Files
dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/routes/sites.js
DashCaddy Polish Loop 270e8d57e3 fix(sites): SSRF hardening — validate upstream + externalUrl reject private/reserved hosts (DC-074) [glm-grade=A]
Pre-fix, an authenticated dashboard operator could call:
  POST /api/v1/site         {domain:"evil.example.com", upstream:"10.0.0.1:80"}
  POST /api/v1/site/external {subdomain:"x", externalUrl:"http://192.168.1.5"}
and end up with a Caddy site block that proxies PUBLIC traffic at
evil.example.com to an INTERNAL host. Caddy runs on DNS2 (same
network as the targets), so the SSRF lands.

The pre-fix /site upstream regex /^[a-z0-9.-]+:\d{1,5}$/i only
checked charset — it happily accepted 192.168.1.1:80 and
169.254.169.254:80 (AWS metadata IP). /site/external called
validateURL() without blockPrivate:true, leaving the door wide open.

(1) New helper validateUpstream() in fleet-validation.js — reuses
    resolveAndCheckAddress() (DC-068 SSRF work) to reject literal
    private IPv4/IPv6 (loopback / RFC1918 / link-local / CGNAT /
    multicast / broadcast / 0.0.0.0 / TEST-NET / benchmark ranges),
    resolve hostnames and reject private answers (rebinding defense),
    and cap port to 1..65535. Opt-in via SITES_ALLOW_PRIVATE_UPSTREAMS=true.

(2) /site calls validateUpstream() BEFORE caddy.modify() — gate
    happens before any state mutation. Throws ValidationError with
    canonical [DC-074] tag and a redacted hostname audit log entry.

(3) /site/external calls validateURL() (syntax only) + validateUpstream()
    (private-IP gate). validateURL's blockPrivate is intentionally
    NOT passed because it has no opt-in — that's what validateUpstream
    is for.

(4) Tests (__tests__/routes/sites-dc074.routes.test.js, NEW, 60/60
    passing): helper unit tests (format, literal IPv4/IPv6 private
    reject, public IP accept, hostname resolve + rebinding defense,
    env opt-in override), POST /site integration (10 regression
    payloads + public accept + opt-in + port range + charset), POST
    /site/external integration (8 regression payloads + public
    accept + DNS rebinding defense + opt-in), canonical SSRF regression
    proof (RFC 1918 literal IPv4 in upstream + RFC 1918 literal IPv4
    in URL host), unchanged-behavior checks on isPrivateOrReservedIPv4/IPv6.

Full repo suite: 2402/2402 tests in 102 suites (zero regressions).
GLM-5.3 stand-in judge round 1 (deleg_384b9f53, 41.46s, 3 tool
calls, MiniMax-M3 per Sami authorization 2026-08-17): A ship-first.

Refs: codex-as-judge SKILL.md 'Stand-in fallback chain'. Verdict
record: /root/dashcaddy-polish/.ump-verdicts/2026-08-18T22-35-00Z-dc-074-round-1-A.json
2026-08-18 15:31:07 -07:00

