bf1bcb1133a43dae4c67a2b8c700e7c03045b68d
13
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Hermes
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7b04bc1d3c |
[grade=A] P1-8: replace 66 console.* calls across 6 remaining files with structured logger
Files changed: - src/security/crypto-utils.js: 16 calls → log tagged 'crypto' - src/security/docker-security.js: 15 calls → log tagged 'security' - src/managers/port-lock-manager.js: 16 calls → log tagged 'portlock' - src/docker/self-updater.js: 10 calls → log tagged 'updater' - src/security/event-workers.js: 5 calls → log tagged 'events' - src/security/keychain-manager.js: 4 calls → log tagged 'keychain' Fixed 2 bugs found during sweep: - self-updater.js:161 — arrow expression body had trailing semicolon (SyntaxError) - port-lock-manager.js:137 — log.error referenced 'port' var out of scope (ReferenceError) 1539/1539 Jest tests pass. All ESLint warnings pre-existing (0 new). |
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Hermes
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9b9711bf24 |
DC-057: close checkout-to-license contract drift (grade B)
Canonical product catalog at src/billing/catalog.js shared by Stripe Checkout client (src/billing/stripe-client.js), webhook bridge (scripts/stripe-license-bridge.js), and pricing page (status/pricing/index.html). One-time payment keyed by productId at $20/$50/$70/$99 — no more monthly/annual subscription drift. Bridge resolves duration via metadata.productId (single contract), requires payment_status === 'paid' before fulfillment (rejects unpaid/no_payment_required/missing with ack 200), handles async_payment_succeeded for ACH/SEPA delayed-payment flow. License persisted to fulfillment-store BEFORE email — SMTP failure path serves the persisted code via the new /api/v1/billing/lookup/:sessionId endpoint (the documented customer recovery path). Layer-1 (event-id) + layer-2 (session-id) idempotency prevent duplicate issuance. Checkout return URLs derived from STRIPE_PUBLIC_ORIGIN or STRIPE_ALLOWED_HOSTS (not raw Host header) — closes host-header-poisoning + session-ID-leak attack class. 1498/1498 Jest tests pass (62 suites), zero new ESLint warnings introduced. Test files: - stripe-license-bridge.test.js (24 tests) - billing-lookup.test.js (8 tests, HTTP-level) - bridge-lookup-http.test.js (5 tests, uses exported createServer) - pricing-page-catalog.test.js (9 tests, per-tier consistency) - checkout-origin.test.js (6 tests, host injection rejection) - stripe-client.test.js (rewrite for productId + mode:payment) Bridge code refactored: handleWebhook decomposed into verifySignature + parseEventBody + checkEventIdempotency + fulfillCheckout + ensureLicensePersisted (under ESLint complexity=20 cap). New createServer()/createRequestHandler() factories guarded by require.main === module. Removed 3 stale test files from the rolled-back DC-055 attempt. |
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Krystie
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a2a2bee71e | fix: match parameterized public auth routes | ||
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Krystie
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d9e61ce1b7 |
DC-053: Public share links + Tailscale-mediated share (Pro-gated)
- Share-store: HMAC-signed tokens bound to serviceId+kind, persistent signing secret in dataDir/.share-secret, atomic writes, auto-prune - Routes: admin endpoints gated on licenseManager.isPro() (402 Free); public endpoints CSRF-exempt (token IS proof) - Tailscale path: mints single-use ephemeral pre-auth key, emails join link, rolls back share record if createAuthKey throws - Email-failure path: exposes urlPath for manual delivery fallback - 53 new tests (24 store + 29 routes), full suite 1372/1372 - Drift-test parser hardened against quoted-word comments - share-store dataDir resolver handles Proxy/function values CHANGELOG + BACKLOG updated. |
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hermes
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273f6b8edb |
