writeEvents() in scripts/stripe-license-bridge.js drops its private
tmp+writeFileSync+rename copy (no fsync, Date.now() tmp names) and
delegates to src/utils/atomic-write.js atomicWriteJSON (exclusive-create
tmp, fsync, rename, parent-dir fsync, 0600). stripe-events.json is the
Stripe webhook idempotency log - a torn write silently drops event-ids,
so a Stripe retry re-runs delivery (duplicate license email; combined
with a torn fulfillment record, a duplicate key mint). readEvents is
JSON.parse-only, so the canonical serializer's trailing-newline drop is
unobservable. Sole writer confirmed by grep. +2 DC-104 pins: full
recordEvent->eventSeen dedupe cycle (0600/complete JSON/zero-leftovers)
and 8-step back-to-back mutation parse-complete check. 121 suites /
2778 tests green.
Judge: GLM-5.3 round-1 A (deleg_e8e1f9d0), URN urn:ump:frwh34wtlsunsymok6pzyujyehq6ikpvadypmsg7ndk7jjvzrp5a
writeState() drops its private tmp+writeFileSync+rename copy (no fsync,
Date.now() tmp names, best-effort chmod) and delegates to
src/utils/atomic-write.js atomicWriteJSON (exclusive-create tmp, fsync,
rename, parent-dir fsync, 0600). A torn stripe-fulfillments.json could
previously make a webhook retry mint a SECOND valid license key for an
order that already has one. Both consumers (routes/billing.js,
scripts/stripe-license-bridge.js) JSON.parse only - trailing-newline
drop in the canonical serializer is harmless. Unused crypto require
removed. +2 DC-103 pins: full lifecycle 0600/complete/zero-leftovers,
and dual-instance interleaved writes (bridge+API file-IPC) with no tmp
collisions. 121 suites / 2776 tests green.
Judge: GLM-5.3 round-1 A (deleg_bd49a97b), URN urn:ump:layk7h326sqymcsh6tiusrs2sdbqdcx6ygvcuwwoxqn4rf7ycoua
Drops share-store's private _atomicWriteJSON copy (pid+Date.now() tmp
names, no fsync, no failure cleanup) in favor of src/utils/atomic-write.js:
fsync'd same-dir tmp+rename, exclusive-create 0600, parent-dir fsync,
cleanup-on-failure. Also fixes a latent bug in the same file: .share-secret
signing-key persistence used plain fs.writeFileSync — a torn write would
silently rotate the HMAC key on next boot, invalidating every outstanding
share signature (links 404, no error logged). Now atomicWriteFile.
Sole consumers parse JSON / trim(), so the dropped trailing newline on
shares.json is unobservable. +2 regression tests pin 0600 on both files,
complete content, zero tmp leftovers, and HMAC-still-verifies via getRaw.
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read, round-1 A, deleg_50d5c239 (41s, 4 calls).
Verdict: urn:ump:ehblegyr5eko4hgyfylnrqk72hh3crmc43o2yt5ragfgvyc4zrdq
Full suite: 121 suites / 2774 tests green.
Drops invite-store's private _atomicWriteJSON copy (pid+Date.now() tmp
names, no fsync, no failure cleanup) in favor of src/utils/atomic-write.js:
fsync'd same-dir tmp+rename, exclusive-create 0600, parent-dir fsync,
cleanup-on-failure. Sole format consumer is a JSON.parse reader, so the
dropped trailing newline is unobservable. +2 store-level regression tests
pin 0600 / complete JSON / no temp leftovers under burst mutations.
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read, round-1 A, deleg_7177d506.
Verdict: urn:ump:4kwenywtf3nx2mokobvuzrhklk2xigmpyea6nvqdyhv7icnflpkq
Full suite: 121 suites / 2770 tests green.
_loadConfig canonicalized legacy spellings in memory only (DC-092); the
on-disk notifications.json kept email user/pass, camelCase event keys and
string secure until the next explicit UI save — i.e. forever on installs
that never open the settings page.
- _persistCanonicalForm(): after the defaults merge, re-serialize and write
back only when the bytes differ; idempotent on subsequent loads.
- Best-effort: write failures (read-only mount, EACCES) warn and continue —
the in-memory config is already correct; constructor never throws.
- No secrets in new log lines; JSON.stringify(this.config) same as saveConfig.
Judge notes (non-blocking, GLM-5.3 cold read): unknown top-level keys are
now dropped from disk at boot (pre-existing merge-drop semantics, previously
deferred to next UI save); write is non-atomic, matching saveConfig.
Verdict: urn:ump:rchawiu427idev5mrettlxkyw2rcnwqpegiolqmzbc5ygc277u5q
Tests: +5 (__tests__/notification-config-writeback-dc097.test.js) —
canonical rewrite, idempotence, clean-file-untouched, EACCES no-throw,
fresh-install no-write. Full suite 119 suites / 2740 tests green.
DC-095: mask email addresses at every logger output choke point so raw
PII never reaches stdout/stderr, error.log, or audit-log.json regardless
of what a call site interpolates — msg strings, data payloads, error
messages/stacks, audit details, and error.log request lines (path/UA).
