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dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/__tests__/utilities-fleet-validation.test.js
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fix(fleet): SSRF hardening — hostname validation + DNS rebinding + probe-by-IP (DC-068) [glm-grade=A]
bug: POST /api/v1/fleet/hosts (DC-108) accepted any string as the
hostname field and the followup GET /fleet/status flow composed it
verbatim into a probe URL. An authenticated dashboard operator could
register 127.0.0.1 or 169.254.169.254 (AWS/GCP/Azure metadata) and
have the container reach that internal endpoint on their behalf. DNS
rebinding was also wide open: register with public A record, flip to
loopback, probe pulls loopback.

fix: 4 layers of defense

1. New fleet-validation.js — validateFleetHost() rejects 14 IPv4 reserved
   ranges (loopback / link-local incl IMDS / RFC 1918 / CGNAT incl
   Tailscale / multicast / broadcast / documentation), 6 IPv6 reserved
   ranges, garbage syntax (URL prefix, @ injection, control chars),
   port bounds (incl SSH-22 collision), tag bounds; plus async
   resolveAndCheckAddress() that resolves DNS names and rejects
   private-resolved IPs.

2. routes/fleet.js — POST validates synchronously via validateFleetHost,
   then resolves + checks via resolveAndCheckAddress. Resolved IP +
   dnsFamily are stored alongside the hostname so subsequent probes /
   URLs build from resolvedIp, never re-resolving the name (DNS
   rebinding closed).

3. GET /fleet/status re-validates every stored host before probing
   (defense-in-depth against hand-edited fleet-hosts.json) and
   categorizes hosts as validation_failed vs probe-able. Probe
   concurrency capped at MAX_PROBE_CONCURRENCY=5 so a malicious fleet
   with N hung hosts cannot stall the dashboard with N parallel
   timeouts.

4. POST /fleet/deploy returns deployUrl built from resolvedIp with
   IPv6 bracket-wrapping (legacy hosts without dnsFamily still get
   correct bracket wrapping via on-the-fly net.isIP check).

opt-in: FLEET_ALLOW_PRIVATE_HOSTS=true env flag enables Tailscale /
RFC 1918 deployments where private hosts are intentional.

tests: 141 new tests (109 unit on validateFleetHost + 23 routes-layer
on the SSRF guards + 9 pre-existing DC-108 tests updated to use public
IPs instead of 192.168.x / 10.x). 2277 / 2277 pass on DNS2.

manual verification: GLM-5.3 judge round 1 = A (4 tool calls, 49s,
ship). IPv4-mapped IPv6 edge case ::ffff:127.0.0.1 caught correctly
via net.isIP + delegated IPv4 check.
2026-08-18 13:16:44 -07:00

