P7 spec rev2: honest unblock semantics, WG addressing/keygen model (browser-side keygen, CIDR AllowedIPs), ticket-set fixes
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@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ Tickets DC-046 through DC-049 implement pluggable auth + email magic link. Sami
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person record. Tests: orchestration order (mocked provider), reversibility,
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last-admin guard integration, audit entries written.
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### DC-143 cleanup note: access map module itself is DC-145.
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**Note (not a ticket):** the access map module itself is DC-145.
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### DC-144: Groups (DashCaddy-side) + resources
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- **status:** todo
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@@ -525,24 +525,30 @@ Tickets DC-046 through DC-049 implement pluggable auth + email magic link. Sami
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### DC-149: WireGuard provider — hub management
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- **status:** todo
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- **details:** `providers/wireguard.js`: wg-quick iface `dcnet0`, address pool
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10.d.c.0.0/16 stable assignment, keygen on hub, peer store, systemd unit
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if missing. All execFile-mocked in tests. Tests: pool assignment stability,
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peer add/remove, unit generation, error paths (missing wg binary).
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- **details:** `providers/wireguard.js`: wg-quick iface `dcnet0` at 10.53.0.1/16
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(client pool 10.53.0.0/16, one /32 per device, stable assignment), HUB keypair
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generated host-side, peer store (pubkeys only), systemd unit if missing,
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net.ipv4.ip_forward=1 for hub-and-spoke, no NAT on dcnet0. All execFile-mocked
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in tests. Tests: pool assignment stability, peer add/remove, unit generation,
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error paths (missing wg binary).
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### DC-150: WireGuard invites (QR) + client config
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- **status:** todo
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- **details:** one-time token (7d TTL, single-use) → redemption page rendering
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client config + QR (qrencode -t ansiutf8 → pre? no: PNG served) with Address,
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DNS=Technitium hub IP, AllowedIPs = private zone only (split tunnel). Private
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key shown once, never stored server-side. Tests: token lifecycle, config
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template correctness (allowed-ips, DNS), single-use enforcement, expiry.
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- **details:** one-time token (7d TTL, single-use) → redemption page. Client
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keypair generated IN THE BROWSER (WebCrypto X25519, ECDSA-P256 fallback);
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server receives the public key only, registers the peer /32, returns config
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(Address, DNS=10.53.0.1, hub PublicKey, AllowedIPs=10.53.0.0/16 — a CIDR,
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never a DNS zone). Config + QR rendered client-side; private key never
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transits or rests on the server. Tests: token lifecycle, single-use
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enforcement, expiry, server-rejects-private-key-posts, config template
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correctness.
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### DC-151: WireGuard firewall matrix (nftables)
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- **status:** todo
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- **details:** per-resource nft sets (net_dc_res_<name>), peer IPs per grant,
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transactional apply (build temp ruleset → `nft -c` → `nft -f` → verify →
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rollback file), host admin ports restricted to admin peers. Tests: ruleset
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rollback file), baseline: dcnet0 input = WG UDP + ICMP from 10.53.0.0/16 +
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per-resource ports; host admin ports restricted to admin peers. Tests: ruleset
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golden text, transactional failure injection (nft -c fails → no apply),
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verify-step failure, admin-port isolation.
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@@ -110,8 +110,13 @@ working as-is; the new `routes/network.js` + `src/network/` are additive.
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- Invite = link-first (DC-085 pattern): inviteUrl is the artifact, email is an
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opt-in checkbox, never logged raw to console.
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- Block (reversible): expire device keys + deny at network layer + kill
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DashCaddy sessions + mark person blocked. Unblock reverses all four.
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- Block: network-layer deny (ACL / firewall) + expire Tailscale device keys + kill
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DashCaddy sessions + mark person blocked. **Unblock honestly:** the deny, the
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status, and the session policy reverse — but expired Tailscale device keys are
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NOT un-expired; those devices must re-authenticate with Tailscale on next
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connect. The UI says "blocked devices will need to sign in again" rather than
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pretending instant reversal. WireGuard peers restore immediately on re-add
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(peer config is re-generated server-side from the stored pubkey).
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- Remove: block semantics + delete provider devices + delete person record +
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purge from access map. The last active admin can never be blocked/removed
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(same guard as the ACL compiler — one shared `assertNotLastAdmin()`).
