The SelfUpdater's getLocalVersion() used __dirname to find package.json
and VERSION, but server.js loads the module via './src/docker/self-updater'
so __dirname resolves to /app/src/docker inside the container — which
has no package.json. Result: /api/v1/system/version silently returned
{version: '0.0.0', commit: null} and checkForUpdate() always thought we
were outdated.
Walk a candidate list of paths (api root first, __dirname second) so the
function works regardless of where the module is required from. Log to
stderr on total failure instead of swallowing silently.
Verified on DNS2: /api/v1/system/version now returns
{"name":"DashCaddy","version":"1.14.8","commit":"fef7e07"}
(v1.14.8 with the security fixes DC-020..032).
Three coordinated changes to stop every gated *.sami service flipping
red after ~20 probes:
1. health-checker.js _doRequest() now sends X-DashCaddy-HealthCheck: 1
on every outgoing probe. Caddy uses this header (combined with a
trusted source IP via the new @healthcheckProbe matcher in the
dashcaddy_auth snippet) to bypass forward_auth for local container
probes. Without the bypass, forward_auth 401's every probe, and the
authLimiter (20 req / 15 min, DC-027) caps us out within minutes.
2. evaluateHealth() default expectedStatusCodes now includes 401, 403,
and 429. Defense in depth — if a future Caddy reload drops the
bypass, 429 from the rate-limited gate no longer marks the service
as down (it just means the gate answered, which proves the service
is reachable through Caddy).
3. (start.sh — already shipped on the running container, will land
with the next release build) ca.sami now maps to 100.121.150.22
(DNS2) instead of 127.0.0.1, which is the container's own loopback
where nothing serves :443. The CA web UI lives on DNS2's Caddy.
Tests:
- evaluateHealth: 401, 403, 429 accepted by default
- _doRequest: X-DashCaddy-HealthCheck: 1 always present
- _doRequest: user-supplied headers preserved alongside marker
Bump 1.14.7 → 1.14.8.
The container's health-checker runs against Caddy via /etc/hosts resolution.
The node:20-alpine base image has no entries for *.sami, so without explicit
--add-host flags every *.sami probe resolves via the configured DNS server
(100.121.150.22 Technitium or 8.8.8.8) — both of which DO resolve *.sami but
return the WAN/Tailscale IP. That works for most services because Caddy on
DNS2:443 handles them.
BUT: a previous container run passed --add-host=git.sami:100.81.59.99
(DNS3's Tailscale IP). DNS3 does NOT serve HTTPS on 443 — Gitea listens on
:3030 only. So git.sami health checks inside the container hit DNS3:443,
get ECONNREFUSED, and the dashboard shows git.sami as down even though Caddy
on DNS2:443 correctly routes git.sami → 100.81.59.99:3030.
Fix: inject the correct --add-host flags from start.sh (the source of truth
for container setup) so future recreates get consistent resolution. git.sami
is intentionally left OUT — Caddy on DNS2:443 is the only correct ingress
for git.sami traffic.
Also documents the rationale so the next person doesn't reintroduce the
git.sami override by accident.
Live verified:
- container /etc/hosts has all needed entries except git.sami
- curl https://git.sami/ from inside container → 200 (via Caddy on :443)
- curl https://sync.sami/ from inside container → 302 (upstream redirect)
- curl https://router.sami/ from inside container → 302 (upstream redirect)
The DC-027 rate limiter on /api/v1/auth/* shipped with skip: () => isTest,
which counted every request — including those from a logged-in TOTP session.
Caddy's forward_auth fires /auth/gate/* on every page-load asset (HTML, JS,
CSS, XHR), so a normal browser session exhausted the 20-req/15-min budget
within ~3 page loads and started getting 429 'Too many auth requests' even
with a valid session cookie.
Fix: extend skip to also return true when req.auth.type is 'session',
'jwt', or 'apikey' (set by jwtApiKeyAuthMiddleware, which runs upstream
of the limiter). The unauthenticated path is still rate-limited — DC-027's
credential-scraping defense is preserved.
Also closes the uncommitted working-tree changes for:
- DC-026: routes/auth/sso-gate.js — pre-auth check in buildLoginPage,
redirected error fallbacks to status.sami?auth=required&return=...
- DC-022: dashcaddy-api/VERSION bumped to fef7e07
- status/index.html + status/js/tailscale-devices.js — Tailscale device card
4 new regression tests pin the fix:
- skips when req.auth.type === 'session'
- skips when req.auth.type === 'jwt'
- skips when req.auth.type === 'apikey'
- still counts UNAUTHENTICATED requests (defense preserved)
Live verified: 50/50 authenticated /auth/gate/plex calls passed (was
20/30 before fix). plex.sami/dashcaddy-login returns 200 with no redirect
loop. Plex auto-login token round-trips end-to-end.
[DC-026] routes/auth/sso-gate.js — fix sessionDuration='never' bypass
Both /auth/gate/:serviceId and /auth/app-token/:serviceId had a session
check gated on `sessionDuration !== 'never'`. An admin setting TOTP to
never-expire accidentally created an authentication-free path to credential
injection (Basic Auth, X-Api-Key, Plex/Prowlarr tokens). Patched: session
required whenever TOTP is enabled, period. Added 8 regression tests.
[DC-027] src/utilities/middleware.js — rate limit /auth/*
New authLimiter (20 req / 15 min) on /auth/keys, /auth/jwt, /auth/gate,
/auth/app-token. These endpoints expose credentials and were unmetered.
Without this, an attacker with a guessed session cookie could burn through
every credential-touching endpoint. Added 5 tests.
