Owner directive "Do it" (2026-10-09): expand the MCP tool set so the
"manage your entire infrastructure" claim is true of the product. 11 new
tools over EXISTING routes: calendar (events/add_source), security
(events/summary), license_status, capabilities, DNS add/remove record,
deploy_recipe, run_workflow, tailscale_status. Handlers verified against
the actual route declarations; credential TYPE passthrough and the DC-162
machine-only tools/call gate unchanged (tests included).
judge r1 (grade C, urn:ump:fyvivcvrphjm5wk227ujr2yzfcgcdvwekjmw6lvnqvjosqrjhtbq)
blocking issues — all fixed in this revision:
1. WORKFLOWS DOUBLE-PREFIX (real product bug the judge caught):
routes/workflows.js declared literal '/workflows/...' paths while
src/app.js mounts the router at /workflows — composed path was
/api/v1/workflows/workflows/..., which the SHIPPED dashboard bundle
(status/js/bundled-workflows.js calls single-prefix /api/v1/workflows/)
never hits: the workflows UI has been broken in production. Fixed by
making route paths RELATIVE to the mount (same class as the recipes
fix); run-workflow MCP path now matches. Also reordered /history
before /:workflowId/history so the literal segment is not captured as
an id (limit 100 vs 50 asserted in tests).
2. Verifier substring check replaced: NEW integration suite
(__tests__/mcp/mcp-core-dc166-integration.test.js) resolves EVERY MCP
tool call's complete mounted (method, path) against the declared route
patterns extracted from the owning route file (params matched as
patterns, comments excluded) — a double prefix or wrong method fails
the run. Plus real-composition dispatch through the actual workflows
router: POST /api/v1/workflows/:id/run reaches the run handler
(sentinel '"ran":true'), list/history handlers land correctly, and a
static guard fails any route file that re-declares its own mount name.
3. Both verbatim-command claims in the brief now name their file.
polish applied: calendar window-math test bounds tightened to exactly
~7 days (was a weak 6-hour lower bound); extra blank line before
tools/list removed; calendar_add_source schema gained the token property
the route already accepts (schema now matches the documented API).
Tests: 73 prior + 15 dc166 unit + 6 integration = 94 MCP tests green;
full suite 6 failed + 3697 passed == 3703 total (known-red billing
family, band-guarded; base-proof shows the same 6 red at a1b8fa3).
eslint: 0 errors on touched files (warnings count unchanged vs base).
Site-vs-product audit (2026-10-09, owner decisions: "advertise as Premium"
and "It should be LLM readable") reconciles the entitlement triangle:
marketing copy <-> PREMIUM_FEATURES <-> license-server grant list.
(Submitter naming: this is judge round 5 for artifact dashcaddy-dc165-code;
"rev5" is the source revision label — one revision per graded round.)
r4 judge blockers addressed:
- B0 (hygiene glob + deterministic patch discovery): verifier now scans
"$d"/*PATCH.diff and *.md/*.sh GLOBS instead of enumerated name lists —
the judge worktree's 4_PATCH.diff (any index) is found by shape; PATCH
hash discovery likewise globs OUT_DIR/SELF_DIR with NO hardcoded
/root/dc165-judge fallback (B2). Fresh pass + fail-closed transcripts
regenerated from the exact submitted bundle (attached).
- B1 (derivation honesty): openapi.yaml + capabilities.js header now split
the SIX MEASURED fields (version, templates count/categories, tools,
transport triple, premium list, language count — each read at request
time from the runtime module) from the STATIC metadata fields (product,
description, restMount, endpoint — registration facts visible in app.js,
labeled as such). The no-drift claim attaches only to the measured set.
- B2: external hardcoded fallbacks removed (above).
- P0: revision labels synchronized (this paragraph).
- P1: fleet wiring grep asserts the EXACT literal requirePremium('fleet')
mount, not any requirePremium occurrence.
Carried from rev2 (r1 blockers — unchanged content): real-composition-root
fleet gate e2e (4 tests: no-activation 403 envelope contract, premium-without-
fleet 403 per-feature, with-fleet gate cleared, prefix inheritance across
hosts/status/deploy); MCP_RUNTIME single-source in routes/mcp.js (transport
literal occurs exactly once in the repo, read by both /info and
capabilities; unit test asserts manifest === MCP_RUNTIME); OpenAPI 200-only
public contract; APPEND-ONLY offline feature migration (legacy entries
preserved; load() complexity extracted into _migrateOfflineFeatureSnapshot,
lint-clean); eslint rc hard-gated on a FRESH per-run capture incl.
middleware.js.
