351 lines
16 KiB
JavaScript
351 lines
16 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* DC-076: Per-service CA cert / private key disclosure hardening
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*
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* Bug class:
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* 1. /api/v1/ca/cert/<domain> and /api/v1/ca/certs were listed in
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* middleware.js PUBLIC_ROUTES. TOTP/session is the gate; if an
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* operator ever disables TOTP (ops command, fresh-install setup
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* state, .disabled-* rename of totp-config.json), an unauthenticated
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* attacker reaching `https://ca.sami/api/ca/cert/<domain>?format=key`
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* would receive the per-service RSA private key for any domain whose
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* cert Caddy has ever signed — that's a per-service key disclosure,
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* not just a CA fingerprint leak. Even WITH TOTP enabled, any
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* read-scope credential could pull a private key, which is over-
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* privileged for "I just want to look at the dashboard".
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* 2. The route's `password` query param defaulted to the literal string
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* `'dashcaddy'` — a hardcoded credential published in source. Every
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* PFX file Caddy signed silently used the same published password.
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* 3. The route had no rate limit — every request forks an `openssl`
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* process and writes to disk, so an authenticated admin in a loop
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* could exhaust CPU/IO.
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*
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* Post-fix (this commit):
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* 1. /api/v1/ca/cert/<domain> + /api/v1/ca/certs removed from
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* PUBLIC_ROUTES — TOTP/session always required.
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* 2. The route additionally requires `admin` scope (defense in depth
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* against future middleware-ordering mistakes and against the case
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* where TOTP is enabled but a read-scope API key is in use).
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* 3. PFX format now REQUIRES an explicit 8-64 char password (no
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* default). Other formats (key, pem, crt, fullchain) reject `=`
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* in the password arg to keep copy-paste mistakes from
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* contaminating logs.
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* 4. Per-IP rate limit: 10 req/min/IP with Retry-After + 429.
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*
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* The suite covers:
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* 1. middleware PUBLIC_ROUTES no longer contains the ca cert/certs paths
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* 2. /cert/<domain> rejects with 403 when no admin scope (read scope,
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* missing scope, malformed scope all rejected)
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* 3. /cert/<domain> rejects with 400 when PFX password missing or weak
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* 4. /cert/<domain> rejects with 400 when domain is malformed
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* (path traversal, single label, control chars)
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* 5. /cert/<domain> returns 200 + cert bytes when admin scope + valid
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* password supplied (mocked openssl)
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* 6. Rate limit: 10 req/min/IP allowed, 11th 429 with Retry-After
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* 7. /certs list endpoint requires admin scope (regression for the
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* public listing)
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*/
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const express = require('express');
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const request = require('supertest');
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const fs = require('fs');
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const path = require('path');
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// We pull the route's internal helpers by requiring the module under test
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// and inspecting its internals via the closure-scoped functions. The cleanest
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// path is to mount the route and assert behavior end-to-end through HTTP.
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const caRoutes = require('../../routes/ca');
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Test fixture: a minimal Express app that mounts /ca with stubbed ctx.
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// The route captures `platformPaths` at module-load time, so the actual
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// production paths are used. Test scenarios that would need an isolated
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// cert dir are covered at the response-shape level (asserting 400/403/429
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// codes) rather than the file-content level.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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function createCaApp({ scope, installMocks = true, tempDirs } = {}) {
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// We don't mock platform-paths because the test scenarios that need
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// filesystem-isolated cert dirs (PFX, cert-file serving) are covered
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// by their pre-staged files in the system temp dir, and the 200-happy
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// path for non-PFX formats is asserted at the response-shape level
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// rather than the file-content level. The route's pre-existing PKI
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// files at the real platformPaths.pkiDir either exist (production
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// setup) or trigger the 500 "CA certificates not found" path — both
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// are acceptable for the scope/admin/password/rate-limit assertions.
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const app = express();
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app.use(express.json({ limit: '1mb' }));
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const wrap = (fn) => (req, res, next) => Promise.resolve(fn(req, res, next)).catch(next);
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const caRoutes = require('../../routes/ca');
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const ok = (res, data) => res.json({ ok: true, ...data });
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const errorResponse = (res, statusCode, message, extras) => {
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res.status(statusCode).json({
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success: false,
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error: message,
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code: (extras && extras.code) || null,
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...(extras || {}),
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});
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};
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const asyncHandler = wrap;
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const ctx = {
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asyncHandler,
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ok,
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errorResponse,
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siteConfig: { tld: '.sami' },
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};
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const ca = caRoutes(ctx);
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// Mount a tiny auth shim that stamps req.auth before the route runs.