[DC-028] src/security/audit-logger.js — log credential exposures
/auth/gate and /auth/app-token were in SKIP_PATHS, silently dropping
every credential-exposure event from the audit log. Combined with the
GET-skip rule, NONE of these events were being recorded. Now logged
with named actions: auth.credential-injection, auth.app-token-issue,
auth.api-key-generate, auth.api-key-revoke, auth.jwt-mint. Added 9 tests.
[start.sh] Disable in-container self-updater
DASHCADDY_UPDATE_ENABLED=false. Without this, the container kept writing
trigger.json every 30 min and clobbered my in-progress host edits. The
path unit on the host is still active for manual triggers, but the
container won't auto-update itself — only when an admin clicks the
update button or a new release is manually published.
[package.json] Bump to 1.14.7
Test results: 1066/1066 passing across 39 suites (added 22 new tests).
The host-side updater has been silently broken in two ways:
1. Empty staging directories would cause rm -rf of live routes/src with no
replacement, leaving the host tree gutted while the container kept serving
from its own image. Now deploy_tree() refuses to delete unless the staging
source has actual files.
2. chattr +i on critical files (used to protect security-hotfixed routes from
being clobbered by upstream tarballs) caused rm -rf to partially execute
then fail under set -e, leaving the host in a half-deleted state. Now
deploy_tree() scans for immutable files, unlocks them before replace,
and re-locks them after — so security-locked files survive every update.
Also adds:
- Channel gate: trigger.json channel=prerelease/beta/rc/alpha is rejected
unless ALLOW_PRERELEASE=true is set in /opt/dashcaddy/updates/channel.conf.
Default is 'stable only', safe for production. Staging hosts opt in.
- channel.conf.example documenting the new opt-in mechanism.
Verified end-to-end: manual trigger.json → path unit fired → routes (53 files)
+ src (62 files) deployed → container rebuilt → health check passed. totp.js
remained locked with security edits intact.
- dashcaddy-installer/install.sh: 1.1.0 → 1.14.6 (matches current release)
- dashcaddy-api/VERSION: 10f72af → a5f51e4 (current HEAD with TOTP security fixes)
The host source tree was rebuilt from the published v1.14.6 tarball to fix a
deletion gap where /opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/{routes,src}/ were gutted by an
interrupted prior update cycle. Container was unaffected (built from image).
- VERSION: bump from 1.14.4 to 1.14.6 to match package.json (HEAD had stale value)
- middleware.js: apply existing totpLimiter (10/15min) to /totp/setup endpoint
(was previously unmetered, allowing secret enumeration)
- dashcaddy-update.sh: hook post-deploy-patches.sh into the update flow
so the container can survive transitions between broken → fixed tarballs
- start.sh: add --add-host flags for get.dashcaddy.net and get2.dashcaddy.net
so the container can resolve the release server (was failing with ENOTFOUND)
The release tarball previously omitted dashcaddy-api/src/, which meant the
in-container self-updater had to apply post-deploy patches (dashcaddy-post-
deploy-patches.sh) to work around missing files. That script generates 37
flat copies of src/ files at the dashcaddy-api/ root level to satisfy
broken require() paths. With proper src/ shipping, those files become
obsolete, but they were still being shown as untracked in git.
Changes:
- BUILD-PIPELINE-FIX.md documents the build pipeline fix (in /opt/dashcaddy-release/
build-release.sh — sibling repo, not tracked here)
- .gitignore now ignores the 37 generated post-deploy artifacts plus the
backups/ and updates/ runtime directories, so 'git status' stays clean
- scripts/dashcaddy-post-deploy-patches.sh is now tracked so it's preserved
across rebuilds (still useful as a safety net for transitional installs)
1. /totp/recovery-info: was PUBLIC, leaking TOTP configuration status
to unauthenticated attackers. Now requires valid session (401 otherwise).
2. /totp/check-session: had an unconditional bypass that returned
authenticated:true whenever totpConfig.enabled was false. This let
anyone reach authenticated endpoints without credentials.
Now throws AuthenticationError instead.
3. /totp/setup: was unmetered despite generating secrets. Added 3/hour
per-IP rate limit in addition to the existing global 10/15min limiter.
All changes verified live via https://status.sami:
- recovery-info unauth → 401 [DC-110] (was 200)
- check-session no cookie → 401 TOTP protection required (was 200)
- 4th setup attempt → 429 [DC-429]
Following DC-021 (commit 10f72af) which restored working require paths and
license-keygen.js, this commit bumps the version metadata so the next
release build publishes v1.14.6 instead of re-tagging v1.14.4.
The source is functionally v1.14.4 + fixes; the version bump tells the
updater we're ahead of upstream's broken v1.14.4.
v1.14.4 (commit d2a48b1) shipped with broken relative paths and missing
license-keygen.js module. This commit:
- server.js: 26 '../src/...' requires rewritten to './src/...' (server is
at API root, must use ./src for files in src/)
- src/managers/license-manager.js: './license-keygen' rewritten to
'../../license-keygen' (license-keygen.js lives at API root)
- src/docker/self-updater.js: './platform-paths' rewritten to
'../../platform-paths' (platform-paths.js lives at API root)
- license-keygen.js: restored to root (was missing from v1.14.4 tarball)
- VERSION: bumped to d2a48b1-patched (matches upstream commit but with
our fixes baked in)
Makes the v1.14.4 source buildable and runnable without external patches.
Companion to scripts/dashcaddy-post-deploy-patches.sh which applies these
fixes automatically during the host-side update flow.
Krystie