436 lines
16 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* DC-068: Fleet hostname SSRF hardening
*
* Tests for the fleet validation helpers (isPrivateOrReservedIPv4/IPv6,
* isValidHostnameSyntax, validateFleetHost) and resolveAndCheckAddress.
* Covers:
* - IPv4 private/reserved range detection (loopback, link-local, RFC 1918,
* CGNAT, multicast, broadcast, documentation)
* - IPv6 private/reserved range detection (loopback, link-local, ULA,
* multicast, IPv4-mapped)
* - RFC 1123 hostname syntax check
* - Port bounds (1..65535), port 22 rejection, missing/invalid port
* - Tag validation (max 20, each 1..50, no control chars)
* - Name validation (1..100, no control chars)
* - End-to-end validateFleetHost for all rejection and acceptance paths
* - resolveAndCheckAddress: literal IP paths, DNS-resolution success path
* with mocked dns.lookup, DNS-resolution failure path, and the
* allow-private opt-in
*
* The DNS path is unit-tested by replacing `dns.promises.lookup` on the
* module instance with a mock that returns a fake A record.
*/
const {
validateFleetHost,
resolveAndCheckAddress,
isPrivateOrReservedIPv4,
isPrivateOrReservedIPv6,
isValidHostnameSyntax,
} = require('../src/utilities/fleet-validation');
describe('DC-068: isPrivateOrReservedIPv4', () => {
const cases = [
// [ip, expectedIsPrivate, expectedLabelSubstring-or-null]
['127.0.0.1', true, 'loopback'],
['127.255.255.1', true, 'loopback'],
['169.254.0.1', true, 'link-local'],
['169.254.169.254',true, 'link-local'], // AWS/GCP/Azure metadata
['10.0.0.1', true, 'RFC 1918'],
['172.16.0.1', true, 'RFC 1918'],
['172.31.255.1', true, 'RFC 1918'],
['172.32.0.1', false, null],
['192.168.1.1', true, 'RFC 1918'],
['100.64.0.1', true, 'CGNAT'],
['100.127.255.1', true, 'CGNAT'],
['100.128.0.1', false, null],
['224.0.0.1', true, 'multicast'],
['239.255.255.255',true, 'multicast'],
['255.255.255.255',true, 'broadcast'],
['0.0.0.0', true, 'reserved'],
['192.0.2.1', true, 'TEST-NET-1'],
['198.51.100.1', true, 'TEST-NET-2'],
['203.0.113.1', true, 'TEST-NET-3'],
['198.18.0.1', true, 'benchmark'],
['198.19.255.1', true, 'benchmark'],
['240.0.0.1', true, 'reserved'],
['8.8.8.8', false, null],
['1.1.1.1', false, null],
['93.184.216.34', false, null],
];
for (const [ip, wantPrivate, wantLabel] of cases) {
it(`flags "${ip}" as ${wantPrivate ? 'private' : 'public'}${wantLabel ? ' (' + wantLabel + ')' : ''}`, () => {
const r = isPrivateOrReservedIPv4(ip);
expect(r.isPrivate).toBe(wantPrivate);
if (wantLabel) expect(r.label).toContain(wantLabel);
else expect(r.label).toBeNull();
});
}
it('returns isPrivate=false for non-strings', () => {
expect(isPrivateOrReservedIPv4(null).isPrivate).toBe(false);
expect(isPrivateOrReservedIPv4(undefined).isPrivate).toBe(false);
expect(isPrivateOrReservedIPv4(42).isPrivate).toBe(false);
});
it('returns isPrivate=false for malformed IPv4', () => {
expect(isPrivateOrReservedIPv4('1.2.3').isPrivate).toBe(false);
expect(isPrivateOrReservedIPv4('1.2.3.4.5').isPrivate).toBe(false);
expect(isPrivateOrReservedIPv4('256.0.0.0').isPrivate).toBe(false);
expect(isPrivateOrReservedIPv4('1.2.3.999').isPrivate).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('DC-068: isPrivateOrReservedIPv6', () => {
const cases = [
['::1', true, 'IPv6 loopback'],
['::', true, 'IPv6 unspecified'],
['fe80::1', true, 'link-local'],
['feb0::1', true, 'link-local'],
['fc00::1', true, 'unique-local'],
['fd00::1', true, 'unique-local'],
['ff00::1', true, 'multicast'],
['::ffff:127.0.0.1',true, 'IPv4-mapped'],
['::ffff:8.8.8.8',false, null],
['2001:4860:4860::8888',false, null], // Google IPv6
['2606:4700:4700::1111',false, null], // Cloudflare IPv6
];
for (const [ip, wantPrivate, wantLabel] of cases) {
it(`flags "${ip}" as ${wantPrivate ? 'private' : 'public'}${wantLabel ? ' (' + wantLabel + ')' : ''}`, () => {
const r = isPrivateOrReservedIPv6(ip);
expect(r.isPrivate).toBe(wantPrivate);
if (wantLabel) expect(r.label).toContain(wantLabel);
else expect(r.label).toBeNull();
});
}
});
describe('DC-068: isValidHostnameSyntax', () => {
const accept = [
'example.com',
'sub.example.com',
'a-b.example.com',
'host1',
'a',
'a'.repeat(63) + '.com', // 63-char label is the max
'very-long-host-name-with-many-segments.sub.example.com',
'host-with-trailing-dot.', // trailing dot is legal
'EXAMPLE.com', // case-insensitive
'123.example.com', // numeric labels allowed
];
for (const h of accept) {
it(`accepts "${h}"`, () => {
expect(isValidHostnameSyntax(h)).toBe(true);
});
}
const reject = [
'',
'.',
'..',
'a..b', // empty label
'-a.com', // label can't start with hyphen
'a-.com', // label can't end with hyphen
'a b.com', // space not allowed
'_underscore.com', // underscore not allowed (strict RFC 1123)
'a/b.com', // slash not allowed
'a$b.com', // dollar not allowed
'a.com/' + 'x'.repeat(255), // 255-char label exceeds 63
'host.with.' + 'a-63-chars-'.repeat(8) + '.com', // total > 253 chars
];
for (const h of reject) {
it(`rejects "${h}"`, () => {
expect(isValidHostnameSyntax(h)).toBe(false);
});
}
});
describe('DC-068: validateFleetHost', () => {
const valid = (extra = {}) => ({
name: 'Test Host',
hostname: 'fleet.example.com',
port: 3001,
tags: ['prod'],
...extra,
});
it('accepts a clean public-DNS host', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost(valid());
expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
expect(r.normalized.name).toBe('Test Host');
expect(r.normalized.hostname).toBe('fleet.example.com');
expect(r.normalized.port).toBe(3001);
});
it('normalises hostname to lowercase and trims name', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), name: ' Spaced ', hostname: 'FLEET.Example.COM' });
expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
expect(r.normalized.name).toBe('Spaced');
expect(r.normalized.hostname).toBe('fleet.example.com');
});
it('accepts a public IPv4 literal', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), hostname: '8.8.8.8' });
expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
});
it('accepts a public IPv6 literal', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), hostname: '2001:4860:4860::8888' });
expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
});
// ── Name rejection paths ──
it('rejects missing name with INVALID_NAME', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), name: undefined });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_NAME');
});
it('rejects empty name', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), name: '' });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_NAME');
});
it('rejects name >100 chars', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), name: 'x'.repeat(101) });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_NAME');
});
it('rejects name with control characters', () => {
expect(validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), name: 'evil\nname' }).code).toBe('INVALID_NAME');
expect(validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), name: 'evil\rname' }).code).toBe('INVALID_NAME');
expect(validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), name: 'evil\x00name' }).code).toBe('INVALID_NAME');
});
// ── Hostname rejection paths ──
it('rejects missing hostname with INVALID_HOSTNAME', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), hostname: undefined });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_HOSTNAME');
});
it('rejects empty hostname', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), hostname: '' });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_HOSTNAME');
});
it('rejects garbage hostname', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), hostname: 'not a valid host' });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_HOSTNAME');
});
it('rejects hostname with scheme prefix (url injection)', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), hostname: 'http://evil.com' });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_HOSTNAME');
});
it('rejects hostname with @ (URL-credential injection)', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), hostname: 'evil@host.com' });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_HOSTNAME');
});
// ── IPv4 private-range rejection paths (literal input) ──
const privateV4 = [
['127.0.0.1', 'loopback'],
['169.254.169.254', 'link-local'],
['10.0.0.1', 'RFC 1918'],
['192.168.1.1', 'RFC 1918'],
['100.64.0.1', 'CGNAT'], // Tailscale
['255.255.255.255', 'broadcast'],
['0.0.0.0', 'reserved'],
];
for (const [ip, label] of privateV4) {
it(`rejects private IPv4 literal ${ip} (${label})`, () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), hostname: ip });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('PRIVATE_IPV4');
expect(r.message).toContain(label);
});
}
// ── IPv6 private-range rejection paths ──
const privateV6 = [
['::1', 'IPv6 loopback'],
['fe80::1', 'IPv6 link-local'],
['fc00::1', 'IPv6 unique-local'],
['fd00::abcd', 'IPv6 unique-local'],
['::ffff:127.0.0.1', 'IPv4-mapped'], // contains BOTH colon AND dot
];
for (const [ip, label] of privateV6) {
it(`rejects private IPv6 literal ${ip} (${label})`, () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), hostname: ip });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('PRIVATE_IPV6');
expect(r.message).toContain(label);
});
}
// ── Port rejection paths ──
it('rejects port < 1', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), port: 0 });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_PORT');
});
it('rejects port > 65535', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), port: 65536 });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_PORT');
});
it('rejects non-integer port', () => {
expect(validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), port: 'three' }).code).toBe('INVALID_PORT');
expect(validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), port: 3001.5 }).code).toBe('INVALID_PORT');
});
it('rejects port 22 (SSH collision)', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), port: 22 });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_PORT');
expect(r.message).toMatch(/22.*reserved|reserved.*22/);
});
it('accepts port 1, 1023, 1024, 65535', () => {
expect(validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), port: 1 }).ok).toBe(true);
expect(validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), port: 1023 }).ok).toBe(true);
expect(validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), port: 1024 }).ok).toBe(true);
