Feature: /etc/dashcaddy/operator.env (root-owned KEY=VALUE file) is forwarded into the DashCaddy container as docker -e flags by start.sh. Canonical flag: ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true on the CREATOR host only. This is a client-side rail, NOT the security boundary: lifetime codes must HMAC-verify against the creator-only signing secret, which is never shipped to customers (installs carry only .license-secret-hash; the license server never issues lifetime codes). Flipping the flag on a customer host grants nothing. Missing file = normal case (zero flags). Design (per judge blockers): 1. scripts/operator-flags.js — Node, ONE pinned file descriptor: lstat pre-check (reject FIFO/device/dir BEFORE any open that could block: r5 DoS blocker) then open(O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NONBLOCK), fstat, read from the SAME fd (r3 TOCTOU blocker closed; O_NONBLOCK makes even an adversarial race on a FIFO non-blocking). Contract: regular file; no group/other access bits; no setuid/setgid/sticky; owner uid 0 under root runtime (owner==euid otherwise). Symlink refused at open even when the target would pass all checks. Violation => stderr FATAL + exit 3. Content is pure data: never sourced/evaled/executed; $(...) values stay inert text (tested). 2. start.sh: rc 3 => warn + forward NOTHING (fail closed); ANY other non-zero rc => ABORT startup (fail loud, r4 blocker; tested via missing-checker simulation); missing file => silent zero overrides. Single helper invocation; keys-only audit line at boot (no values). 3. Artifact hygiene (r3/r5): verifier section [8] EXECUTES a scan of the judge-dir + evidence-dir for full-format license codes and FAILS if no PATCH.diff is present at all (no vacuous pass); indexed 0_/1_/2_/3_ names recognized. (An earlier round leaked one code; it is dead — signing secret rotated, keygen verify reports INVALID.) Root-cause hardening (2026-10-08 incident: deploy checkouts overwriting git-TRACKED runtime state revoked the owner's premium and hid service cards): - untrack dashcaddy-api/data/services.json AND add an explicit .gitignore entry for it (r5: untrack alone leaves accidental re-add possible) - untrack dashcaddy-api/.license-secret + .license-counter, extend .gitignore. The secret's old value in git history is already rotated, hence cryptographically dead. Tests: 17 executed operator-flags tests — incl. FIFO regression (mkfifo, no writer, hard 2s timeout, expect immediate rc 3), O_NOFOLLOW symlink-to-valid-target, 0644/0755/setuid/directory/foreign-owner/usage rejections, missing-file-silent, injection-inert, full translation suite; license-manager 76 + tier-enforcement 21 untouched => 114 targeted green.
265 lines
13 KiB
Bash
Executable File
265 lines
13 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/bin/bash
|
|
set -e
|
|
CONTAINER_NAME="dashcaddy-api"
|
|
IMAGE="dashcaddy-dashcaddy-api:latest"
|
|
DATA_DIR="/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/data"
|
|
CADDYFILE="/etc/caddy/Caddyfile"
|
|
ASSETS_DIR="/var/www/dashcaddy-status/assets"
|
|
UPDATES_DIR="/opt/dashcaddy/updates"
|
|
BACKUPS_DIR="/opt/dashcaddy/backups"
|
|
HOST_IP="172.17.0.1"
|
|
# DC-118: this host's own routable IPs (comma-sep) — passed to the API so the
|
|
# caddy-event self-noise filter can drop the host's own curl probes (watchdog,
|
|
# cron) without blinding the store to external curl traffic. Loopback is
|
|
# always implicit in the worker; add the tailscale IP when discoverable.
|
|
SELF_IPS="127.0.0.1"
|
|
TS_IP="$(tailscale ip -4 2>/dev/null | head -1 || true)"
|
|
[ -n "$TS_IP" ] && SELF_IPS="${SELF_IPS},${TS_IP}"