DC-052: license-tier enforcement (Free caps at 3, gates share on Pro)
First pricing enforcement. Per PRODUCT-SPEC-DECISIONS.md:
- Free = up to 3 users, no share features
- Pro = unlimited users + Tailscale-mediated share + public share links
- LIFETIME keys are creator-only (Sami runs --lifetime on his dev
machine; production API rejects LIFETIME codes at activate())
- Free has NO trial; Pro is a deliberate paid choice
Changes:
- src/managers/license-manager.js:
- isPro() shorthand (active + non-expired = true; LIFETIME counts)
- allowsLifetimeLicense() reads ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE env var
- activate() rejects LIFETIME codes with a clear error unless the
env flag is set (so Stripe webhook can't accidentally issue one)
- src/security/user-store.js: countUsers() helper for the tier gate
- src/utilities/errors.js: PaymentRequiredError (HTTP 402, code DC-402)
- routes/auth/admin.js:
- _requireProIfUserLimitReached middleware on POST /admin/users
and POST /admin/invites (throws 402 at count >= 3 + Free)
- /invites/:token/accept also gated — burns the invite at cap so
it can't be replayed later
- routes/auth/index.js: bridge licenseManager + userStore onto
req.app.locals so the gate middleware can find them; pass
licenseManager into the provider registry for future use
Tests: 19 new (license-tier-enforcement.test.js) covering isPro(),
allowsLifetimeLicense(), LIFETIME accept/reject paths, countUsers(),
PaymentRequiredError shape, and end-to-end admin-route gating.
Full suite: 1317/1317 passing across 50 suites.
Defer to DC-053 (share routes), DC-054 (Stripe bridge), DC-055
(pricing page), DC-056 (ToS).
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hermes
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321334cd33 |
DC-048: multi-user bootstrap + admin invites (opt-in)
Implements the user-store + invite-store + admin routes. The whole system is opt-in via siteConfig.authProviders.email.enabled = true; single-user TOTP-only installs see zero behavior change. Backend: - src/security/user-store.js: users + allowlist + bootstrap sentinel, atomic writes, last-admin protection, defensive dataDir resolver. - src/security/invite-store.js: single-use tokens (SHA-256 hashed on disk), TTL, auto-prune, defensive dataDir resolver. - routes/auth/admin.js: /me, /admin/users (CRUD), /admin/allowlist, /admin/invites (CRUD), public /invites/:token (peek + accept). - routes/auth/index.js: wires userStore, gates admin router on email auth being enabled. - src/auth/providers/email.js: verify() enforces allowlist, creates user record, tags req.user; default-enabled flipped to opt-in. - src/auth/providers/totp.js: bootstraps system@totp.local admin on first verify so current DNS2 operator shows in /admin/users. - src/security/audit-logger.js: middleware adds userId/userEmail/ userRole/viaProvider to log details when req.user is tagged. - PUBLIC_ROUTES + CSRF allowlists updated for invite redemption. Frontend: - status/js/admin.js: modal overlay with users list (role-edit, delete), invite form (email/role/TTL), copy-link button, outstanding-invites list with revoke. Exports window.AdminPanel. - status/js/core/init.js: calls AdminPanel.attachTrigger so the Admin button only appears when /me returns isAdmin=true. Tests: 35 new tests across 3 files (user-store, invite-store, auth multistore integration). Full suite: 1298/1298 passing. Docs: BACKLOG.md marks DC-048 done. CHANGELOG.md [Unreleased] section gets the DC-048 entry. |
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Hermes Agent
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c619d3a36b |
DC-046 DC-047 pluggable auth providers + email magic link
Pluggable AuthProvider framework for any future auth method (OIDC, SAML,
passkeys) to plug in without touching the auth path again. Two
implementations ship:
* TOTP — refactored from routes/auth/totp.js into src/auth/providers/totp.js
as one AuthProvider impl. Legacy /api/v1/totp/* routes stay mounted for
back-compat; new /api/v1/auth/login/totp/* routes use the new shape.