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// This mirrors what the global totpAuthMiddleware + jwtApiKeyAuthMiddleware
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// do in production: req.auth = { type, scope, ... }.
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app.use((req, _res, next) => {
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req.auth = { type: 'session', scope: scope || [] };
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// req.ip is read by the rate limiter
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req.ip = '127.0.0.1';
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next();
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});
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app.use('/ca', ca);
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return { app };
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Tests
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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describe('DC-076: CA cert/key disclosure hardening', () => {
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describe('middleware PUBLIC_ROUTES no longer whitelists the per-service cert/key endpoints', () => {
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// Read the public-routes source so a future refactor that re-adds the
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// path is caught by THIS test (not by an external integration test
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// that depends on running TOTP-disabled).
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const fs = require('fs');
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const middlewareSrc = fs.readFileSync(
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path.join(__dirname, '../../src/utilities/middleware.js'), 'utf8');
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// Extract the PUBLIC_ROUTES block (best-effort text scan — catches
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// both `path: '/api/v1/ca/cert/...'` and `path: '/api/v1/ca/certs'`).
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const caCertEntry = middlewareSrc.match(/path:\s*['"]\/api\/v1\/ca\/cert\/[^'"]*['"]/);
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const caCertsEntry = middlewareSrc.match(/path:\s*['"]\/api\/v1\/ca\/certs['"]/);
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test('/api/v1/ca/cert/ prefix is NOT in PUBLIC_ROUTES', () => {
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expect(caCertEntry).toBeNull();
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});
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test('/api/v1/ca/certs exact path is NOT in PUBLIC_ROUTES', () => {
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expect(caCertsEntry).toBeNull();
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});
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});
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describe('/cert/:domain — admin scope required (defense in depth)', () => {
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test('no scope at all -> 403 with DC-076_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: [] });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/dns1.sami?format=key');
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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expect(res.body.code).toBe('DC-076_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE');
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expect(res.body.requiredScope).toBe('admin');
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});
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test('read-only scope -> 403 with DC-076_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['read'] });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/dns1.sami?format=key');
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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expect(res.body.code).toBe('DC-076_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE');
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expect(res.body.actualScope).toEqual(['read']);
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});
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test('write scope (but not admin) -> 403', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['read', 'write'] });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/dns1.sami?format=key');
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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test('admin scope -> proceeds past the scope gate', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['admin'] });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/dns1.sami?format=key');
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// Will fail later (no password? actually format=key doesn't need pw)
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// but MUST NOT 403. We expect a 4xx for the cert file not existing
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// (the test stubs open the route, but the openssl mock below would
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// still hit a real openssl — we test 200 only when mocks are wired).
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// For the no-mock path, we accept anything except 403.
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expect(res.status).not.toBe(403);
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});
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test('scope field coerced defensively (string, not array) -> 403', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: 'admin' });
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// Override the auth shim to set a malformed scope
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app.use((req, _res, next) => {
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req.auth = { type: 'session', scope: 'admin' /* not an array */ };
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next();
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});
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/dns1.sami?format=key');
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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});
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describe('/cert/:domain — PFX format requires explicit password', () => {
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test('no password supplied -> 400 DC-076_PASSWORD_REQUIRED', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['admin'] });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/dns1.sami?format=pfx');
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expect(res.status).toBe(400);
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expect(res.body.code).toBe('DC-076_PASSWORD_REQUIRED');
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});
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test('default password "dashcaddy" was the pre-fix behavior — now rejected', async () => {
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// Pre-fix: the route used `password = 'dashcaddy'` as default; PFX
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// files were signed with that string. Post-fix: an explicit password
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// shorter than 8 chars or matching the old default shape ("dashcaddy"
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// is 9 chars, lowercase only) must be REJECTED if it doesn't match
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// the policy. The policy is 8-64 chars from [A-Za-z0-9!@#%^_+,.~:-],
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// so "dashcaddy" is technically 9 chars and would pass... but we
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// test that an EXPLICIT password is required (no implicit default)
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// by sending no password and asserting 400.
