test(api): DC-087 hermetic caddy-admin health mirrors + file-level raw-fetch guard [glm-grade=B]

Two mirrored health-handler test suites (health-endpoints, health-probe-aliases) probed the Caddy admin API with raw Origin-less native fetch. On the prod host the adversarial cron runs the full jest suite every 30 min against a live Caddy admin with enforce_origin: 12 journal 403 lines per run (~700/day of 'client is not allowed to access from origin' spam) while tests stayed green. - Mirrors now call fetchT (byte-identical to src/app.js:930 probe) with fetchT jest.spyOn-mocked at buildApp scope; caddyOk-configurable in both suites - New guard test in utils-http-caddy-admin-origin.test.js: any __tests__ file pairing a raw await-fetch with a Caddy-admin token (:2019|adminUrl| CADDY_ADMIN) fails the suite — file-level pairing catches the historical cross-line drift shape a call-window regex missed - DC-087-ALLOW-RAW-FETCH comment escape hatch (raw-text marker, guard file never self-exempts, skips logged to jest output) Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read via delegate_task deleg_4d384dea (round 1 C -> round 2 B, zero blockers, polish folded). Verdict URN: urn:ump:azrv2xp72koiwi5r4yb6ureu4aqqloqq64sgmftsajh6ci2mzj2q Mutation probes: historical drift reintroduction -> guard red; hatch marker -> skipped+logged; restore -> 33/33. Full suite 2603/2603.
[glm-grade=A] build(status): rebuild dist + sw — DC-085 link-first invite frontend bundle
2026-08-22 15:14:25 -07:00 · 2026-08-22 14:28:21 -07:00 · 2026-08-22 14:27:54 -07:00 · 2026-08-22 14:27:40 -07:00 · 2026-08-22 14:23:25 -07:00 · 2026-08-22 06:14:48 -07:00
30 changed files with 1403 additions and 254 deletions
@@ -22,11 +22,17 @@ process.env.HEALTH_DATA_DIR = tmpDir;
 process.env.HEALTH_CONFIG_FILE = path.join(tmpDir, 'health-config.json');
 process.env.HEALTH_HISTORY_FILE = path.join(tmpDir, 'health-history.json');

-const { HealthChecker } = require('../src/monitoring/health-checker');
 // Module exports a singleton instance, not a class — see module.exports in
 // src/monitoring/health-checker.js. The test creates fresh state by replacing
 // the relevant maps on the singleton in beforeEach.
 const healthCheckerSingleton = require('../src/monitoring/health-checker');
+const originalDownThreshold = process.env.HEALTH_DOWN_THRESHOLD;
+const originalUpThreshold = process.env.HEALTH_UP_THRESHOLD;
+
+function restoreEnv(name, value) {
+  if (value === undefined) delete process.env[name];
+  else process.env[name] = value;
+}

 function makeUp(serviceId = 'svc1') {
  return {
@@ -68,6 +74,15 @@ describe('DC-086: hysteresis on the dashboard badge', () => {
    hc = healthCheckerSingleton;
  });

+  afterEach(() => {
+    restoreEnv('HEALTH_DOWN_THRESHOLD', originalDownThreshold);
+    restoreEnv('HEALTH_UP_THRESHOLD', originalUpThreshold);
+  });
+
+  afterAll(() => {
+    fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
  test('first probe (no prior state) emits', () => {
    hc.recordStatus('svc1', makeUp());
    expect(emitSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
@@ -88,6 +103,19 @@ describe('DC-086: hysteresis on the dashboard badge', () => {
    expect(hc.displayedStatus.get('svc1').status).toBe('up');
  });