325 lines
14 KiB
JavaScript

const express = require('express');
const fs = require('fs');
const { CADDY, REGEX, LIMITS } = require('../src/utilities/constants');
const { ValidationError, ConflictError, NotFoundError } = require('../src/utilities/errors');
const { validateURL } = require('../src/security/input-validator');
const { ok, successMessage } = require('../src/utils/responses');
// DC-074: SSRF defense — reject upstream hosts that resolve to
// private/reserved ranges before they reach the Caddyfile.
const { validateUpstream } = require('../src/utilities/fleet-validation');
/**
* Sites route factory
* @param {Object} deps - Explicit dependencies
* @param {Function} deps.asyncHandler - Async route handler wrapper
* @param {Object} deps.caddy - Caddy manager
* @param {Object} deps.dns - DNS manager
* @param {Function} deps.fetchT - Fetch with timeout
* @param {Function} deps.buildDomain - Domain builder function
* @param {Function} deps.addServiceToConfig - Service config adder
* @param {Object} deps.siteConfig - Site configuration
* @param {Object} deps.log - Logger instance
* @returns {express.Router}
*/
module.exports = function({ asyncHandler, ok, caddy, dns, fetchT, buildDomain, addServiceToConfig, siteConfig, log }) {
const router = express.Router();
// Get Caddyfile contents
router.get('/caddyfile', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const content = await caddy.read();
ok(res, { content });
}, 'caddyfile-get'));
// Get current Caddy config (from admin API)
router.get('/caddy/config', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const response = await fetchT(`${caddy.adminUrl}/config/`);
const config = await response.json();
ok(res, { config });
}, 'caddy-config'));
// Reload Caddy configuration via admin API
router.post('/caddy/reload', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const caddyfileContent = await caddy.read();
const response = await fetchT(`${caddy.adminUrl}/load`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': CADDY.CONTENT_TYPE },
body: caddyfileContent
});
if (!response.ok) {
const errorText = await response.text();
log.error('caddy', new Error(`Caddy reload failed: ${errorText.slice(0, 500)}`));
throw new Error('Caddy reload failed. Check server logs for details.');
}
successMessage(res, 'Caddy configuration reloaded successfully');
}, 'caddy-reload'));
// Get Certificate Authorities from Caddyfile
router.get('/caddy/cas', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const content = await caddy.read();
const cas = [];
const pkiRegex = /pki\s*\{([^}]*(?:\{[^}]*\}[^}]*)*)\}/gs;
let pkiMatch;
while ((pkiMatch = pkiRegex.exec(content)) !== null) {
const pkiBlock = pkiMatch[1];
let caMatch;
const caBlockRegex = /ca\s+(\S+)\s*\{([^}]*(?:\{[^}]*\}[^}]*)*)\}/gs;
while ((caMatch = caBlockRegex.exec(pkiBlock)) !== null) {
const caName = caMatch[1];
const caBlock = caMatch[2];
const ca = { id: caName, name: caName, root: {}, intermediate: {} };
const nameMatch = /name\s+"([^"]+)"/.exec(caBlock);
if (nameMatch) ca.name = nameMatch[1];
const rootCnMatch = /root_cn\s+"([^"]+)"/.exec(caBlock);
const intCnMatch = /intermediate_cn\s+"([^"]+)"/.exec(caBlock);
if (rootCnMatch) ca.root_cn = rootCnMatch[1];
if (intCnMatch) ca.intermediate_cn = intCnMatch[1];
const rootMatch = /root\s*\{([^}]*)\}/s.exec(caBlock);
if (rootMatch) {
const rootBlock = rootMatch[1];
const certMatch = /cert\s+(\S+)/.exec(rootBlock);
const keyMatch = /key\s+(\S+)/.exec(rootBlock);
if (certMatch) ca.root.cert = certMatch[1];
if (keyMatch) ca.root.key = keyMatch[1];
}
const intMatch = /intermediate\s*\{([^}]*)\}/s.exec(caBlock);
if (intMatch) {
const intBlock = intMatch[1];
const certMatch = /cert\s+(\S+)/.exec(intBlock);
const keyMatch = /key\s+(\S+)/.exec(intBlock);
if (certMatch) ca.intermediate.cert = certMatch[1];
if (keyMatch) ca.intermediate.key = keyMatch[1];
}
cas.push(ca);
}
}
const tlsGlobalRegex = /\{\s*acme_ca\s+(\S+)/g;
let tlsMatch;
while ((tlsMatch = tlsGlobalRegex.exec(content)) !== null) {
cas.push({ name: 'acme', url: tlsMatch[1], type: 'acme' });
}
const siteBlocks = content.match(/[\w.-]+\s*\{[^}]*tls\s+[^}]*\}/gs) || [];
const tlsInternalCAs = new Set();
for (const block of siteBlocks) {
const tlsInternalMatch = /tls\s+internal\s*\{[^}]*ca\s+(\S+)/s.exec(block);
if (tlsInternalMatch) tlsInternalCAs.add(tlsInternalMatch[1]);
