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Author SHA1 Message Date
Hermes 6732a1e1df [glm-grade=B] fix(auth): DC-089 mask invite/user emails in server logs
Two log sites in routes/auth/admin.js wrote raw email PII to the server
log: the SMTP-unconfigured 'auth-invite-send' warn and the 'invite
accepted, user created' info. Both now route through
AuthProvider.maskEmail() with a '[unmaskable-email]' sentinel fallback
(never the raw address). Two regression tests assert the raw address is
absent from log meta and the masked form present. Response contract
unchanged (full email still returned to the authenticated admin).

Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read (deleg_f0896de3), grade B / ship / zero
blockers; polish notes folded in. Verdict URN:
urn:ump:jd2htpwq76ni6bapj3vxjpvypfdnoc4argqbzpcerutmh7u5khea
Full suite: 2610/2610 (109 suites).
2026-08-22 16:22:53 -07:00
Hermes ea96abe95a Merge dc/DC-088-remove-service-tombstones: removeService generation tombstones + incident closure [glm-grade=B]
CI / Test & Lint (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / Security audit (push) Canceled after 0s
2026-08-22 15:55:29 -07:00
Hermes 3ccf66754a [glm-grade=B] fix(monitoring): DC-088 removeService generation tombstones + incident closure
- serviceGenerations no longer leaks entries: removeService deletes the live
  entry and records a TTL'd (10min) tombstone swept by cleanupHistory
- monotonic instance-wide generationSeq prevents generation reuse across
  remove->re-add cycles (ABA) and supersedes tombstones on re-configure
- _isStaleCapture(): presence-aware stale check — live entry must match
  exactly; no entry is stale only under a higher-generation tombstone
  (preserves correct behavior for disk-loaded never-configured services)
- catch path increments consecutiveFailures only after the stale check, so
  a late-rejected probe cannot resurrect state for a removed service
- open incidents for a removed service close via the standard resolve path
  (resolvedBy=service-removed, WS/SSE incident-resolved broadcast)
- 6 regression tests; full suite 2608/2608 green

Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read (Codex stand-in), verdict B/ship, zero blockers
2026-08-22 15:55:26 -07:00
Hermes c71b794ccc Merge dc/DC-087-test-mirrors-fetcht: hermetic caddy-admin test mirrors + raw-fetch guard [glm-grade=B]
CI / Test & Lint (push) Canceled after 0s
CI / Security audit (push) Canceled after 0s
2026-08-22 15:14:35 -07:00
Hermes f2285a2550 test(api): DC-087 hermetic caddy-admin health mirrors + file-level raw-fetch guard [glm-grade=B]
Two mirrored health-handler test suites (health-endpoints, health-probe-aliases)
probed the Caddy admin API with raw Origin-less native fetch. On the prod host
the adversarial cron runs the full jest suite every 30 min against a live Caddy
admin with enforce_origin: 12 journal 403 lines per run (~700/day of
'client is not allowed to access from origin' spam) while tests stayed green.

- Mirrors now call fetchT (byte-identical to src/app.js:930 probe) with fetchT
  jest.spyOn-mocked at buildApp scope; caddyOk-configurable in both suites
- New guard test in utils-http-caddy-admin-origin.test.js: any __tests__ file
  pairing a raw await-fetch with a Caddy-admin token (:2019|adminUrl|
  CADDY_ADMIN) fails the suite — file-level pairing catches the historical
  cross-line drift shape a call-window regex missed
- DC-087-ALLOW-RAW-FETCH comment escape hatch (raw-text marker, guard file
  never self-exempts, skips logged to jest output)

Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read via delegate_task deleg_4d384dea (round 1 C -> round 2
B, zero blockers, polish folded). Verdict URN: urn:ump:azrv2xp72koiwi5r4yb6ureu4aqqloqq64sgmftsajh6ci2mzj2q
Mutation probes: historical drift reintroduction -> guard red; hatch marker ->
skipped+logged; restore -> 33/33. Full suite 2603/2603.
