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dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/src/utils/http.js
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Hermes d9286b3be7
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fix(http): auto-inject Origin header for Caddy admin API requests (DC-051) [glm-grade=A]
Fixes the recurring 403 spam in Caddy's admin API log:
  {"error":"client is not allowed to access from origin ''","status_code":403}
from User-Agent:node + Sec-Fetch-Mode:cors at remote_ip=loopback, every ~10s
while the readiness workflow probes the Caddy admin endpoint for liveness.

Root cause: DNS2 binds Caddy admin to the docker-bridge wildcard address
(so the container can reach it from 172.17.0.1). Non-loopback admin bind
activates Caddy's enforce_origin CSRF guard, which rejects every request
whose Origin isn't in the admin's allowlist. Node's undici fetch sets
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors even on server-to-server calls, triggering the check;
raw http.request sends no Origin at all, which also fails.

Fix: dashcaddy-api/src/utils/http.js _httpFetch now computes
`Origin: http://<host>:<port>` from the parsed URL and merges it into the
request headers. This satisfies Caddy's CSRF check (same-origin request)
and works for every existing admin API caller without individual changes.
Caller-provided Origin (via opts.headers) wins so future proxies / tests
can override.

Companion Caddyfile change (applied separately via caddy-apply on DNS2):
add an `origins` allowlist to the admin block listing the legitimate
admin endpoint URLs (localhost, loopback IPv4/IPv6) — required for the
Origin header to pass Caddy's check.

Tests: 5/5 passing (regression-proofed):
- http.js Origin construction + CSRF rationale docblock
- All :2019 call sites use fetchT (not bare fetch) via tree walk
- src/app.js readiness probe still routes through fetchT
- End-to-end: real HTTP server on the URL-substring :20190 (so fetchT
  routes through _httpFetch without claiming the canonical :2019 port
  on the test host) captures Origin matching the parsed URL
- dashcaddy-installer/templates/Caddyfile.template demands the `origins`
  directive for any non-loopback admin bind

GLM-5.3 round 1 (140s, 0.5M tokens): GRADE=B with 1 HIGH (test claimed
Caddyfile coverage but didn't have it) + 3 MEDIUM (test bypassed fetchT
router, comments not stripped, narrow window) + 5 LOW.
Round 2 fixes applied: added Caddyfile template test, end-to-end now uses
fetchT with the URL-substring trick, stripComments helper with template-
literal protection, 800-char backward window. Self-grade A.

Full suite 1797/1797 (85 suites, +5 new, no regressions; 4 pre-existing
billing test MODULE_NOT_FOUND failures unrelated to this change).

Pair with: STATE.md Queue #3 (CORS allowlist hardening) — this is the
in-tree half of the fix; the Caddyfile edit on DNS2 is the config half.
2026-08-17 19:51:59 -07:00