Product behavior: 'fleet' + 'workflows' + 'auto-backup' in PREMIUM_FEATURES
(descriptions source-quoted: bundled-workflows ids; /backups/schedule
schema fields); requirePremium('fleet') mounted at the /fleet ROUTER prefix
BEFORE fleetRoutes; GET /api/v1/capabilities public machine-readable ground
truth (PUBLIC_ROUTES exact GET + drift-test directMount + openapi doc);
offline-only forward-migration (online activations untouched — server
authoritative across the network boundary).
Diff: 9 files vs 4143bff (exact stats in EVIDENCE header).
Tests: 9 dc165 + 4 fleet-e2e + 76 license-manager + 21 tier + 14 drift =
124 targeted green; 50 MCP route tests re-verified green after the
MCP_RUNTIME refactor (77 combined on the focused rerun).
Judge r1 (C) blockers B1-B3 + polish both applied — see body of rev1 commit for feature scope.
urn:ump:l2tg66wmchkmd6fde4k3ojwc56zpxqh657spe37bu6dpvduswalq
The floating assistant was broken end-to-end; Sami said "Do it that works".
Three user-visible bugs fixed + the promised LLM delegation implemented:
FRONTEND (status/js/ai-chat.js — rewritten):
- Response parsing: old code read data.data; the API returns the FLAT ok()
envelope — EVERY reply rendered "Sorry, something went wrong". Now reads
the real shape (contract asserted by route test).
- Suggestion chips: onclick="...send('"Deploy Plex"')" — nested quotes,
invalid JS, dead buttons (shipped like this). Now data-driven buttons with
addEventListener.
- Deploy button: called window.openAppSelector which NEVER existed anywhere
in the tree (grep-verified). Now opens the REAL deploy modal via new
window.openDeployConfigFor(templateId) exported by app-selector.js —
resolves against the live API template cache, reuses showDeployConfig
(same path a manual catalog click takes). Widgets route to the grid.
- Conversation history (last 6 turns) now rides along per request, engine
badge in header, ⚙ settings sub-panel (baseUrl/model/API key + Test +
Remove), all server text via textContent (no HTML injection), CSP-safe
(no inline handlers).
BACKEND (routes/ai-intent.js):
- TWO engines, one contract. LLM classifier (OpenAI-compatible chat
completions) with system prompt embedding the LIVE 78-app catalog + the
six wizard categories; regex patterns kept as the zero-config default and
the automatic failover (HTTP error, timeout via AbortController,
unparseable output -> pattern answers; response carries engine +
llmError so the UI can say which served — no silent degradation).
- Closed-vocabulary schema validation: intent MUST be in the known set else
'unknown'; appId MUST exist in APP_TEMPLATES else nulled (hallucinated
ids cannot leak into deploy plans); categories filtered to the wizard's
real keys; reply stripped of control chars + bounded to 600; history
role-filtered (only user/assistant pass — client-injected system turns
dropped) + capped; input capped to 1000 chars.
- enrich() rebuilds the response contract per intent; pattern-canned
response is dropped when the LLM rerouted the intent (no stale shape);
deployPlan body.port now fills from the template's defaultPort (was
hardcoded null); deployPlan shape asserted against wizard usage.
- Key storage: PUT /ai/settings stores {baseUrl,model,apiKey} in the
ENCRYPTED credential store (key 'ai:llm') via ctx.credentialManager —
NOT config.json (GET /config echoes the raw file to the browser; that
route's shape was verified before this decision). Blank apiKey on PUT
keeps the stored one. GET /ai/settings reports configured/source/model/
hasApiKey — the key value NEVER crosses the wire (asserted). Env
fallback AI_LLM_BASE_URL/AI_LLM_API_KEY/AI_LLM_MODEL + legacy
LLM_PROXY_URL for headless installs. POST /ai/settings/test = one-shot
real classify probe returning ok/sample or ok:false/reason (never
throws). DELETE clears.
- GET /ai/capabilities now reports engine + llm status (pattern was honest
marketing before; now it can be true).
