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Author SHA1 Message Date
Hermes 0e7bb97129 [glm-grade=A] fix(log-insights): wire dispose to /app/data paths + bound keepDays (DC-081)
Pre-fix, the dispose endpoint + storage info block in dashcaddy-api/routes/log-insights.js
HARDCODED /opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/data/audit-log.json and
/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/data/security-events.jsonl, which DO NOT EXIST in the
production container (verified 2026-08-19 01:42Z: /app/data/audit-log.json = 318 KB,
/app/data/security-events.jsonl = 15 MB, /opt/... = ENOENT). The dispose endpoint
silently no-op'd (read empty arrays, wrote empty arrays back); the storage block in
GET was always empty.

Also: parseInt(req.body.keepDays) || 30 accepted negative numbers. keepDays = -1000
produces a cutoff +3 years in the future, then the filter e.timestamp < cutoff
deletes 100% of the audit log. Operators must not be able to wipe forensic context
with a typo.

Fix:
  * _resolvePaths() uses process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE || path.join(platformPaths.dataDir, 'audit-log.json'),
    matching the canonical resolution in src/security/audit-logger.js and src/security/event-store.js.
    Both GET + POST share the resolved paths (single source of truth).
  * _validateKeepDays() rejects undefined/null/NaN/Infinity/-Infinity/strings-of-floats/
    non-integers/out-of-range input with a clear error BEFORE any file IO.
    Allowed: integer in [1, 3650] (1 day .. 10 years).
  * POST /log-insights/dispose now requires { keepDays: integer 1..3650, confirm: true }.
    Preview is read-only. Confirm branch audits-the-wipe BEFORE the actual delete
    (matches the audit-logs/DELETE + error-logs/DELETE pattern).
  * Atomic write for audit-log.json (tmp + rename) — a crash mid-write cannot leave
    the file half-empty (state-manager reads it on every container start).

Tests (23 new, dashcaddy-api/__tests__/routes/log-insights.routes.test.js):
  * _validateKeepDays: 6 tests (rejects undefined/NaN/Infinity/floats/negative/0/3651; accepts 1..3650; coerces numeric strings).
  * _resolvePaths: 3 tests (default-fallback + env-override + canonical-match-against-audit-logger+event-store).
  * POST /log-insights/dispose: 14 tests via real Express stack (rejects -1000/0/Infinity/30.5/>3650; preview/confirm round-trip;
    confirm=false treated as preview; preview-includes-resolved-paths; missing-file-handled; corrupt-parse 500;
    wrong-shape 500; -1000-core-regression — sentinel file survives).

GLM-5.3 round 1: A.
2026-08-18 18:56:13 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop 98737995a9 Merge dc/DC-080: Tailscale admin endpoint validation hardening (DC-080) [glm-grade=B]
CI / Security audit (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / Test & Lint (push) Canceled after 0s
2026-08-18 18:35:59 -07:00
Hermes 99ec6ebc53 fix(tailscale-admin): harden apiToken/tags/description validation (DC-080) [glm-grade=B]
DC-080 round-1 GLM-5.3 judge verdict: B. Round-2 polish folded into same
commit per multi-round fix-first protocol: tighten tag regex to require
non-empty name after 'tag:' (matches Tailscale spec), drop dead
`module.exports.createApp = null` line.

THREAT MODEL
Pre-fix, /api/v1/tailscale/* and /api/v1/tailscale/admin/* (TOTP-gated)
had inconsistent checks on caller-supplied input. Three coupled gaps:

  (a) PUT /settings validated `apiToken.startsWith('tskey-api-')` but
      had NO length cap — body-parser limit was the only ceiling. A 1 MB
      string starting with `tskey-api-` would be `.trim()`-ed, sent to
      Tailscale's /devices endpoint, and waste server-side CPU on a
      request that will always 401.
  (b) POST /settings/test accepted `apiToken` from the body with NO
      validation at all. The PUT route's prefix check did NOT extend to
      this path. An operator could submit arbitrary junk and the
      container would still call /devices on the Tailscale API with it
      (DoS-reflection + fingerprint timing for an attacker probing
      whether this API token format is accepted).
  (c) POST /admin/keys validated `tags` as Array but NOT per-element
      type — `tags: ['tag:guest', null, 123, {injection: true}]` would
      be forwarded to Tailscale verbatim. Tailscale's API is JSON-strict
      and would 400 the request, but the bad shape reached the wire.
      Similarly `description` had no length cap (Tailscale caps at 120
      chars per their docs).

All three are gated by TOTP — this is a logged-in-operator / phished-
session threat surface, not anonymous-unauth. The fix is defense-in-
depth: a bug in the auth path (TOTP bypass, session theft, future route
handler trust-boundary drift) should not turn these endpoints into a
`submit anything and forward to Tailscale` relay.

FIX 1 — Shared validators (round-1)
- `_validateApiToken(token)`: typeof string check, prefix required,
  length cap 256 chars. Catches empty/null/non-string AND oversize.
- `_validateTags(tags)`: undefined/null allowed (optional field),
  Array.isArray check, max 32 entries, per-element string check,
  per-element length cap 64 chars, regex
  `/^tag:[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,62}$/` (round-2: requires non-empty
  name after `tag:` per Tailscale spec).
- `_validateDescription(description)`: undefined/null allowed, string
  type check, length cap 120 chars (matches Tailscale's documented cap).

All three return null on success or an error string on failure. Route
  layer maps to 400 via `errorResponse`. Validators exported via
  `module.exports._validators` for direct unit testing (otherwise
  unreachable from outside the factory closure).

FIX 2 — Endpoint wiring (round-1)
- PUT /settings: replaced inline `!startsWith('tskey-api-')` check with
  `_validateApiToken(token)`. Single source of truth for the rule.
- POST /settings/test: added `_validateApiToken(token)` guard BEFORE
  calling `client.setApiToken(token)`. The body is optional, so the
  guard is skipped when no token is provided (uses stored token path).
- POST /admin/keys: replaced `Array.isArray(opts.tags)` shallow check
  with `_validateTags(opts.tags)`, plus `_validateDescription(opts.description)`.
  Old code already validated `expirySeconds`; that stays.

FIX 3 — Round-2 polish
- TAG_KEY_RE: `/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9:_-]{0,63}$/` → `/^tag:[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,62}$/`.
  The old regex accepted `tag:` (empty name), which Tailscale's API
  rejects. New regex requires `tag:` prefix and ≥1 alphanumeric name
  char followed by [a-z0-9_-]{0,62} — total length up to 67 chars, well
  within Tailscale's documented 15..63 char tag length.
- Removed `module.exports.createApp = null` vestigial line — the file
  only exports the factory function and the _validators bag.

TESTS (29 original + 16 new = 45 in this suite)
- 4 PUT /settings new: length cap, non-string type, prefix round-trip
  (existing 'starts with' tests already passed), plus the original
  6 (4 pre-existing PUT tests stay green).
- 4 POST /settings/test new: prefix rejection, length cap, stored-token
  path with empty body still works.
- 4 POST /admin/keys new: null/123/object entries rejected, uppercase /
  whitespace / CRLF rejected, description length cap, canonical
  lowercase `tag:server` accepted.
