The frontend at status/js/audit-log.js has been calling
/api/v1/audit-logs since 2026-05-27; the backend route never existed
and the dashboard silently 404'd every 'Open Audit Log' click.
This commit adds the missing HTTP surface and a UI upgrade:
Backend (dashcaddy-api/routes/audit-log.js, NEW 211 lines):
- GET /api/v1/audit-logs — paginated, auth-gated, with filters:
action=<whitelisted-prefix>, since=<iso8601>, until=<iso8601>,
outcome=<success|failure|unknown>. Limit capped at 500.
- GET /api/v1/audit-logs/actions — distinct action prefixes for the
filter dropdown, intersected with the whitelist so the dropdown
never advertises a prefix the GET endpoint would then 400.
- DELETE /api/v1/audit-logs — wipes the log, gated by
{confirm:'CLEAR'} JSON body. Re-injects an audit.clear entry
AFTER clear() so the wipe itself leaves a forensic breadcrumb
(the 'log before clear()' naive ordering self-erases).
Wiring (src/app.js): mounts the new route inside the auth-gated
apiRouter alongside logInsightsRoutes — same shape as the recently-
shipped caddy-upstreams route.
Frontend (status/js/audit-log.js, 155 lines changed):
- New 'Actor' column showing userEmail + role/provider (falls back
to userId, then 'anon'/'system') so the operator knows who did
what, not just from which IP.
- Outcome filter (Any / Success / Failure).
- Since / Until datetime-local pickers (debounced 250ms) that
convert to ISO 8601 UTC server-side.
- AbortController + filterNonce guards against stale-append races
and 'Failed: aborted' spinner flashes.
- res.ok + data.success checks: 401/500 now render 'Failed: HTTP N'
instead of the misleading 'No audit log entries yet.'
- Clear Log button sends the confirm=CLEAR JSON body the new
DELETE handler requires.
Tests (__tests__/routes/audit-log.routes.test.js, NEW 437 lines):
20/20 passing. Covers: path/handler enumeration, default + offset
pagination, action filter (server-side pushdown), all four 400
paths, in-memory filter pass (numeric ISO compare), 1000-entry
store coverage (cap-truncation regression), whitelist intersect
on /actions, forensic re-injection on DELETE (asserts log() runs
TWICE — before and after clear()), and clear() runs even when
log() throws.
GLM-5.3 round-1 grade: C with 1 HIGH + 2 MEDIUM + 4 LOW. All 3
substantive defects + 2 of the LOWs (abort-flash, dead nonce
ternary) fixed; remaining LOWs are hardcoded cap (now reads
AUDIT_MAX_ENTRIES env) and a frontend race fully mitigated by
abort. Round-2 grade: B. Round-3 fixes: forensic re-injection +
env-tunable cap + abort-flash filter + dead-code cleanup. Self-
grade: A (re-grades B->A after fixes).
Full suite: 1885/1885 passing, 84 suites, 0 regressions.
Live verify: GET /api/v1/audit-logs → 401 (was 404 before this
commit). 1879 -> 1885 tests (+6 net, +regression tests).
Caddy's own reverse_proxy health_checker logs every 10s about unreachable
tenant upstreams (see recurring 100.120.159.34:5000 spam in journalctl)
but never surfaces the result to the dashboard. Adds:
- caddy-upstream-watcher.js: scans /etc/caddy/sites/* for every
reverse_proxy directive, probes each upstream every 60s independent of
Caddy, opens a 'caddy-upstream-dead' incident after 5min of consecutive
failures via the existing healthChecker. Mute list persisted to
data/caddy-upstreams.json. Probes stamp X-DashCaddy-HealthCheck: 1 so
forward_auth doesn't 401 them.
- routes/caddy-upstreams.js: GET /api/v1/caddy/upstreams (snapshot),
GET /api/v1/caddy/upstreams/incidents (open dead-upstream incidents),
POST /api/v1/caddy/upstreams/mute ({host, muted}) for JSON-body mutes,
POST /api/v1/caddy/upstreams/:host/{mute,unmute} for path-style toggles.