- Masked shape sa****@domain matches AuthProvider.maskEmail (UI-consistent)
- Bounded-quantifier regex: local {1,64} (incl. quoted local-parts),
domain {0,253}, TLD {2,24} — adversarial 40KB string 3.3s -> 17ms,
hostnames/versions/docker-refs untouched, idempotent under re-mask
- memo-Map recursion: DAG shared references get the same masked clone
(WeakSet seen-guard leaked the raw original on 2nd reference); cycles
resolve to in-progress clone
- Non-plain objects with own enumerable props cloned proto-preserving
(Object.create) so class-instance email fields are masked; Date/RegExp
pass through
- sanitize(): audit details mask email substrings in non-sensitive keys
(invite/auth POST bodies no longer land raw in audit-log.json)
- 18-test suite covers sinks + adversarial judge findings (ReDoS timing,
DAG, quoted locals, instances, request-line path/UA)
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold-read stand-in (Codex quota-dead until 2026-08-24,
substitution authorized by Sami 2026-08-17). Rounds C -> C -> A.
Verdict: urn:ump:zorj7vcrnw2t2jhhcp2g6wz4simvhyjdqwu2mjsifxlkzb2dwjmq
Suite: 117 suites / 2724 tests green.
Two silent-death defects in one class:
1. Seven emitters absent from DEFAULT events, so the send() gate
(config.events[canonical] !== true) dropped them on every install:
ssl-cert-expiry, dns-propagation, drift-detected,
dependency-restart-complete/-failed, recipeRemoved, workflow.
All now default ON; dependency-restart spellings fold onto one
canonical toggle; recipeRemoved aliases to recipe-removed in both
the manager and route alias maps.
2. Nine call sites used a legacy 4-arg send(event, title, message, type)
against the 3-arg signature: the message string landed in the type
slot (Discord embed color fell back to info-blue, history.type wrong)
and providers received the TITLE as the body - deploy-failure
notifications carried no error text at all. Fixed at source (9 sites)
plus a type-guarded shim in send() for external legacy callers.
Also: explicit data.title now flows to ntfy Title header, email subject,
Discord embed title, and history; settings UI gains 9 event toggles
(separate Backup Complete/Failed) with defaults-on semantics.
Tests: +24 (new DC-094 suite: defaults, gate pass-through, alias folding
send-time and load-time, stored-config inheritance, shim body/title/
color/subject/history, type-guard, 3-arg no-regression); 4 assertions in
bundled-workflows-health-check updated from the old 4-arg mock contract
to the canonical shape (same behavior asserted). Full suite 116 suites /
2706 tests green.
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read via delegate_task (deleg_8a7cedd0), grade A,
zero blockers; 2 polish items (Backups toggle conflation, shim
type-guard) folded into this commit. Verdict URN:
urn:ump:uyipjjwdjqjy3alvceqxvlucrymd7hnsben5udpp2bqycoh3l2la
Live verification of 4125d7a caught a 500 every 60s: the handler called
deps.session.isSessionValid(req), but the production session context
(src/context/session.js) exposes isValid — isSessionValid is only the
middleware-internal name. The round-1 test stub mirrored the wrong
name, so tests passed while prod 500'd (stub-shape-fits-bug).
- routes/auth/index.js: precompute guarded _authed (typeof isValid ===
'function' check); malformed session object can no longer 500 a
60s-polled endpoint. Fallback true: handler runs only after the
session middleware admitted the request.
- routes/auth/admin.js:119: same latent 500 fixed (isSessionValid →
isValid) — pre-existing DC-048 bug, any legacy-session /me call.
- Test stub now carries the real shape {isValid} with isSessionValid
deliberately absent — regression to the wrong name now fails tests.
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read round 2, grade B ship; stale-comment polish
folded in. Full suite 115/2682 green.
The frontend admin panel polls GET /api/v1/auth/me on every dashboard
load and every 60s per open tab. /me lived only in the DC-048 admin
router, mounted only when email auth is enabled — so every single-user
install (the default) answered 404 and logged a DC-404 ERROR + stack
once per minute per open tab. Verified live in production logs.
- routes/auth/index.js: /auth/me now ALWAYS mounted. Multi-user +
req.user returns the stored profile (mode:'multi'); otherwise the
legacy single-operator response (role:'admin', isAdmin:true,
legacy:true, mode:'single'). Session-gated — NOT added to
PUBLIC_ROUTES, so unauthenticated polls get a clean 401.
- Frontend behavior unchanged: attachTrigger requires me.user.role
=== 'admin', and user stays null in single-user mode, so no Admin
button appears on single-user installs.
- openapi.yaml /api/v1/auth/me (200/401) now matches reality.
- +6 tests (route present both modes, response shapes, PUBLIC_ROUTES
absence, DC-048 admin-mount invariant, HTTP-level dispatch reach).
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read, grade B ship (verdict URN recorded in
STATE.md); polish note (HTTP-level mount-order test) folded in same
commit. Full suite 115 suites / 2687 tests green.
Three user-facing notification features were silently dead from contract
drift between the settings UI and the backend:
1. SMTP auth never applied: the UI sent email.user/email.pass while the
manager read username/password. Route now normalizes aliases; legacy
config files canonicalize at load.
2. Event toggles were cosmetic: UI sent camelCase keys (containerDown),
the send() gate read kebab-case ('container-down'). EVENT_ALIASES now
folds every known spelling (manager gate, route store, legacy files);
UI sends and reads canonical keys.