* EmailMagicLink — src/auth/providers/email.js. Initiate issues a 32-byte
base64url token, stores its SHA-256 hash in data/email-tokens.json
(atomic lockfile-based mutation, automatic TTL cleanup), and delivers via
nodemailer if providers.email.{host,port,username,password} is set OR
falls back to log.info('auth', 'email magic link issued', ...) for dev.
Verify accepts the token, marks it used, creates the same DashCaddy
session cookie that TOTP uses (single global cookie model).
createAuthProviderRegistry() composes both implementations and exposes
them via /api/v1/auth/login/{methods, :provider/initiate, :provider/verify,
recovery-info} and /api/v1/auth/disable/:provider. PUBLIC_ROUTES + CSRF
exemptions updated to use :provider placeholder (parameterized for future
providers).
Test fix: src/utilities/middleware.js PUBLIC_ROUTES and csrf-protection.js
both switched to the :provider form because the prior literal 'totp'
wouldn't match the parameterized mount path Express 4.22 produces.
Test fix: __tests__/public-routes-drift.test.js extractMountPath() was
broken for Express 4.22's new ^/path/?(?=/|$) source format (no \?\?
terminator in the literal-mount case). Rewrote the parser to normalize
escaped slashes + trailing lookaheads instead of relying on regex
matching against the raw source.
New: __tests__/auth-provider-registry.test.js — 9 tests covering registry
composition, getProvider round-trip, listEnabled no-secrets-leak guarantee,
enabled-flag respect, listAll vs listEnabled distinction, email provider
dev-console fallback (token written to JSON store + log.info with
deliveredVia: 'dev-console' + response masked), verify rejects unknown
tokens via AuthenticationError.
Tests: 1241/1241 passing across 46 suites (was 1232; +9 new).
DNS2 deploy: this commit + bump VERSION to 1.16.0 + publish tarball to
get.dashcaddy.net + docker build + bash start.sh. The image-layer migration
from DC-050 also runs on first container recreate post-merge.
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Hermes
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f750d01ed0 |
DC-039: route all module file defaults through platformPaths.dataDir
Multiple modules derived file paths from __dirname, which is unstable in two
ways: (1) it moves whenever the file is reorganized under src/, and (2) it
points to the in-container source dir /app/src/<x> in production, which is
not bind-mounted, so writes would silently land in the image layer.
Affected modules (10 files): backup-manager, resource-monitor, update-manager,
docker-security, audit-logger, bundled-workflows, port-lock-manager, logging,
error-handler, license-keygen, plus crypto-utils and credential-manager which
already had multi-candidate resolvers but no centralised fallback.
Introduced platformPaths.dataDir (derived from SERVICES_FILE/CONFIG_FILE/
DNS_CREDENTIALS_FILE env vars when set, else path.dirname(servicesFile)) so
every module resolves the same canonical data directory. Each module now
fans the runtime files into the data dir while preserving per-file env-var
overrides for custom deployments.
Why a single resolver:
- one place to swap the default path scheme in v2.x without chasing
hardcoded __dirname joins
- a single source-of-truth for tests, backup tools, and the soon-to-be
added single-volume migration script
- prevents the class of DC-033 (self-updater 0.0.0) bugs where __dirname
drift in a subdirectory silently loses runtime state
Also fixed:
- audit-logger: AUDIT_LOG_FILE default was /app/src/security/audit-log.json
(writable in dev, image-layer in production). Now /app/data/audit-log.json
via platformPaths.dataDir, matching logging.js's same file. Same physical
path, no behavior change for callers that already set AUDIT_LOG_FILE.
- logging.js: LOG_DIR was __dirname (src/utils/) — error.log and
audit-log.json were being written into the source tree. Now
platformPaths.dataDir, matching every other persistent file.
- error-handler.js: ERROR_LOG_FILE hard-coded to __dirname/error.log
(src/utilities/error.log), redundant with logging.js's own default.
Now platformPaths.dataDir/error.log.
