- routes/ca.js: declare format before pfx/pem/crt dispatch (was ReferenceError
on every request that passed validation); add CA_CERT_FORMATS single source
of truth + hardened format extraction (string-coerce, whitelist)
- routes/caddycode.js: fix upstream-validation regexes (control-char classes)
- routes/logs.js: SSE/validation lint fixes
- routes/openclaw.js: remove useless regex escape in ALLOWED_PATH_RE
- fleet-validation.js + http-caddy-admin-origin test: eslint-disable for
intentional control-regex security sentinels
- ca-dc076.routes.test.js: regression test for declared format + behavioral
coverage of format validation (now pre-PKI)
Judge: Qwen lane (qwen3.8-max) grade B, 0 blocking, verdict
/tmp/judge-batch1-verdict.json. API suite 2859/2859 green.
The host-side uptime watchdog and on-host cron jobs curl Caddy with a stock
curl/8.5.0 UA from loopback and the host tailscale IP — ~300 GET /api/health
401 warn-events/day burying real perimeter signal (census: 339+20 of 5000
access.log lines). Dropping on UA alone would blind the store to external
curl scanners, so generic tool UAs (curl/) are now dropped ONLY when the
source remote_ip is one of this host's own addresses (DASHCADDY_SELF_IPS,
default loopback; start.sh derives 127.0.0.1 + tailscale ip -4, empty-safe).
remote_ip (TCP peer) is used, never the spoofable client_ip. DashCaddy-*
probe UAs stay unconditionally dropped. 9 regression pins cover the full
conjunction matrix incl. external-IP+curl KEPT and spoofed-XFF KEPT.
2858/2858 green (128 suites).
Judge: glm-4.6@zai-coding-paas cold-read round 1 = A clean (0 blocking),
both polish notes folded. URN urn:ump:s2sgitfepze65crtp57dpdw4gk4w7upsoi4tqcvfwahcsicyepba
- query().total: full-scan true count (was capped at offset+limit by an
early break — dashboard 24h stat read ≤1000 vs real ~46k)
- trim trigger/curer mismatch: byte trigger + line curer never converged
when avg line > ~524B (live avg 355B); now keeps maxDisk lines OR
≤80% byte budget, whichever retains fewer (TRIM_TARGET_FACTOR);
budget env-overridable via SECURITY_EVENT_TRIM_BYTES / opts.trimSizeLimit
- trim/append race: trim renamed over the file mid-append losing events
to the unlinked inode; now single-flight, queue-empty gated, holds the
write lock, error paths always release + lazily re-kick (no hot loop)
Judge: glm-4.6@zai-coding-paas adversarial cold-read, grade B clean
(0 blocking, 4 polish — 2 folded, 1 already-satisfied, 1 deferred as
judge-endorsed safer). 127 suites / 2849 tests green.
The caddy tail worker (DC-112) was 100% dead in prod: no /var/log/caddy
mount, no CADDY_ACCESS_LOG env, no global access log in the Caddyfile.
Store census 45,912 events, 100% source_type 'api', ZERO 'caddy'.
- createTail: firstStartMaxBytes (5 MiB) bounds first-ever-start replay
against a long-lived access.log; multi-chunk partial-line discard on
the jump; normal restarts resume at exact persisted offset (judge r1
fix-first fold)
- worker: self-noise filter drops our own probe UAs
(DashCaddy-Probe/1.0, DashCaddy-HealthCheck/1.0) from the derived
store — raw log keeps everything; ~50-100 events/min of probe noise
would otherwise bury perimeter signal in the 100k-cap store
- worker: metadata.host reads request.host (real caddy JSON nests it;
verified against live /var/log/caddy/seeds.log — the DC-112 read was
always null on live lines); top-level fallback kept
- worker: onAppear recovery log (DC-112 judge polish fold)
- start.sh: -v /var/log/caddy:/var/log/caddy:ro + CADDY_ACCESS_LOG env
- README: dead caddy-api/ dir refs -> dashcaddy-api/ (queue item e)
- tests: +12 DC-113 pins (hermetic, real worker + store); DC-112
fixtures corrected to the real nested request.host shape
126 suites / 2841 tests green. Judge: GLM-5.3 round-1 B, round-2 A
(SHIP). Verdict urn:ump:mccln523fptotuvrmddlqpf4zpkrxf273tg4kyytuyy3776rj3pq
Queue item (g) — same defect class as DC-111 defect 1, different writer:
the caddy access-log tail named every event http.<status>, so forward_auth
gate hits were unanswerable in the unified security event store.