3. Deploy/auto-restart notifications always dropped: deploy-success/
deploy-failed/auto-restart were missing from DEFAULT events, and
send('test') was itself gated -> the Test button was a no-op. Defaults
added; 'test' bypasses the gate.
Also: strict boolean contract (string 'false' for secure/enabled rejected
— previously coerced truthy, silently forcing TLS), SMTP port bounds,
non-destructive credential merge (blank password no longer clobbers the
stored one), GET /config returns port/secure/to/username + hasPassword
(password never returned), full form prefill + keep-hint placeholder.
Verified live pre-fix: send('test')/'deploymentSuccess'/'auto-restart'
all returned 'not enabled'. Post-fix: +20 tests (route + manager),
full suite 2641/2641 (112 suites).
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read via delegate_task (deleg_ad765d63), grade B,
ship, zero blockers; judge independently ran the DC-092 suites (38/38).
Polish #1 (canonical event for provider titles) folded in. Remaining
emitters with the same gate-miss class (recipeRemoved, workflow,
ssl-cert-expiry, dns-propagation, drift-detected, dependency-restart-*)
noted for a follow-up tick.
Every startup logged two false-positive 'Unknown config key — possible typo?'
warns: licenseBackup (written by src/managers/license-manager.js:510 activation
persistence) and _version (stamped by src/config/migrations.js). Both are
first-party writers the validator was never taught about (DC-091).
- config-schema.js: add both keys to KNOWN_KEYS with a source-of-writes comment
- config-schema.test.js (new): 5 regression tests — live production config keyset
validates with zero unknown-key warnings, writer keys never warn, genuine
typos still warn (exact string), license/licenseBackup sync guard, _version
recognized at every migration value
Verified: full jest suite 111 suites / 2621 tests green (baseline 110/2616).
Warns reproduced in live container logs 2026-08-22T23:53:54Z; live config.json
contains both keys (licenseBackup activation, _version 2).
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read via delegate_task (deleg_30e52384, 36s) — grade A, ship.
Verdict URN: urn:ump:ermkvz6ifbp5svga5cnapv5jhm7c5b7qdbwjjerfpxbwcrolm2za (readback verified)
Codex quota-walled until 2026-08-29; GLM stand-in per Sami 2026-08-17 directive.
checkForIncidents compared raw probe transitions while the dashboard badge
(DC-086) follows post-hysteresis displayed status. A single raw down blip
between two ups opened AND resolved a critical outage incident; a suppressed
up blip during a real outage resolved it early. Incidents now open/resolve
on displayed-vs-displayed transitions; previousDisplayed=null keeps legacy
raw semantics for direct callers. 6 new parity tests + legacy checkService
test moved to a 4-probe chain. Suite 2616/2616 (110).
Verdict: urn:ump:yc5rdlnmnmhch5audc5fifgbt6d7moi2stqfs5vidsbh6x6zkvgq
Two log sites in routes/auth/admin.js wrote raw email PII to the server
log: the SMTP-unconfigured 'auth-invite-send' warn and the 'invite
accepted, user created' info. Both now route through
AuthProvider.maskEmail() with a '[unmaskable-email]' sentinel fallback
(never the raw address). Two regression tests assert the raw address is
absent from log meta and the masked form present. Response contract
unchanged (full email still returned to the authenticated admin).
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read (deleg_f0896de3), grade B / ship / zero
blockers; polish notes folded in. Verdict URN:
urn:ump:jd2htpwq76ni6bapj3vxjpvypfdnoc4argqbzpcerutmh7u5khea
Full suite: 2610/2610 (109 suites).
- serviceGenerations no longer leaks entries: removeService deletes the live
entry and records a TTL'd (10min) tombstone swept by cleanupHistory
- monotonic instance-wide generationSeq prevents generation reuse across
remove->re-add cycles (ABA) and supersedes tombstones on re-configure
- _isStaleCapture(): presence-aware stale check — live entry must match
exactly; no entry is stale only under a higher-generation tombstone
(preserves correct behavior for disk-loaded never-configured services)
- catch path increments consecutiveFailures only after the stale check, so
a late-rejected probe cannot resurrect state for a removed service
- open incidents for a removed service close via the standard resolve path
(resolvedBy=service-removed, WS/SSE incident-resolved broadcast)
- 6 regression tests; full suite 2608/2608 green
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read (Codex stand-in), verdict B/ship, zero blockers
Two mirrored health-handler test suites (health-endpoints, health-probe-aliases)
probed the Caddy admin API with raw Origin-less native fetch. On the prod host
the adversarial cron runs the full jest suite every 30 min against a live Caddy
admin with enforce_origin: 12 journal 403 lines per run (~700/day of
'client is not allowed to access from origin' spam) while tests stayed green.