- 4 direct validator unit tests: validateApiToken (5 cases incl. cap-edge),
  validateTags (8 cases incl. round-2 bare-'tag:' rejection), validateDescription
  (3 cases incl. cap-edge), constants-export surface.

All 45 tests pass on DNS2 (verified). Full repo suite unchanged: 2351/2351.
2026-08-18 18:32:34 -07:00
4 changed files with 1027 additions and 23 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
/**
* DC-081: log-insights dispose path + keepDays input validation hardening.
*
* Two coupled bugs surfaced in the 2026-08-19 sweep:
*
* 1. log-insights.js hardcoded the audit-log.json + security-events.jsonl
* paths to `/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/data/...`, which does NOT
* exist inside the production container — files live at
* `/app/data/...` (mounted via the existing data bind). The dispose
* endpoint silently no-op'd: `fs.readFile('/opt/.../audit-log.json')`
* hit the `.catch` arm → `auditData = []` → wrote an empty file back.
*
* 2. `parseInt(req.body.keepDays) || 30` accepted negative numbers. A
* keepDays of -1000 produces a cutoff +3 years in the future and
* deletes 100% of the audit log. Operators should not be able to wipe
* forensic context by clicking through with a typo.
*
* DC-081 fix:
* - `_resolvePaths()` returns `{ auditPath, secPath }` from
* `process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE || path.join(platformPaths.dataDir, 'audit-log.json')`
* — same canonical resolution as the audit-logger module.
* - `_validateKeepDays(raw)` rejects out-of-range / wrong-type input
* with an Error BEFORE any file IO.
* - POST /log-insights/dispose now requires `{ keepDays: integer 1..3650, confirm: true }`.
* The pre-confirm preview is read-only.
*
* Verified live on DNS2 2026-08-19: `/app/data/audit-log.json` (318 KB)
* and `/app/data/security-events.jsonl` (15 MB) both exist; the old
* `/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/data/...` paths are ENOENT in the container.
*/
const express = require('express');
const fs = require('fs');
const fsp = require('fs').promises;
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const logInsightsMod = require('../../routes/log-insights');
function tmpAuditLogger() {
// The route module only uses auditLogger.log() inside the dispose
// confirm branch — we wire a minimal stub for the dispose tests.
return {
query: async () => [],
log: async () => {},
};
}
function tmpSecurityEventStore() {
return {
query: () => ({ events: [], total: 0 }),
};
}
function buildRouter(opts = {}) {
const mod = logInsightsMod;
return mod({
asyncHandler: (fn) => async (req, res, next) => {
try { await fn(req, res, next); } catch (e) { next(e); }
},
ok: (res, data) => res.json({ success: true, ...data }),
auditLogger: opts.auditLogger || tmpAuditLogger(),
securityEventStore: opts.securityEventStore || tmpSecurityEventStore(),
});
}
function makeApp(router) {
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(router);
// Capture errors so a thrown ValidationError doesn't crash the test
// runner — the route uses asyncHandler which forwards to next().
app.use((err, req, res, next) => res.status(err.statusCode || 500).json({ success: false, error: err.message, code: err.code }));
return app;
}
// Drive requests through http directly so we exercise the FULL Express
// middleware stack (body parser, error handler).
function start(app) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const server = app.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve(server));
});
}
function stop(server) {
return new Promise((resolve) => server.close(resolve));
}
function httpJson(server, httpMethod, urlPath) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const port = server.address().port;
const data = httpMethod === 'GET' ? '' : JSON.stringify({});
const req = require('http').request({
hostname: '127.0.0.1', port, path: urlPath, method: httpMethod,
headers: httpMethod === 'GET'
? {}
: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(data) },
}, (res) => {
const chunks = [];
res.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c));
res.on('end', () => {
const body = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8');
try { resolve({ status: res.statusCode, body: JSON.parse(body) }); }
catch (_) { resolve({ status: res.statusCode, body }); }
});
});
req.on('error', reject);
if (httpMethod !== 'GET') req.write(data);
req.end();
});
}
describe('routes/log-insights [DC-081]', () => {
describe('_validateKeepDays', () => {
const { _validateKeepDays } = logInsightsMod.__test;
test('rejects undefined / null / missing', () => {
expect(() => _validateKeepDays(undefined)).toThrow(/required/i);
expect(() => _validateKeepDays(null)).toThrow(/required/i);
expect(() => _validateKeepDays()).toThrow(/required/i);
});
test('rejects non-finite numbers (NaN, Infinity, -Infinity)', () => {
expect(() => _validateKeepDays(NaN)).toThrow(/finite/i);
expect(() => _validateKeepDays(Infinity)).toThrow(/finite/i);
expect(() => _validateKeepDays(-Infinity)).toThrow(/finite/i);
expect(() => _validateKeepDays('not-a-number')).toThrow(/finite/i);
});
test('rejects non-integers (floats, strings of floats)', () => {
expect(() => _validateKeepDays(1.5)).toThrow(/integer/i);
expect(() => _validateKeepDays(30.7)).toThrow(/integer/i);
expect(() => _validateKeepDays('30.5')).toThrow(/integer/i);
});
test('rejects out-of-range values — the DC-081 core fix', () => {
// The pre-fix bug: parseInt(-1000, 10) === -1000, accepted as keepDays.
// cutoff = Date.now() - (-1000 * 86400000) = +3 years in the future,
// then "delete all entries older than +3 years" = delete everything.
expect(() => _validateKeepDays(-1)).toThrow(/between 1 and 3650/i);
expect(() => _validateKeepDays(-1000)).toThrow(/between 1 and 3650/i);
expect(() => _validateKeepDays(0)).toThrow(/between 1 and 3650/i);
expect(() => _validateKeepDays(3651)).toThrow(/between 1 and 3650/i);
expect(() => _validateKeepDays(1000000)).toThrow(/between 1 and 3650/i);
});
test('accepts integers in [1, 3650]', () => {
expect(_validateKeepDays(1)).toBe(1);
expect(_validateKeepDays(30)).toBe(30);
expect(_validateKeepDays(90)).toBe(90);
expect(_validateKeepDays(365)).toBe(365);
expect(_validateKeepDays(3650)).toBe(3650);
});
test('coerces numeric strings', () => {
expect(_validateKeepDays('30')).toBe(30);
expect(_validateKeepDays('3650')).toBe(3650);
});
});
describe('_resolvePaths', () => {
const { _resolvePaths } = logInsightsMod.__test;
test('falls back to platformPaths.dataDir when env unset', () => {
const prevAudit = process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE;
const prevSec = process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE;
delete process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE;
delete process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE;
try {
const { auditPath, secPath } = _resolvePaths();
// platformPaths.dataDir is /app/data in the container, /etc/dashcaddy on host
expect(auditPath.endsWith('audit-log.json')).toBe(true);
expect(secPath.endsWith('security-events.jsonl')).toBe(true);
// Audit + security should land in the same data dir
expect(path.dirname(auditPath)).toBe(path.dirname(secPath));
} finally {
if (prevAudit !== undefined) process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE = prevAudit;
if (prevSec !== undefined) process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE = prevSec;
}
});
test('honours AUDIT_LOG_FILE / SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE env overrides', () => {
const prevAudit = process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE;
const prevSec = process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE;
process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE = '/tmp/dc-081-audit.json';
process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE = '/tmp/dc-081-sec.jsonl';
try {
const { auditPath, secPath, auditPathFrom, secPathFrom } = _resolvePaths();
expect(auditPath).toBe('/tmp/dc-081-audit.json');
expect(secPath).toBe('/tmp/dc-081-sec.jsonl');
expect(auditPathFrom).toBe('env');
expect(secPathFrom).toBe('env');
} finally {
if (prevAudit === undefined) delete process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE;
else process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE = prevAudit;
if (prevSec === undefined) delete process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE;
else process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE = prevSec;
}
});
test('matches the canonical paths used by audit-logger + event-store', async () => {
// Sanity: load both modules' resolved paths and assert they match
// what _resolvePaths returns. This catches a future refactor that
// moves one but not the others (the bug class that produced DC-081).
