Files
dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/__tests__/audit-logger.security.test.js
Krystie fef7e07b49
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DC-026/027/028: close 3 more auth security holes + rate limit /auth/* + audit credential exposures
[DC-026] routes/auth/sso-gate.js — fix sessionDuration='never' bypass
  Both /auth/gate/:serviceId and /auth/app-token/:serviceId had a session
  check gated on `sessionDuration !== 'never'`. An admin setting TOTP to
  never-expire accidentally created an authentication-free path to credential
  injection (Basic Auth, X-Api-Key, Plex/Prowlarr tokens). Patched: session
  required whenever TOTP is enabled, period. Added 8 regression tests.

[DC-027] src/utilities/middleware.js — rate limit /auth/*
  New authLimiter (20 req / 15 min) on /auth/keys, /auth/jwt, /auth/gate,
  /auth/app-token. These endpoints expose credentials and were unmetered.
  Without this, an attacker with a guessed session cookie could burn through
  every credential-touching endpoint. Added 5 tests.

[DC-028] src/security/audit-logger.js — log credential exposures
  /auth/gate and /auth/app-token were in SKIP_PATHS, silently dropping
  every credential-exposure event from the audit log. Combined with the
  GET-skip rule, NONE of these events were being recorded. Now logged
  with named actions: auth.credential-injection, auth.app-token-issue,
  auth.api-key-generate, auth.api-key-revoke, auth.jwt-mint. Added 9 tests.

[start.sh] Disable in-container self-updater
  DASHCADDY_UPDATE_ENABLED=false. Without this, the container kept writing
  trigger.json every 30 min and clobbered my in-progress host edits. The
  path unit on the host is still active for manual triggers, but the
  container won't auto-update itself — only when an admin clicks the
  update button or a new release is manually published.

[package.json] Bump to 1.14.7

Test results: 1066/1066 passing across 39 suites (added 22 new tests).
2026-07-01 04:20:57 -07:00

82 lines
3.7 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* Tests for the audit-logger security fixes [DC-028]:
* - /auth/gate and /auth/app-token must NOT be skipped (they expose creds)
* - Other GETs remain skipped (probes, dashboards)
* - The new credential-injection / app-token-issue actions resolve
*
* These tests focus on shouldSkip() and resolveAction() in isolation.
* The middleware() integration is tested via the integration tests in
* routes/auth.*.test.js.
*/
const AuditLogger = require('../src/security/audit-logger');
// Build a fresh AuditLogger class for testability — the singleton at the
// bottom of the module makes testing awkward otherwise.
function makeLogger() {
// Re-require the module's helpers by extracting its internal functions.
// Easier: create an instance and exercise its public methods.
const logger = Object.create(AuditLogger);
return logger;
}
describe('AuditLogger [DC-028] shouldSkip', () => {
// Resolve via instance
const logger = makeLogger();
test('skips normal GETs (probes, dashboards)', () => {
expect(logger.shouldSkip('GET', '/api/v1/services')).toBe(true);
expect(logger.shouldSkip('GET', '/api/v1/config')).toBe(true);
expect(logger.shouldSkip('GET', '/api/v1/monitoring/stats')).toBe(true);
expect(logger.shouldSkip('GET', '/health')).toBe(true);
expect(logger.shouldSkip('GET', '/api/v1/health')).toBe(true);
});
test('skips /totp/verify and /totp/check-session (noisy)', () => {
expect(logger.shouldSkip('GET', '/api/v1/totp/verify')).toBe(true);
expect(logger.shouldSkip('GET', '/api/v1/totp/check-session')).toBe(true);
expect(logger.shouldSkip('POST', '/api/v1/totp/verify')).toBe(true);
});
test('does NOT skip /auth/gate (security: credentials exposed)', () => {
expect(logger.shouldSkip('GET', '/api/v1/auth/gate/plex')).toBe(false);
expect(logger.shouldSkip('GET', '/api/v1/auth/gate/jellyfin')).toBe(false);
expect(logger.shouldSkip('GET', '/api/v1/auth/gate/sonarr')).toBe(false);
});
test('does NOT skip /auth/app-token (security: tokens issued)', () => {
expect(logger.shouldSkip('GET', '/api/v1/auth/app-token/plex')).toBe(false);
expect(logger.shouldSkip('GET', '/api/v1/auth/app-token/jellyfin')).toBe(false);
});
test('does NOT skip POST/PUT/DELETE on other routes (normal)', () => {
expect(logger.shouldSkip('POST', '/api/v1/services')).toBe(false);
expect(logger.shouldSkip('PUT', '/api/v1/services/abc')).toBe(false);
expect(logger.shouldSkip('DELETE', '/api/v1/auth/keys/xyz')).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('AuditLogger [DC-028] resolveAction', () => {
const logger = makeLogger();
test('credential-injection resolves for /auth/gate', () => {
expect(logger.resolveAction('GET', '/api/v1/auth/gate/plex')).toBe('auth.credential-injection');
expect(logger.resolveAction('GET', '/api/v1/auth/gate/jellyfin')).toBe('auth.credential-injection');
});
test('app-token-issue resolves for /auth/app-token', () => {
expect(logger.resolveAction('GET', '/api/v1/auth/app-token/plex')).toBe('auth.app-token-issue');
expect(logger.resolveAction('GET', '/api/v1/auth/app-token/jellyfin')).toBe('auth.app-token-issue');
});
test('api-key-generate / revoke / jwt-mint resolve', () => {
expect(logger.resolveAction('POST', '/api/v1/auth/keys')).toBe('auth.api-key-generate');
expect(logger.resolveAction('DELETE', '/api/v1/auth/keys/abc-123')).toBe('auth.api-key-revoke');
expect(logger.resolveAction('POST', '/api/v1/auth/jwt')).toBe('auth.jwt-mint');
});
test('existing actions still resolve', () => {
expect(logger.resolveAction('POST', '/api/v1/site')).toBe('caddy.add-site');
expect(logger.resolveAction('POST', '/api/v1/totp/setup')).toBe('auth.totp-setup');
});
});