if (/tls\s+internal(?:\s|$)/.test(block) && !/tls\s+internal\s*\{/.test(block)) {
tlsInternalCAs.add('local');
}
}
for (const caName of tlsInternalCAs) {
if (!cas.find(c => c.name === caName)) {
cas.push({ name: caName, type: 'internal', note: 'Referenced in tls directive' });
}
}
if (cas.length === 0 && /tls\s+internal/.test(content)) {
cas.push({ name: 'local', type: 'internal', note: 'Default Caddy internal CA' });
}
const caList = cas.map(ca => ({
id: ca.id || ca.name,
name: ca.name,
displayName: ca.name !== (ca.id || ca.name) ? `${ca.name} (${ca.id || ca.name})` : ca.name
}));
ok(res, { cas: caList });
}, 'caddy-get-cas'));
// Remove a site from Caddyfile
router.delete('/site/:domain', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const { domain } = req.params;
if (!domain) throw new ValidationError('Domain is required');
// Validate domain format before it is escaped and interpolated into a regex
if (!REGEX.DOMAIN.test(domain)) {
throw new ValidationError('[DC-301] Invalid domain format');
}
const result = await caddy.modify((content) => {
const escapedDomain = domain.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
const siteBlockRegex = new RegExp(
`\\n?${escapedDomain}\\s*\\{[^{}]*(?:\\{[^{}]*(?:\\{[^{}]*\\}[^{}]*)*\\}[^{}]*)*\\}\\s*`, 'g'
);
const modified = content.replace(siteBlockRegex, '\n');
if (modified.length === content.length) return null;
return modified.replace(/\n{3,}/g, '\n\n');
});
if (!result.success) {
if (result.rolledBack) {
throw new Error( `Removed "${domain}" but Caddy reload failed (rolled back): ${result.error}`);
}
throw new NotFoundError(`Site block for "" in Caddyfile`);
}
successMessage(res, `Site "${domain}" removed from Caddyfile and Caddy reloaded`);
}, 'site-delete'));
// Add a new site to Caddyfile and reload
router.post('/site', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const { domain, upstream, config } = req.body;
if (!domain || !upstream) throw new ValidationError('Domain and upstream are required');
if (!REGEX.DOMAIN.test(domain)) throw new ValidationError('[DC-301] Invalid domain format');
// DC-074: SSRF defense — reject upstreams that resolve to private/
// reserved ranges BEFORE we write them into the Caddyfile. Without
// this, an authenticated dashboard operator can call POST /api/v1/site
// with `upstream: '10.0.0.1:80'` and end up with a Caddy site block
// that proxies public traffic to an internal host. Caddy runs on
// DNS2 (same network as the targets), so the SSRF lands.
//
// The existing upstreamRegex /^[a-z0-9.-]+:\d{1,5}$/i only checks
// charset — it happily accepts 192.168.1.1:80 and 169.254.169.254:80
// (the AWS metadata IP). validateUpstream() also does a DNS lookup
// for hostnames so a malicious operator can't sneak a public-looking
// domain past the gate and have it resolve to a private IP later.
const upstreamCheck = await validateUpstream(upstream);
if (!upstreamCheck.ok) {
// Don't echo attacker-supplied hostnames in the audit log; keep the
// canonical code + message but never write the raw value.
log?.warn?.('site', 'POST /site rejected by SSRF gate', { code: upstreamCheck.code });
throw new ValidationError(`[DC-074] ${upstreamCheck.message} (set SITES_ALLOW_PRIVATE_UPSTREAMS=true to opt in)`);
}
const content = await caddy.read();
const escapedDomain = domain.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
const siteBlockRegex = new RegExp(`\\n?${escapedDomain}\\s*\\{`, 'g');
if (siteBlockRegex.test(content)) {
throw new ConflictError(`Site block for "" already exists in Caddyfile`);
}
// Always generate structured config — never allow raw Caddy config injection
const newSiteBlock = `\n${domain} {\n reverse_proxy ${upstream}\n tls internal\n}\n`;
const result = await caddy.modify(c => c + newSiteBlock);
if (!result.success) {
throw new Error( `[DC-303] Site added to Caddyfile but reload failed: ${result.error}`,
result.rolledBack ? { note: 'Caddyfile was rolled back to previous state' } : {});
}
successMessage(res, `Site "${domain}" added to Caddyfile and Caddy reloaded successfully`);
}, 'site-add'));
// Add external service reverse proxy to Caddyfile
router.post('/site/external', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const { subdomain, externalUrl, preserveHost, followRedirects, sslType, caddyfilePath, reloadCaddy: shouldReload, createDns, serviceName, logo } = req.body;
if (!subdomain || !externalUrl) {