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['admin'] });
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const noPw = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/dns1.sami?format=pfx');
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expect(noPw.status).toBe(400);
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expect(noPw.body.code).toBe('DC-076_PASSWORD_REQUIRED');
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});
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test('short password (< 8 chars) -> 400 DC-076_PASSWORD_INVALID', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['admin'] });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/dns1.sami?format=pfx&password=short');
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expect(res.status).toBe(400);
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expect(res.body.code).toBe('DC-076_PASSWORD_INVALID');
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});
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test('password with `=` -> 400 DC-076_PASSWORD_INVALID', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['admin'] });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/dns1.sami?format=pfx&password=abcdefgh=');
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expect(res.status).toBe(400);
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expect(res.body.code).toBe('DC-076_PASSWORD_INVALID');
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});
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test('password with disallowed char (e.g. `/`) -> 400', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['admin'] });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/dns1.sami?format=pfx&password=abc/12345');
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expect(res.status).toBe(400);
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expect(res.body.code).toBe('DC-076_PASSWORD_INVALID');
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});
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test('non-PFX format (key) does NOT require a password (regression for PFX-only password logic)', async () => {
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// The point of this test is to prove that the new DC-076 password
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// gate only fires for PFX. Other formats (key, pem, crt, fullchain)
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// must not 400 on missing-password.
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//
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// We can't easily test the 200 happy path here because the route
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// calls `openssl x509 -in server.crt -noout -dates` to check cert
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// expiry, and a fake server.crt makes that fall through to cert
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// regeneration (which calls real openssl and writes real certs to
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// the real platformPaths.generatedCertsDir — not what we want in a
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// unit test). Instead, we assert that the route does NOT 400 with
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// the password-required shape. We use /format=crt which has the
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// simplest validation path.
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['admin'] });
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// No password supplied; format=crt. Should NOT 400 with
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// DC-076_PASSWORD_REQUIRED (that's only for PFX).
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/dns1.sami?format=crt');
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if (res.status === 400 && res.body.code === 'DC-076_PASSWORD_REQUIRED') {
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throw new Error('non-PFX format wrongly required a password: ' + JSON.stringify(res.body));
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}
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// The actual response could be 200 (cert served) or 500 (cert files
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// missing in test env, or openssl error from fake data) — both
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// are acceptable; what matters is NOT 400 DC-076_PASSWORD_REQUIRED.
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expect(res.status).not.toBe(400);
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});
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});
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describe('/cert/:domain — domain validation', () => {
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test('rejects single-label domain (no dot)', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['admin'] });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/dns1?format=key');
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expect(res.status).toBe(400);
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expect(res.body.code).toBe('DC-076_DOMAIN_INVALID');
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});
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test('rejects domain with `..` (path traversal)', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['admin'] });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd?format=key');
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// Express decodes %2F in the path -> /ca/cert/../etc/passwd
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// The new regex `^[a-z0-9]...` rejects this entirely.
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expect([400, 404]).toContain(res.status);
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});
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test('rejects domain with control char (\\n)', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['admin'] });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/evil%0A.com?format=key');
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expect([400, 404]).toContain(res.status);
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});
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test('rejects uppercase domain (must be lowercase per the new regex)', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['admin'] });
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const res = await request(app)
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.get('/ca/cert/DNS1.SAMI?format=key');
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expect(res.status).toBe(400);
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expect(res.body.code).toBe('DC-076_DOMAIN_INVALID');
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});
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});
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describe('/cert/:domain — rate limit', () => {
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test('first 10 requests in 60s succeed (or fail non-rate-limit), 11th returns 429', async () => {
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// 10 requests should all NOT be 429 (the rate-limit counter is
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// reset per module load, so each test starts fresh).
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for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['admin'] });
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const r = await request(app).get('/ca/cert/dns1.sami?format=key');
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expect(r.status).not.toBe(429);
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}
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// 11th MUST be 429 (the rate limit is in-module state; only the
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// last test's app shares state with itself, so we use the same
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// app for the 11th request).
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['admin'] });
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// First 10
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for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
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await request(app).get('/ca/cert/dns1.sami?format=key');
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}
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const over = await request(app).get('/ca/cert/dns1.sami?format=key');
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expect(over.status).toBe(429);
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expect(over.body.code).toBe('DC-076_RATE_LIMITED');
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expect(over.headers['retry-after']).toMatch(/^\d+$/);
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});
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});
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describe('/certs — list endpoint requires admin scope', () => {
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test('no admin scope -> 403', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['read'] });
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const res = await request(app).get('/ca/certs');
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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});
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test('admin scope -> 200', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: ['admin'] });
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const res = await request(app).get('/ca/certs');
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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});
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});
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describe('static /root.crt and /info remain public (CA cert IS public)', () => {
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test('GET /ca/root.crt does not require admin scope', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: [] });
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const res = await request(app).get('/ca/root.crt');
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// 200 if the file is there, 404 if not — but NEVER 403
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expect([200, 404]).toContain(res.status);
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});
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test('GET /ca/info does not require admin scope', async () => {
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const { app } = createCaApp({ scope: [] });
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const res = await request(app).get('/ca/info');
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// 200 if cert-info.json is there, 404 if not — but NEVER 403
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expect([200, 404]).toContain(res.status);
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});
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});
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});
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