2026-08-22 15:14:25 -07:00
7 changed files with 327 additions and 16 deletions
+46 -1
View File
@@ -237,4 +237,49 @@ describe('DC-085: link-first admin invites', () => {
.send({ email: 'a@x.com', ttlHours: 1 });
expect(res.body.shareText).toContain('expires in 1h');
});
});
test('DC-089: SMTP-unconfigured warn log masks the invite email (no raw PII)', async () => {
mockEmailSender.isConfigured.mockReturnValueOnce(false);
const res = await request(app)
.post('/api/v1/auth/admin/invites')
.send({ email: 'friend@example.com', role: 'operator', sendEmail: true });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.deliveredVia).toBe('failed');
const warn = logCalls.find(c =>
c.level === 'warn' && c.topic === 'auth-invite-send'
);
expect(warn).toBeDefined();
// The raw address must not appear; the masked form must.
expect(JSON.stringify(warn.meta)).not.toContain('friend@example.com');
expect(warn.meta.email).toBe('fr****@example.com');
});
test('DC-089: invite-accepted info log masks the created user email (no raw PII)', async () => {
// Pre-authorize the email (POST /admin/users) so userStore.login doesn't
// reject with not_authorized — bootstrap already happened in beforeEach.
const preauth = await request(app)
.post('/api/v1/auth/admin/users')
.send({ email: 'newfriend@example.com' });
expect(preauth.status).toBe(200);
const issue = await request(app)
.post('/api/v1/auth/admin/invites')
.send({ email: 'newfriend@example.com', role: 'viewer' });
expect(issue.status).toBe(200);
const token = issue.body.acceptUrl.match(/invites\/([^/]+)\/accept/)[1];
const res = await request(app)
.post(`/api/v1/auth/invites/${token}/accept`)
.send({});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const info = logCalls.find(c =>
c.level === 'info' && c.msg === 'invite accepted, user created'
);
expect(info).toBeDefined();
expect(JSON.stringify(info.meta)).not.toContain('newfriend@example.com');
expect(info.meta.email).toBe('ne****@example.com');
});
});
@@ -591,6 +591,113 @@ describe('HealthChecker', () => {
});
});
describe('DC-088: removeService generation tombstones + incident closure', () => {
it('does not leak a serviceGenerations entry and records a tombstone', () => {
healthChecker.configureService('svc1', { url: 'http://test.local' });
expect(healthChecker.serviceGenerations.has('svc1')).toBe(true);
healthChecker.removeService('svc1');
expect(healthChecker.serviceGenerations.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
const tomb = healthChecker.removedGenerations.get('svc1');
expect(tomb).toBeDefined();
expect(tomb.generation).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(tomb.removedAt).toBeGreaterThan(0);
});
it('re-added service gets a strictly higher generation (no ABA)', () => {
healthChecker.configureService('svc1', { url: 'http://test.local' });
const gen1 = healthChecker.serviceGenerations.get('svc1');
healthChecker.removeService('svc1');
healthChecker.configureService('svc1', { url: 'http://test.local/v2' });
const gen2 = healthChecker.serviceGenerations.get('svc1');
expect(gen2).toBeGreaterThan(gen1);
expect(healthChecker.removedGenerations.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
});
it('closes open incidents for the removed service as resolved', () => {
healthChecker.saveConfig = jest.fn();
healthChecker.incidents.push({
id: 'incident-test-1',
serviceId: 'svc1',
type: 'outage',
status: 'open',
createdAt: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000).toISOString()
});
healthChecker.incidents.push({
id: 'incident-other',
serviceId: 'svc2',
type: 'outage',
status: 'open',
createdAt: new Date(Date.now() - 60_000).toISOString()
});
const resolvedSpy = jest.fn();
healthChecker.on('incident-resolved', resolvedSpy);
healthChecker.removeService('svc1');
const closed = healthChecker.incidents.find(i => i.id === 'incident-test-1');
expect(closed.status).toBe('resolved');
expect(closed.resolvedBy).toBe('service-removed');
expect(closed.resolvedAt).toBeDefined();
expect(closed.duration).toBeGreaterThan(0);
expect(healthChecker.incidents.find(i => i.id === 'incident-other').status).toBe('open');
expect(resolvedSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
});
it('in-flight probe captured before removal is discarded via tombstone', async () => {
let resolveProbe;
healthChecker.config.services.svc1 = { url: 'http://test.local' };
healthChecker._doRequest = jest.fn(() => new Promise(resolve => {
resolveProbe = resolve;
}));