+  test('up, down, up, down, down resets the first streak before flipping', () => {
+    hc.recordStatus('svc1', makeUp());
+    hc.recordStatus('svc1', makeDown());
+    hc.recordStatus('svc1', makeUp());
+    hc.recordStatus('svc1', makeDown());
+    expect(hc.displayedStatus.get('svc1').status).toBe('up');
+    expect(emitSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
+    hc.recordStatus('svc1', makeDown());
+    expect(hc.displayedStatus.get('svc1').status).toBe('down');
+    expect(emitSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+
  test('two consecutive "down" probes flip the badge to red', () => {
    hc.recordStatus('svc1', makeUp());        // baseline: green
    hc.recordStatus('svc1', makeDown());      // blip #1 — keep green (counter=1)
@@ -120,10 +148,28 @@ describe('DC-086: hysteresis on the dashboard badge', () => {
  });

  test('getCurrentStatus returns the displayed status, not the raw probe', () => {
-    hc.recordStatus('svc1', makeUp());
-    hc.recordStatus('svc1', makeDown());      // raw=down, displayed=up
+    const displayedUp = makeUp();
+    displayedUp.timestamp = '2026-08-22T09:59:00.000Z';
+    displayedUp.statusCode = 200;
+    displayedUp.message = 'healthy';
+    displayedUp.details = { source: 'accepted-up' };
+    hc.recordStatus('svc1', displayedUp);
+    const latestRaw = makeDown();
+    latestRaw.timestamp = '2026-08-22T10:00:00.000Z';
+    latestRaw.responseTime = 987;
+    latestRaw.statusCode = 500;
+    latestRaw.message = 'failed probe';
+    latestRaw.error = 'upstream failure';
+    latestRaw.details = { source: 'suppressed-down' };
+    hc.recordStatus('svc1', latestRaw);       // raw=down, displayed=up
    const out = hc.getCurrentStatus();
    expect(out['svc1'].status).toBe('up');    // shown to API consumers
+    expect(out['svc1'].timestamp).toBe(displayedUp.timestamp);
+    expect(out['svc1'].statusCode).toBe(200);
+    expect(out['svc1'].message).toBe('healthy');
+    expect(out['svc1'].error).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(out['svc1'].details).toEqual({ source: 'accepted-up' });
+    expect(hc.currentStatus.get('svc1')).toBe(latestRaw);
  });

  test('a long steady-green run produces exactly ONE emit (no per-probe spam)', () => {
@@ -142,7 +188,6 @@ describe('DC-086: hysteresis on the dashboard badge', () => {
  });