|
|
# Local Technitium (binds 0.0.0.0:53) resolves *.sami + recurses for docker subnet
|
|
# external fallback. Without this the container only has 8.8.8.8 and every
|
|
# *.sami health-check probe fails with ENOTFOUND (uptime bars stay empty).
|
|
DNS_PRIMARY="100.121.150.22" # Technitium (Tailscale IP) — resolves *.sami
|
|
# DC-121: the fallback must ALSO serve *.sami. Node's tls.connect resolves via
|
|
# dns.lookup → getaddrinfo → musl, which queries ALL resolv.conf nameservers in
|
|
# PARALLEL and takes the first reply. With 8.8.8.8 as fallback, Google NXDOMAINs
|
|
# the internal .sami TLD and wins that race ~2-5% of the time. Measured on DNS2
|
|
# inside the live container 2026-08-24: dns.lookup 18/400 ENOTFOUND for records
|
|
# that resolve fine via the primary; c-ares pinned to 8.8.8.8 alone returns
|
|
# NXDOMAIN 10/10; c-ares pinned to the primary 0/400. (Source of ssl-monitor
|
|
# "Failed to check cert" warn noise; the git.sami /etc/hosts pin below was a
|
|
# per-name paperover of this same class.) DNS1's Technitium secondary
|
|
# (100.71.97.12) serves *.sami AND recurses for external names — both verified
|
|
# from inside the container — so whichever resolver wins the race, the answer
|
|
# is correct.
|
|
DNS_FALLBACK="100.71.97.12" # DNS1 Technitium secondary — serves *.sami + recurses
|
|
|
|
# --- DC-164 rev4: operator env overrides --------------------------------------
|
|
# /etc/dashcaddy/operator.env is forwarded into the container as -e flags by
|
|
# dashcaddy-api/scripts/operator-flags.js (Node; single O_NOFOLLOW fd pinned
|
|
# for BOTH the contract checks and the read — no TOCTOU window). Contract
|
|
# violation (rc 3) = fail closed: warn and forward NOTHING. Unexpected error
|
|
# (any other rc != 0) = fail loud: ABORT startup, do not silently run with
|
|
# an unverified operator file state. The canonical flag:
|
|
# ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true on the CREATOR's host only. This is a
|
|
# client-side rail, not the security boundary — lifetime codes still must
|
|
# HMAC-verify against the creator-only signing secret (never shipped to
|
|
# customers), so flipping the flag on a customer host grants nothing.
|
|
# Missing file / no overrides = normal customer case (zero flags added).
|
|
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
|
OPERATOR_ENV_FILE="${OPERATOR_ENV_FILE:-/etc/dashcaddy/operator.env}"
|
|
OPERATOR_FLAGS=()
|
|
OP_HELPER="$SCRIPT_DIR/dashcaddy-api/scripts/operator-flags.js"
|
|
if [ -e "$OPERATOR_ENV_FILE" ]; then
|
|
if [ ! -r "$OP_HELPER" ]; then
|
|
echo "[start.sh] FATAL: operator.env present but contract checker missing: $OP_HELPER" >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
OP_NODE="${OPERATOR_NODE:-node}"
|
|
if ! command -v "$OP_NODE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
|
echo "[start.sh] FATAL: operator.env present but '$OP_NODE' not found (set OPERATOR_NODE)" >&2
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
OP_RAW="$( "$OP_NODE" "$OP_HELPER" "$OPERATOR_ENV_FILE" )" || OP_RC=$?
|
|
OP_RC="${OP_RC:-0}"
|
|
if [ "$OP_RC" -eq 3 ]; then
|
|
echo "[start.sh] WARNING: operator env file rejected by contract check — forwarding NO overrides" >&2
|
|
elif [ "$OP_RC" -ne 0 ]; then
|
|
echo "[start.sh] FATAL: operator contract checker failed (exit $OP_RC) — aborting startup" >&2
|
|
exit "$OP_RC"
|
|
elif [ -n "$OP_RAW" ]; then
|
|
while IFS= read -r kv; do
|
|
[ -n "$kv" ] && OPERATOR_FLAGS+=(-e "$kv")
|
|
done <<< "$OP_RAW"
|
|
echo "[start.sh] operator.env: $(( ${#OPERATOR_FLAGS[@]} / 2 )) items forwarded (keys only: $(printf '%s\n' "${OPERATOR_FLAGS[@]}" | grep -v '^-e$' | cut -d= -f1 | paste -sd, -))"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# --- One-time migration from Docker image layer to bind mount --------------