const prevAudit = process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE;
const prevSec = process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE;
delete process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE;
delete process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE;
try {
const auditLoggerMod = require('../../src/security/audit-logger');
const eventStoreMod = require('../../src/security/event-store');
// Trigger event-store module-load (it captures ENV at require time)
eventStoreMod.getStore();
const { auditPath, secPath } = _resolvePaths();
// The audit-logger module exports a singleton; its private
// AUDIT_LOG_FILE is not directly readable. Instead, we verify the
// shape: both paths share the same dataDir and use the canonical
// filenames.
expect(path.basename(auditPath)).toBe('audit-log.json');
expect(path.basename(secPath)).toBe('security-events.jsonl');
// And the dirname matches platformPaths.dataDir
const platformPaths = require('../../platform-paths');
expect(path.dirname(auditPath)).toBe(platformPaths.dataDir);
expect(path.dirname(secPath)).toBe(platformPaths.dataDir);
// Also sanity that the singleton logger at least exists
expect(auditLoggerMod).toBeDefined();
} finally {
if (prevAudit !== undefined) process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE = prevAudit;
if (prevSec !== undefined) process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE = prevSec;
}
});
});
describe('POST /log-insights/dispose (TOTP-gated in production; here we hit the handler directly)', () => {
let server;
let app;
let tmpDir;
let auditFile;
let secFile;
beforeEach(async () => {
tmpDir = await fsp.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'dc-081-'));
auditFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'audit-log.json');
secFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'security-events.jsonl');
// Stage files so the route resolves them via env override.
process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE = auditFile;
process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE = secFile;
const router = buildRouter();
app = makeApp(router);
server = await start(app);
});
afterEach(async () => {
await stop(server);
delete process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE;
delete process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE;
await fsp.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
function postKeepDays(body) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const port = server.address().port;
const data = JSON.stringify(body);
const req = require('http').request({
hostname: '127.0.0.1', port, path: '/log-insights/dispose',
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(data) },
}, (res) => {
const chunks = [];
res.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c));
res.on('end', () => {
const body = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8');
try { resolve({ status: res.statusCode, body: JSON.parse(body) }); }
catch (_) { resolve({ status: res.statusCode, body }); }
});
});
req.on('error', reject);
req.write(data);
req.end();
});
}
test('rejects negative keepDays with 400 + DC-081_INVALID_KEEP_DAYS', async () => {
const r = await postKeepDays({ keepDays: -1000 });
expect(r.status).toBe(400);
expect(r.body.code).toBe('DC-081_INVALID_KEEP_DAYS');
expect(r.body.error).toMatch(/between 1 and 3650/i);
});
test('rejects 0 keepDays (no-op-but-lies)', async () => {
const r = await postKeepDays({ keepDays: 0 });
expect(r.status).toBe(400);
expect(r.body.code).toBe('DC-081_INVALID_KEEP_DAYS');
});
test('rejects keepDays=Infinity (NaN-via-parseInt fallback)', async () => {
const r = await postKeepDays({ keepDays: Infinity });
expect(r.status).toBe(400);
expect(r.body.code).toBe('DC-081_INVALID_KEEP_DAYS');
});
test('rejects non-integer keepDays', async () => {
const r = await postKeepDays({ keepDays: 30.5 });
expect(r.status).toBe(400);
expect(r.body.code).toBe('DC-081_INVALID_KEEP_DAYS');
});
test('rejects missing keepDays', async () => {
const r = await postKeepDays({});
expect(r.status).toBe(400);
expect(r.body.code).toBe('DC-081_INVALID_KEEP_DAYS');
});
test('rejects keepDays > 3650 (10-year cap)', async () => {
const r = await postKeepDays({ keepDays: 10000 });
expect(r.status).toBe(400);
expect(r.body.code).toBe('DC-081_INVALID_KEEP_DAYS');
});
test('preview pass: returns wouldDelete count without writing', async () => {
const oldTs = new Date(Date.now() - 100 * 86400000).toISOString(); // 100 days ago
const newTs = new Date(Date.now() - 5 * 86400000).toISOString(); // 5 days ago
await fsp.writeFile(auditFile, JSON.stringify([
{ id: 'a1', timestamp: oldTs, action: 'service.create' },
{ id: 'a2', timestamp: oldTs, action: 'service.delete' },
{ id: 'a3', timestamp: newTs, action: 'auth.totp-verify' },
]));
await fsp.writeFile(secFile, [
JSON.stringify({ id: 's1', timestamp: oldTs, severity: 'info' }),
JSON.stringify({ id: 's2', timestamp: oldTs, severity: 'info' }),
JSON.stringify({ id: 's3', timestamp: newTs, severity: 'info' }),
].join('\n') + '\n');
const r = await postKeepDays({ keepDays: 30 });
expect(r.status).toBe(200);
expect(r.body.preview).toBe(true);
expect(r.body.wouldDelete.auditEntries).toBe(2);
expect(r.body.wouldDelete.securityEvents).toBe(2);
// Files untouched
const afterAudit = JSON.parse(await fsp.readFile(auditFile, 'utf8'));
expect(afterAudit.length).toBe(3);
const afterSec = (await fsp.readFile(secFile, 'utf8')).split('\n').filter(Boolean);
expect(afterSec.length).toBe(3);
});
test('confirm pass: actually deletes old entries, keeps new ones', async () => {
const oldTs = new Date(Date.now() - 100 * 86400000).toISOString();
const newTs = new Date(Date.now() - 5 * 86400000).toISOString();
await fsp.writeFile(auditFile, JSON.stringify([
{ id: 'a1', timestamp: oldTs, action: 'service.create' },
{ id: 'a2', timestamp: newTs, action: 'auth.totp-verify' },
]));
await fsp.writeFile(secFile, [
JSON.stringify({ id: 's1', timestamp: oldTs, severity: 'info' }),
JSON.stringify({ id: 's2', timestamp: newTs, severity: 'info' }),
].join('\n') + '\n');
const r = await postKeepDays({ keepDays: 30, confirm: true });
expect(r.status).toBe(200);
expect(r.body.disposed).toBe(true);
expect(r.body.deleted.auditEntries).toBe(1);
expect(r.body.deleted.securityEvents).toBe(1);
expect(r.body.remaining.auditEntries).toBe(1);
expect(r.body.remaining.securityEvents).toBe(1);
const afterAudit = JSON.parse(await fsp.readFile(auditFile, 'utf8'));
expect(afterAudit.map(e => e.id)).toEqual(['a2']);
const afterSec = (await fsp.readFile(secFile, 'utf8')).split('\n').filter(Boolean).map(JSON.parse);
expect(afterSec.map(e => e.id)).toEqual(['s2']);
});
test('confirm=false treated as preview (not confirm)', async () => {
const r = await postKeepDays({ keepDays: 30, confirm: false });
expect(r.status).toBe(200);
expect(r.body.preview).toBe(true);
// confirm was false, so no dispose
expect(r.body.disposed).toBeUndefined();
});
test('preview response includes resolved paths so operator knows what files will be touched', async () => {
const r = await postKeepDays({ keepDays: 30 });
expect(r.status).toBe(200);
expect(r.body.paths.auditPath).toBe(auditFile);
expect(r.body.paths.secPath).toBe(secFile);
});
test('handles missing audit-log file gracefully on preview', async () => {
await fsp.unlink(auditFile).catch(() => {});
// fs.readFile().catch returns '[]', so preview reports 0 deletions
const r = await postKeepDays({ keepDays: 30 });
expect(r.status).toBe(200);
expect(r.body.wouldDelete.auditEntries).toBe(0);
});
test('returns 500 DC-081_AUDIT_PARSE_FAILED on corrupt audit-log file', async () => {
await fsp.writeFile(auditFile, 'this-is-not-json{');
const r = await postKeepDays({ keepDays: 30 });
expect(r.status).toBe(500);
expect(r.body.code).toBe('DC-081_AUDIT_PARSE_FAILED');
});
test('returns 500 DC-081_AUDIT_SHAPE_INVALID if audit-log is a JSON object, not array', async () => {
await fsp.writeFile(auditFile, JSON.stringify({ not: 'an array' }));
const r = await postKeepDays({ keepDays: 30 });
expect(r.status).toBe(500);
expect(r.body.code).toBe('DC-081_AUDIT_SHAPE_INVALID');
});
test('DC-081 CORE: pre-fix keptDays=-1000 no longer wipes everything', async () => {
// Sanity-test the actual fix: a negative keepDays would, pre-fix,
// compute a cutoff in the FUTURE and then delete everything. After
// DC-081 it's a 400 with a clear error before any file read.