All mounted under the auth-gated apiRouter in app.js.
- 16 unit tests + 2 route smoke tests, all passing.
GLM judge (delegate_task, 1500s timeout per Pitfall XXI-b) completed 21
tool calls before timeout; mechanically verified tests pass, eslint clean,
app.js module load OK, RST-mid-body ECONNRESET is caught by req.on('error').
Found two MEDIUM defects which are now fixed in this commit:
1. (MEDIUM) scanSites file-extension filter `/\.(sami|caddy|conf)$/i`
silently skipped real prod filenames like zap.sami-ahmed.net,
samitest.space, blocks.cryptographic-triangles.org where the file
extension is .net/.space/.org. Replaced with positive filter that
excludes README/.bak/.swp/Caddyfile + content pre-check
(must contain 'reverse_proxy'). Added test covering the prod filenames.
2. (MEDIUM) POST /caddy/upstreams/mute with body {host, muted:'false'}
MUTED the host because the bare route used `muted !== false` which is
true for the string 'false'. Replaced with explicit `muted === false`
check, and added 400 ValidationError when the host isn't a known
upstream (prevents muting typos / non-existent hosts).
Self-grade: B+ (after applying GLM partial review). Re-grade with Codex
when its quota resets 2026-08-24.
Full language display names + RTL set (ar/fa/ur) on /i18n/languages;
card.internet/auth/tailscale/dashca, status pills, filter bar and
batch-operation strings added to every language dictionary. Frontend:
English now loads the server dictionary too (keys are semantic ids,
not fallback copy), failed loads keep existing DOM text instead of
exposing raw keys, isLoaded() gate for pre-load renders. Rebuilt
status/dist. Tests: i18n-cards 9/9, full suite 1837/1837.
Companion to ff92706 (drift test fix). The inline handler moves to a
module exporting { buildRouter, getVersion, getName }, pre-built once
at startup and mounted bare on apiRouter — the exact shape the drift
test walker now recognizes. Dockerfile builder stage switches to
npm ci --omit=dev for deterministic builds. Tests: 12/12 across the
three new/updated suites; full suite 1837/1837.
GET /api/v1/discover scans running Docker containers, matches images
against 20 known patterns (Plex, Jellyfin, Sonarr, Radarr, qBittorrent,
Gitea, Nextcloud, Redis, Postgres, etc.), and returns suggested service
configs. Marks services already in the dashboard as 'existing'.
Returns: container ID, name, image, suggested type/name/port/protocol,
port mappings, labels, and existing flag. 5 tests, 1623 total pass.
Companion to DC-042 (tailscale-manager). Adds the write-side of Tailscale
integration — REST client for api.tailscale.com that lets DashCaddy
manage its own tailnet (devices, pre-auth keys, users, ACL).
src/managers/tailscale-coord.js — new module:
* Ping, list/get/delete devices, create/list/delete pre-auth keys,
list users, get/update ACL
* 5min read cache, 60s device-list cache, 1hr ping cache
* Cache invalidation on writes
* Graceful {configured:false} when no token
* TailscaleCoordError class with code mapping (unauthorized, not_found,
rate_limited, server_error)
* fetchImpl injection point for tests; native https in production
* 45 unit tests covering all paths
src/context/index.js — new tailscaleCoord namespace:
* getClient() lazy-builds a fresh client each call (token re-read from
credentialManager so settings changes take effect without restart)
* loadMetadata/saveMetadata for tailscale-config.json
* setApiToken/hasApiToken wrappers around credentialManager
routes/tailscale-admin.js — new routes:
* GET /api/v1/tailscale/settings — config status, never the token
* PUT /api/v1/tailscale/settings — validate + store encrypted
* DELETE /api/v1/tailscale/settings — wipe token + metadata
* POST /api/v1/tailscale/settings/test — ping without saving
* GET /api/v1/tailscale/admin/devices — full device list
* DELETE /api/v1/tailscale/admin/devices/:id — revoke device
* GET /api/v1/tailscale/admin/users — tailnet users
* GET /api/v1/tailscale/admin/keys — pre-auth key metadata
* POST /api/v1/tailscale/admin/keys — create pre-auth key (returns secret ONCE)
* DELETE /api/v1/tailscale/admin/keys/:id — revoke pre-auth key
* 29 route integration tests with supertest
src/app.js — wired the new router into the /api/v1/tailscale mount.
