Pre-fix, dashcaddy-api/routes/exec.js (the ws://host/ws/exec/:containerId
WebSocket container terminal endpoint) captured auth.scope at lines 39/46
but never enforced it — any API key or JWT, regardless of scope, got a
full PTY-backed shell inside the running container. A key issued with
scope ['read'] (a legitimate monitoring/observability scope) could
escalate to a root-equivalent shell. Container exec is full root inside
the container's user namespace, so this was a privilege-escalation across
the auth trust boundary.
Fix:
1. assertExecScope(auth) requires scope.includes('admin'); throws a
tagged 403 error (DC-072_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE) on rejection with
requiredScope + actualScope in the envelope.
2. Called BEFORE wss.handleUpgrade so the WS gate cannot be bypassed.
3. 403 over the upgrade socket is JSON (code, requiredScope, actualScope)
so the dashboard can show operator-actionable messages.
4. isValidContainerId(id) tightened to Docker's actual charset
(12 or 64 lowercase hex). Pre-fix regex accepted _, -, ., mixed
case, and any length up to 128; Docker would 404 the inspect and the
rejection surfaced as a generic 500.
5. Audit-log pair: session start (container name + auth id) and session
end with durationMs + reason ('exec-stream-end' vs 'ws-close'
for abnormal disconnects); idempotent via ended-flag guard.
6. Both helpers exported via __test for unit tests (no live WS).
Tests: 20 new tests in __tests__/routes/exec.routes.test.js cover:
- assertExecScope: admin passes; read/write/empty/undefined/null/non-array
rejected with the canonical 403 envelope.
- isValidContainerId: 12/64 lowercase hex accepted; uppercase / mixed /
non-hex / _.- / wrong length / null / non-string / padded / CRLF
payload rejected.
Full suite: 2327/2327 tests passing across 100 suites (zero regressions).
GLM-5.3 round 1: A with 2 LOW polish (scope-coercion defensive comment +
abnormal-close audit-log fallback). Both folded into the same commit.
Round 2: A. Ship.