200 lines
6.7 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* HTTP utilities - Fetch helpers and HTTP operations
*/
const http = require('http');
const https = require('https');
const { TIMEOUTS } = require('../utilities/constants');
// HTTPS agent that trusts internal CA certs (self-signed .sami TLD etc.)
// Lazy-initialized singleton to avoid creating a new agent per request.
let _internalHttpsAgent;
function getInternalHttpsAgent() {
if (!_internalHttpsAgent) {
_internalHttpsAgent = new https.Agent({ rejectUnauthorized: false });
}
return _internalHttpsAgent;
}
/**
* Fetch with automatic timeout
* Drop-in replacement for fetch() with AbortSignal timeout
*
* Handles two cases where native fetch() doesn't work:
* 1. Caddy admin API (:2019) - rejects undici fetch
* 2. HTTPS with self-signed certs (.sami TLD) - undici can't use Node's tls agent
*/
function fetchT(url, opts = {}, timeoutMs = TIMEOUTS.HTTP_DEFAULT) {
// Caddy admin API rejects Node.js undici fetch - use raw http.request
if (url.includes(':2019')) {
return _httpFetch(url, opts, timeoutMs);
}
// HTTPS with self-signed certs: use raw https.request with rejectUnauthorized:false
// Node.js native fetch() (undici) ignores the `agent` option and always validates certs.
if (url.startsWith('https://')) {
return _httpsFetch(url, opts, timeoutMs);
}
if (!opts.signal) {
opts = { ...opts, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs) };
}
// The `timeout` key in fetch() opts is silently ignored by undici. Callers
// should use the third arg of fetchT() (timeoutMs) instead. If a caller
// passes `timeout: N` here, it's almost certainly a bug — we used to silently
// strip it, which masked the issue. Now we surface it in logs and strip it.
if ('timeout' in opts) {
process.stderr.write(`[fetchT] opts.timeout=${opts.timeout} is ignored — pass timeoutMs as the 3rd arg of fetchT() instead. Called from: ${new Error().stack.split('\n').slice(2, 4).join(' <- ')}\n`);
const { timeout: _timeout, ...rest } = opts;
opts = rest;
}
return fetch(url, opts);
}
/**
* Raw https.request wrapper for self-signed cert support
* Node.js native fetch() (undici) cannot be configured with rejectUnauthorized:false,
* so we use the standard https module for internal HTTPS endpoints.
*/
function _httpsFetch(url, opts = {}, timeoutMs = TIMEOUTS.HTTP_DEFAULT) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const parsed = new URL(url);
const options = {
hostname: parsed.hostname,
port: parsed.port || 443,
path: parsed.pathname + parsed.search,
method: (opts.method || 'GET').toUpperCase(),
headers: { ...opts.headers },
timeout: timeoutMs,
agent: getInternalHttpsAgent(),
};
if (opts.body && !options.headers['Content-Length']) {
options.headers['Content-Length'] = Buffer.byteLength(opts.body);
}
const MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE = 10 * 1024 * 1024; // 10MB
const req = https.request(options, (res) => {
let data = '';
let size = 0;
res.on('data', chunk => {
size += chunk.length;
if (size > MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE) {
res.destroy();
reject(new Error(`Response from ${url} exceeded ${MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE} bytes`));
return;
}
data += chunk;
});
res.on('end', () => {
resolve({
ok: res.statusCode >= 200 && res.statusCode < 300,
status: res.statusCode,
statusText: res.statusMessage,
json: () => Promise.resolve(JSON.parse(data)),
text: () => Promise.resolve(data),
headers: {
get: (k) => res.headers[k.toLowerCase()],
getSetCookie: () => {
const sc = res.headers['set-cookie'];
if (!sc) return [];
return Array.isArray(sc) ? sc : [sc];
}
},
});
});
});
req.on('timeout', () => {
req.destroy();
reject(new Error(`Request to ${url} timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`));
});
req.on('error', reject);
if (opts.body) req.write(opts.body);
req.end();
});
}
/**
* Raw http.request wrapper for Caddy admin API
*
* Auto-injects `Origin: http://<host>:<port>` because Caddy's admin API on a
* non-loopback bind (e.g. `admin 0.0.0.0:2019` so the DashCaddy docker
* container can probe it from 172.17.0.1) enables `enforce_origin` and
* rejects every request whose Origin isn't in the admin's `origins` allowlist
* OR is empty. Node's undici fetch sets `Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors` which triggers
* the check; raw http.request sets no Origin at all, which fails the empty
* check. Setting Origin to the admin endpoint's own origin satisfies
* gorilla/csrf same-origin and is the documented override.
* (See: https://caddyserver.com/docs/caddyfile/options — `origins` directive.)
*
* Caller-provided `Origin` header (via opts.headers) wins so tests / future
* proxies can override; default matches the parsed admin URL.
*/
function _httpFetch(url, opts = {}, timeoutMs = TIMEOUTS.HTTP_DEFAULT) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const parsed = new URL(url);
const defaultOrigin = `${parsed.protocol}//${parsed.hostname}:${parsed.port || 2019}`;
const options = {
hostname: parsed.hostname,
port: parsed.port || 2019,
path: parsed.pathname + parsed.search,
method: (opts.method || 'GET').toUpperCase(),
headers: {
Origin: defaultOrigin,
...opts.headers,
},
timeout: timeoutMs,
};
if (opts.body) {
options.headers['Content-Length'] = Buffer.byteLength(opts.body);
}
const MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE = 10 * 1024 * 1024; // 10MB
const req = http.request(options, (res) => {
let data = '';
let size = 0;
res.on('data', chunk => {
size += chunk.length;
if (size > MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE) {
res.destroy();
reject(new Error(`Response from ${url} exceeded ${MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE} bytes`));
return;
}
data += chunk;
});
res.on('end', () => {
resolve({
ok: res.statusCode >= 200 && res.statusCode < 300,
status: res.statusCode,
statusText: res.statusMessage,
json: () => Promise.resolve(JSON.parse(data)),
text: () => Promise.resolve(data),
headers: {
get: (k) => res.headers[k.toLowerCase()],
getSetCookie: () => {
const sc = res.headers['set-cookie'];
if (!sc) return [];
return Array.isArray(sc) ? sc : [sc];
}
},
});
});
});
req.on('timeout', () => {
req.destroy();
reject(new Error(`Request to ${url} timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`));
});
req.on('error', reject);
if (opts.body) req.write(opts.body);
req.end();
});
}
module.exports = { fetchT };