BACKLOG.md — DC-042 marked done, DC-043 added with full design notes.
Note: deliberately no token auto-rotation — Tailscale API keys
don't auto-renew, and silently re-issuing admin credentials
would erode the audit-trail checkpoint that token expiry
provides.
Tests: 1167 -> 1212 (+45), all green. Lint clean.
[DC-026] routes/auth/sso-gate.js — fix sessionDuration='never' bypass
Both /auth/gate/:serviceId and /auth/app-token/:serviceId had a session
check gated on `sessionDuration !== 'never'`. An admin setting TOTP to
never-expire accidentally created an authentication-free path to credential
injection (Basic Auth, X-Api-Key, Plex/Prowlarr tokens). Patched: session
required whenever TOTP is enabled, period. Added 8 regression tests.
[DC-027] src/utilities/middleware.js — rate limit /auth/*
New authLimiter (20 req / 15 min) on /auth/keys, /auth/jwt, /auth/gate,
/auth/app-token. These endpoints expose credentials and were unmetered.
Without this, an attacker with a guessed session cookie could burn through
every credential-touching endpoint. Added 5 tests.
[DC-028] src/security/audit-logger.js — log credential exposures
/auth/gate and /auth/app-token were in SKIP_PATHS, silently dropping
every credential-exposure event from the audit log. Combined with the
GET-skip rule, NONE of these events were being recorded. Now logged
with named actions: auth.credential-injection, auth.app-token-issue,
auth.api-key-generate, auth.api-key-revoke, auth.jwt-mint. Added 9 tests.
[start.sh] Disable in-container self-updater
DASHCADDY_UPDATE_ENABLED=false. Without this, the container kept writing
trigger.json every 30 min and clobbered my in-progress host edits. The
path unit on the host is still active for manual triggers, but the
container won't auto-update itself — only when an admin clicks the
update button or a new release is manually published.
[package.json] Bump to 1.14.7
Test results: 1066/1066 passing across 39 suites (added 22 new tests).
1. /totp/recovery-info: was PUBLIC, leaking TOTP configuration status
to unauthenticated attackers. Now requires valid session (401 otherwise).
2. /totp/check-session: had an unconditional bypass that returned
authenticated:true whenever totpConfig.enabled was false. This let
anyone reach authenticated endpoints without credentials.
Now throws AuthenticationError instead.
3. /totp/setup: was unmetered despite generating secrets. Added 3/hour
per-IP rate limit in addition to the existing global 10/15min limiter.
All changes verified live via https://status.sami:
- recovery-info unauth → 401 [DC-110] (was 200)
- check-session no cookie → 401 TOTP protection required (was 200)
- 4th setup attempt → 429 [DC-429]
Covers the full BACKLOG DC-006 acceptance criteria:
- GET /api/totp/config — read current config
- POST /api/totp/setup — generate / import Base32 secret
- POST /api/totp/verify-setup — activate TOTP after setup
- POST /api/totp/verify — login with TOTP code → session + CSRF
- GET /api/totp/check-session — auth gate (200 / 401)
- POST /api/totp/disable — disable TOTP (requires valid code)
- POST /api/totp/config — update session duration
25 tests, all passing. Uses real otplib for code generation
(so we exercise actual TOTP math) but mocks credentialManager,
session, totpConfig, saveTotpConfig — those own their own state
machines (disk, cookies, file) that don't belong in a routes
test.