|
|
# DC-039 follow-up. Before v1.14.10, certain modules (audit-logger, license-
|
|
# keygen, credential-manager) defaulted their files to /app/src/* via
|
|
# path.join(__dirname, 'foo.json'). Those writes landed in the Docker image
|
|
# layer and VANISHED on every container recreate. This step scans for any
|
|
# non-empty zombie files left over from a previous image (where /opt/dashcaddy/
|
|
# previously used /opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/src/... as the path root) and
|
|
# copies their contents into the bind-mounted data dir ONCE.
|
|
#
|
|
# Idempotent: bails out if the migration sentinel file already exists.
|
|
# Designed to be a no-op on every fresh install.
|
|
MIGRATION_SENTINEL="${DATA_DIR}/.migrated-from-image-layer"
|
|
IMAGE_LAYER_ZOMBIES=(
|
|
"/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/src/security/audit-log.json"
|
|
"/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/src/security/.encryption-key"
|
|
"/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/src/security/.encryption-key.bak"
|
|
"/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/src/utils/error.log"
|
|
"/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/src/managers/.license-secret"
|
|
"/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/src/managers/.license-counter"
|
|
)
|
|
# Note: set -e is active at top of script. Each per-file step uses an
|
|
# explicit `|| true` (or guarded `if`) so a single unreadable zombie file
|
|
# can't take down the whole container. The sentinel write at the end is
|
|
# outside any conditional so it always runs once.
|
|
run_image_layer_migration() {
|
|
if [ -f "${MIGRATION_SENTINEL}" ]; then
|
|
return 0
|
|
fi
|
|
mkdir -p "${DATA_DIR}" || { echo "[start.sh] [migration] mkdir failed: ${DATA_DIR}"; return 0; }
|
|
local migrated=0
|
|
for src in "${IMAGE_LAYER_ZOMBIES[@]}"; do
|
|
if [ -f "${src}" ] && [ -s "${src}" ]; then
|
|
local dest_name dest
|
|
dest_name="$(basename "${src}")"
|
|
dest="${DATA_DIR}/migrated-${dest_name}"
|
|
if [ ! -f "${dest}" ]; then
|
|
echo "[start.sh] [migration] Recovering image-layer file: ${src} -> ${dest}"
|
|
if cp -a "${src}" "${dest}" 2>/dev/null; then
|
|
migrated=$((migrated + 1))
|
|
else
|
|
echo "[start.sh] [migration] WARN: failed to copy ${src} (continuing)"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
done
|
|
if [ "$migrated" -gt 0 ]; then
|
|
echo "[start.sh] [migration] Recovered ${migrated} file(s) from image layer."
|
|
echo "[start.sh] [migration] Review files prefixed 'migrated-' in ${DATA_DIR} and merge or delete."
|
|
fi
|
|
# Sentinel write MUST run regardless of any per-file failure above.
|
|
date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > "${MIGRATION_SENTINEL}" 2>/dev/null || echo "1" > "${MIGRATION_SENTINEL}"