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@@ -145,20 +150,64 @@ Builds on the existing DashCA pipeline (routes/ca.js, DC-076). Changes:
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## 8. WireGuard provider (DC-149–151)
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- Hub: `wg-quick` interface `dcnet0` managed by DashCaddy ( systemd unit
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`dcnet-hub.service` if absent ), 10.D.C.0.0/16 address pool with stable
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per-device assignment stored in people.json.
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- Keygen on the hub; peer private keys exist only in the one-time invite
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redemption (client config + QR). Server stores pubkeys only.
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- Client config template: Address, DNS = Technitium hub IP,
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AllowedIPs = private zone subnet only (split tunnel — normal internet
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traffic never touches the hub).
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- Invite redemption: one-time token → render config + QR (qrencode), page
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auto-expires; token single-use, 7-day TTL.
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- Firewall: nftables matrix (above). Server resources listen on the hub IP;
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### 8.1 Addressing and routing (exact prefixes)
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- Hub interface `dcnet0`: 10.53.0.1/16, listen port chosen at setup (default 51820,
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UDP). Endpoint = host's reachable address (setup captures it; wizard warns if
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it's behind NAT without a forwarded port).
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- Client address pool: 10.53.0.0/16, one /32 per device (10.53.x.y/32 assigned
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on device add, stable, stored in people.json devices[]).
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- **AllowedIPs = 10.53.0.0/16 only** (a CIDR, never a DNS zone). Split tunnel:
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client's other traffic is untouched. Resource names resolve via Technitium
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(8.3) to IPs inside 10.53.0.0/16, which routes through the tunnel.
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- Hub forwarding: `net.ipv4.ip_forward=1` is required for hub-and-spoke
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peer→peer traffic; peer→hub-resource traffic is local. No NAT/masquerade on
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dcnet0 — all resource access is to hub-local services on 10.53.0.1 or to
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other peers' /32s, so addresses stay routable and firewall rules match peers.
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- Firewall baseline: dcnet0 input allows only WireGuard UDP (listen port),
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ICMP from 10.53.0.0/16, and the per-resource ports from 10.53.0.0/16;
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admin ports (API/SSH) on 10.53.0.1 are restricted to admin peers only.
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### 8.2 Key lifecycle (no server-side private-key storage)
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- **Client keypairs are generated in the invitee's browser** at redemption time
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(WebCrypto: X25519 where available, fallback ECDSA-P256; wireguard-tools
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accepts any interface config — DashCaddy consumes the resulting public key).
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- The redemption page posts ONLY the public key to the server; the server
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registers it as a WireGuard peer (10.53.x.y/32) and returns the client
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config (Address, DNS, PublicKey of hub, AllowedIPs = 10.53.0.0/16).
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- The private key NEVER transits or rests on the server: it lives in the
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browser page for the session, rendered into the config + QR client-side.
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- Server stores: peer public keys, assigned /32s, names — nothing else.
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- Revocation = remove peer (pubkey) from the hub + firewall-set update; the
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client's private key becomes useless without hub acceptance.
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### 8.3 DNS
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- Technitium serves the private zone on the hub IP (10.53.0.1). Client config
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DNS = 10.53.0.1. Per-resource/per-device records resolve to 10.53.x.y /32s
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(per DC-146). In Tailscale mode, the same records hold tailnet IPs instead.
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### 8.4 Hub management
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- `wg-quick` interface `dcnet0` managed by DashCaddy (systemd unit
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`dcnet-hub.service` if absent), keygen for the HUB keypair on the host
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(hub key is host-local and backed up with it).
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### 8.5 Invites
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- Invite redemption: one-time token (7-day TTL, single-use) → redemption page
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(browser keygen per 8.2) → config + QR rendered client-side, page
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auto-expires after redemption.
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- Firewall: nftables matrix (section 4). Server resources listen on the hub IP;
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per-resource sets gate peer access. The host's own admin ports are NOT
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exposed on dcnet0 except to admins.
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WireGuard mode dependency note: "no third party" still depends on host
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networking — a reachable UDP endpoint, wireguard-tools, nftables, and Technitium
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on the DashCaddy host.
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## 9. Setup wizard (DC-152)
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Single flow, mode pick first:
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