MOUNT (src/app.js): aiIntentRoutes receives siteConfig, log, fetchImpl
(ctx.fetchT — test-injectable) and credentialManager.
Docs: OpenAPI +4 AI path entries (intent, capabilities, settings, settings/test); CHANGELOG entry; dist bundle rebuilt
(openDeployConfigFor present in features.js; SW cache c62511c40d).
Tests: 20 NEW in __tests__/routes/ai-intent-engine.test.js (engine
selection w/ and w/o store, off-catalog phrasing via mock LLM,
hallucinated-id nulling, illegal intent coercion, HTTP-500 failover,
AbortError timeout failover, markdown-fence repair, reply sanitization,
history cap+role filter, env config path, intent-disagreement rebuild w/
real jellyfin port 8096, flat envelope contract, 400s, 1000-char cap,
settings GET/PUT/DELETE/test incl. key-never-echoed assertions,
capabilities engine reporting) + the 18 original pattern tests unchanged +
composition-root e2e 8 pass. Full suite: 3643 passed; only the pre-existing
pdf-parse billing family red (6 failed in documented band [5,7], patch
touches no billing file).
Judge r2 (grade C) — all 3 blockers + both polish items:
1. REQUEST-vs-NOTIFICATION by PRESENCE, never truthiness: validateJsonRpc
uses hasOwnProperty('id'); id 0 and id '' are VALID request ids echoed
back BY VALUE (strict-equality tested), id:null treated as a request
under the documented error-id convention. mcp-core default branch fixed
the same way (`if (id)` → hasOwnProperty — id 0 / '' unknown-method now
answer -32601 with the id echoed instead of being swallowed as falsy).
Routes' malformed-notification silence path also switched to
presence-based detection (id:null + bad params → 400 envelope, not 204).
2. params:null REJECTED (-32600): contract is object-or-omitted ONLY
(strict JSON-RPC; the old code's m.params !== null guard contradicted
the documented contract). Boundary tests pin the policy.
3. Unknown-method boundary tests: id 0 → -32601 id:0, id '' → -32601 id:'',
id null → -32601 id:null — asserted at BOTH layer levels (route).
Polish:
- 16-case TABLE-DRIVEN boundary matrix covering every allowed/rejected
id/params combination incl. 202 vs 204 notification split.
- Verifier now probes writable /tmp up front (exit 73 + clear message if
unavailable; documented requirement) instead of dying at mktemp.
- Verifier target count 57 → 73 (DC-162 suites) with the boundary table
named in the assertion label.
Full DC-162 suite: 73 passed (route 50 + core 23). No transport/credential
semantics changed from rev2.
urn:ump:or2qqhcytp6lfzlyi7xru7hdqy3uar2hbjllsrrbxrbray3c5kpa
All three r3 blocking issues fixed + polish applied:
- Radicale provision route now FAILS CLOSED (409) unless the target container
is present, inspectable, and its image matches /radicale/i. Missing
containerId, failed inspect, or non-Radicale image → nothing is written to
the shared config and no source/credential is registered. 4 new tests cover
the three refusal paths + the verified-image happy path.
- ICS feed fetch now streams with a hard 5 MiB body cap (same bound as the
CalDAV path) via readBodyCapped(); oversized feeds reject mid-stream and
degrade to per-source error. Test covers a >5 MiB feed end-to-end.
- Verifier mode separation: `--verify` runs the same checks fully read-only
(all output under mktemp -d in /tmp, transcript printed to stdout, scratch
removed on exit — proven rc=0 with zero repo/tmp-side writes); default
transcript mode is explicitly declared a TRANSCRIPT GENERATOR in its header
and writes only under the script's own directory.
- Full-suite count assertions replaced with the documented invariant
(failed ∈ [5,7], failing set == known-flaky billing suite, extras pass
isolated rerun) — judge r3 polish.
- Stale credential-key comment in radicale-provisioner.js header corrected.
Calendar suites: 43 passed (38 + 5 new). Perf note: readBodyCapped streams;
no full-buffer read of unbounded bodies on the ICS path anymore.
All three r2 blocking issues fixed + polish applied:
- useExisting (adopted) Radicale containers no longer get a source registered
with credentials the operator never provisioned. Registration happens ONLY
when pre-start provisioning succeeded; adopted deployments get a
calendarHint in the deploy response pointing at the manual-wiring modal.
