Commit Graph
19 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
DashCaddy Polish Loop 65a447e27e DC-130 rev3: log.error on unexpected bridge status in /status + test asserting the log call (13 tests green)
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2026-09-14 04:19:55 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop 121caef488 DC-130 rev2: fail-fast bridge bindings (host), /status gateway-error mapping (401/403/unreachable -> 502, probe-failure stays ok:false) + 3 new tests (13 total)
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2026-09-14 04:11:30 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop 0ab1dfe6e5 DC-130: start.sh passes SHIPDECK_BRIDGE_URL/TOKEN_FILE to the container (deploys panel bridge wiring)
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2026-09-14 03:49:35 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop c90851f25f DC-130: deploys panel frontend — modal with services/deploy/journal tabs, rollback + status actions (bundle + cache tag rebuilt) 2026-09-14 03:49:35 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop 98d25ac41b DC-130: deploys panel frontend — modal with services/deploy/journal tabs, rollback + status actions, wired into features bundle + top bar 2026-09-14 03:49:19 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop 1fc61c3fdb DC-130: shipdeck deploys panel — bridge-proxied source deploys (routes + tests, opt-in via SHIPDECK_BRIDGE_URL) 2026-09-14 03:33:31 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop e33bc91438 fix(publish): prune build artifacts (build-output, out, dist_electron, data, release) from release tarball — v1.16.0 tarball was 817MB with gitignored Electron build-output; now 21MB
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2026-09-13 05:45:40 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop 70e252c8a5 [grade=A urn:ump:seyasvbntxsjibq5jiaqmfowc6xgchwe4jvcc54jd6355ujgm75q] DC-122: self-updater hardening + auto-update on + docker disk discipline (v1.16.0)
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- _isNewer: same-version releases are never 'newer' (commit labels are
  opaque stamps) — kills the same-version auto-apply regression loop
- _autoCheckAndApply: identical version@sha256 never re-applied
- dashcaddy-update.sh: truthful rollback verdicts (failed rebuild/health
  = exit 1 + failure result), exact frontend snapshot/restore (incl.
  update-introduced owned subtrees), contents-copy cp fallbacks with
  manifest reconciliation, JSON-encoded results/meta/stamp, prune on
  every exit path
- self-updater: frontend-only Linux releases fail loudly (no more silent
  no-op success stuck in 'applying')
- start.sh: DASHCADDY_UPDATE_ENABLED=true (Sami 2026-09-13), json-file
  log caps 10M x3, source->webroot sync via update-stamp contract
- tests: _isNewer regression suite, functional cycle + json/escape suites
  (scripts/test-frontend-cycle.sh, scripts/test-json-escape.sh)

15 judge rounds: C,C,D,D,C,C,D,C,C,C,D,C,A
2026-09-13 05:32:14 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop 939fdbb68b fix(services): commit deployed sec.sami card addition (staged during last night's deploy, missed the commit) 2026-09-13 05:32:13 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop fad51c81b2 [grade=A] Register sec.sami dashboard in DashCaddy login-page map
Add 'sec' to the buildLoginPage pages map in sso-gate.js. Without it,
/api/v1/auth/login-page?service=sec returned 404 'Unknown service' — the
TOTP login page is built from a hardcoded per-service map, so adding sec
to services.json (runtime config, gitignored) alone was not enough.

sec needs no app-token (plain web app behind the TOTP gate): after
check-session verifies the session it redirects to /?direct=1, bypassing
the Caddy @needsAutoLogin loop.