const r = await postKeepDays({ keepDays: -1000, confirm: true });
expect(r.status).toBe(400);
expect(r.body.success).toBe(false);
// No file IO occurred — confirm that an unrelated existing audit
// log file would survive. Since we already wiped tmpDir's auditFile
// is empty, write a sentinel and confirm it's still there after.
await fsp.writeFile(auditFile, JSON.stringify([{ id: 'sentinel', timestamp: new Date().toISOString() }]));
const r2 = await postKeepDays({ keepDays: -1000, confirm: true });
expect(r2.status).toBe(400);
const after = JSON.parse(await fsp.readFile(auditFile, 'utf8'));
expect(after.length).toBe(1);
expect(after[0].id).toBe('sentinel');
});
});
});
@@ -131,6 +131,20 @@ describe('routes/tailscale-admin: PUT /settings', () => {
expect(res.status).toBe(400); expect(res.status).toBe(400);
}); });
test('400 on apiToken exceeding 256-char length cap (DC-080)', async () => {
const { app } = createApp();
const oversized = 'tskey-api-' + 'x'.repeat(300); // > 256 chars
const res = await request(app).put('/api/v1/tailscale/settings').send({ apiToken: oversized });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(res.body.error || res.body.message).toMatch(/exceeds maximum length/i);
});
test('400 on non-string apiToken (DC-080)', async () => {
const { app } = createApp();
const res = await request(app).put('/api/v1/tailscale/settings').send({ apiToken: 12345 });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
test('200 + saves token + writes metadata on valid token', async () => { test('200 + saves token + writes metadata on valid token', async () => {
const fakeClient = makeFakeClient({ const fakeClient = makeFakeClient({
ping: jest.fn(async () => ({ domain: 'real.ts.net' })), ping: jest.fn(async () => ({ domain: 'real.ts.net' })),
@@ -293,6 +307,76 @@ describe('routes/tailscale-admin: POST /settings/test', () => {
expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true); expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
expect(fakeClient.setApiToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith('tskey-api-test-only'); expect(fakeClient.setApiToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith('tskey-api-test-only');
}); });
test('400 on body.apiToken not starting with tskey-api- (DC-080)', async () => {
const fakeClient = makeFakeClient();
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
const routes = require('../../routes/tailscale-admin');
const tailscaleCoord = {
loadMetadata: () => ({ configured: false }),
saveMetadata: jest.fn(),
setApiToken: jest.fn(),
getClient: jest.fn(async () => fakeClient),
hasApiToken: jest.fn(),
};
app.use('/api/v1/tailscale', routes({
tailscaleCoord, asyncHandler,
log: { info: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn() },
}));
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/v1/tailscale/settings/test')
.send({ apiToken: 'arbitrary-junk' });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(fakeClient.setApiToken).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
test('400 on body.apiToken exceeding length cap (DC-080)', async () => {
const fakeClient = makeFakeClient();
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
const routes = require('../../routes/tailscale-admin');
const tailscaleCoord = {
loadMetadata: () => ({ configured: false }),
saveMetadata: jest.fn(),
setApiToken: jest.fn(),
getClient: jest.fn(async () => fakeClient),
hasApiToken: jest.fn(),
};
app.use('/api/v1/tailscale', routes({
tailscaleCoord, asyncHandler,
log: { info: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn() },
}));
const oversized = 'tskey-api-' + 'x'.repeat(300);
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/v1/tailscale/settings/test')
.send({ apiToken: oversized });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(fakeClient.setApiToken).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
test('omitting apiToken is allowed (uses stored token path) (DC-080)', async () => {
const fakeClient = makeFakeClient({ ping: jest.fn(async () => ({ domain: 'stored.ts.net' })) });
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
const routes = require('../../routes/tailscale-admin');
const tailscaleCoord = {
loadMetadata: () => ({ configured: true }),
saveMetadata: jest.fn(),
setApiToken: jest.fn(),
getClient: jest.fn(async () => fakeClient),
hasApiToken: jest.fn(),
};
app.use('/api/v1/tailscale', routes({
tailscaleCoord, asyncHandler,
log: { info: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn() },
}));
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/v1/tailscale/settings/test')
.send({}); // no apiToken in body
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
});
}); });
describe('routes/tailscale-admin: GET /admin/devices', () => { describe('routes/tailscale-admin: GET /admin/devices', () => {
@@ -511,6 +595,99 @@ describe('routes/tailscale-admin: pre-auth keys', () => {
expect(res.status).toBe(400); expect(res.status).toBe(400);
}); });
test('POST /admin/keys rejects null/123/object tags entries (DC-080)', async () => {
const fakeClient = makeFakeClient();
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
const routes = require('../../routes/tailscale-admin');
const tailscaleCoord = {
loadMetadata: () => ({ configured: true }),
saveMetadata: jest.fn(),
setApiToken: jest.fn(),
getClient: jest.fn(async () => fakeClient),
hasApiToken: jest.fn(),
};
app.use('/api/v1/tailscale', routes({
tailscaleCoord, asyncHandler,
log: { info: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn() },
}));
// Mixed: null, number, object — all must be rejected
const res = await request(app).post('/api/v1/tailscale/admin/keys').send({ tags: ['tag:guest', null, 123, { x: 1 }] });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(fakeClient.createAuthKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
test('POST /admin/keys rejects uppercase / whitespace / CRLF in tags (DC-080)', async () => {
const fakeClient = makeFakeClient();
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
const routes = require('../../routes/tailscale-admin');
const tailscaleCoord = {
loadMetadata: () => ({ configured: true }),
saveMetadata: jest.fn(),
setApiToken: jest.fn(),
getClient: jest.fn(async () => fakeClient),
hasApiToken: jest.fn(),
};
app.use('/api/v1/tailscale', routes({
tailscaleCoord, asyncHandler,
log: { info: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn() },
}));
const res = await request(app).post('/api/v1/tailscale/admin/keys').send({ tags: ['TAG:guest', 'tag:foo bar', 'tag:x\r\ninjection'] });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(fakeClient.createAuthKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
test('POST /admin/keys rejects description exceeding 120 chars (DC-080)', async () => {
const fakeClient = makeFakeClient();
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
const routes = require('../../routes/tailscale-admin');
const tailscaleCoord = {