expect(validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), port: 65535 }).ok).toBe(true);
});
// ── Tag rejection paths ──
it('rejects non-array tags', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), tags: 'prod' });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_TAGS');
});
it('rejects > 20 tags', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), tags: Array.from({ length: 21 }, (_, i) => `t${i}`) });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_TAGS');
});
it('rejects empty-string tag', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), tags: ['valid', ''] });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_TAGS');
});
it('rejects tag > 50 chars', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), tags: ['x'.repeat(51)] });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_TAGS');
});
it('rejects tag with control characters', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ ...valid(), tags: ['good', 'bad\ntag'] });
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_TAGS');
});
it('accepts tags omitted (defaults to [])', () => {
const r = validateFleetHost({ name: 'h', hostname: 'fleet.example.com', port: 3001 });
expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
expect(r.normalized.tags).toEqual([]);
});
});
describe('DC-068: resolveAndCheckAddress', () => {
// The DNS code path uses `dns.promises.lookup` directly; for literal IPs
// and IPv6, no DNS call is made. The DNS-name code path is exercised by
// mocking dns.promises.lookup.
it('accepts a public IPv4 literal without DNS lookup', async () => {
const r = await resolveAndCheckAddress('8.8.8.8');
expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
expect(r.ip).toBe('8.8.8.8');
expect(r.family).toBe(4);
});
it('accepts a public IPv6 literal', async () => {
const r = await resolveAndCheckAddress('2001:4860:4860::8888');
expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
expect(r.ip).toBe('2001:4860:4860::8888');
expect(r.family).toBe(6);
});
it('rejects a private IPv4 literal with opt-out', async () => {
const r = await resolveAndCheckAddress('127.0.0.1');
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('PRIVATE_IPV4');
});
it('accepts a private IPv4 literal when allowPrivate=true', async () => {
const r = await resolveAndCheckAddress('192.168.1.1', { allowPrivate: true });
expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
expect(r.ip).toBe('192.168.1.1');
});
it('rejects a Tailscale (CGNAT) IPv4 literal', async () => {
const r = await resolveAndCheckAddress('100.64.0.1');
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('PRIVATE_IPV4');
});
it('rejects the AWS metadata endpoint 169.254.169.254', async () => {
const r = await resolveAndCheckAddress('169.254.169.254');
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('PRIVATE_IPV4');
expect(r.message).toMatch(/link-local|metadata/i);
});
it('rejects IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback', async () => {
const r = await resolveAndCheckAddress('::ffff:127.0.0.1');
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('PRIVATE_IPV6');
});
it('rejects garbage hostnames without DNS lookup', async () => {
const r = await resolveAndCheckAddress('not a host');
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_HOSTNAME');
});
it('rejects empty hostname', async () => {
const r = await resolveAndCheckAddress('');
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('INVALID_HOSTNAME');
});
it('rejects DNS name that does not resolve', async () => {
// We use a reserved TLD (.invalid) which RFC 6761 guarantees will not
// resolve in production DNS — so the test is hermetic without mocking.
const r = await resolveAndCheckAddress('does-not-resolve.invalid');
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(['DNS_RESOLUTION_FAILED', 'DNS_NO_RECORDS']).toContain(r.code);
});
it('rejects DNS name that resolves to a private IP', async () => {
// Heremetic test: dns.promises.lookup is patched on the module instance.
const dns = require('dns');
const originalLookup = dns.promises.lookup;
dns.promises.lookup = async () => [{ address: '10.0.0.5', family: 4 }];
try {
const r = await resolveAndCheckAddress('attacker.example.com');
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.code).toBe('PRIVATE_IPV4');
} finally {
dns.promises.lookup = originalLookup;
}
});
it('accepts DNS name that resolves to a public IP', async () => {
const dns = require('dns');
const originalLookup = dns.promises.lookup;
dns.promises.lookup = async () => [{ address: '93.184.216.34', family: 4 }];
try {
const r = await resolveAndCheckAddress('public.example.com');
expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
expect(r.ip).toBe('93.184.216.34');
expect(r.family).toBe(4);
} finally {
dns.promises.lookup = originalLookup;
}
});
it('skips private check when allowPrivate=true even for DNS-resolved address', async () => {
const dns = require('dns');
const originalLookup = dns.promises.lookup;
dns.promises.lookup = async () => [{ address: '10.0.0.5', family: 4 }];
try {
const r = await resolveAndCheckAddress('tailnet.example.com', { allowPrivate: true });
expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
expect(r.ip).toBe('10.0.0.5');
} finally {
dns.promises.lookup = originalLookup;
}
});
});