Codex grade A (urn:ump:p3jkreyxpqikwt54uxgpl7sybkbsnklbs5kdonq5ejfqyh27udla).
2026-09-13 05:32:13 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop 98737995a9 Merge dc/DC-080: Tailscale admin endpoint validation hardening (DC-080) [glm-grade=B]
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2026-08-18 18:35:59 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop e8c5a7a1fb Merge dc/DC-074-sites-ssrf: DC-074 sites SSRF hardening [glm-grade=A]
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2026-08-18 15:31:14 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop 7db152499c Merge dc/DC-073-caddy-upstreams-host-validation: DC-073 phantom-mute hardening [glm-grade=A]
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2026-08-18 15:10:40 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop b64f23301b Merge dc/DC-072-exec-scope: DC-072 exec scope + containerId hardening (glm-grade=A)
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2026-08-18 14:54:06 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop 83d7c65bf2 fix(exec): scope-based authorization + tighten containerId charset (DC-072) [glm-grade=A]
Pre-fix, dashcaddy-api/routes/exec.js (the ws://host/ws/exec/:containerId
WebSocket container terminal endpoint) captured auth.scope at lines 39/46
but never enforced it — any API key or JWT, regardless of scope, got a
full PTY-backed shell inside the running container. A key issued with
scope ['read'] (a legitimate monitoring/observability scope) could
escalate to a root-equivalent shell. Container exec is full root inside
the container's user namespace, so this was a privilege-escalation across
the auth trust boundary.

Fix:
1. assertExecScope(auth) requires scope.includes('admin'); throws a
   tagged 403 error (DC-072_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE) on rejection with
   requiredScope + actualScope in the envelope.
2. Called BEFORE wss.handleUpgrade so the WS gate cannot be bypassed.
3. 403 over the upgrade socket is JSON (code, requiredScope, actualScope)
   so the dashboard can show operator-actionable messages.
4. isValidContainerId(id) tightened to Docker's actual charset
   (12 or 64 lowercase hex). Pre-fix regex accepted _, -, ., mixed
   case, and any length up to 128; Docker would 404 the inspect and the
   rejection surfaced as a generic 500.
5. Audit-log pair: session start (container name + auth id) and session
   end with durationMs + reason ('exec-stream-end' vs 'ws-close'
   for abnormal disconnects); idempotent via ended-flag guard.
6. Both helpers exported via __test for unit tests (no live WS).

Tests: 20 new tests in __tests__/routes/exec.routes.test.js cover:
- assertExecScope: admin passes; read/write/empty/undefined/null/non-array
  rejected with the canonical 403 envelope.
- isValidContainerId: 12/64 lowercase hex accepted; uppercase / mixed /
  non-hex / _.- / wrong length / null / non-string / padded / CRLF
  payload rejected.

Full suite: 2327/2327 tests passing across 100 suites (zero regressions).

GLM-5.3 round 1: A with 2 LOW polish (scope-coercion defensive comment +
abnormal-close audit-log fallback). Both folded into the same commit.
Round 2: A. Ship.
2026-08-18 14:53:57 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop 384f9c8bdb Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/fix/dc-069-caddy-admin-ipv6-origin'
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2026-08-18 13:35:30 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop c6b2f556c2 fix(openclaw): harden proxy — 5 MiB cap, RFC 7230 hop-by-hop strip, open-redirect (Location/Refresh/WWW-Auth) strip, path + status validators (DC-065) [glm-grade=A]
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Round 1 GLM-5.3: C — missing "location" (open-redirect through proxy).
Round 2 GLM-5.3: C — missing "refresh" + "www-authenticate" (same class).
Round 3 GLM-5.3: A — ship.

Closure of four vulnerabilities in routes/openclaw.js proxyRequest():

  (a) Unbounded response passthrough → 5 MiB cap with 502 + DC-065
      message on overrun. Buffer-first pipeUpstream keeps the status
      code uncommitted until the cap check passes (cannot downgrade
      after res.write()).

  (b) Hop-by-hop + dangerous response-header passthrough → stripped via
      sanitizeForwardedHeaders(). Hop-by-hop per RFC 7230 §6.1
      (Connection, Keep-Alive, Proxy-Authenticate/Authorization, TE,
      Trailers, Transfer-Encoding, Upgrade). Dangerous responses
      (Set-Cookie [browser poisoning], Location/Refresh [open-redirect
      through same-origin proxy], WWW-Authenticate [phishing dialog],
      Content-Encoding [mismatched encoding], Content-Length [body
      desync], Server/X-Powered-By [fingerprinting]).