  test('DOWN_THRESHOLD env var is honored', () => {
-    const origDown = process.env.HEALTH_DOWN_THRESHOLD;
    process.env.HEALTH_DOWN_THRESHOLD = '3';
    jest.resetModules();
    const HC2Module = require('../src/monitoring/health-checker');
@@ -164,7 +209,89 @@ describe('DC-086: hysteresis on the dashboard badge', () => {
    hc2.recordStatus('svc1', makeDown());      // 3 — flip
    expect(spy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
    expect(hc2.displayedStatus.get('svc1').status).toBe('down');
-    if (origDown === undefined) delete process.env.HEALTH_DOWN_THRESHOLD;
-    else process.env.HEALTH_DOWN_THRESHOLD = origDown;
  });
-});
+
+  test.each(['not-a-number', '0', '-2', '1.5'])('malformed DOWN_THRESHOLD %s falls back to 2', value => {
+    process.env.HEALTH_DOWN_THRESHOLD = value;
+    jest.resetModules();
+    const hc2 = require('../src/monitoring/health-checker');
+    hc2.displayedStatus = new Map();
+    hc2.consecutiveSinceChange = new Map();
+    hc2.currentStatus = new Map();
+    hc2.history = {};
+    hc2.removeAllListeners('status-check');
+    const spy = jest.fn();
+    hc2.on('status-check', spy);
+    hc2.recordStatus('svc1', makeUp());
+    hc2.recordStatus('svc1', makeDown());
+    expect(spy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    hc2.recordStatus('svc1', makeDown());
+    expect(spy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+  });
+
+  test('UP_THRESHOLD env var greater than 1 is honored', () => {
+    process.env.HEALTH_UP_THRESHOLD = '2';
+    jest.resetModules();
+    const hc2 = require('../src/monitoring/health-checker');
+    hc2.displayedStatus = new Map();
+    hc2.consecutiveSinceChange = new Map();
+    hc2.currentStatus = new Map();
+    hc2.history = {};
+    hc2.removeAllListeners('status-check');
+    const spy = jest.fn();
+    hc2.on('status-check', spy);
+    hc2.recordStatus('svc1', makeDown());
+    hc2.recordStatus('svc1', makeUp());
+    expect(spy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(hc2.displayedStatus.get('svc1').status).toBe('down');
+    hc2.recordStatus('svc1', makeUp());
+    expect(spy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    expect(hc2.displayedStatus.get('svc1').status).toBe('up');
+  });
+
+  test.each(['not-a-number', '0', '-2', '1.5'])('malformed UP_THRESHOLD %s falls back to 1', value => {
+    process.env.HEALTH_UP_THRESHOLD = value;
+    jest.resetModules();
+    const hc2 = require('../src/monitoring/health-checker');
+    hc2.displayedStatus = new Map();
+    hc2.consecutiveSinceChange = new Map();
+    hc2.currentStatus = new Map();
+    hc2.history = {};
+    hc2.removeAllListeners('status-check');
+    const spy = jest.fn();
+    hc2.on('status-check', spy);
+    hc2.recordStatus('svc1', makeDown());
+    hc2.recordStatus('svc1', makeUp());
+    expect(spy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
+    expect(hc2.displayedStatus.get('svc1').status).toBe('up');
+  });
+
+  test('removeService clears hysteresis state before the same ID is re-added', () => {
+    hc.config.services.svc1 = { name: 'Service 1' };
+    hc.recordStatus('svc1', makeUp());
+    hc.recordStatus('svc1', makeDown());
+    expect(hc.displayedStatus.has('svc1')).toBe(true);
+    expect(hc.consecutiveSinceChange.get('svc1')).toBe(1);
+    hc.consecutiveFailures.set('svc1', 3);
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => {}, 60_000);
+    hc.serviceTimers.set('svc1', timer);
+
+    hc.saveConfig = jest.fn();
+    hc.removeService('svc1');
+
+    expect(hc.displayedStatus.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
+    expect(hc.consecutiveSinceChange.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
+    expect(hc.currentStatus.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
+    expect(hc.consecutiveFailures.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
+    expect(hc.serviceTimers.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
+
+    hc.config.services.svc1 = { name: 'Service 1 re-added' };
+    const emitSpyAfterReAdd = jest.fn();
+    hc.on('status-check', emitSpyAfterReAdd);
+    hc.recordStatus('svc1', makeDown());
+
+    expect(emitSpyAfterReAdd).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(hc.displayedStatus.get('svc1').status).toBe('down');
+    expect(hc.consecutiveSinceChange.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
@@ -203,6 +203,48 @@ describe('HealthChecker', () => {
      expect(result.error).toBe('ECONNREFUSED');
    });

+    it('opens and resolves an outage incident across real checkService transitions', async () => {
+      healthChecker._doRequest = jest.fn()
+        .mockResolvedValueOnce({ healthy: true, statusCode: 200, message: 'ok', details: {} })
+        .mockResolvedValueOnce({ healthy: false, statusCode: 500, message: 'down', details: {} })
+        .mockResolvedValueOnce({ healthy: true, statusCode: 200, message: 'ok', details: {} });
+
+      const config = { url: 'http://test.local' };
+      await healthChecker.checkService('svc1', config);
+      await healthChecker.checkService('svc1', config);
+
+      expect(healthChecker.incidents).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(healthChecker.incidents[0]).toMatchObject({
+        serviceId: 'svc1',
+        type: 'outage',
+        status: 'open'
+      });
+
+      await healthChecker.checkService('svc1', config);
+      expect(healthChecker.incidents[0].status).toBe('resolved');
+      expect(healthChecker.incidents[0].resolvedAt).toBeDefined();
+    });
+
+    it('does not resurrect state when an in-flight probe resolves after removal', async () => {
+      let resolveProbe;
+      healthChecker.config.services.svc1 = { url: 'http://test.local' };
+      healthChecker._doRequest = jest.fn(() => new Promise(resolve => {
+        resolveProbe = resolve;
+      }));
+
+      const pending = healthChecker.checkService('svc1', healthChecker.config.services.svc1);
+      healthChecker.saveConfig = jest.fn();
+      healthChecker.removeService('svc1');
+      resolveProbe({ healthy: true, statusCode: 200, message: 'late', details: {} });
+      await pending;
+
+      expect(healthChecker.currentStatus.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
+      expect(healthChecker.displayedStatus.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
+      expect(healthChecker.consecutiveFailures.has('svc1')).toBe(false);
+      expect(healthChecker.history.svc1).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(healthChecker.incidents).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
    it('increments consecutive failures on error', async () => {
      healthChecker._doRequest = jest.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('fail'));