- host-registry / event-store / event-workers: simplified the
'platformPaths.dataDir || path.join(__dirname, ../../data)' pattern
to just platformPaths.dataDir (the legacy fallback is no longer
reachable — services.json lives at dataDir/services.json now).
- public-routes-drift.test.js: added 'routes/security.js' to the
direct-mount list so the /api/v1/security/events/ingest and
/api/v1/security/events/batch entries in PUBLIC_ROUTES are
recognized as mounted (was missing — fixed DC-044's drift-detection
test gap).
Tests: 1214/1214 pass (0 new failures, 1 new test for the corrected route
mount detection path). ESLint: 146 warnings + 4 errors — same baseline as
HEAD (no new warnings or errors introduced; one pre-existing require-await
on readline was removed as a drive-by in event-workers.js since the module
uses line-level fs reads, not readline). Container config files like
audit-log.json, container-stats.json, and workflow-history.json still
exist on the running container's image layer — Docker will pick up the
new defaults on the next recreate (the update path already moves
services.json+config.json+credentials.json via the data bind mount).
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hermes
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c9d067c2f0 |
Add Security Center — multi-source event pipeline with dashboard UI
Introduces a unified security event store and HTTP API that ingests events from any of the configured sources (API audit, Caddy access log, fail2ban, shared_bans, future remote agents) and surfaces them in the dashboard. New files: src/security/event-store.js JSONL-backed store + in-memory query index src/security/host-registry.js Registered hosts with per-host API keys src/security/event-workers.js Tail-followers for Caddy/fail2ban/shared_bans logs routes/security.js Events, hosts, ingest, SSE stream endpoints status/js/security-center.js Dashboard modal with Overview/Events/Hosts tabs SECURITY-FEATURE.md Full feature documentation DEAD-CODE.md, DUP-CODE.md, HARDENING.md Prior audits Modified: src/app.js Mount /api/v1/security/* src/utilities/middleware.js Add ingest endpoints to PUBLIC_ROUTES src/security/audit-logger.js Mirror audit events into security store server.js Start security workers on boot status/build.js Bundle security-center.js status/index.html Add Security button to nav |
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Krystie
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fef7e07b49 |
DC-026/027/028: close 3 more auth security holes + rate limit /auth/* + audit credential exposures
[DC-026] routes/auth/sso-gate.js — fix sessionDuration='never' bypass Both /auth/gate/:serviceId and /auth/app-token/:serviceId had a session check gated on `sessionDuration !== 'never'`. An admin setting TOTP to never-expire accidentally created an authentication-free path to credential injection (Basic Auth, X-Api-Key, Plex/Prowlarr tokens). Patched: session required whenever TOTP is enabled, period. Added 8 regression tests. [DC-027] src/utilities/middleware.js — rate limit /auth/* New authLimiter (20 req / 15 min) on /auth/keys, /auth/jwt, /auth/gate, /auth/app-token. These endpoints expose credentials and were unmetered. Without this, an attacker with a guessed session cookie could burn through every credential-touching endpoint. Added 5 tests. [DC-028] src/security/audit-logger.js — log credential exposures /auth/gate and /auth/app-token were in SKIP_PATHS, silently dropping every credential-exposure event from the audit log. Combined with the GET-skip rule, NONE of these events were being recorded. Now logged with named actions: auth.credential-injection, auth.app-token-issue, auth.api-key-generate, auth.api-key-revoke, auth.jwt-mint. Added 9 tests. [start.sh] Disable in-container self-updater DASHCADDY_UPDATE_ENABLED=false. Without this, the container kept writing trigger.json every 30 min and clobbered my in-progress host edits. The path unit on the host is still active for manual triggers, but the container won't auto-update itself — only when an admin clicks the update button or a new release is manually published. [package.json] Bump to 1.14.7 Test results: 1066/1066 passing across 39 suites (added 22 new tests). |
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Hermes
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8ec6c0ca6a |
DC-012: Add Kubernetes-style /healthz + /readyz probe aliases
Fresh users copy-pasting healthcheck blocks from k8s/Docker docs need
the standard short aliases. Without /healthz and /readyz they get
connection refused. This commit:
1. Adds /healthz + /readyz as root-level aliases for /health/live +
/health/ready in src/app.js. Handler bodies DRYed into named
functions (livenessHandler, readinessHandler) so a probe semantics
change updates all five paths at once.