|
|
}
|
|
run_image_layer_migration
|
|
|
|
# --- /etc/hosts overrides for the container ---------------------------------
|
|
# The base image (node:20-alpine) has no entries for *.sami. We must inject
|
|
# them via --add-host so health checks inside the container can resolve LAN
|
|
# and Tailscale IPs to the right destinations.
|
|
#
|
|
# IMPORTANT: Do NOT add `git.sami:100.81.59.99` (DNS3). DNS3 does not serve
|
|
# HTTPS on 443 — it only serves Gitea on :3030. Setting git.sami → DNS3 in
|
|
# the container would make health checks bypass Caddy and hit a closed port.
|
|
# Let Caddy (on DNS2:443) handle git.sami and route to DNS3:3030 internally.
|
|
#
|
|
# Layout:
|
|
# dns3.sami / gitea → DNS3 (Tailscale IP, used by tools inside the container
|
|
# that need to talk to Gitea directly, e.g. backups)
|
|
# dns3-wan.sami → DNS3 Contabo WAN fallback
|
|
# dns2.sami → DNS2 (this host) — for cross-service references
|
|
# dns1.sami → DNS1 (SAMI-CLOUD-U32)
|
|
# dc-contabo-de → DashCaddy Contabo test instance
|
|
# git.dashcaddy.net → DashCaddy upstream git
|
|
# git.sami → DNS2 (NOT DNS3 — see warning above). Resolves an
|
|
# intermittent ENOTFOUND in the ssl-monitor's TLS
|
|
# handshake check (~2/h) by pinning the name in the
|
|
# container's /etc/hosts to the Caddy listener.
|
|
# ca.sami → local CA (DN2 + DN3 both have their own)
|
|
ADD_HOST_FLAGS=(
|
|
# host.docker.internal → host bridge IP (Docker host-gateway). The caddy
|
|
# upstream watcher probes Caddy site upstreams from INSIDE this container;
|
|
# `reverse_proxy localhost:PORT` in a site file means the HOST's loopback,
|
|
# so the watcher remaps loopback probe targets to this name (see
|
|
# dashcaddy-api/src/monitoring/caddy-upstream-watcher.js). Without this
|
|
# entry the probes would hit the container's own loopback and report every
|
|
# host-side upstream as dead.
|
|
--add-host=host.docker.internal:host-gateway
|
|
--add-host=dns3.sami:100.81.59.99
|
|
--add-host=gitea:100.81.59.99
|
|
--add-host=dns3-wan.sami:74.208.167.19
|
|
--add-host=dns2.sami:100.121.150.22
|
|
--add-host=dns1.sami:100.71.97.12
|
|
--add-host=dc-contabo-de:100.98.123.59
|
|
--add-host=git.dashcaddy.net:100.98.123.59
|
|
--add-host=git.sami:100.121.150.22
|
|
# ca.sami resolves via DNS to 100.121.150.22 (Caddy on DNS2). Don't pin
|
|
# to 127.0.0.1 — nothing listens on 443 inside the container, so the
|
|
# health checker would fail with ECONNREFUSED. The CA itself is a
|
|
# public-facing service that goes through Caddy just like every other *.sami.
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Always recreate to ensure env vars are correct (CONFIG_FILE defaults to /etc/dashcaddy/ which doesn't exist)
|
|
if docker ps -a --format "{{.Names}}" | grep -q "^${CONTAINER_NAME}$"; then
|
|
echo "[start.sh] Recreating container to apply correct env vars..."
|
|
docker rm -f ${CONTAINER_NAME}
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Tailscale CLI + control socket — lets the container invoke
|
|
# `tailscale status --json` to populate /api/v1/tailscale/status etc.
|
|
# The binary is statically linked (Go), so the bind-mount works under
|
|
# the container's Alpine libc without any library forwarding.
|
|
# Both mounts are read-only: `tailscale status --json` is a read query
|
|
# that the local tailscaled handles; we never need to mutate state
|
|
# from inside the container.
|
|
echo "[start.sh] Creating container with full config..."
|
|
|
|
# Sync the freshly-built dashboard bundle into the static directory Caddy
|
|
# serves — decided by VERSION METADATA, not file mtimes (mtimes are not
|
|
# reliable: scp/tar/cp can preserve or shuffle them). DC-122 contract:
|
|
# - The self-updater writes a STAMP (update-stamp.json) into the live web
|
|
# root when it deploys a frontend; while that stamp is newer than the
|
|
# source tree's VERSION file, start.sh must NOT touch the live bundle.
|
|
# - Normal builds: publishing bumps the source VERSION (mtime = build time)
|
|
# and clears any stale stamp, so source wins and the sync happens.
|
|
echo "[start.sh] Syncing dashboard bundle into static dir (metadata-driven)..."
|
|
mkdir -p /var/www/dashcaddy-status/dist
|
|
if [ -d /opt/dashcaddy/status/dist ]; then
|
|
NEEDS_SYNC=1
|
|
STAMP=/var/www/dashcaddy-status/update-stamp.json
|
|
SRC_VERSION=/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/VERSION
|
|
if [ -f "$STAMP" ] && [ -f "$SRC_VERSION" ] && [ "$STAMP" -nt "$SRC_VERSION" ]; then
|
|
# A self-updater deployment is newer than the last source build: hands off.
|
|
echo "[start.sh] Deployed frontend stamp newer than source VERSION — skipping sync to preserve deployed frontend."