const pending = healthChecker.checkService('svc1', healthChecker.config.services.svc1);
healthChecker.saveConfig = jest.fn();
healthChecker.removeService('svc1');
resolveProbe({ healthy: true, statusCode: 200, message: 'late', details: {} });
await pending;
expect(healthChecker.currentStatus.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
expect(healthChecker.consecutiveFailures.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
});
it('a rejected in-flight probe after removal does not re-create failure state', async () => {
let rejectProbe;
healthChecker.config.services.svc1 = { url: 'http://test.local' };
healthChecker._doRequest = jest.fn(() => new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
rejectProbe = reject;
}));
const pending = healthChecker.checkService('svc1', healthChecker.config.services.svc1);
healthChecker.saveConfig = jest.fn();
healthChecker.removeService('svc1');
rejectProbe(new Error('late failure'));
await pending;
expect(healthChecker.consecutiveFailures.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
expect(healthChecker.currentStatus.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
});
it('sweeps expired tombstones in cleanupHistory', () => {
healthChecker.removedGenerations.set('svc1', {
generation: 1,
removedAt: Date.now() - 60 * 60 * 1000 // 1h ago, TTL default 10m
});
healthChecker.removedGenerations.set('svc2', {
generation: 2,
removedAt: Date.now() // fresh
});
healthChecker.cleanupHistory();
expect(healthChecker.removedGenerations.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
expect(healthChecker.removedGenerations.has('svc2')).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('cleanupHistory', () => {
it('removes entries older than retention period', () => {
const old = new Date(Date.now() - 35 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000).toISOString(); // 35 days ago
@@ -26,6 +26,19 @@ jest.mock('dockerode', () => {
function buildApp({ configOk = true, servicesOk = true, dockerOk = true, caddyOk = true } = {}) {
process.env.MOCK_DOCKER_DOWN = dockerOk ? '0' : '1';
// DC-087 — mirror src/app.js faithfully: the caddy check goes through
// fetchT (which injects the Origin header Caddy's enforce_origin allowlist
// requires), and is MOCKED so the suite is hermetic — no live request to a
// real Caddy admin on :2019. The previous raw-`fetch` mirror sent an
// Origin-less probe to the LIVE admin whenever the full suite ran on the
// prod host (adversarial cron every 30 min): 12 journal 403 lines per run,
// ~700/day of `client is not allowed to access from origin ''` noise,
// plus a false checks.caddy.ok=false in the mirrored readiness payload.
const fetchT = jest.spyOn(require('../src/utils/http'), 'fetchT')
.mockImplementation(async () => (caddyOk
? { ok: true, status: 200 }
: { ok: false, status: 403 }));
const app = express();
const config = {
CONFIG_FILE: '/tmp/dc-test-config.json',
@@ -103,9 +116,13 @@ function buildApp({ configOk = true, servicesOk = true, dockerOk = true, caddyOk
allOk = false;
}
// DC-087 — mirror src/app.js exactly (fetchT, not raw fetch). fetchT is
// mocked at buildApp() scope, so this stays hermetic: no live probe to a
// real Caddy admin (the old raw-fetch mirror 403-spammed the prod journal
// every time the adversarial cron ran the full suite on this host).
try {
const caddyUrl = config.CADDY_ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:2019';
const response = await fetch(`${caddyUrl}/config/apps/http/servers/srv0/listen`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000) });
const response = await fetchT(`${caddyUrl}/config/apps/http/servers/srv0/listen`, {}, 10000);
checks.caddy = { ok: response.ok, status: response.status };
if (!response.ok) allOk = false;
} catch (e) {
@@ -33,9 +33,18 @@ jest.mock('dockerode', () => {
// Mirror the canonical handler block from src/app.js — if this drifts from
// the real handler, these tests will start failing and force a sync.
function buildApp({ configOk = true, servicesOk = true, dockerOk = true } = {}) {
function buildApp({ configOk = true, servicesOk = true, dockerOk = true, caddyOk = true } = {}) {
process.env.MOCK_DOCKER_DOWN = dockerOk ? '0' : '1';
// DC-087 — mirror src/app.js: caddy check via fetchT (Origin-injecting),
// mocked here so the suite is hermetic. The old raw-fetch mirror probed the
// LIVE Caddy admin on :2019 whenever the full suite ran on the prod host
// (adversarial cron): Origin-less → 403 → 12 journal error lines per run.