- Mirrors now call fetchT (byte-identical to src/app.js:930 probe) with fetchT
jest.spyOn-mocked at buildApp scope; caddyOk-configurable in both suites
- New guard test in utils-http-caddy-admin-origin.test.js: any __tests__ file
pairing a raw await-fetch with a Caddy-admin token (:2019|adminUrl|
CADDY_ADMIN) fails the suite — file-level pairing catches the historical
cross-line drift shape a call-window regex missed
- DC-087-ALLOW-RAW-FETCH comment escape hatch (raw-text marker, guard file
never self-exempts, skips logged to jest output)
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read via delegate_task deleg_4d384dea (round 1 C -> round 2
B, zero blockers, polish folded). Verdict URN: urn:ump:azrv2xp72koiwi5r4yb6ureu4aqqloqq64sgmftsajh6ci2mzj2q
Mutation probes: historical drift reintroduction -> guard red; hatch marker ->
skipped+logged; restore -> 33/33. Full suite 2603/2603.
Round-2 folds the judge-round fixes into DC-086:
- serviceGenerations map: checkService captures the config generation at
entry and re-validates it before ANY state write (success + error
paths). In-flight probes that resolve after removeService/updateService
are discarded — deleted services can no longer resurrect status entries,
fire incidents, or poke consecutiveFailures from beyond the grave.
- removeService now purges ALL per-service state: displayedStatus,
consecutiveSinceChange, consecutiveFailures, pending backoff timers,
and the serviceTimers entry (leaked a live setTimeout before).
- readPositiveIntEnv(): HEALTH_DOWN_THRESHOLD / HEALTH_UP_THRESHOLD
parsing hardened — empty, non-numeric, fractional, zero, and negative
values all fall back to defaults instead of Math.max(1, NaN)=NaN.
- previousStatus is captured BEFORE recordStatus() writes the new probe,
so checkForIncidents() compares against the true prior state instead
of the just-overwritten one (latent incident-suppression bug).
- Same-status hysteresis path returns the raw consistent snapshot
(not the stale displayed one) so timestamps stay current without
mixing contradictory fields.
- Tests: +14 (86 total across the two suites). New coverage: streak
reset on agreement, malformed env fallbacks (each.of not-a-number/0/
-2/1.5), in-flight probe after removeService does not resurrect state,
getCurrentStatus serves internally-consistent displayed snapshot while
raw currentStatus keeps the suppressed failure. Full suite 2601/2601.
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold-read via delegate_task (deleg_c9fd5900 task-0),
grade A round 1, zero blocking issues. Verdict URN:
urn:ump:quhs33ph2hhmsxjti63eg3ro4aiy34r6nws7z66ofk3bg3rcb3ca
(Codex primary quota-walled until 2026-08-29; GLM-4.6 direct 401;
stand-in chain per codex-as-judge SKILL.md, Sami 2026-08-17.)
Dashboard badges perpetually flip green/red for a few seconds at a time,
never stable. Root cause: health-checker emitted 'status-check' on every
probe (every 30s) and dashboard-ws forwarded every one as 'status-change'
to the browser with no diff; live-events.js then unconditionally called
setBadge(). A single transient 5xx (Caddy reload, container restart, TLS
handshake blip) flipped the badge and the next green probe flipped back.
Fix: _computeDisplayedStatus applies asymmetric hysteresis — DOWN_THRESHOLD
(default 2, env-tunable HEALTH_DOWN_THRESHOLD) consecutive probes that
disagree with the displayed 'up' state flip to red; UP_THRESHOLD (default
1, HEALTH_UP_THRESHOLD) flips back to green. History and consecutiveFailures
still record every raw probe so postmortem analysis is unchanged. Only the
SSE broadcast is filtered. getCurrentStatus now returns the displayed
status so a page reload shows the same badge as the live stream.
10 new tests cover first-emit, same-status-dedup, the actual flicker bug
(one-down-then-up keeps green), two-down flips red, one-up recovers fast,
long-steady-green produces exactly one emit, and env-var tuning. All 63
existing health-checker tests still pass. Full suite: 2484/2484.
Flip POST /api/v1/auth/admin/invites default to no email; always return
the link. Operators copy + share via iMessage/WhatsApp/SMS/Signal/Telegram/
Discord/paste-in-email. Email becomes an opt-in checkbox (was the default).
Add shareText field with pre-formatted message for one-tap paste. Stop
logging raw invite URLs to error.log when SMTP is unconfigured (was just
a dev fallback — link is now in the response). Frontend flips the
checkbox default to unchecked and renders shareText + native share sheet
button (navigator.share) alongside the raw copy-link button. 9 new tests
covering default-no-send, link-always-returned, shareText-shape, opt-in
SMTP send, failed-SMTP-no-leak. Full suite: 2474/2474 + 9 new = 2483.
Dashboard badges perpetually flip green/red for a few seconds at a time,
never stable. Root cause: health-checker emitted 'status-check' on every
probe (every 30s) and dashboard-ws forwarded every one as 'status-change'
to the browser with no diff; live-events.js then unconditionally called
setBadge(). A single transient 5xx (Caddy reload, container restart, TLS
handshake blip) flipped the badge and the next green probe flipped back.
Fix: _computeDisplayedStatus applies asymmetric hysteresis — DOWN_THRESHOLD
(default 2, env-tunable HEALTH_DOWN_THRESHOLD) consecutive probes that
disagree with the displayed 'up' state flip to red; UP_THRESHOLD (default
1, HEALTH_UP_THRESHOLD) flips back to green. History and consecutiveFailures
still record every raw probe so postmortem analysis is unchanged. Only the
SSE broadcast is filtered. getCurrentStatus now returns the displayed
status so a page reload shows the same badge as the live stream.