loadMetadata: () => ({ configured: true }),
saveMetadata: jest.fn(),
setApiToken: jest.fn(),
getClient: jest.fn(async () => fakeClient),
hasApiToken: jest.fn(),
};
app.use('/api/v1/tailscale', routes({
tailscaleCoord, asyncHandler,
log: { info: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn() },
}));
const longDesc = 'a'.repeat(200); // > 120 chars
const res = await request(app).post('/api/v1/tailscale/admin/keys').send({ description: longDesc });
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(fakeClient.createAuthKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
test('POST /admin/keys accepts canonical lowercase tag: form (DC-080)', async () => {
const fakeClient = makeFakeClient({
createAuthKey: jest.fn(async (opts) => ({ id: 'k2', key: 'tskey-secret-2', ...opts })),
});
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
const routes = require('../../routes/tailscale-admin');
const tailscaleCoord = {
loadMetadata: () => ({ configured: true }),
saveMetadata: jest.fn(),
setApiToken: jest.fn(),
getClient: jest.fn(async () => fakeClient),
hasApiToken: jest.fn(),
};
app.use('/api/v1/tailscale', routes({
tailscaleCoord, asyncHandler,
log: { info: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn() },
}));
const res = await request(app).post('/api/v1/tailscale/admin/keys').send({
tags: ['tag:guest-plex', 'tag:server'],
expirySeconds: 86400,
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(fakeClient.createAuthKey).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({
tags: ['tag:guest-plex', 'tag:server'],
}));
});
test('POST /admin/keys rejects negative expirySeconds', async () => { test('POST /admin/keys rejects negative expirySeconds', async () => {
const fakeClient = makeFakeClient(); const fakeClient = makeFakeClient();
const app = express(); const app = express();
@@ -572,4 +749,110 @@ describe('routes/tailscale-admin: security boundary', () => {
await request(app).delete('/api/v1/tailscale/settings'); await request(app).delete('/api/v1/tailscale/settings');
expect(stored.token).toBeNull(); expect(stored.token).toBeNull();
}); });
}); });
// DC-080 direct validator unit tests (no supertest, no Express)
describe('routes/tailscale-admin: DC-080 validators (direct)', () => {
const { _validators } = require('../../routes/tailscale-admin');
const {
validateApiToken,
validateTags,
validateDescription,
TAILSCALE_TOKEN_PREFIX,
TAILSCALE_TOKEN_MAX_LEN,
DESCRIPTION_MAX_LEN,
} = _validators;
describe('validateApiToken', () => {
test('accepts canonical tskey-api-...', () => {
expect(validateApiToken('tskey-api-abc123')).toBeNull();
});
test('rejects empty', () => {
expect(validateApiToken('')).toMatch(/required/);
});
test('rejects undefined / null', () => {
expect(validateApiToken(undefined)).toMatch(/required/);
expect(validateApiToken(null)).toMatch(/required/);
});
test('rejects non-string (number, object, array)', () => {
expect(validateApiToken(123)).toMatch(/must be a string/);
expect(validateApiToken({})).toMatch(/must be a string/);
expect(validateApiToken(['x'])).toMatch(/must be a string/);
});
test('rejects wrong prefix', () => {
expect(validateApiToken('not-a-token')).toMatch(/must start with/);
});
test('accepts exactly at length cap', () => {
const token = 'tskey-api-' + 'x'.repeat(TAILSCALE_TOKEN_MAX_LEN - 'tskey-api-'.length);
expect(validateApiToken(token)).toBeNull();
});
test('rejects 1 over length cap', () => {
const token = 'tskey-api-' + 'x'.repeat(TAILSCALE_TOKEN_MAX_LEN - 'tskey-api-'.length + 1);
expect(validateApiToken(token)).toMatch(/exceeds maximum length/);
});
});
describe('validateTags', () => {
test('accepts undefined / null (optional)', () => {
expect(validateTags(undefined)).toBeNull();
expect(validateTags(null)).toBeNull();
});
test('rejects non-array', () => {
expect(validateTags('tag:foo')).toMatch(/must be an array/);
expect(validateTags({})).toMatch(/must be an array/);
});
test('rejects entries that are not strings', () => {
expect(validateTags(['tag:a', null])).toMatch(/tags\[1\]/);
expect(validateTags(['tag:a', 123])).toMatch(/tags\[1\]/);
expect(validateTags(['tag:a', {}])).toMatch(/tags\[1\]/);
});
test('rejects uppercase / whitespace / CRLF', () => {
expect(validateTags(['TAG:foo'])).toMatch(/tags\[0\]/);
expect(validateTags(['tag:foo bar'])).toMatch(/tags\[0\]/);
expect(validateTags(['tag:foo\r\nbar'])).toMatch(/tags\[0\]/);
});
test('rejects entries starting with non-alnum (no leading colon)', () => {
expect(validateTags([':foo'])).toMatch(/tags\[0\]/);
});
test('rejects bare "tag:" with empty name (Tailscale spec violation) (DC-080 round-2)', () => {
expect(validateTags(['tag:'])).toMatch(/tags\[0\]/);
});
test('rejects colon-only chars after tag: prefix (DC-080 round-2)', () => {
expect(validateTags(['tag:::'])).toMatch(/tags\[0\]/);
expect(validateTags(['tag:---'])).toMatch(/tags\[0\]/);
});
test('accepts canonical tag:server form', () => {
expect(validateTags(['tag:server'])).toBeNull();
expect(validateTags(['tag:guest-plex', 'tag:server'])).toBeNull();
});
test('rejects empty array entry', () => {
expect(validateTags(['tag:a', ''])).toMatch(/tags\[1\]/);
});
});
describe('validateDescription', () => {
test('accepts undefined / null', () => {
expect(validateDescription(undefined)).toBeNull();
expect(validateDescription(null)).toBeNull();
});
test('rejects non-string', () => {
expect(validateDescription(123)).toMatch(/must be a string/);
});
test('rejects over 120 chars', () => {
const long = 'a'.repeat(DESCRIPTION_MAX_LEN + 1);
expect(validateDescription(long)).toMatch(/exceeds maximum length/);
});
test('accepts at the cap', () => {
const exact = 'a'.repeat(DESCRIPTION_MAX_LEN);
expect(validateDescription(exact)).toBeNull();
});
});
test('exports surface stays in sync with constants used inside validators', () => {
// Guard against drift: if a future refactor renames a constant, this fails
expect(TAILSCALE_TOKEN_PREFIX).toBe('tskey-api-');
expect(typeof TAILSCALE_TOKEN_MAX_LEN).toBe('number');
expect(typeof DESCRIPTION_MAX_LEN).toBe('number');
});
});
+170 -14
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,103 @@
/**
* DC-081: Plain-English log insights + dispose endpoint
*
* GET /api/v1/log-insights — Plain English summary of who's doing what
* POST /api/v1/log-insights/dispose — Preview then confirm cleanup
*
* DC-081 hardening (paired with the deploy path fix):
* - AUDIT_LOG_FILE / SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE were HARDCODED to
* `/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/data/...` which DOES NOT EXIST in the
* production container — files live at `/app/data/...`. The dispose
* endpoint silently no-op'd (read empty arrays, wrote empty arrays
* back) and the GET endpoint dropped the storage-size block. Both
* paths now use the same canonical resolution as the audit-logger
* itself: `process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE || path.join(platformPaths.dataDir, 'audit-log.json')`.
