 12:16:56 -07:00