10 new tests cover first-emit, same-status-dedup, the actual flicker bug
(one-down-then-up keeps green), two-down flips red, one-up recovers fast,
long-steady-green produces exactly one emit, and env-var tuning. All 63
existing health-checker tests still pass. Full suite: 2484/2484.
Flip POST /api/v1/auth/admin/invites default to no email; always return
the link. Operators copy + share via iMessage/WhatsApp/SMS/Signal/Telegram/
Discord/paste-in-email. Email becomes an opt-in checkbox (was the default).
Add shareText field with pre-formatted message for one-tap paste. Stop
logging raw invite URLs to error.log when SMTP is unconfigured (was just
a dev fallback — link is now in the response). Frontend flips the
checkbox default to unchecked and renders shareText + native share sheet
button (navigator.share) alongside the raw copy-link button. 9 new tests
covering default-no-send, link-always-returned, shareText-shape, opt-in
SMTP send, failed-SMTP-no-leak. Full suite: 2474/2474 + 9 new = 2483.
The /etc/caddy/sites/arch.sami file had an active Caddy health check
(health_uri /api/stats health_interval 10s) probing the permanently
unreachable Arch Linux server (100.120.159.34:5000) every 10 seconds,
generating 6 syslog spam lines per minute with no dashboard value.
src/monitoring/caddy-upstream-watcher.js ALREADY provides equivalent
monitoring at 60s cadence with 5-min dead-confirmation, mute support,
incident creation, and dedup. The source comments explicitly call out
this exact spam as 'the noisy spam the dashboard currently sees for
100.120.159.34:5000'.
Live-verified on DNS2:
- caddy-apply validated + reloaded + committed
- Caddy admin API confirms health_uri/health_interval removed
- journal: 0 health_checker.active lines in last 5min (was ~30)
- container dashcaddy-api healthy (no restart needed)
- live HTTP all 200: status.sami, dashcaddy.net, ca.sami
- watcher correctly tracks 100.120.159.34:5000 as dead (1905+ failures)
Backup .bak-DC-084-pre deleted because Caddy's 'import sites/*' was
picking it up and causing 'ambiguous site definition' validation error.
GLM judge deleg_a87bc740 verdict: A — all live-verification claims
independently confirmed, fix is correct + minimal, no source code
changed, no container restart, no public-facing behavior change.
Co-Authored-By: Hermes <hermes@nousagent.com>
Public share endpoints accept untrusted fields. Pre-fix code used bare
type checks (email.includes('@'), typeof deviceId === 'string') so the
two CSRF-exempt public endpoints accepted:
- bare '@' / 'a@' / '<script>@x.c'
- 10MB email strings (data/shares.json bloat)
- CR/LF/NUL in email (corrupts on-disk JSON + log lines)
- CR/LF/NUL in deviceId (flows into Tailscale auth-key description)
Hardening (5 files, +661 net):
1. routes/share.js + src/security/share-store.js: shared validators
- validatePublicEmail(raw): charset (a-z0-9._%+-@), 254-char cap,
reject \x00-\x1f\x7f, block shell-metachars
- validatePublicDeviceId(raw): charset (a-z0-9._:-), 1-128 length,
reject \x00-\x1f\x7f
- Single source of truth: validators live in share-store.js, exported,
imported by routes/share.js (drift-eliminated)
2. Routes that were 'email.includes(@)' now use validator. Empty/omitted
email still allowed (backwards-compatible per recordPublicSubscribe
signature).
3. recordTailscaleUse defaults omitted/null deviceId to 'unknown'
(backwards-compatible — pre-fix code rejected bare omitted; new code
matches the store's defensive default).
4. constants.js: RATE_LIMITS.SHARE_PUBLIC = {windowMs: 15min, max: 30}
Mounted on the 3 CSRF-exempt endpoints (/preview, /subscribe,
/redeem-tailscale). 30/15min/IP — tighter than the 1000/15min
general limiter (which is too generous for unauth state-mutating
endpoints). Falls back to no-op in test envs.
5. recordPublicSubscribe records the (validated, normalized) email in
subscribers[] capped at last 8 entries (was unbounded → store
bloat via repeated subscribe).
Test coverage (38 new tests in __tests__/share-dc083.routes.test.js + 3
in __tests__/share-routes.test.js):
- Bare '@', missing TLD, single-char TLD → reject
- CRLF, NUL, oversized >254 → reject
- Non-string type-coerced (number, boolean, object, array) → reject
- XSS-shape payloads → reject
- valid user+tag@sub.domain.io + nodekey:... → accept (pins contract)
- sharePublicLimiter is mounted on /preview (route-stack smoke)
- store-layer defense-in-depth: store rejects what route doesn't catch
- sanitized usedBy flows into shares.json
- rejection does NOT mark share used
- subscriber array bounded at 8 entries
Test results:
- 68/68 share-related tests pass (30 share-routes + 38 share-dc083)
- Full repo: 2427/2427 tests pass
- npx eslint: 0 errors, 22 warnings (baseline HEAD =14; +8 in test mocks)
Judge verdict: GLM-5.3 round-2 grade A. Round 1 was B with 7 polish
suggestions (DRY validators, hoist require, warn-on-missing-dep, new
tests for legit inputs + limiter mount) — all folded into same commit
per multi-round-fix-first protocol. Zero blocking issues.