- Weekly BYDAY expansion: candidates earlier than DTSTART are skipped (they
do not consume COUNT); window inclusion now uses interval-overlap
semantics (occurrence span vs window span) for both recurring and
non-recurring events. Three new tests cover midweek DTSTART, a straddling
multi-day event, and a boundary-exactly-ending event.
- Verifier is now read-only on the graded tree: no stash/checkout/rewrite.
Base proof runs in a temporary git worktree of 448f535 under /tmp (removed
on exit); the flaky pdf-parse suite is proven pre-existing via "red at
base" + "patch touches no billing file" (empty diff), and a race-flaky
suite (DC-116, witnessed once under parallel load) is given one isolated
rerun which must pass.
Polish: PUT /sources normalizes the user field (and clamps name) like POST.
Calendar suites: 38 passed (35 + 3 new recurrence tests). The 3558/3564
full-suite numbers vary by one flaky pdf-parse member between runs; the
evidence now asserts the invariant (suite red at base, no billing file in
the patch, flaky suites green on isolated rerun) instead of an exact count.
All five r1 blocking issues fixed + polish items applied:
- Unified credential-key convention: registerAutoWiredSource now stores at
calendar:source:<source.id> — the same key the events fetcher resolves —
so auto-wired sources authenticate on first fetch (was calendar:radicale:
<subdomain>, fetched key never written = empty-password CalDAV auth).
- calendarStateManager is now passed INTO assembleContext(...) (the r1 patch
only extended the function signature, so ctx.calendarStateManager was
undefined and the deploy hook silently skipped auto-wiring).
- Radicale config is provisioned BEFORE container start (Radicale reads its
config at startup): the deploy hook writes config+htpasswd ahead of
deployContainer() and passes the pre-start credentials to the post-deploy
registration step; useExisting path logs an explicit restart warning.
- PUT /sources/:id now validates URL updates through the same shared
validateSourceUrl() used by POST (protocol + remote-plaintext rules).
- New end-to-end contract test (calendar-autowire.e2e.test.js): spins a real
HTTP CalDAV server, registers an auto-wired source, then fetches events
through the API — the server verifies Basic auth against the provisioned
password, so a credential-key or wiring regression fails the suite.
Polish: provisioning is idempotent (deterministic source id, update instead
of duplicate), unbiased rejection-sampling for password/salt generation,
writeRadicaleConfig docstring no longer claims idempotence.
Calendar suites: 35 passed (32 prior + 3 new). Lint: 0 errors; complexity
warnings in deploy.js pre-exist at base (61 vs 68 now — the hook did not
worsen the trend line materially; calendar files themselves lint clean).
- __tests__/e2e-node/composition-root.e2e.test.js: `boot()` takes {timeoutMs, code}
and the timeout rejection carries the child it killed; a NEW test drives the real
timeout against a child that never reports PORT/READY and asserts the OS-observed
SIGKILL on that child (marker e2e-timeout-kill) — the r4 claim is now exercised.
- routes/deploys.js: bridge() coerces any non-object JSON body (null/[]/string) into
the same failure shape as a non-JSON body, so no `body.ok` deref can 500 or report a
false success; the subdomain label regex rejects leading AND trailing hyphens.
- __tests__/routes/deploys.catalog.r4.test.js: trailing-dash rejection case + three
malformed-successful-body cases (clean 502, never 500).
BLOCK0: catalog deploy audit now uses the REAL AuditLogger contract
(auditLogger.log({action,resource,details,outcome,ip})) fire-and-forget
via Promise.resolve().catch — async audit failures can never fail the
deploy response (tested with a throwing audit backend).
BLOCK1: verify.sh targeted-jest block captures jest exit code explicitly
(set +e / rc / loud FAIL) — no silent termination under set -e.
BLOCK2: subdomain advertised by the App Selector modal is now FORWARDED
end-to-end (selector -> /deploys/catalog/deploy validated charset ->
bridge --subdomain -> CLI CatalogInstallOptions, implemented in
dc-catalog-2 r3); invalid subdomains 400 before the bridge (4 cases).
POLISH: boot-timeout SIGKILLs the child (no leaked process).
New r4 suite: 7 tests (audit shape success/failure, subdomain forward +
4 rejections). Full suite 157 suites / 3519 tests green.
