[pending-judge] fix(r5): exercise the boot-timeout kill, total bridge-body handling, strict subdomain labels (judge r4 blockers)
- __tests__/e2e-node/composition-root.e2e.test.js: `boot()` takes {timeoutMs, code}
and the timeout rejection carries the child it killed; a NEW test drives the real
timeout against a child that never reports PORT/READY and asserts the OS-observed
SIGKILL on that child (marker e2e-timeout-kill) — the r4 claim is now exercised.
- routes/deploys.js: bridge() coerces any non-object JSON body (null/[]/string) into
the same failure shape as a non-JSON body, so no `body.ok` deref can 500 or report a
false success; the subdomain label regex rejects leading AND trailing hyphens.
- __tests__/routes/deploys.catalog.r4.test.js: trailing-dash rejection case + three
malformed-successful-body cases (clean 502, never 500).
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@@ -29,11 +29,10 @@ let child;
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let PORT;
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let JWT;
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// Boot the REAL app via its REAL entry contract (createApp + listen). The
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// child mints a JWT through the same authManager singleton the app wires.
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function boot() {
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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const child = spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', `
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// The child program booted by default: the REAL app through its REAL entry
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// contract (createApp + listen). It mints a JWT through the same authManager
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// singleton the app wires, then reports JWT/PORT/READY on stdout.
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const BOOT_CODE = `
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process.env.DATA_DIR = ${JSON.stringify(DATA_DIR)};
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process.env.SERVICES_FILE = ${JSON.stringify(path.join(DATA_DIR, 'services.json'))};
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process.env.TOTP_CONFIG_FILE = ${JSON.stringify(path.join(DATA_DIR, 'totp-config.json'))};
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@@ -55,7 +54,15 @@ function boot() {
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process.on('SIGTERM', () => server.close(() => process.exit(0)));
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process.on('SIGINT', () => server.close(() => process.exit(0)));
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}).catch((e) => { console.error('BOOT-FAIL', e && e.message); process.exit(1); });
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`], { cwd: ROOT, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] });
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`;
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// Boot that program (or an override code string) as a child process.
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// `timeoutMs` is parameterized so the timeout path is exercisable for real.
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function boot(opts = {}) {
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const timeoutMs = opts.timeoutMs || 30000;
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const code = opts.code || BOOT_CODE;
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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const child = spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', code], { cwd: ROOT, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] });
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let buf = '';
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let settled = false;
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const to = setTimeout(() => {
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@@ -63,9 +70,15 @@ function boot() {
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settled = true;
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// POLISH (judge r3): a timed-out boot must not leak the child.
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try { child.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch (_) {}
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reject(new Error('boot timeout'));
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// judge r4: the timeout path must be TESTABLE, so the rejected error
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// carries the child it killed — the test asserts the OS-observed
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// signal on that child instead of trusting this bookkeeping.
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const err = new Error('boot timeout');
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err.child = child;
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err.timedOut = true;
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reject(err);
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}
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}, 30000);
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}, timeoutMs);
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child.stdout.on('data', (d) => {
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buf += String(d);
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const mj = buf.match(/JWT:(\S*)/);
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@@ -131,6 +144,33 @@ describe('composition-root e2e (real createApp on ephemeral port)', () => {
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expect(child.exitCode).toBeNull();
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});
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// judge r4 (blocker): the claim that the boot timeout KILLS the child was
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// previously unbacked — the handler existed but nothing exercised it. This
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// test drives the real timeout path with a child that never reports
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// PORT/READY (exactly the hang the timeout exists for), at a 1.5s timeout
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// instead of the production 30s, and asserts the OS-observed exit signal on
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// that very child (not the helper's bookkeeping).
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it('kills the spawned child when the boot timeout fires (e2e-timeout-kill)', async () => {
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let timedOutErr = null;
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await expect(
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boot({ timeoutMs: 1500, code: 'setInterval(function () {}, 1000);' })
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.catch((e) => { timedOutErr = e; throw e; })
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).rejects.toThrow(/boot timeout/);
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expect(timedOutErr).toBeTruthy();
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expect(timedOutErr.timedOut).toBe(true);
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const hung = timedOutErr.child;
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expect(hung).toBeTruthy();
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// The kernel signal is the evidence: wait for the exit event if it has not
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// landed yet (SIGKILL is immediate, but the event is delivered async).
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if (hung.exitCode === null && !hung.signalCode) {
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await new Promise((r) => {
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const t = setTimeout(r, 4000);
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hung.once('exit', () => { clearTimeout(t); r(); });
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});
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}
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expect(hung.signalCode).toBe('SIGKILL');
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}, 15000);
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it('minted a real JWT via the app auth manager', () => {
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expect(JWT.length).toBeGreaterThan(20);
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});
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@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ describe('DC-CATALOG-3 r4: audit contract + subdomain forwarding', () => {
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['uppercase', 'MyBot'],
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['underscore', 'my_bot'],
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['leading dash', '-bot'],
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['trailing dash', 'bot-'],
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['too long', 'a'.repeat(64)],
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])('invalid subdomain %s rejected with 400 before the bridge', async (_l, sub) => {
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const { app, calls } = makeApp({});
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@@ -91,4 +92,20 @@ describe('DC-CATALOG-3 r4: audit contract + subdomain forwarding', () => {
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.expect(400);
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expect(calls).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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// judge r4 polish: a 200 whose JSON body is not a plain object (res.json()
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// resolves for `null`, `[]`, `0`, `"x"`) must not reach `body.ok` as a
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// null-deref (500) or as a truthy string (false success) — it is a clean 502.
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it.each([
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['null body', null],
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['string body', 'ok'],
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['array body', []],
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])('malformed successful bridge response (%s) is a clean 502, never a 500', async (_l, malformed) => {
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const { app } = makeApp({ 'POST /api/catalog/deploy': { status: 200, body: malformed } });
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const res = await request(app)
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.post('/api/v1/deploys/catalog/deploy')
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.send({ app: 'whoami', port: 8100 })
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.expect(502);
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expect(String(res.body.error)).toContain('malformed');
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});
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});
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@@ -76,6 +76,15 @@ module.exports = function ({ asyncHandler, log, auditLogger, fetchT }) {
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} catch (e) {
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parsed = { ok: false, error: 'bridge returned non-JSON response' };
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}
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// POLISH (judge r4): res.json() also resolves for the JSON literals `null`,
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// `[]`, `0`, `"x"`. A successful-but-empty/malformed bridge response must
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// not reach a `body.ok` dereference as null (TypeError -> 500) or as a
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// truthy string (silent false success). Coerce anything that is not a
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// plain object into the same failure shape as the non-JSON branch, so
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// every `body.ok` below is total for any bridge output.
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if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== 'object' || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
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parsed = { ok: false, error: 'bridge returned a malformed response body' };
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}
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return { status: res.status, body: parsed };
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}
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@@ -119,7 +128,10 @@ module.exports = function ({ asyncHandler, log, auditLogger, fetchT }) {
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env[k] = v;
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}
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const subdomain = String((req.body && req.body.subdomain) || '');
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if (subdomain !== '' && !/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$/.test(subdomain)) {
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// POLISH (judge r4): DNS labels may not begin or end with a hyphen, so
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// `-bot` and `bot-` are both rejected (the previous pattern allowed the
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// trailing form); 1-63 chars, lowercase alphanumerics and inner hyphens.
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if (subdomain !== '' && !/^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$/.test(subdomain)) {
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return errorResponse(res, 400, 'invalid subdomain');
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}
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const payload = {
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