const fetchT = jest.spyOn(require('../src/utils/http'), 'fetchT')
.mockImplementation(async () => (caddyOk
? { ok: true, status: 200 }
: { ok: false, status: 403 }));
const app = express();
const config = {
CONFIG_FILE: '/tmp/dc-test-config.json',
@@ -108,8 +117,10 @@ function buildApp({ configOk = true, servicesOk = true, dockerOk = true } = {})
allOk = false;
}
try {
// DC-087 — mirror src/app.js exactly: fetchT (mocked above), not raw
// fetch. Hermetic: no live request to a real Caddy admin.
const caddyUrl = config.CADDY_ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:2019';
const response = await fetch(`${caddyUrl}/config/apps/http/servers/srv0/listen`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000) });
const response = await fetchT(`${caddyUrl}/config/apps/http/servers/srv0/listen`, {}, 10000);
checks.caddy = { ok: response.ok, status: response.status };
if (!response.ok) allOk = false;
} catch (e) {
@@ -118,6 +118,67 @@ describe('Caddyfile + utils/http.js — Origin header construction (DC-051)', ()
expect(offenders).toEqual([]);
});
test('all :2019 call sites in TESTS use fetchT or a mocked fetchT (not raw fetch)', () => {
// DC-087 — the same rule, extended into __tests__. The api-code walk above
// skips __tests__, which let two mirrored health-handler test files keep a
// raw await-fetch caddy probe long after src/app.js moved to fetchT. On a
// host where the suite runs alongside a live Caddy admin (the prod box
// runs the full jest suite every 30 min via a cron adversarial check),
// that Origin-less raw fetch 403-spammed the Caddy journal (~700
// client-not-allowed error lines per day) while the tests still passed —
// checks.caddy.ok=false was silently accepted as sandbox noise. Mirrors
// MUST call fetchT (mocked at buildApp scope for hermeticity). A raw
// await-fetch at a Caddy-admin-URL call site in a test is an offender.
// NOTE: keep this comment free of backticks — stripComments pairs
// backtick spans across lines, and a stray pair shields real code from
// the comment stripper (this test self-flagged its first draft).
//
// Detection is deliberately FILE-LEVEL, not call-window: the historical
// drift kept the fetch call itself token-free (the URL came from a
// caddyUrl variable defined on a PREVIOUS line from CADDY_ADMIN_URL),
// so a call-window regex never fired. Any raw await-fetch in a file
// that also references the Caddy admin anywhere is an offender.
// Escape hatch for future tests that intentionally assert Origin-less
// 403 behavior against their own local listener: put the marker
// DC-087-ALLOW-RAW-FETCH in the file and it is skipped.
const testsRoot = path.join(__dirname);
const offenders = [];
const skipped = [];
function walk(dir) {
for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
if (entry.name === 'node_modules') continue;
const p = path.join(dir, entry.name);
if (entry.isDirectory()) walk(p);
else if (entry.name.endsWith('.js')) {
const rawText = fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8');
// Escape hatch (checked on RAW text so a comment marker works —
// comments are stripped below): a file carrying the
// DC-087-ALLOW-RAW-FETCH marker declares it intentionally
// raw-fetches the Caddy admin (e.g. asserting Origin-less 403
// against its own local listener). The guard file itself is
// always scanned (never skipped) so the hatch can't be used to
// blind this very test.
if (p !== __filename && /DC-087-ALLOW-RAW-FETCH/.test(rawText)) {
skipped.push(p);
continue;
}
const text = stripComments(rawText);
const hasAdminToken = /:2019|adminUrl|admin_api_url|CADDY_ADMIN/.test(text);
const hasRawAwaitFetch = /await\s+fetch\(/.test(text);
if (hasAdminToken && hasRawAwaitFetch) {
offenders.push(`${p}: raw await-fetch in a file referencing the Caddy admin (mock fetchT instead; documented escape-hatch marker available for intentional 403 tests)`);
}
}
}
}
walk(testsRoot);
if (skipped.length) {
// Visibility for hatch use — shows up in jest output for reviewers.
console.info('[DC-087 guard] escape-hatch skipped:', skipped.join(', '));
}
expect(offenders).toEqual([]);
});
test('readiness handler in src/app.js probes the exact URL the watcher needs', () => {
const raw = fs.readFileSync(
path.join(__dirname, '../src/app.js'),
@@ -127,9 +188,9 @@ describe('Caddyfile + utils/http.js — Origin header construction (DC-051)', ()
expect(raw).toMatch(/\/config\/apps\/http\/servers\/srv0\/listen/);
// Goes through fetchT, NOT bare fetch — that's how the Origin injection
// takes effect. Look at the 800 chars BEFORE the probe URL on the same
// line / call site — the call must be `fetchT(...)`, not `await fetch(...)`.