@@ -26,6 +26,19 @@ jest.mock('dockerode', () => {
 function buildApp({ configOk = true, servicesOk = true, dockerOk = true, caddyOk = true } = {}) {
  process.env.MOCK_DOCKER_DOWN = dockerOk ? '0' : '1';

+  // DC-087 — mirror src/app.js faithfully: the caddy check goes through
+  // fetchT (which injects the Origin header Caddy's enforce_origin allowlist
+  // requires), and is MOCKED so the suite is hermetic — no live request to a
+  // real Caddy admin on :2019. The previous raw-`fetch` mirror sent an
+  // Origin-less probe to the LIVE admin whenever the full suite ran on the
+  // prod host (adversarial cron every 30 min): 12 journal 403 lines per run,
+  // ~700/day of `client is not allowed to access from origin ''` noise,
+  // plus a false checks.caddy.ok=false in the mirrored readiness payload.
+  const fetchT = jest.spyOn(require('../src/utils/http'), 'fetchT')
+    .mockImplementation(async () => (caddyOk
+      ? { ok: true, status: 200 }
+      : { ok: false, status: 403 }));
+
  const app = express();
  const config = {
    CONFIG_FILE: '/tmp/dc-test-config.json',
@@ -103,9 +116,13 @@ function buildApp({ configOk = true, servicesOk = true, dockerOk = true, caddyOk
      allOk = false;
    }

+    // DC-087 — mirror src/app.js exactly (fetchT, not raw fetch). fetchT is
+    // mocked at buildApp() scope, so this stays hermetic: no live probe to a
+    // real Caddy admin (the old raw-fetch mirror 403-spammed the prod journal
+    // every time the adversarial cron ran the full suite on this host).
    try {
      const caddyUrl = config.CADDY_ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:2019';
-      const response = await fetch(`${caddyUrl}/config/apps/http/servers/srv0/listen`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000) });
+      const response = await fetchT(`${caddyUrl}/config/apps/http/servers/srv0/listen`, {}, 10000);
      checks.caddy = { ok: response.ok, status: response.status };
      if (!response.ok) allOk = false;
    } catch (e) {
@@ -33,9 +33,18 @@ jest.mock('dockerode', () => {

 // Mirror the canonical handler block from src/app.js — if this drifts from
 // the real handler, these tests will start failing and force a sync.
-function buildApp({ configOk = true, servicesOk = true, dockerOk = true } = {}) {
+function buildApp({ configOk = true, servicesOk = true, dockerOk = true, caddyOk = true } = {}) {
  process.env.MOCK_DOCKER_DOWN = dockerOk ? '0' : '1';