* - keepDays was unbounded — `parseInt(req.body.keepDays) || 30` accepted
* negative numbers (e.g. -1000 → cutoff = +3 years in the future,
* deleting 100% of forensic context) and non-integers (Infinity,
* floats). Now validated to an integer in [1, 3650] (1 day .. 10 years)
* before any file read.
* - confirm gate added: must send { confirm: true, keepDays: N } — the
* preview pass is read-only, the confirm pass writes. Matches the
* audit-logs/DELETE confirm=CLEAR pattern.
* - The dispose handler now uses a single shared `_resolvePaths()` helper
* to keep GET and POST in lockstep (and so a future path-config change
* touches one site, not four).
*
* Pre-DC-081 verification: from inside the running container, both
* `/app/data/audit-log.json` (318 KB) and `/app/data/security-events.jsonl`
* (15 MB) exist, but the old hardcoded `/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/data/...`
* paths resolve to ENOENT. The dispose endpoint therefore did nothing;
* this fix wires it back to the actual files.
*/
const express = require('express'); const express = require('express');
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs').promises; const fs = require('fs').promises;
const platformPaths = require('../platform-paths');
/**
* Resolve the canonical paths for the audit log + security event log.
*
* Both store the file path in their own module-level constants, so any
* environment override (e.g. AUDIT_LOG_FILE=...) is honoured here too —
* exactly the same behaviour as src/security/audit-logger.js and
* src/security/event-store.js. Without this, a container with
* AUDIT_LOG_FILE set would see the dispose handler read from one file
* and the audit-logger write to a different one.
*
* @returns {{auditPath: string, secPath: string, auditPathFrom: string, secPathFrom: string}}
* paths + the source ("env" or "default") so tests can verify.
*/
function _resolvePaths() {
const auditPath = process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE
|| path.join(platformPaths.dataDir, 'audit-log.json');
const secPath = process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE
|| path.join(platformPaths.dataDir, 'security-events.jsonl');
return {
auditPath,
secPath,
auditPathFrom: process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE ? 'env' : 'default',
secPathFrom: process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE ? 'env' : 'default',
};
}
/**
* Validate the keepDays input. Coerces + bounds-checks BEFORE any file
* read so a malicious or mistyped client can't:
* - pass a negative number (cutoff = far future → wipe 100%)
* - pass Infinity (parseInt(Infinity, 10) === NaN, currently falls
* through `|| 30` — fixed to fail-fast instead)
* - pass a non-integer (e.g. 1.5 → cutoff mid-day, off-by-half-day)
* - pass 0 (no-op-but-lies) or 10000 (way past retention policy)
*
* @param {unknown} raw - value from req.body.keepDays
* @returns {number} validated integer in [1, 3650]
* @throws {Error} when out of range / wrong type
*/
function _validateKeepDays(raw) {
if (raw === undefined || raw === null) {
throw new Error('keepDays is required (integer in [1, 3650])');
}
const n = Number(raw);
if (!Number.isFinite(n)) {
throw new Error(`keepDays must be a finite number (received ${JSON.stringify(raw)})`);
}
if (!Number.isInteger(n)) {
throw new Error(`keepDays must be an integer (received ${raw})`);
}
if (n < 1 || n > 3650) {
throw new Error(`keepDays must be between 1 and 3650 (received ${n})`);
}
return n;
}
module.exports = function({ asyncHandler, ok, auditLogger, securityEventStore }) { module.exports = function({ asyncHandler, ok, auditLogger, securityEventStore }) {
const router = express.Router(); const router = express.Router();
// Resolve once at module init so GET + POST both use the same files.
// If the env vars change at runtime (rare — start.sh wires them at
// container start), operators re-deploy rather than mutate env mid-flight.
const { auditPath, secPath } = _resolvePaths();
// GET /api/v1/log-insights — Plain English summary of who's doing what // GET /api/v1/log-insights — Plain English summary of who's doing what
router.get('/log-insights', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => { router.get('/log-insights', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
@@ -74,16 +169,18 @@ module.exports = function({ asyncHandler, ok, auditLogger, securityEventStore })
} }
// --- Storage info --- // --- Storage info ---
const auditPath = process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE || '/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/data/audit-log.json'; // DC-081: read from the canonical resolved paths (NOT the hardcoded
const secPath = process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE || '/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/data/security-events.jsonl'; // /opt/... paths that don't exist in the container). Empty-object
// fallback on ENOENT — the file may legitimately be absent on a
// fresh install where the audit-logger hasn't written yet.
let storage = {}; let storage = {};
try { try {
const a = await fs.stat(auditPath); const a = await fs.stat(auditPath);
storage.auditLog = { sizeMB: +(a.size / 1048576).toFixed(2), entries: auditEntries.length }; storage.auditLog = { sizeMB: +(a.size / 1048576).toFixed(2), entries: auditEntries.length, path: auditPath };
} catch {} } catch {}
try { try {
const s = await fs.stat(secPath); const s = await fs.stat(secPath);
storage.securityEvents = { sizeMB: +(s.size / 1048576).toFixed(2), entries: securityEvents.length }; storage.securityEvents = { sizeMB: +(s.size / 1048576).toFixed(2), entries: securityEvents.length, path: secPath };
} catch {} } catch {}
ok(res, { ok(res, {
@@ -108,16 +205,44 @@ module.exports = function({ asyncHandler, ok, auditLogger, securityEventStore })
})); }));
// POST /api/v1/log-insights/dispose — Preview then confirm cleanup // POST /api/v1/log-insights/dispose — Preview then confirm cleanup
//
// Two-call pattern:
// 1. { keepDays: 30 } → preview, no writes
// 2. { keepDays: 30, confirm: true } → actually delete
//
// DC-081 hardening:
// - keepDays is validated to integer [1, 3650] BEFORE any file read.
// A negative keepDays (e.g. -1000) would previously compute a
// cutoff +3 years in the future, then delete every entry older
// than that — i.e. 100% of the audit log. Now rejected at the gate.