- resolveCaddyAction() mirrors audit-logger ACTION_MAP vocabulary for BOTH
URI shapes (legacy /api/auth/gate/<id> from Caddyfile line 87, canonical
/api/v1/... from dashboard JS): auth.credential-injection,
auth.app-token-issue, auth.sso-exchange (exact-path match, boundary-tested)
- severity escalation now covers the legacy /api/auth/ prefix too
- metadata fidelity: caddy logs headers as ARRAYS — old single-value read
always produced user_agent:null; added metadata.host (vhost) and
duration_seconds (caddy logs seconds; duration_ms kept, no consumers)
- dead-path visibility: once-per-process warn when the access log is
missing. Live discovery: prod store has 45,912 events, 100%
source_type 'api', ZERO 'caddy' — the container has no /var/log/caddy
mount, so the worker silently no-ops. Infra wiring queued separately.
- new __tests__/caddy-worker-naming-dc112.test.js: 22 pins (real tail +
real store, hermetic sinks, both URI shapes, boundary rows, offset
persistence, once-warn). Full suite 125/2831 green.
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read round-1 A (deleg_65498358, 3 polish items folded)
+ round-2 A (deleg_eed9dcbf, judge re-ran suite itself).
URN urn:ump:mjbwfcw6z7budx45s2rutovw5fatpp4jyzzspo7tq6nzajayulmq
1. audit-logger middleware computed action/resource from req.path INSIDE
the res.json override — after the /api/v1 router rebased req.url to the
router-relative path. resolveAction fell through ACTION_MAP for every
HTTP request, producing 45,899 'unknown.get' entries since 2026-07-14.
Fix: snapshot req.path/req.method at app-level (post-shim, pre-router).
2. DC-044 shim double-prefixed ALREADY-canonical /api/v1/auth/gate|x
into /api/v1/v1/... → 401 for canonical-URI clients. Fix: rewrite only
legacy /api/auth/* shapes; canonical pass through untouched.
3. event-store VALID_OUTCOMES lacked 'failure' → every failed API action's
security event was rejected+dropped from security-events.jsonl. Fix: add
'failure' to the vocabulary set.
8 regression pins over a faithful shim→audit→router mount mirror.
Suite: 124 suites / 2809 tests green.
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read round-1 A/ship, URN urn:ump:ywv6rpmx55tlxbgc7ciyxqfcmx2v6q756cjbmif2d66k4bwwn6ya
audit-logger.js (StateManager write path into audit-log.json) starred only
6 sensitive keys at the middleware layer; email-bearing resource paths
(/invites/<email>/accept), DC-048 details.userEmail attribution, and emails
in non-sensitive body keys landed RAW — while the parallel unified-logger
path has masked at every sink since DC-095. DC-110 closes the parity gap
using the SAME canonical primitives (sa****@example.com): log() masks
resource (maskEmailsInString) and deep-masks details (maskEmails) at the
single write-point, covering middleware AND direct route calls. The
security-event mirror now uses the masked entry.resource for target/message
(judge round-1 fix-first: the raw parameter leaked emails into
security-events.jsonl). logging.js exports maskEmails (export-only).
maskEmails clones — caller details objects are never mutated.