// (We look backward because the URL sits inside the call's argument list,
// so the call site comes before the URL token.)
// line / call site — the call must be fetchT(...), never a raw await of
// the global fetch. (We look backward because the URL sits inside the
// call's argument list, so the call site comes before the URL token.)
const idx = raw.indexOf('srv0/listen');
const around = raw.substr(Math.max(0, idx - 400), 800);
expect(around).toMatch(/fetchT\(/);
+3 -2
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ const platformPaths = require('../../platform-paths');
const { createUserStore } = require('../../src/security/user-store');
const { createInviteStore } = require('../../src/security/invite-store');
const emailSender = require('../../src/auth/providers/email-sender');
const AuthProvider = require('../../src/auth/providers/base');
const { ValidationError, NotFoundError, ForbiddenError, PaymentRequiredError } = require('../../src/utilities/errors');
const { ok, successMessage } = require('../../src/utils/responses');
@@ -254,7 +255,7 @@ module.exports = function({ asyncHandler, errorResponse, log, session, dataDir }
// server log on every unconfigured-install invite.
log.warn && log.warn('auth-invite-send',
'invite send skipped: SMTP not configured (operator opted in)',
{ inviteId: issued.id, email: issued.email });
{ inviteId: issued.id, email: AuthProvider.maskEmail(issued.email) || '[unmaskable-email]' });
deliveredVia = 'failed';
}
} catch (sendErr) {
@@ -369,7 +370,7 @@ module.exports = function({ asyncHandler, errorResponse, log, session, dataDir }
log.info && log.info('auth', 'invite accepted, user created', {
userId: userResult.user.id,
email: userResult.user.email,
email: AuthProvider.maskEmail(userResult.user.email) || '[unmaskable-email]',
role: userResult.user.role,
inviteId: invite.id,
});
+76 -7
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ const CHECK_INTERVAL = parseInt(process.env.HEALTH_CHECK_INTERVAL || '30000', 10
const MAX_CHECK_INTERVAL = parseInt(process.env.HEALTH_CHECK_MAX_INTERVAL || '300000', 10); // 5 minutes max backoff
const MAX_ENTRIES_PER_SERVICE = parseInt(process.env.HEALTH_MAX_ENTRIES || '500', 10); // Cap to prevent disk explosion
const HISTORY_RETENTION_DAYS = parseInt(process.env.HEALTH_HISTORY_RETENTION || '30', 10);
// DC-088: how long a removal tombstone outlives the removal itself. Only needs
// to cover the max in-flight probe lifetime (timeout + scheduling headroom);
// swept by cleanupHistory so removed services cannot accumulate map entries.
const REMOVED_GENERATION_TTL_MS = parseInt(process.env.HEALTH_REMOVED_GEN_TTL || '600000', 10);
// DC-086: hysteresis thresholds for badge display.
// The raw probe result can flap on a single transient blip (Caddy reload,
@@ -72,6 +76,14 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
this.serviceTimers = new Map(); // serviceId -> timer for per-service backoff
// Invalidate probe completions that race with removal/reconfiguration.
this.serviceGenerations = new Map(); // serviceId -> configuration generation
// DC-088: monotonically increasing sequence so generation numbers can never
// repeat across remove -> re-add cycles (prevents ABA on the stale check).
this.generationSeq = 0;
// DC-088: serviceId -> { generation, removedAt } tombstones. A live entry in
// serviceGenerations means the service is (re)configured; a tombstone with a
// HIGHER generation than the captured one marks the capture as stale. Entry
// is deleted when the service is removed, so the live map cannot leak.
this.removedGenerations = new Map();
}
/**
@@ -139,6 +151,21 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
this.cleanupHistory();
}
/**
* DC-088: true when a probe's captured generation no longer matches the
* service's current configuration state. A live serviceGenerations entry
* must match exactly. With no live entry the service was never configured
* in this process (disk-loaded / direct callers) — stale only if a removal
* tombstone with a HIGHER generation exists.