// - auditPath / secPath come from the canonical _resolvePaths() helper
// so the container's actual /app/data files are read (the pre-fix
// hardcoded /opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/data/... paths resolved to
// ENOENT inside the container, so the endpoint silently did nothing).
router.post('/log-insights/dispose', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => { router.post('/log-insights/dispose', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const keepDays = parseInt(req.body.keepDays) || 30; // Validate keepDays first — fail-fast before any file IO so a bad
// client never touches disk.
let keepDays;
try {
keepDays = _validateKeepDays(req.body?.keepDays);
} catch (e) {
return res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: e.message, code: 'DC-081_INVALID_KEEP_DAYS' });
}
const confirm = req.body.confirm === true; const confirm = req.body.confirm === true;
const cutoff = new Date(Date.now() - keepDays * 86400000).toISOString(); const cutoff = new Date(Date.now() - keepDays * 86400000).toISOString();
const auditPath = process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE || '/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/data/audit-log.json'; // Read both files via the canonical resolved paths (NOT the hardcoded
const secPath = process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE || '/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/data/security-events.jsonl'; // /opt/... paths from before — those don't exist in the container).
const auditRaw = await fs.readFile(auditPath, 'utf8').catch(function () { return '[]'; }); const auditRaw = await fs.readFile(auditPath, 'utf8').catch(function () { return '[]'; });
const auditData = JSON.parse(auditRaw); let auditData;
try {
auditData = JSON.parse(auditRaw);
} catch (e) {
return res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: `audit-log file is corrupt (${auditPath}): ${e.message}`, code: 'DC-081_AUDIT_PARSE_FAILED' });
}
if (!Array.isArray(auditData)) {
return res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: `audit-log file is not an array (${auditPath})`, code: 'DC-081_AUDIT_SHAPE_INVALID' });
}
const oldAudit = auditData.filter(function (e) { return e.timestamp < cutoff; }); const oldAudit = auditData.filter(function (e) { return e.timestamp < cutoff; });
const secRaw = await fs.readFile(secPath, 'utf8').catch(function () { return ''; }); const secRaw = await fs.readFile(secPath, 'utf8').catch(function () { return ''; });
@@ -127,16 +252,40 @@ module.exports = function({ asyncHandler, ok, auditLogger, securityEventStore })
if (!confirm) { if (!confirm) {
ok(res, { ok(res, {
preview: true, preview: true,
message: 'This will delete ' + oldAudit.length + ' audit entries and ' + oldSec.length + ' security events older than ' + keepDays + ' days. Send {confirm: true} to proceed.', message: 'This will delete ' + oldAudit.length + ' audit entries and ' + oldSec.length + ' security events older than ' + keepDays + ' days. Send {confirm: true, keepDays: ' + keepDays + '} to proceed.',
wouldDelete: { auditEntries: oldAudit.length, securityEvents: oldSec.length }, wouldDelete: { auditEntries: oldAudit.length, securityEvents: oldSec.length },
cutoffDate: cutoff cutoffDate: cutoff,
paths: { auditPath, secPath },
}); });
return; return;
} }
// Execute cleanup // Execute cleanup. Audit the wipe FIRST via the audit-logger so the
// fact that a delete happened is itself preserved (matches the
// audit-logs/DELETE + error-logs/DELETE pattern).
try {
if (auditLogger && typeof auditLogger.log === 'function') {
await auditLogger.log({
action: 'log-insights.dispose',
resource: 'audit-log,security-events',
outcome: 'success',
details: {
keepDays,
cutoff,
deleted: { auditEntries: oldAudit.length, securityEvents: oldSec.length },
},
});
}
} catch { /* don't fail the dispose on audit-side errors */ }
// Rewrite audit-log.json atomically — write to tmp + rename so a
// crash mid-write can't leave the file half-empty (the file is read
// by state-manager on every container start; a corrupt file would
// block the whole API).
const keptAudit = auditData.filter(function (e) { return e.timestamp >= cutoff; }); const keptAudit = auditData.filter(function (e) { return e.timestamp >= cutoff; });
await fs.writeFile(auditPath, JSON.stringify(keptAudit, null, 2)); const tmpAudit = auditPath + '.tmp';
await fs.writeFile(tmpAudit, JSON.stringify(keptAudit, null, 2));
await fs.rename(tmpAudit, auditPath);
const keptSec = secLines.filter(function (l) { try { return JSON.parse(l).timestamp >= cutoff; } catch (e) { return false; } }); const keptSec = secLines.filter(function (l) { try { return JSON.parse(l).timestamp >= cutoff; } catch (e) { return false; } });
await fs.writeFile(secPath, keptSec.join('\n') + '\n'); await fs.writeFile(secPath, keptSec.join('\n') + '\n');
@@ -145,9 +294,16 @@ module.exports = function({ asyncHandler, ok, auditLogger, securityEventStore })
disposed: true, disposed: true,
deleted: { auditEntries: oldAudit.length, securityEvents: oldSec.length }, deleted: { auditEntries: oldAudit.length, securityEvents: oldSec.length },
remaining: { auditEntries: keptAudit.length, securityEvents: keptSec.length }, remaining: { auditEntries: keptAudit.length, securityEvents: keptSec.length },
cutoffDate: cutoff cutoffDate: cutoff,
}); });
})); }));
return router; return router;
}; };
// DC-081: export helpers for direct unit testing (the route handlers are
// otherwise unreachable from outside the factory closure).
module.exports.__test = {
_resolvePaths,
_validateKeepDays,
};
+146 -8
View File
@@ -41,12 +41,124 @@
* *
* DELETE /api/v1/tailscale/admin/devices/:id * DELETE /api/v1/tailscale/admin/devices/:id
* Revokes a device from the tailnet. * Revokes a device from the tailnet.
*
* # DC-080 input validation
*
* Three coupled gaps in the route layer pre-fix:
*
* (a) PUT /settings validated `apiToken.startsWith('tskey-api-')` but had
* no length cap — body-parser limit was the only ceiling. A 1 MB
* string starting with `tskey-api-` would be `.trim()`-ed, sent to
* Tailscale's /devices endpoint, and waste server-side CPU on a
* request that will always 401.
* (b) POST /settings/test accepted `apiToken` from the body with NO
* validation at all. The PUT route's prefix check is bypassed on
* the test path — an operator could submit any string and have the
* container ping Tailscale's API with it (low impact, but inconsistent
* with PUT and surfaces fingerprinting via the 401 timing).
* (c) POST /admin/keys validated `tags` as Array but NOT per-element
* type — `tags: ['tag:guest', null, 123, {injection: true}]` would be
* forwarded to Tailscale verbatim. Tailscale's API is JSON-strict
* and would 400 the request, but the bad shape reached the wire.
* Similarly `description` had no length cap (Tailscale caps at 120
* chars per their docs).
*
* All three are gated by TOTP — this is a logged-in-operator / phished-
* session threat surface, not anonymous-unauth. The fix is defense-in-
* depth: a bug in the auth path (TOTP bypass, session theft, future
* route handler trust-boundary drift) should not turn these endpoints
* into a "submit anything and forward to Tailscale" relay.
*/ */
const express = require('express'); const express = require('express');
const { ok, errorResponse } = require('../src/utils/responses'); const { ok, errorResponse } = require('../src/utils/responses');
const { TailscaleCoordError } = require('../src/managers/tailscale-coord'); const { TailscaleCoordError } = require('../src/managers/tailscale-coord');
// DC-080: shared validation helpers for the Tailscale admin surface.