GET /deploys/catalog/apps -> bridge /api/catalog/apps (73 embedded apps,
single source of truth). POST /deploys/catalog/deploy {app,port,env} ->
validated (service-id charset, port 1024-65535, env name/value rules) then
proxied to bridge /api/catalog/deploy which runs the shipdeck CLI catalog
deploy (OCI image -> hardened systemd service; NO Docker daemon). Audited
as deploy.catalog with ok/seconds. 11 table-driven route tests incl.
validation rejections never reaching the bridge + bridge-failure 502 shape.
App Selector submit rewired from /apps/deploy (Docker chain) to
/deploys/catalog/deploy — same modal, same fields (port, mediaPath, plex
claim token as env), no new UI screens. Full suite 3510/3510 (156 suites).
- DC-160: /catalog/:appId read app.image/ports/env/volumes which live under
app.docker.* — every detail response was empty. Now reads docker.* and
surfaces defaultPort/subdomain/healthCheck/mediaMount/claimToken/difficulty/
setupInstructions for the deploy form. List/search use the templates own
category field (old hand-rolled CATEGORY_MAP mis-categorized apps).
- Shield (routes/shield.js + 5-line app.js mount) committed to source after
weeks as prod-only drift; regression test asserts the mount exists.
- New composition-root e2e suite: boots REAL createApp() on an ephemeral
port, probes the historically-broken routes through the REAL mount table
(wizard wiring, shield, catalog detail, deploys bridge) — the class of bug
all 3 P7 dogfood findings belonged to. 5 tests.
- Full suite 3499/3499 (155 suites); table-driven DC-160 test covers all 73
image templates.
Add 'sec' to the buildLoginPage pages map in sso-gate.js. Without it,
/api/v1/auth/login-page?service=sec returned 404 'Unknown service' — the
TOTP login page is built from a hardcoded per-service map, so adding sec
to services.json (runtime config, gitignored) alone was not enough.
sec needs no app-token (plain web app behind the TOTP gate): after
check-session verifies the session it redirects to /?direct=1, bypassing
the Caddy @needsAutoLogin loop.
Codex grade A (urn:ump:p3jkreyxpqikwt54uxgpl7sybkbsnklbs5kdonq5ejfqyh27udla).
- routes/ca.js: declare format before pfx/pem/crt dispatch (was ReferenceError
on every request that passed validation); add CA_CERT_FORMATS single source
of truth + hardened format extraction (string-coerce, whitelist)
- routes/caddycode.js: fix upstream-validation regexes (control-char classes)
- routes/logs.js: SSE/validation lint fixes
- routes/openclaw.js: remove useless regex escape in ALLOWED_PATH_RE
- fleet-validation.js + http-caddy-admin-origin test: eslint-disable for
intentional control-regex security sentinels
- ca-dc076.routes.test.js: regression test for declared format + behavioral
coverage of format validation (now pre-PKI)
Judge: Qwen lane (qwen3.8-max) grade B, 0 blocking, verdict
/tmp/judge-batch1-verdict.json. API suite 2859/2859 green.
Two silent-death defects in one class:
1. Seven emitters absent from DEFAULT events, so the send() gate
(config.events[canonical] !== true) dropped them on every install:
ssl-cert-expiry, dns-propagation, drift-detected,
dependency-restart-complete/-failed, recipeRemoved, workflow.
All now default ON; dependency-restart spellings fold onto one
canonical toggle; recipeRemoved aliases to recipe-removed in both
the manager and route alias maps.
2. Nine call sites used a legacy 4-arg send(event, title, message, type)
against the 3-arg signature: the message string landed in the type
slot (Discord embed color fell back to info-blue, history.type wrong)
and providers received the TITLE as the body - deploy-failure
notifications carried no error text at all. Fixed at source (9 sites)
plus a type-guarded shim in send() for external legacy callers.
Also: explicit data.title now flows to ntfy Title header, email subject,
Discord embed title, and history; settings UI gains 9 event toggles
(separate Backup Complete/Failed) with defaults-on semantics.
Tests: +24 (new DC-094 suite: defaults, gate pass-through, alias folding
send-time and load-time, stored-config inheritance, shim body/title/
color/subject/history, type-guard, 3-arg no-regression); 4 assertions in
bundled-workflows-health-check updated from the old 4-arg mock contract
to the canonical shape (same behavior asserted). Full suite 116 suites /
2706 tests green.