+  // DC-087 — mirror src/app.js: caddy check via fetchT (Origin-injecting),
+  // mocked here so the suite is hermetic. The old raw-fetch mirror probed the
+  // LIVE Caddy admin on :2019 whenever the full suite ran on the prod host
+  // (adversarial cron): Origin-less → 403 → 12 journal error lines per run.
+  const fetchT = jest.spyOn(require('../src/utils/http'), 'fetchT')
+    .mockImplementation(async () => (caddyOk
+      ? { ok: true, status: 200 }
+      : { ok: false, status: 403 }));
+
  const app = express();
  const config = {
    CONFIG_FILE: '/tmp/dc-test-config.json',
@@ -108,8 +117,10 @@ function buildApp({ configOk = true, servicesOk = true, dockerOk = true } = {})
      allOk = false;
    }
    try {
+      // DC-087 — mirror src/app.js exactly: fetchT (mocked above), not raw
+      // fetch. Hermetic: no live request to a real Caddy admin.
      const caddyUrl = config.CADDY_ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:2019';
-      const response = await fetch(`${caddyUrl}/config/apps/http/servers/srv0/listen`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10000) });
+      const response = await fetchT(`${caddyUrl}/config/apps/http/servers/srv0/listen`, {}, 10000);
      checks.caddy = { ok: response.ok, status: response.status };
      if (!response.ok) allOk = false;
    } catch (e) {
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ function createApp(depsOverride = {}) {
    errorResponse: jest.fn(),
    log,
    renewCSRFToken,
+    siteConfig: { tld: '.sami', dashboardHost: 'status.sami' },
    ...depsOverride,
  };

@@ -299,7 +300,7 @@ describe('TOTP Auth Routes — DC-006 Integration Test', () => {
    it('returns 200 + creates new session + rotates CSRF on valid code (BACKLOG: "valid TOTP → session token → authenticated request succeeds")', async () => {
      const secret = await setupTOTP();
      const token = authenticator.generate(secret);
-      const res = await request(app).post('/api/totp/verify').send({ code: token });
+      const res = await request(app).post('/api/totp/verify').send({ code: token, serviceId: 'plex' });
      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
      expect(res.body.success).toBe(true);
      expect(res.body.message).toMatch(/Authenticated successfully/);
@@ -308,8 +309,29 @@ describe('TOTP Auth Routes — DC-006 Integration Test', () => {
      expect(deps.session.create).toHaveBeenCalled();
      expect(deps.session.setCookie).toHaveBeenCalled();
      expect(deps.session.createHandoffToken).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+      expect(deps.session.createHandoffToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith('plex.sami');
      expect(deps.renewCSRFToken).toHaveBeenCalled();
    });
+
+    it('does not issue an unbound handoff token for a dashboard-only login', async () => {
+      const secret = await setupTOTP();
+      const token = authenticator.generate(secret);
+      const res = await request(app).post('/api/totp/verify').send({ code: token });
+
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.ssoToken).toBeNull();
+      expect(deps.session.createHandoffToken).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it('rejects an invalid handoff service ID before issuing a token', async () => {
+      const secret = await setupTOTP();
+      const token = authenticator.generate(secret);
+      const res = await request(app).post('/api/totp/verify').send({ code: token, serviceId: 'plex.sami' });
+
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(res.body.error).toMatch(/Invalid service ID/);
+      expect(deps.session.createHandoffToken).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
  });

  // ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -450,7 +472,7 @@ describe('TOTP Auth Routes — DC-006 Integration Test', () => {

      // 4. Re-login via /totp/verify (the "login" path)
      const loginCode = authenticator.generate(secret);
-      const loginRes = await request(app).post('/api/totp/verify').send({ code: loginCode });
+      const loginRes = await request(app).post('/api/totp/verify').send({ code: loginCode, serviceId: 'plex' });
      expect(loginRes.status).toBe(200);
      expect(loginRes.body.csrfToken).toBeDefined();
      expect(loginRes.body.ssoToken).toBe('mock-sso-handoff-token');
@@ -288,6 +288,21 @@ describe('Services Routes', () => {
      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
      expect(res.body.hasApiKey).toBe(true);
    });
+
+    it('requires both username and password before reporting Basic Auth ready', async () => {
+      const credentialManager = {
+        store: jest.fn(),
+        retrieve: jest.fn().mockImplementation((key) => {
+          if (key === 'service.radarr.username') return Promise.resolve('admin');
+          return Promise.resolve(null);
+        }),
+        delete: jest.fn(),
+      };
+      const { app } = createApp({ credentialManager });
+      const res = await request(app).get('/api/services/radarr/credentials');
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      expect(res.body.hasBasicAuth).toBe(false);
+    });
  });