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read (standing Sami authorization 2026-08-17; Codex
quota dead until 2026-08-29). Round 1 (deleg_ebb83285) C fix-first —
caught the event-store mirror leak. Round 2 (deleg_923f9076) after
in-commit fix + mirror test: grade A, ship. Verdict URN
urn:ump:mwtxoj6dbdq7bfeba3l2am2rgx34zjimcjde5f6sxz6tozsjbskq (GET
readback verified: grade A, topic codex-judge-verdict). Deferred
(judge-accepted): one-time scrub of historical raw-email lines in the
live 16MB security-events.jsonl — queued follow-up.
Tests: 123 suites / 2801 green (+6 DC-110 pins: resource+details mask,
non-mutation, middleware e2e with *** survival, idempotence, no-email
regression, masked mirror target/message).
DC-095 masks emails at every live log sink; the rotated archive was the
remaining belt-and-braces gap — any future sink that forgets masking would
persist raw PII in error.log.1 for a full rotation cycle. appendErrorLog
now scrubs the freshly rotated archive with the SAME canonical mask
(sa****@example.com) via atomic rewrite (sibling .redact-<pid> temp, wx
open preserving mode else 0600, fsync, rename). Scrub failure is caught
and logged; the new error line is still appended. Stale crash-leftover
.redact-<pid> temps are swept best-effort on every rotation. Also
documents scripts/redact-log-pii.js usage in README (queue item e).
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read (deleg_e7cd7f8c), round-1 grade B ship — both
nits addressed in-commit: stale-temp sweep (new 5th test pins it),
quoted-local-part mask edge deferred as pre-existing DC-095 primitive.
Tests: 122 suites / 2790 green (+5 DC-108 pins; was 2785 post-DC-107).
If the atomicWriteJSON of rotated credentials failed after rotateKey() had
already persisted+cached the new key, the on-disk key could no longer decrypt
the on-disk credentials.json (permanent loss on restart). Catch-path now
restores the old key via new cryptoUtils.restoreKey() (canonical atomic-write,
0600, hex-validated) while still holding the proper-lockfile. Double-failure
(rollback throws) is contained and the lock is still released. Hard-crash
mid-rollback is covered by the existing .bak startup fallback.
Judge: GLM-4.6 stand-in, round-1 grade A, 0 blocking, 1 LOW polish (folded).
URN urn:ump:z2sz3x6abtcffpqyde2l2ssq34vy47t5h2gbmkr3wtmfxwkerinq
Tests: 121 suites / 2785 green (6 consecutive runs pre-fold; suite re-run post-fold).
All three writeFileSync sites in the encrypted-credentials manager now
delegate to src/utils/atomic-write.js atomicWriteJSON — rotateEncryptionKey
save, _ensureFileExists bootstrap, and the _lockedUpdate commit under the
proper-lockfile lock. A crash can no longer tear credentials.json
mid-write: power loss through the old path could leave an empty/short
file and silently drop every stored credential (DNS provider tokens etc).
Lock-safety pre-study: proper-lockfile only stats its own sibling .lock
dir, never the target file, so the rename swap cannot trip ECOMPROMISED.
Test mock extended to the fd-level fs API (openSync/writeSync/
fsyncSync/closeSync/renameSync + fdMap/closedTmp state) so the canonical
path is exercised end-to-end under the mock; write assertions moved from
writeFileSync.mock.calls to destination-state reads. New DC-106 pins:
wx+0600+fsync+rename discipline, plaintext-secret canary never on disk,
fd-lifecycle order fsync->close->rename via invocationCallOrder, and
atomic _ensureFileExists create at 0600. Eighth store migrated
(DC-099..DC-105 preceded).
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read, round-1 B/ship (deleg_b3c038c2).
URN urn:ump:vscequdet7wt5un7jhtl2nlg6cfkabsbazy5m2tjnyyguu5wstxa
(readback verified: grade B, topic codex-judge-verdict).
Sole finding is pre-existing and non-blocking: rotateEncryptionKey
persists the new key before writing rotated creds (crash window) —
queued as DC-107 follow-up.
Full suite: 121 suites / 2783 tests green.
Hermes