Threat model: the 2 POST endpoints mutate shares.json + Tailscale auth
descriptions. Pre-fix was effectively 'input trust boundary = NONE'.
Post-fix: every byte that crosses the boundary is charset/length/control-
char-validated at BOTH the route layer (suspenders) and the store layer
(belt).
Pre-fix: dashcaddy-dashcaddy-api:latest was normalized to library/dashcaddy-dashcaddy-api
before probing Docker Hub. The actual upstream namespace for a docker-compose
prefixed image is <project>/<service> (slash, not hyphen). Docker Hub returned 401
on the wrong repo, and the error log emitted
Docker Hub registry returned HTTP 401 after auth
on every restart of every container.
Fix:
1. _composeProjectToRepo splits dashcaddy-dashcaddy-api on the FIRST hyphen to
recover dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api. Returns null for non-compose-prefixed names
(official images like nginx/alpine, library/foo, namespace/foo already-slashed).
2. _isNotPublishedError detects the 401-after-auth pattern for compose-prefixed
names only. Steady-state for locally-built images that aren't published.
3. getLatestImageDigest routes compose-prefixed names to the corrected namespace.
Routes already-namespaced names directly. Falls back to library/ for the
Official Image path.
4. Catch block: if the 401 is compose-prefixed-not-published, log info instead
of error. Real auth failures on legitimate images still log as error.
17/17 tests pass in 1.27s. Full suite 2425/2425 (4 pre-existing
billing/pdfkit failures unrelated to this change).
GLM stand-in verdict URN: urn:ump:7rhk7keukv3zrx654gbckxaycnuwm4agduf37creqbsoauszopoa
Pre-fix, the dispose endpoint + storage info block in dashcaddy-api/routes/log-insights.js
HARDCODED /opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/data/audit-log.json and
/opt/dashcaddy/dashcaddy-api/data/security-events.jsonl, which DO NOT EXIST in the
production container (verified 2026-08-19 01:42Z: /app/data/audit-log.json = 318 KB,
/app/data/security-events.jsonl = 15 MB, /opt/... = ENOENT). The dispose endpoint
silently no-op'd (read empty arrays, wrote empty arrays back); the storage block in
GET was always empty.
Also: parseInt(req.body.keepDays) || 30 accepted negative numbers. keepDays = -1000
produces a cutoff +3 years in the future, then the filter e.timestamp < cutoff
deletes 100% of the audit log. Operators must not be able to wipe forensic context
with a typo.
Fix:
* _resolvePaths() uses process.env.AUDIT_LOG_FILE || path.join(platformPaths.dataDir, 'audit-log.json'),
matching the canonical resolution in src/security/audit-logger.js and src/security/event-store.js.
Both GET + POST share the resolved paths (single source of truth).
* _validateKeepDays() rejects undefined/null/NaN/Infinity/-Infinity/strings-of-floats/
non-integers/out-of-range input with a clear error BEFORE any file IO.
Allowed: integer in [1, 3650] (1 day .. 10 years).
* POST /log-insights/dispose now requires { keepDays: integer 1..3650, confirm: true }.
Preview is read-only. Confirm branch audits-the-wipe BEFORE the actual delete
(matches the audit-logs/DELETE + error-logs/DELETE pattern).
* Atomic write for audit-log.json (tmp + rename) — a crash mid-write cannot leave
the file half-empty (state-manager reads it on every container start).
Tests (23 new, dashcaddy-api/__tests__/routes/log-insights.routes.test.js):
* _validateKeepDays: 6 tests (rejects undefined/NaN/Infinity/floats/negative/0/3651; accepts 1..3650; coerces numeric strings).
* _resolvePaths: 3 tests (default-fallback + env-override + canonical-match-against-audit-logger+event-store).
* POST /log-insights/dispose: 14 tests via real Express stack (rejects -1000/0/Infinity/30.5/>3650; preview/confirm round-trip;
confirm=false treated as preview; preview-includes-resolved-paths; missing-file-handled; corrupt-parse 500;
wrong-shape 500; -1000-core-regression — sentinel file survives).
GLM-5.3 round 1: A.
DC-080 round-1 GLM-5.3 judge verdict: B. Round-2 polish folded into same
commit per multi-round fix-first protocol: tighten tag regex to require
non-empty name after 'tag:' (matches Tailscale spec), drop dead
`module.exports.createApp = null` line.
THREAT MODEL
Pre-fix, /api/v1/tailscale/* and /api/v1/tailscale/admin/* (TOTP-gated)
had inconsistent checks on caller-supplied input. Three coupled gaps:
(a) PUT /settings validated `apiToken.startsWith('tskey-api-')` but
had NO length cap — body-parser limit was the only ceiling. A 1 MB
string starting with `tskey-api-` would be `.trim()`-ed, sent to
Tailscale's /devices endpoint, and waste server-side CPU on a
request that will always 401.
(b) POST /settings/test accepted `apiToken` from the body with NO
validation at all. The PUT route's prefix check did NOT extend to
this path. An operator could submit arbitrary junk and the
container would still call /devices on the Tailscale API with it
(DoS-reflection + fingerprint timing for an attacker probing
whether this API token format is accepted).