*/
_isStaleCapture(serviceId, generation) {
if (this.serviceGenerations.has(serviceId)) {
return this.serviceGenerations.get(serviceId) !== generation;
}
const tomb = this.removedGenerations.get(serviceId);
return Boolean(tomb && tomb.generation > generation);
}
/**
* Check a single service
*/
@@ -160,7 +187,7 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
details: result.details
};
if ((this.serviceGenerations.get(serviceId) || 0) !== generation) {
if (this._isStaleCapture(serviceId, generation)) {
return status;
}
@@ -179,9 +206,6 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
} catch (error) {
const responseTime = Date.now() - startTime;
// Increment failure count for backoff
this.consecutiveFailures.set(serviceId, (this.consecutiveFailures.get(serviceId) || 0) + 1);
const status = {
serviceId,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
@@ -190,10 +214,14 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
error: error.message
};
if ((this.serviceGenerations.get(serviceId) || 0) !== generation) {
if (this._isStaleCapture(serviceId, generation)) {
return status;
}
// Increment failure count for backoff — only after the result is known
// to be non-stale, so a removed service cannot re-create map entries.
this.consecutiveFailures.set(serviceId, (this.consecutiveFailures.get(serviceId) || 0) + 1);
const previousStatus = this.currentStatus.get(serviceId);
this.recordStatus(serviceId, status);
this.checkForIncidents(serviceId, status, config, previousStatus);
@@ -660,7 +688,13 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
this.config.services = {};
}
this.serviceGenerations.set(serviceId, (this.serviceGenerations.get(serviceId) || 0) + 1);
// DC-088: monotonic instance-wide sequence — a re-added service can never
// recycle a previous generation number, and any older in-flight capture is
// invalidated by definition.
this.generationSeq += 1;
this.serviceGenerations.set(serviceId, this.generationSeq);
// Re-configuration supersedes any prior removal tombstone.
this.removedGenerations.delete(serviceId);
this.config.services[serviceId] = {
enabled: config.enabled !== false,
name: config.name || serviceId,
@@ -683,12 +717,35 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
* Remove service configuration
*/
removeService(serviceId) {
this.serviceGenerations.set(serviceId, (this.serviceGenerations.get(serviceId) || 0) + 1);
// DC-088: tombstone the captured generation instead of leaking an entry.
// The live map entry is deleted; an in-flight probe captured BEFORE this
// point sees no live entry but a higher tombstone generation, so it is
// discarded. configureService clears the tombstone on re-add.
this.generationSeq += 1;
this.serviceGenerations.delete(serviceId);
this.removedGenerations.set(serviceId, {
generation: this.generationSeq,
removedAt: Date.now()
});
if (this.config.services) {
delete this.config.services[serviceId];
this.saveConfig();
}
// DC-088: open incidents for a removed service must not linger forever.
// Close them through the same resolve path a recovery would, annotated so
// history shows why (dashboard renders resolved incidents green + duration).
for (const incident of this.incidents) {
if (incident.serviceId === serviceId && incident.status === 'open') {
incident.status = 'resolved';
incident.resolvedAt = new Date().toISOString();
incident.duration = new Date(incident.resolvedAt) - new Date(incident.createdAt);
incident.resolvedBy = 'service-removed';
this.emit('incident-resolved', incident);
this.emit('log', 'info', `Incident closed by service removal: ${incident.id}`);
}
}
this.currentStatus.delete(serviceId);
this.displayedStatus.delete(serviceId);
this.consecutiveSinceChange.delete(serviceId);
@@ -714,6 +771,18 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
this.history[serviceId] = this.history[serviceId].slice(-MAX_ENTRIES_PER_SERVICE);
}
}
// DC-088: sweep expired removal tombstones. After the TTL no probe that
// captured a pre-removal generation can still be in flight (timeout is
// bounded by performHealthCheck), so the tombstone has done its job.
if (this.removedGenerations.size > 0) {
const now = Date.now();
for (const [serviceId, tomb] of this.removedGenerations) {
if (now - tomb.removedAt > REMOVED_GENERATION_TTL_MS) {
this.removedGenerations.delete(serviceId);
}
}
}
}
/**