  // ===== SEEDHOST CREDENTIAL ENDPOINTS =====
@@ -50,6 +50,17 @@ describe('TOTP session cookie scope', () => {
    expect(cookie).not.toMatch(/(?:^|;)\s*Domain=/i);
  });

+  test('host-bound SSO token can only be redeemed on its intended service host', () => {
+    const session = buildSession();
+    const wrongHostToken = session.createHandoffToken('plex.sami');
+    expect(session.redeemHandoffToken(wrongHostToken, 'chat.sami')).toBe(false);
+    expect(session.redeemHandoffToken(wrongHostToken, 'plex.sami')).toBe(false);
+
+    const correctHostToken = session.createHandoffToken('plex.sami');
+    expect(session.redeemHandoffToken(correctHostToken, 'plex.sami')).toBe(true);
+    expect(session.redeemHandoffToken(correctHostToken, 'plex.sami')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
  test('logout clears the host-only secure cookie', () => {
    const session = buildSession();
    const headers = {};
@@ -1,15 +1,29 @@
 const express = require('express');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const vm = require('vm');
 const request = require('supertest');
 const createSsoRouter = require('../routes/auth/sso-gate');

-function createApp({ redeem = true } = {}) {
+function loadCredentialVaultHandoff() {
+  const source = fs.readFileSync(
+    path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'status', 'js', 'credential-vault-handoff.js'),
+    'utf8',
+  );
+  const window = { location: { origin: 'https://status.sami' } };
+  vm.runInNewContext(source, { window, SITE: { tld: '.sami' }, URL });
+  return window.DCCredentialVault;
+}
+
+function createApp({ redeem = true, valid = true, storedCredentials = {}, dashboardHost = 'status.sami' } = {}) {
  const app = express();
  const session = {
-    redeemHandoffToken: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(redeem),
+    redeemHandoffToken: jest.fn((token) => (typeof redeem === 'function' ? redeem(token) : redeem)),
    setCookieHostOnly: jest.fn((res) => {
      res.setHeader('Set-Cookie', 'dashcaddy_session=test; Path=/; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax');
    }),
-    isValid: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(true),
+    isValid: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(valid),
+    createHandoffToken: jest.fn().mockReturnValue('fresh-sso-handoff-token'),
  };
  const asyncHandler = (fn) => (req, res, next) => Promise.resolve(fn(req, res, next)).catch(next);
  const errorResponse = (res, status, message, extra = {}) => res.status(status).json({ success: false, error: message, ...extra });
@@ -21,14 +35,15 @@ function createApp({ redeem = true } = {}) {
    log: { warn: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn() },
    getAppSession: jest.fn(),
    appSessionCache: new Map(),
-    credentialManager: { retrieve: jest.fn() },
+    credentialManager: { retrieve: jest.fn((key) => Promise.resolve(storedCredentials[key] || null)) },
    fetchT: jest.fn(),
-    getServiceById: jest.fn(),
+    getServiceById: jest.fn((id) => Promise.resolve({ id, url: `https://${id}.sami` })),
    licenseManager: {
      hasFeature: jest.fn().mockReturnValue(true),
      requirePremium: jest.fn(() => (_req, _res, next) => next()),
    },
    servicesStateManager: { read: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue([]) },
+    siteConfig: { dashboardHost },
  });
  app.use('/api/v1', router);
  return { app, session };
@@ -44,7 +59,7 @@ describe('cross-host SSO exchange redirect', () => {
    expect(res.status).toBe(303);
    expect(res.headers.location).toBe('/settings?tab=network#dns');
    expect(res.headers['set-cookie'][0]).not.toMatch(/Domain=/i);
-    expect(session.redeemHandoffToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith('one-time');
+    expect(session.redeemHandoffToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith('one-time', '127.0.0.1');
  });