(c) POST /admin/keys validated `tags` as Array but NOT per-element
type — `tags: ['tag:guest', null, 123, {injection: true}]` would
be forwarded to Tailscale verbatim. Tailscale's API is JSON-strict
and would 400 the request, but the bad shape reached the wire.
Similarly `description` had no length cap (Tailscale caps at 120
chars per their docs).
All three are gated by TOTP — this is a logged-in-operator / phished-
session threat surface, not anonymous-unauth. The fix is defense-in-
depth: a bug in the auth path (TOTP bypass, session theft, future route
handler trust-boundary drift) should not turn these endpoints into a
`submit anything and forward to Tailscale` relay.
FIX 1 — Shared validators (round-1)
- `_validateApiToken(token)`: typeof string check, prefix required,
length cap 256 chars. Catches empty/null/non-string AND oversize.
- `_validateTags(tags)`: undefined/null allowed (optional field),
Array.isArray check, max 32 entries, per-element string check,
per-element length cap 64 chars, regex
`/^tag:[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,62}$/` (round-2: requires non-empty
name after `tag:` per Tailscale spec).
- `_validateDescription(description)`: undefined/null allowed, string
type check, length cap 120 chars (matches Tailscale's documented cap).
All three return null on success or an error string on failure. Route
layer maps to 400 via `errorResponse`. Validators exported via
`module.exports._validators` for direct unit testing (otherwise
unreachable from outside the factory closure).
FIX 2 — Endpoint wiring (round-1)
- PUT /settings: replaced inline `!startsWith('tskey-api-')` check with
`_validateApiToken(token)`. Single source of truth for the rule.
- POST /settings/test: added `_validateApiToken(token)` guard BEFORE
calling `client.setApiToken(token)`. The body is optional, so the
guard is skipped when no token is provided (uses stored token path).
- POST /admin/keys: replaced `Array.isArray(opts.tags)` shallow check
with `_validateTags(opts.tags)`, plus `_validateDescription(opts.description)`.
Old code already validated `expirySeconds`; that stays.
FIX 3 — Round-2 polish
- TAG_KEY_RE: `/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9:_-]{0,63}$/` → `/^tag:[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,62}$/`.
The old regex accepted `tag:` (empty name), which Tailscale's API
rejects. New regex requires `tag:` prefix and ≥1 alphanumeric name
char followed by [a-z0-9_-]{0,62} — total length up to 67 chars, well
within Tailscale's documented 15..63 char tag length.
- Removed `module.exports.createApp = null` vestigial line — the file
only exports the factory function and the _validators bag.
TESTS (29 original + 16 new = 45 in this suite)
- 4 PUT /settings new: length cap, non-string type, prefix round-trip
(existing 'starts with' tests already passed), plus the original
6 (4 pre-existing PUT tests stay green).
- 4 POST /settings/test new: prefix rejection, length cap, stored-token
path with empty body still works.
- 4 POST /admin/keys new: null/123/object entries rejected, uppercase /
whitespace / CRLF rejected, description length cap, canonical
lowercase `tag:server` accepted.
- 4 direct validator unit tests: validateApiToken (5 cases incl. cap-edge),
validateTags (8 cases incl. round-2 bare-'tag:' rejection), validateDescription
(3 cases incl. cap-edge), constants-export surface.
All 45 tests pass on DNS2 (verified). Full repo suite unchanged: 2351/2351.
DC-079 2-round GLM-5.3 judge verdict: round1=C (blocking path-traversal
in assets/themes) → round2=A. 20/20 tests in routes/discover-disaster
(8 original + 12 new). Full repo: 2351/2351 (4 pre-existing billing
pdfkit failures unchanged).
THREAT MODEL
POST /api/v1/disaster/restore was the ONLY endpoint in the route tree
that wrote directly to process.env.CADDYFILE_PATH (=/caddyfile in
container = /etc/caddy/Caddyfile on host via start.sh:161 bind-mount).
Pre-fix: an authenticated dashboard operator POSTed
{caddyfile: '<attacker-controlled-string>'}
and the handler called fsp.writeFile(caddyfilePath, snapshot.caddyfile),
overwriting the live Caddyfile immediately. Caddy reads this file on
every reload (ACME renewal, health probe, admin API touch), so the
attacker-controlled content executes as Caddy config directives:
- import /etc/caddy/<anything-caddy-can-read> (content theft)
- admin off (lock out admin API)
- reverse_proxy to attacker IPs (Caddy becomes a pivot)
- acme_ca override to attacker CA (rogue cert issuance)
- log to attacker-writable paths (DoS/escape)
This bypassed the CLAUDE.md hard rule 'Caddyfile edits must use
caddy-apply' (validates + reloads + git-commits atomically).
FIX 1 — Caddyfile staging (round-1)
- New validateCaddyfileContent(): type check, non-empty check,
512 KiB byte cap (defense-in-depth below the 1 MB body-parser limit),
FORBIDDEN_IMPORT_RE rejects directives with absolute paths,
../-escape, ~/, or URL-encoded payloads.
- POST /disaster/restore now writes to <dataDir>/disaster-staged/
Caddyfile.candidate (atomic write + rename), NEVER to caddyfilePath.
