Domain=.sami cookies are silently rejected by real browsers - .sami is an
unregistered custom TLD, so browsers treat sami itself as the effective
public suffix and refuse to set a cookie scoped to it (the same rule that
stops a site from setting a supercookie for all of .com). Confirmed via
curl verbose (cookie dropped, domain must not set cookies for sami) and
via the Firefox console on the actual device (Cookie rejected for invalid
domain) for the same cookie. The session cookie set on status.sami after
TOTP verify could never reach plex.sami/jellyfin.sami/emby.sami/chat.sami
no matter how the cookie itself was built - prior fixes tonight left this
mechanism untouched, which is why the loop persisted.
Fix: /totp/verify mints a short-lived (60s) single-use opaque token. The
status.sami frontend appends it to the redirect URL when bouncing the
user back to a gated service. That services login page exchanges the
token via the new public GET /api/v1/auth/sso-exchange for a host-only
session cookie (no Domain attribute - always accepted). isSessionValid
only checks the cookies HMAC signature, never its Domain, so the host-only
cookie validates identically to the cross-domain one on every existing
check with zero changes to that logic.
New module status/js/auth-gate.js owns the Caddy ?auth=required flow.
On load it queries GET /api/v1/auth/login/methods to discover which
AuthProviders are configured. Three branches:
* 0 providers → legacy TOTP overlay (delegates to window._showTotpOverlay)
* 1 provider (totp only) → legacy TOTP overlay (delegates, no UI change)
* 2+ providers → provider selector with 'Sign in with …' buttons
Email provider challenge is a single email input + 'Send sign-in link'
button. POST to /api/v1/auth/login/email/initiate. On success the UI
shows 'check the server logs' message if deliveredVia == 'dev-console'
(production hosts without SMTP fall back gracefully) or 'check your
inbox' when SMTP is configured.
TOTP button just calls window.location.reload() — simplest path because
totp-auth.js wires the 6-digit input handlers at module-load time, and
a reload re-runs all IIFEs with the original markup. Same behavior as
the legacy single-provider path.
Coordination with totp-auth.js: auth-gate.js sets window.__dc_049_handled
= true at IIFE entry. totp-auth.js's top-level ?auth=required check
reads that flag and skips its own UI when set — eliminates the flicker
in multi-provider installs. Single-provider installs still work because
the legacy code path is unchanged (auth-gate delegates to it).
Bundle order in build.js: auth-gate.js BEFORE totp-auth.js so the flag
is set in time.
Webpack-style bundle markers verified offline: __dc_049_handled,
auth-gate-email-input, provider-btn, _showAuthGate, totp_redirect all
present in dist/core.js (now 20 files, 248KB raw / 153KB min). New SW
cache hash dashcaddy-shell-680e230383 (was 743f9c17b0).
- status/js/totp-recovery.js: NEW. Wires up recovery panel on the TOTP
gate. Pastes Base32 -> /api/v1/totp/setup -> /verify-setup -> session.
Exposes window._refreshRecoveryLink() called by totp-auth.js.
- status/js/totp-auth.js: showTotpOverlay() now calls
_refreshRecoveryLink() so the recovery link hides when TOTP is healthy
and appears when it's broken.
- status/js/totp-settings.js: removed setupSection.style.display='none'
so 'Import existing secret' is always visible; added 'Download backup
file' button after setup that exports the Base32 + recovery
instructions as JSON.
- status/index.html: added 'Lost access? Recover with saved Base32
key ->' link to the TOTP overlay plus the recovery panel itself;
added title tooltip to the auth card reminding users to save the
Base32 on first setup.
- status/build.js: include JS('totp-recovery.js') in the core bundle
after totp-auth.js (since recovery registers a hook auth calls).
- Fix service edit double-write bug (was creating duplicate entries)
- Add editable display name field to service edit modal
- Backend update endpoint now accepts name, logo, and recalculates url
- Fix CSRF token regeneration breaking all POST requests (nonce was
being regenerated on every request, invalidating cached tokens)
- CSRF nonce now persists across requests, rotated only on TOTP login
- Frontend secureFetch auto-retries on CSRF failure with fresh token
- Restore lifetime license activation on DNS2
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Escape all innerHTML assignments with user/external data across 12 JS files
- Upgrade credential encryption: per-value IV, key moved to sessionStorage
- Fix open redirect in TOTP auth via proper URL hostname validation
- Remove sensitive DNS topology data from localStorage cache
- Add security regression test suite (51 tests)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full codebase including API server (32 modules + routes), dashboard frontend,
DashCA certificate distribution, installer script, and deployment skills.
Hermes