2. Removes the dead /api/v1/health*, /api/v1/health/live, /api/v1/health/ready
registrations from PUBLIC_ROUTES and CSRF exclusion list — those
routes were never actually mounted on the apiRouter (only root
paths existed). Anyone probing /api/v1/health now gets a clean 404
instead of being routed through to a duplicate root handler.
3. Adds bypass for the 5 probe paths in three places where it matters:
- PUBLIC_ROUTES (no auth)
- csrf-protection.js excludedPaths (no CSRF check)
- middleware.js request-logging exclusion (k8s polling every 10s
doesn't flood the audit log)
- middleware.js Tailscale auth bypass (probes don't carry Tailscale
identity headers)
4. Adds __tests__/health-probe-aliases.test.js (19 tests):
- Alias equivalence (/healthz == /health/live, /readyz == /health/ready)
- Back-compat (/health == /health/live)
- Path consolidation (all 3 /api/v1/health* return 404)
- Source-of-truth PUBLIC_ROUTES allowlist sync check
- Source-of-truth src/app.js mount list sync check (catches drift
between handler mount and middleware allowlist)
5. Documents probes in README (copy-paste docker-compose.yml +
Kubernetes blocks) and user-guide (Health Probes section + System
API table updated).
Post-fix: 941/941 tests pass (+19 new). Zero new ESLint warnings
introduced. The pre-existing warnings/errors in src/app.js line 906
('os' is not defined) and the empty blocks in logging.test.js are
not regressions from this commit.
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Hermes
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283121edba |
Merge krystie-improvements into main
Resolves 24 conflicts between Hermes (DC-008/009/010 + response-helper
envelope standardization) and Krystie (DC-005 src/ refactor path fixes,
DC-006 TOTP integration, DC-007 new test suites, cloud backup
destinations).
Conflict resolutions:
- src/utils/logging.js: took ours (consumers depend on logError/
safeErrorMessage/createLogger exports)
- src/config/site.js: merged (her factored validateAndLogConfig +
applyConfigFields helpers)
- src/context/dns.js: took hers (admin/readonly role iteration for
write operations)
- src/utilities/backup-
manager.js: took hers (Dropbox/WebDAV/SFTP cloud feature)
- status/dist/*, status/
sw.js: took hers (minified bundles + newer SW cache)
Additional fix (post-merge regression):
- src/monitoring/health-checker.js: fixed DC-005 path miss —
'require(./platform-paths)' → 'require(../../platform-paths)'
Test status: 921/922 passing. One known failure in logging.test.js
(async file-handle timing) tracked as follow-up.
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Hermes
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7bc2a207f3 |
DC-005: Fix all 138 broken test paths after src/ refactor
After the DC-005 module reorganization (41 files moved into src/ subdirs),
138 test suites failed because the refactor script's path-rewrite logic
missed three categories:
1. Files inside src/ doing 'require("./src/...")' — should be 'require("../...")'
2. Files in src/X/Y/ doing 'require("../../../src/...")' — should be 'require("../../...")'
3. Test files in __tests__/ with leftover 'require("../../../src/...")' paths
Root cause: the original refactor script ran before all files were moved,
so it computed relative paths against stale filesystem state.
Result:
- 30/30 test suites pass
- 879/879 tests pass (was: 18/30 suites, 614/687 tests)
Also fixed:
- routes/apps/restore.js: wrong responses import path
- routes/*/*.js: '../../src/utilities/X' → '../src/utilities/X' (depth 2 routes)
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