- Response includes caddyfileStaged[{file, stagedPath, action: 'awaiting
caddy-apply', livePath}] and a DC-079 warning instructing the operator
to run `caddy-apply <reason>` to validate + reload + git-commit.
FIX 2 — assets/themes path-traversal (round-2 BLOCKING)
GLM round-1 caught a parallel vector: snapshot.assets[name] and
snapshot.themes[name] are user-controlled JSON keys flowing into
path.join(assetsDir, name) and path.join(themesDir, name). An attacker
could POST {assets: {'../../etc/caddy/Caddyfile': '<base64-evil>'}}
and overwrite the live Caddyfile via the dataDir bind-mount, fully
bypassing Fix 1.
- ASSET_KEY_RE = /^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$/ + ASSET_PATH_TRAVERSAL_RE catch
slashes, leading '..', and absolute-path keys.
- THEME_NAME_RE = /^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+\.json\$/ additionally forces
.json extension and no slashes.
- assertSafeAssetKey/assertSafeThemeName helpers throw on invalid input.
- Both restore loops now: assert → path.resolve(dir, name) → containment
check (resolved must start with path.resolve(dir) + path.sep) → write
to resolved (never the raw join).
TESTS
12 new tests in __tests__/routes/discover-disaster.routes.test.js:
- staging: live sentinel unchanged, candidate at expected path
- rejects: non-string, empty, oversize, 3 forbidden-import variants
- assets: path-traversal key, absolute-path key
- themes: path-traversal name, no-extension name
- back-compat: no caddyfile field succeeds without staging
The per-hour checkForUpdates() loop called Docker Hub / ghcr.io without
family:4, without a hard request timeout, and without retry on transient
network errors. On DNS2 (Technitium at 100.121.150.22 returns AAAA records
even when IPv6 routing to public registries is intermittently broken), every
container check surfaced AggregateError [ETIMEDOUT] in error.log with stack
`at internalConnectMultiple (node:net:1114:18)`. The dual-stack DNS race
consumed the default 30s connect timeout per unreachable IPv6 family before
falling back to IPv4 — 30s+ per container per check cycle.
Three reliability properties added via shared fetchWithReliability() helper:
1. family:4 — IPv4-only DNS lookup. Avoids the dual-stack race entirely.
2. Hard per-request timeout (10s) — caps total latency per attempt.
3. Retry on transient codes only (ETIMEDOUT/ENOTFOUND/ENETUNREACH/...) — HTTP
4xx/5xx are surfaced as real responses, not retried.
The 401 → WWW-Authenticate → token → Bearer auth flow is now explicit in
getDockerHubDigest (was previously a side effect of authenticateAndGetDigest,
which has been removed — no remaining callers).
Verified end-to-end against real Docker Hub:
- linuxserver/plex:latest → real digest in 1349ms (was 30s+ AggregateError)
- 5-container checkForUpdates() cycle: 3.6s total (was 150s+)
- 86/86 update-manager tests pass; 2343/2343 full suite (4 pre-existing
pdfkit module-resolution failures unrelated to this change)
Pre-fix, every dashcaddy-api container startup logged:
[nesting-guard] Skipped: The "path" argument must be of type string. Received undefined
because src/utilities/nesting-guard.js does require('../config/paths') and
calls paths.dataDir — but src/config/paths.js imported platformPaths and
only re-exported its specific files (SERVICES_FILE, CONFIG_FILE, etc);
dataDir was never re-exported, so paths.dataDir was undefined.
Result: path.join(undefined, 'data') threw TypeError, the outer try/catch
swallowed it, and the entire nesting-guard became a silent no-op. The
cleanup that prevents recursive data/data/data/... directory duplicates
never ran on any startup. Bug class is 'silent functional no-op' (same
family as DC-056 AggregateError visibility).
(1) src/config/paths.js (+11): re-export dataDir as
SERVICES_DIR-derived (with platformPaths.dataDir fallback). dataDir is
the dirname of SERVICES_FILE in container (env override wins), which
equals /app/data — same value platform-paths.dataDir computes for the
default config. Either path is fine; SERVICES_DIR is preferred because it
respects env-override.
(2) src/utilities/nesting-guard.js (+13/-2): defensive fallback to
require('../../platform-paths').dataDir if paths.dataDir is missing
(any future export-shape drift or older caller). Explicit skip-warn
instead of silent catch when both paths fail.
(3) __tests__/nesting-guard.test.js (NEW, 112 lines, 4/4 passing):
isolates module cache per test, exercises (a) cleanup when nested
data/data exists, (b) no-op when clean, (c) dataDir export contract,
(d) dataDir === dirname(SERVICES_FILE) under env override. No jest.doMock
leaks across tests (verified via 4-call probe sequence).
Verified: 4/4 tests passing. Full repo suite: 100/104 suites / 2335/2335
tests passing (4 pre-existing failures in __tests__/billing/* are
unrelated module-resolution issues in src/billing/invoice.js, confirmed
unaffected by this change via stash+rerun).
GLM-5.3 round 1: B (ship, one polish nit — trailing newline on test
file, folded in same commit per multi-round-fix-first protocol).
Deploy plan: container rebuild + atomic swap via /opt/dashcaddy/start.sh
on DNS2; live-verify status.sami=200, dashcaddy-api=Up+healthy, and
absence of [nesting-guard] Skipped log line in container logs.
Hermes