throw new ValidationError('Subdomain and externalUrl are required');
}
if (!REGEX.SUBDOMAIN.test(subdomain)) {
throw new ValidationError('[DC-301] Invalid subdomain format');
}
// DC-074: SSRF defense — validate the URL syntax via validateURL() (catches
// non-http(s) schemes, malformed URLs) AND validateUpstream() (catches
// every private/reserved range including CGNAT, multicast, TEST-NET
// ranges that validateURL's isPrivateIP() regex misses).
//
// We intentionally do NOT pass `blockPrivate: true` to validateURL()
// here — that's handled by validateUpstream() below, which honors the
// SITES_ALLOW_PRIVATE_UPSTREAMS opt-in. validateURL's blockPrivate path
// is a hard reject with no escape hatch, which would force operators
// who intentionally proxy to a private target to remove validation
// entirely.
try {
validateURL(externalUrl);
} catch (validationErr) {
throw new ValidationError(validationErr.message);
}
// DC-074: validateUpstream() does the same rigorous private-IP check
// fleet-validation shipped for DC-068, with full CGNAT / multicast /
// broadcast / 0.0.0.0 / TEST-NET / benchmark range coverage and a DNS
// resolution step for hostnames (rebinding defense).
let parsedExternalUrl;
try {
parsedExternalUrl = new URL(externalUrl);
} catch (_) {
// validateURL() above already gates URL syntax — unreachable.
throw new ValidationError('Invalid external URL');
}
const externalCheck = await validateUpstream(`${parsedExternalUrl.hostname}:${parsedExternalUrl.port || (parsedExternalUrl.protocol === 'https:' ? '443' : '80')}`);
if (!externalCheck.ok) {
log?.warn?.('site', 'POST /site/external rejected by SSRF gate', { code: externalCheck.code });
throw new ValidationError(`[DC-074] ${externalCheck.message} (set SITES_ALLOW_PRIVATE_UPSTREAMS=true to opt in)`);
}
const domain = buildDomain(subdomain);
let dnsWarning = null;
if (createDns) {
try {
await dns.universalCreateRecord(subdomain, siteConfig.dnsServerIp);
log.info('dns', 'DNS record created for external proxy', { domain, ip: siteConfig.dnsServerIp });
} catch (dnsError) {
dnsWarning = `DNS creation failed: ${dnsError.message}. You may need to create the DNS record manually.`;
log.warn('dns', 'DNS creation failed for external proxy', { domain, error: dnsError.message });
}
}
const sslConfig = sslType === 'letsencrypt' ? '' : 'tls internal';
const hostHeader = preserveHost ? `\n header_up Host {upstream_hostport}` : '';
const urlObj = new URL(externalUrl);
// Validate URL components are safe for Caddyfile syntax
const unsafeCaddyChars = /[{}\n\r]/;
if (unsafeCaddyChars.test(urlObj.host) || unsafeCaddyChars.test(urlObj.pathname)) {
throw new ValidationError('External URL contains characters not safe for Caddy configuration');
}
const baseUrl = `${urlObj.protocol}//${urlObj.host}`;
const urlPath = urlObj.pathname.replace(/\/$/, '');
let proxyConfig = '';
if (urlPath && urlPath !== '') {
proxyConfig = `\n${domain} {\n ${sslConfig}\n\n handle_path ${urlPath}/* {\n reverse_proxy ${baseUrl} {\n transport http {\n tls\n tls_server_name ${urlObj.host}\n }\n }\n }\n\n handle {\n redir ${urlPath}/ permanent\n }\n}\n`;
} else {
proxyConfig = `\n${domain} {\n ${sslConfig}\n\n reverse_proxy ${externalUrl} {${hostHeader}\n transport http {\n tls\n }\n }\n}\n`;
}
const caddyResult = await caddy.modify(c => {
const escapedDomain = domain.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
if (new RegExp(`\\n?${escapedDomain}\\s*\\{`, 'g').test(c)) return null;
return c + proxyConfig;
});
if (!caddyResult.success && !caddyResult.rolledBack) {
throw new ConflictError(`Site block for "" already exists in Caddyfile`);
}
if (!caddyResult.success) {
throw new Error( `[DC-303] External proxy added but Caddy reload failed (rolled back): ${caddyResult.error}`);
}
if (serviceName && logo) {
try {
await addServiceToConfig({
id: subdomain, name: serviceName, logo,
isExternal: true, externalUrl,
deployedAt: new Date().toISOString()
});
log.info('deploy', 'Service added to dashboard', { subdomain });
} catch (serviceError) {
log.warn('deploy', 'Failed to add service to dashboard', { subdomain, error: serviceError.message });
}
}
const data = {
message: `External service proxy for ${domain} -> ${externalUrl} created${shouldReload ? ' and Caddy reloaded' : ''}`
};
if (dnsWarning) data.warning = dnsWarning;
ok(res, data);
}, 'site-external'));
return router;
};