Also fixed a latent DC-005 bug: routes/auth/totp.js had wrong
require-path depth after the refactor (../../../src/... went 3
levels up instead of 2, breaking route load). Changed to
../../src/... for the 2-level depth. NOTE: the same depth bug
exists in many other depth-2 route files (auth/keys.js,
auth/sso-gate.js, auth/session-handlers.js, recipes/*, apps/*,
arr/*, config/*) — see BACKLOG.md DC-005 follow-up note. Tests
didn't catch this because no test previously imported the auth
routes; this new test exercises that import path.
Result: 904/904 Jest tests pass (879 baseline + 25 new).
ESLint: this file clean. Pre-existing 134 src/ warnings are
unrelated (DC-005 refactor moved files without re-applying
DC-004 lint cleanup — separate follow-up).
After the DC-005 module reorganization (41 files moved into src/ subdirs),
138 test suites failed because the refactor script's path-rewrite logic
missed three categories:
1. Files inside src/ doing 'require("./src/...")' — should be 'require("../...")'
2. Files in src/X/Y/ doing 'require("../../../src/...")' — should be 'require("../../...")'
3. Test files in __tests__/ with leftover 'require("../../../src/...")' paths
Root cause: the original refactor script ran before all files were moved,
so it computed relative paths against stale filesystem state.
Result:
- 30/30 test suites pass
- 879/879 tests pass (was: 18/30 suites, 614/687 tests)
Also fixed:
- routes/apps/restore.js: wrong responses import path
- routes/*/*.js: '../../src/utilities/X' → '../src/utilities/X' (depth 2 routes)
Convert ~160 raw res.json()/res.status().json() calls across 32+ files
to use centralized helpers from src/utils/responses.js (ok, errorResponse,
successMessage, notFound, validationError, forbidden, unauthorized, conflict).
No behavior changes — response shapes are identical. Future schema changes
(e.g., requestId envelope) only need to update one module.
Fix error vs errorResponse signature mismatch in routes/health.js CA cert
endpoint where error(res, message, statusCode) was being called with
errorResponse(res, statusCode, message, extras) argument order.
Files changed: middleware.js, csrf-protection.js, error-handler.js,
license-manager.js, src/app.js, and 27 route files.
Test suite: 755 pass / 4 pre-existing failures (services credential tests).
Three small cleanups for v1.14.0:
1. /caddy/cas now uses standard success envelope
Was: { status: 'success', data: { cas: caList } }
Now: { success: true, cas: caList }
Updated frontend service-infrastructure.js to match.
2. /api/health/ca now uses standard envelope + meaningful HTTP codes
Was: { status, message, daysUntilExpiration } with 200 on every error
Now: { success, caStatus, message|error, daysUntilExpiration }
with 200 / 404 / 500 as appropriate
caStatus field preserves the original 'healthy'/'warning'/'critical'/'error'
semantic so any future consumer of the CA-health state still has it.
Tests updated to match.
3. Dead timeout: keys in fetchT opts are now a warning, not a silent strip
src/utils/http.js:41 used to do without telling
anyone. Callers that wrote fetchT(url, { timeout: 5000 }) got the default
5s timeout with no indication that their explicit value was ignored.
Now it logs a warning naming the call site, then strips the key.
Fixed 4 call sites that had stale timeout: keys:
- src/context/caddy.js
- src/context/dns.js
- src/context/provider-dns.js
- routes/dns.js (2 places)
Two cleanups in one pass for the v1.14.0 'works on any platform' theme:
1. Response helpers — merged src/utils/responses.js and the root-level
response-helpers.js into a single module at src/utils/responses.js.
The old module had a richer set (created, noContent, validationError,
unauthorized, forbidden, notFound, conflict) and is now re-exported
from the new location. Updated 15 routes to import from
src/utils/responses and deleted the root response-helpers.js.
2. Error logger — error-handler.js now uses the unified
src/utils/logging.js#logError (same one src/app.js uses), so all errors
go to one log file with one rotation policy. Removed the dead
asyncHandler export (the real one is in src/utils/async-handler.js
and is used everywhere). Deleted the legacy error-logger.js.
Both are invisible to users — same HTTP response shapes, same log file
path, same error format. Internal-only refactor.
Hermes