  (c) proxyRes.statusCode trusted without validation → coerceUpstreamStatus()
      coerces non-integer / out-of-range / non-number to 502
      (the semantic `bad gateway` for unreadable upstream).

  (d) Path taken from req.params[0] without validation → validatePath()
      rejects empty / non-string / oversize (414) / absolute-URL
      injection (\) / whitespace / CR / LF / backslash /
      characters outside RFC 3986 pchar + query separator set.

Tests: __tests__/routes/openclaw.proxy-hardening.test.js (NEW, 351 lines,
18 tests): 5 router-shape, 5 sanitizeForwardedHeaders (incl. all
stripped-header classes), 4 coerceUpstreamStatus, 5 validatePath, 3
end-to-end (oversized-response cap, safe-headers forwarding, path-injection
reject) — all green. Helpers are exposed on the Express router as
\ for direct, hermetic unit testing (no source-string
parsing, no regex sandbox).

Verified: 18/18 DC-065 suite + 95/95 full repo suites / 2144/2144 tests
on DNS2 pre-deploy.

Memory tradeoff note: the buffer-first pipeUpstream caps per-call memory
at 5 MiB; at 1000 concurrent connections worst-case is ~5 GiB. Node CLI
flags in start.sh + ulimit bound concurrency. Documented inline.
2026-08-18 11:59:58 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop 4e75b13e90 Merge feature/dc-064-discover-adopt-fetcht: DC-064 discover-adopt fetchT (glm-grade=A)
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2026-08-18 11:32:14 -07:00
DashCaddy Polish Loop c01a011d47 [glm-grade=A] fix(caddy-upstreams): swap errorResponse arg order to statusCode-first; add type validator (DC-062)
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Routes/caddy-upstreams.js had 4 callsites with argument-order swapped: errorResponse(res, 'message', 503) instead of errorResponse(res, 503, 'message'). The canonical signature from src/utils/responses.js:66 takes statusCode FIRST; the swapped call passed a STRING where Express expected a status code. res.status('Caddy upstream watcher not initialized') throws RangeError [ERR_HTTP_INVALID_STATUS_CODE], Express's error middleware catches it, and the response is 500 with an HTML stack trace instead of the intended 503 JSON. Four `!caddyUpstreamWatcher` defensive guards had this exact pattern; all fixed.

Defense-in-depth (responses.js): errorResponse() now validates that statusCode is an integer in 100..599 and that message is a string BEFORE calling res.status(). Future arg-order mistakes fail fast with a clear TypeError naming the wrong arg and the message — instead of writing a 500 HTML panic to the wire. Legacy error(res, message, statusCode) helper (used by ~7 files that import as 'error: errorResponse' alias) is intentionally untouched.

Tests (__tests__/utils-responses-dc-062.test.js, NEW, 21 tests pass):
- correct (res, 503, msg) order: 503 JSON
- swapped (res, msg, statusCode) order: TypeError (was: silent 500 HTML panic)
- 10 invalid-statusCode cases: NaN, Infinity, '503', null, undefined, underflow, overflow, float, object, array — all rejected
- non-string message rejected
- DC-086 extras.code propagation preserved
- legacy error() helper regression: still works
- pre-fix Express server proves the bug class (500 HTML when statusCode is a string)
- all 4 caddy-upstreams routes with null watcher now return 503 JSON
- static source scan: 0 swapped patterns, 4 canonical (statusCode, 'message') occurrences

Full suite: 92 suites / 2039 tests / all green pre and post fix.

[glm-grade=A] from deleg_45e44614 (3 tool calls, 82s, MiniMax-M3 stand-in per Sami's 2026-08-17 authorization)
2026-08-18 09:03:58 -07:00