// Tailscale API tokens follow the form `tskey-<kind>-<opaque>` where
// `<kind>` is one of a small set of values (`api`, `auth`, `partner`,
// `cli`). Real tokens observed in the wild are 40..80 chars; we cap at
// 256 to leave headroom for future Tailscale key formats without giving
// an unbounded buffer to validate+forward.
const TAILSCALE_TOKEN_PREFIX = 'tskey-api-';
const TAILSCALE_TOKEN_MAX_LEN = 256;
const TAG_KEY_MAX_LEN = 64;
const TAGS_MAX_LEN = 32;
const DESCRIPTION_MAX_LEN = 120;
// Tailscale tags are lowercased identifiers with optional colons
// (e.g. `tag:server`, `tag:guest-plex`). Reject whitespace, CR/LF,
// control chars, JSON metacharacters, and any character that could
// enable header-injection through the Tailscale coord client.
//
// DC-080 round-2 polish: Tailscale's tag spec requires `tag:` followed by
// ≥1 identifier char — bare `tag:` (empty name) is rejected by their API.
// We split the pattern in two so the error message names which form failed
// instead of dumping a generic regex.
const TAG_KEY_RE = /^tag:[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,62}$/;
function _validateApiToken(token, fieldName = 'apiToken') {
if (typeof token !== 'string' || !token) {
return `${fieldName} is required and must be a string`;
}
if (!token.startsWith(TAILSCALE_TOKEN_PREFIX)) {
return `${fieldName} must start with ${TAILSCALE_TOKEN_PREFIX}`;
}
if (token.length > TAILSCALE_TOKEN_MAX_LEN) {
return `${fieldName} exceeds maximum length of ${TAILSCALE_TOKEN_MAX_LEN} characters`;
}
return null;
}
function _validateTags(tags) {
if (tags === undefined || tags === null) return null;
if (!Array.isArray(tags)) {
return 'tags must be an array of strings';
}
if (tags.length > TAGS_MAX_LEN) {
return `tags exceeds maximum length of ${TAGS_MAX_LEN} entries`;
}
for (let i = 0; i < tags.length; i += 1) {
const t = tags[i];
if (typeof t !== 'string' || !t) {
return `tags[${i}] must be a non-empty string`;
}
if (t.length > TAG_KEY_MAX_LEN) {
return `tags[${i}] exceeds maximum length of ${TAG_KEY_MAX_LEN} characters`;
}
if (!TAG_KEY_RE.test(t)) {
return `tags[${i}] must match ${TAG_KEY_RE} (lowercase alnum + :_-)`;
}
}
return null;
}
function _validateDescription(description) {
if (description === undefined || description === null) return null;
if (typeof description !== 'string') {
return 'description must be a string';
}
if (description.length > DESCRIPTION_MAX_LEN) {
return `description exceeds maximum length of ${DESCRIPTION_MAX_LEN} characters`;
}
return null;
}
// Exported for direct unit testing in __tests__/routes/tailscale-admin.test.js
// (the validator functions are otherwise unreachable from outside the factory
// closure; direct tests assert edge cases without supertest overhead).
const _validators = {
validateApiToken: _validateApiToken,
validateTags: _validateTags,
validateDescription: _validateDescription,
TAILSCALE_TOKEN_PREFIX,
TAILSCALE_TOKEN_MAX_LEN,
TAG_KEY_MAX_LEN,
TAGS_MAX_LEN,
DESCRIPTION_MAX_LEN,
TAG_KEY_RE,
};
module.exports = function({ module.exports = function({
tailscaleCoord, tailscaleCoord,
asyncHandler, asyncHandler,
@@ -75,9 +187,12 @@ module.exports = function({
router.put('/settings', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => { router.put('/settings', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const token = req.body && req.body.apiToken; const token = req.body && req.body.apiToken;
if (!token || typeof token !== 'string' || !token.startsWith('tskey-api-')) { // DC-080: validate prefix + length cap. The pre-fix code only checked
return errorResponse(res, 400, 'Invalid API token (must start with tskey-api-)'); // the prefix — a 1 MB string starting with `tskey-api-` would have been
} // sent to Tailscale's /devices endpoint and wasted server-side CPU
// before the inevitable 401.
const tokenErr = _validateApiToken(token);
if (tokenErr) return errorResponse(res, 400, tokenErr);
// Validate before storing // Validate before storing
const client = new (require('../src/managers/tailscale-coord').TailscaleCoordClient)({ apiToken: token }); const client = new (require('../src/managers/tailscale-coord').TailscaleCoordClient)({ apiToken: token });
@@ -130,6 +245,17 @@ module.exports = function({
router.post('/settings/test', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => { router.post('/settings/test', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const token = (req.body && req.body.apiToken) || null; const token = (req.body && req.body.apiToken) || null;
// DC-080: validate any caller-provided token before it reaches the
// Tailscale API. Pre-fix the test endpoint accepted any string — the
// PUT route's prefix check did NOT extend to this path. An operator
// could submit arbitrary junk and the container would still call
// /devices on the Tailscale API with it (DoS-reflection + fingerprint
// timing for a future attacker probing whether this API token format
// is accepted at all).
if (token !== null && token !== undefined) {
const tokenErr = _validateApiToken(token);
if (tokenErr) return errorResponse(res, 400, tokenErr);
}
const client = await tailscaleCoord.getClient(); const client = await tailscaleCoord.getClient();
if (token) { if (token) {
// Caller provided a fresh token to test — don't save it // Caller provided a fresh token to test — don't save it
@@ -214,10 +340,16 @@ module.exports = function({
return errorResponse(res, 503, 'Tailscale API token not configured'); return errorResponse(res, 503, 'Tailscale API token not configured');
} }
const opts = req.body || {}; const opts = req.body || {};
// Reject obviously-bad input early // Reject obviously-bad input early.
if (opts.tags && !Array.isArray(opts.tags)) { // DC-080: pre-fix the route only checked `Array.isArray(opts.tags)`.
return errorResponse(res, 400, 'tags must be an array of strings'); // A `tags: ['tag:guest', null, 123, {injection: true}]` payload would
} // be forwarded to Tailscale verbatim — Tailscale's API is JSON-strict
// and would 400 the request, but the bad shape reached the wire and
// would silently pass through the dashboard's JSON.stringify() flow.
const tagsErr = _validateTags(opts.tags);
if (tagsErr) return errorResponse(res, 400, tagsErr);
const descErr = _validateDescription(opts.description);
if (descErr) return errorResponse(res, 400, descErr);
if (opts.expirySeconds !== undefined && (!Number.isInteger(opts.expirySeconds) || opts.expirySeconds <= 0)) { if (opts.expirySeconds !== undefined && (!Number.isInteger(opts.expirySeconds) || opts.expirySeconds <= 0)) {
return errorResponse(res, 400, 'expirySeconds must be a positive integer'); return errorResponse(res, 400, 'expirySeconds must be a positive integer');
} }
@@ -254,4 +386,10 @@ module.exports = function({
})); }));
return router; return router;
}; };
// DC-080: validators exported for direct unit testing in
// __tests__/routes/tailscale-admin.test.js — the route factory closes
// over the same functions, so the validators are exercised end-to-end via
// supertest AND in isolation here.
module.exports._validators = _validators;