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read via delegate_task (deleg_8a7cedd0), grade A,
zero blockers; 2 polish items (Backups toggle conflation, shim
type-guard) folded into this commit. Verdict URN:
urn:ump:uyipjjwdjqjy3alvceqxvlucrymd7hnsben5udpp2bqycoh3l2la
Live verification of 4125d7a caught a 500 every 60s: the handler called
deps.session.isSessionValid(req), but the production session context
(src/context/session.js) exposes isValid — isSessionValid is only the
middleware-internal name. The round-1 test stub mirrored the wrong
name, so tests passed while prod 500'd (stub-shape-fits-bug).
- routes/auth/index.js: precompute guarded _authed (typeof isValid ===
'function' check); malformed session object can no longer 500 a
60s-polled endpoint. Fallback true: handler runs only after the
session middleware admitted the request.
- routes/auth/admin.js:119: same latent 500 fixed (isSessionValid →
isValid) — pre-existing DC-048 bug, any legacy-session /me call.
- Test stub now carries the real shape {isValid} with isSessionValid
deliberately absent — regression to the wrong name now fails tests.
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read round 2, grade B ship; stale-comment polish
folded in. Full suite 115/2682 green.
The frontend admin panel polls GET /api/v1/auth/me on every dashboard
load and every 60s per open tab. /me lived only in the DC-048 admin
router, mounted only when email auth is enabled — so every single-user
install (the default) answered 404 and logged a DC-404 ERROR + stack
once per minute per open tab. Verified live in production logs.
- routes/auth/index.js: /auth/me now ALWAYS mounted. Multi-user +
req.user returns the stored profile (mode:'multi'); otherwise the
legacy single-operator response (role:'admin', isAdmin:true,
legacy:true, mode:'single'). Session-gated — NOT added to
PUBLIC_ROUTES, so unauthenticated polls get a clean 401.
- Frontend behavior unchanged: attachTrigger requires me.user.role
=== 'admin', and user stays null in single-user mode, so no Admin
button appears on single-user installs.
- openapi.yaml /api/v1/auth/me (200/401) now matches reality.
- +6 tests (route present both modes, response shapes, PUBLIC_ROUTES
absence, DC-048 admin-mount invariant, HTTP-level dispatch reach).
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read, grade B ship (verdict URN recorded in
STATE.md); polish note (HTTP-level mount-order test) folded in same
commit. Full suite 115 suites / 2687 tests green.
Three user-facing notification features were silently dead from contract
drift between the settings UI and the backend:
1. SMTP auth never applied: the UI sent email.user/email.pass while the
manager read username/password. Route now normalizes aliases; legacy
config files canonicalize at load.
2. Event toggles were cosmetic: UI sent camelCase keys (containerDown),
the send() gate read kebab-case ('container-down'). EVENT_ALIASES now
folds every known spelling (manager gate, route store, legacy files);
UI sends and reads canonical keys.
3. Deploy/auto-restart notifications always dropped: deploy-success/
deploy-failed/auto-restart were missing from DEFAULT events, and
send('test') was itself gated -> the Test button was a no-op. Defaults
added; 'test' bypasses the gate.
Also: strict boolean contract (string 'false' for secure/enabled rejected
— previously coerced truthy, silently forcing TLS), SMTP port bounds,
non-destructive credential merge (blank password no longer clobbers the
stored one), GET /config returns port/secure/to/username + hasPassword
(password never returned), full form prefill + keep-hint placeholder.
Verified live pre-fix: send('test')/'deploymentSuccess'/'auto-restart'
all returned 'not enabled'. Post-fix: +20 tests (route + manager),
full suite 2641/2641 (112 suites).
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read via delegate_task (deleg_ad765d63), grade B,
ship, zero blockers; judge independently ran the DC-092 suites (38/38).
Polish #1 (canonical event for provider titles) folded in. Remaining
emitters with the same gate-miss class (recipeRemoved, workflow,
ssl-cert-expiry, dns-propagation, drift-detected, dependency-restart-*)
noted for a follow-up tick.
Two log sites in routes/auth/admin.js wrote raw email PII to the server
log: the SMTP-unconfigured 'auth-invite-send' warn and the 'invite
accepted, user created' info. Both now route through
AuthProvider.maskEmail() with a '[unmaskable-email]' sentinel fallback
(never the raw address). Two regression tests assert the raw address is
absent from log meta and the masked form present. Response contract
unchanged (full email still returned to the authenticated admin).
Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read (deleg_f0896de3), grade B / ship / zero
blockers; polish notes folded in. Verdict URN:
urn:ump:jd2htpwq76ni6bapj3vxjpvypfdnoc4argqbzpcerutmh7u5khea
Full suite: 2610/2610 (109 suites).
Flip POST /api/v1/auth/admin/invites default to no email; always return
the link. Operators copy + share via iMessage/WhatsApp/SMS/Signal/Telegram/
Discord/paste-in-email. Email becomes an opt-in checkbox (was the default).
Add shareText field with pre-formatted message for one-tap paste. Stop
logging raw invite URLs to error.log when SMTP is unconfigured (was just
a dev fallback — link is now in the response). Frontend flips the
checkbox default to unchecked and renders shareText + native share sheet
button (navigator.share) alongside the raw copy-link button. 9 new tests
covering default-no-send, link-always-returned, shareText-shape, opt-in
SMTP send, failed-SMTP-no-leak. Full suite: 2474/2474 + 9 new = 2483.
Public share endpoints accept untrusted fields. Pre-fix code used bare
type checks (email.includes('@'), typeof deviceId === 'string') so the
two CSRF-exempt public endpoints accepted:
- bare '@' / 'a@' / '<script>@x.c'
- 10MB email strings (data/shares.json bloat)
- CR/LF/NUL in email (corrupts on-disk JSON + log lines)
- CR/LF/NUL in deviceId (flows into Tailscale auth-key description)
Hardening (5 files, +661 net):
1. routes/share.js + src/security/share-store.js: shared validators
- validatePublicEmail(raw): charset (a-z0-9._%+-@), 254-char cap,
reject \x00-\x1f\x7f, block shell-metachars
- validatePublicDeviceId(raw): charset (a-z0-9._:-), 1-128 length,
reject \x00-\x1f\x7f
- Single source of truth: validators live in share-store.js, exported,
imported by routes/share.js (drift-eliminated)
2. Routes that were 'email.includes(@)' now use validator. Empty/omitted
email still allowed (backwards-compatible per recordPublicSubscribe
signature).
3. recordTailscaleUse defaults omitted/null deviceId to 'unknown'
(backwards-compatible — pre-fix code rejected bare omitted; new code
matches the store's defensive default).
4. constants.js: RATE_LIMITS.SHARE_PUBLIC = {windowMs: 15min, max: 30}
Mounted on the 3 CSRF-exempt endpoints (/preview, /subscribe,
/redeem-tailscale). 30/15min/IP — tighter than the 1000/15min
general limiter (which is too generous for unauth state-mutating
endpoints). Falls back to no-op in test envs.
5. recordPublicSubscribe records the (validated, normalized) email in
subscribers[] capped at last 8 entries (was unbounded → store
bloat via repeated subscribe).
Test coverage (38 new tests in __tests__/share-dc083.routes.test.js + 3
in __tests__/share-routes.test.js):
- Bare '@', missing TLD, single-char TLD → reject
- CRLF, NUL, oversized >254 → reject
- Non-string type-coerced (number, boolean, object, array) → reject
- XSS-shape payloads → reject
- valid user+tag@sub.domain.io + nodekey:... → accept (pins contract)
- sharePublicLimiter is mounted on /preview (route-stack smoke)
- store-layer defense-in-depth: store rejects what route doesn't catch
- sanitized usedBy flows into shares.json
- rejection does NOT mark share used
- subscriber array bounded at 8 entries
Test results:
- 68/68 share-related tests pass (30 share-routes + 38 share-dc083)
- Full repo: 2427/2427 tests pass
- npx eslint: 0 errors, 22 warnings (baseline HEAD =14; +8 in test mocks)
Judge verdict: GLM-5.3 round-2 grade A. Round 1 was B with 7 polish
suggestions (DRY validators, hoist require, warn-on-missing-dep, new
tests for legit inputs + limiter mount) — all folded into same commit
per multi-round-fix-first protocol. Zero blocking issues.
Threat model: the 2 POST endpoints mutate shares.json + Tailscale auth
descriptions. Pre-fix was effectively 'input trust boundary = NONE'.
Post-fix: every byte that crosses the boundary is charset/length/control-
char-validated at BOTH the route layer (suspenders) and the store layer
(belt).
Hermes
sami7777