|
|
NEEDS_SYNC=0
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$NEEDS_SYNC" = "1" ]; then
|
|
cp /opt/dashcaddy/status/dist/*.js /var/www/dashcaddy-status/dist/ 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
cp /opt/dashcaddy/status/sw.js /var/www/dashcaddy-status/ 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
cp /opt/dashcaddy/status/index.html /var/www/dashcaddy-status/ 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
rm -f "$STAMP"
|
|
echo "[start.sh] Bundle synced ($(ls /opt/dashcaddy/status/dist/*.js 2>/dev/null | wc -l) bundle files + sw.js + index.html)."
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
echo "[start.sh] WARN: /opt/dashcaddy/status/dist missing — skipping sync (frontend will be stale)."
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
docker run -d --restart unless-stopped --name ${CONTAINER_NAME} \
|
|
--memory=1g --memory-swap=2g --cpus=2 \
|
|
--log-driver json-file --log-opt max-size=10m --log-opt max-file=3 \
|
|
--add-host=get.dashcaddy.net:194.233.88.206 \
|
|
--add-host=get2.dashcaddy.net:194.233.88.206 \
|
|
--dns ${DNS_PRIMARY} \
|
|
--dns ${DNS_FALLBACK} \
|
|
"${ADD_HOST_FLAGS[@]}" \
|
|
-p 127.0.0.1:3001:3001 \
|
|
-v ${DATA_DIR}:/app/data \
|
|
-v ${BACKUPS_DIR}:/app/backups \
|
|
-v ${CADDYFILE}:/caddyfile \
|
|
-v /etc/caddy/sites:/etc/caddy/sites:ro \
|
|
-v /var/log/caddy:/var/log/caddy:ro \
|
|
-v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
|
|
-v ${ASSETS_DIR}:/app/assets \
|
|
-v ${UPDATES_DIR}:/app/updates \
|
|
-v /opt/sami-files/logs:/opt/sami-files/logs:ro \
|
|
-v /usr/bin/tailscale:/usr/bin/tailscale:ro \
|
|
-v /var/run/tailscale:/var/run/tailscale:ro \
|
|
-v /etc/ssl/sami-ca:/etc/ssl/sami-ca:ro \
|
|
-v /var/log/journal:/var/log/journal:ro \
|
|
-v /usr/bin/journalctl:/usr/bin/journalctl:ro \
|
|
-e NODE_ENV=production \
|
|
-e SERVICES_FILE=/app/data/services.json \
|
|
-e CONFIG_FILE=/app/data/config.json \
|
|
-e BACKUP_DIR=/app/backups \
|
|
-e DNS_CREDENTIALS_FILE=/app/data/dns-credentials.json \
|
|
-e CREDENTIALS_FILE=/app/data/credentials.json \
|
|
-e ENCRYPTION_KEY_FILE=/app/data/.encryption-key \
|
|
-e HEALTH_HISTORY_FILE=/app/data/health-history.json \
|
|
-e HEALTH_CONFIG_FILE=/app/data/health-config.json \
|
|
-e CADDYFILE_PATH=/caddyfile \
|
|
-e CADDY_ADMIN_URL=http://${HOST_IP}:2019 \
|
|
-e CADDY_ACCESS_LOG=/var/log/caddy/access.log \
|
|
-e DASHCADDY_SELF_IPS="${SELF_IPS}" \
|
|
-e ASSETS_DIR=/app/assets \
|
|
-e DASHCADDY_API_SOURCE_DIR=/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api \
|
|
-e DASHCADDY_UPDATE_ENABLED=true \
|
|
-e SHIPDECK_BRIDGE_URL=http://172.17.0.1:8977 \
|
|
-e SHIPDECK_BRIDGE_TOKEN_FILE=/app/data/shipdeck-bridge-token \
|
|
-e CA_CERT_PATH=/etc/ssl/sami-ca/root.crt \
|
|
${OPERATOR_FLAGS[@]+"${OPERATOR_FLAGS[@]}"} \
|
|
${IMAGE} |