  test.each([
@@ -82,3 +97,105 @@ describe('cross-host SSO exchange redirect', () => {
    expect(session.setCookieHostOnly).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
  });
 });
+
+describe('existing-session SSO handoff', () => {
+  test('mints a handoff token without asking for TOTP again', async () => {
+    const { app, session } = createApp();
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/v1/auth/sso-handoff?serviceId=plex')
+      .set('Cookie', 'dashcaddy_session=valid-session');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ success: true, ssoToken: 'fresh-sso-handoff-token' });
+    expect(session.createHandoffToken).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(session.createHandoffToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith('plex.sami');
+  });
+
+  test('refuses to mint a handoff token without a valid session', async () => {
+    const { app, session } = createApp({ valid: false });
+    const res = await request(app).get('/api/v1/auth/sso-handoff?serviceId=plex');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    expect(session.createHandoffToken).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  test('completes the full mint, exchange, cookie, redirect lifecycle', async () => {
+    const issued = new Set(['fresh-sso-handoff-token']);
+    const redeemOnce = (token) => issued.delete(token);
+    const { app } = createApp({ redeem: redeemOnce });
+
+    const mint = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/v1/auth/sso-handoff?serviceId=plex')
+      .set('Cookie', 'dashcaddy_session=valid-session');
+    const exchange = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/v1/auth/sso-exchange')
+      .query({ token: mint.body.ssoToken, return: '/web/' });
+
+    expect(exchange.status).toBe(303);
+    expect(exchange.headers.location).toBe('/web/');
+    expect(exchange.headers['set-cookie'][0]).toContain('dashcaddy_session=');
+    expect(exchange.headers['set-cookie'][0]).not.toMatch(/Domain=/i);
+
+    const replay = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/v1/auth/sso-exchange')
+      .query({ token: mint.body.ssoToken, return: '/web/' });
+    expect(replay.status).toBe(401);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('encrypted-vault credential onboarding', () => {
+  test('app-token identifies missing credentials as a form requirement', async () => {
+    const { app } = createApp();
+    const res = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/v1/auth/app-token/plex')
+      .set('Cookie', 'dashcaddy_session=valid-session');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(428);
+    expect(res.body).toMatchObject({
+      success: false,
+      credentialsRequired: true,
+      serviceId: 'plex',
+    });
+  });
+
+  test('service login page sends missing credentials to the encrypted vault form', async () => {
+    const { app } = createApp();
+    const res = await request(app).get('/api/v1/auth/login-page?service=plex');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.text).toContain("if(j.credentialsRequired){vault('plex');return}");
+    expect(res.text).toContain("dashboardOrigin+'?credentials='");
+  });
+
+  test('service login page derives the vault origin from trusted dashboard config', async () => {
+    const { app } = createApp({ dashboardHost: 'dashboard.home' });
+    const res = await request(app).get('/api/v1/auth/login-page?service=plex');
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.text).toContain('dashboardOrigin="https://dashboard.home"');
+  });
+
+  test('full vault-save handoff lifecycle reaches exchange, cookie, and final service path', async () => {
+    const issued = new Set(['fresh-sso-handoff-token']);
+    const { app } = createApp({ redeem: (token) => issued.delete(token) });
+    const mint = await request(app)
+      .get('/api/v1/auth/sso-handoff?serviceId=plex')
+      .set('Cookie', 'dashcaddy_session=valid-session');
+
+    const vault = loadCredentialVaultHandoff();
+    const target = new URL(vault.buildHandoffTarget(
+      'https://plex.sami/web/?direct=1#home',
+      mint.body.ssoToken,
+      'plex',
+    ));
+    // The shared Caddy snippet rewrites /dashcaddy-sso to the canonical API
+    // route while preserving the token and relative return query.
+    const exchange = await request(app).get('/api/v1/auth/sso-exchange' + target.search);
+
+    expect(target.pathname).toBe('/dashcaddy-sso');
+    expect(exchange.status).toBe(303);
+    expect(exchange.headers.location).toBe('/web/?direct=1#home');
+    expect(exchange.headers['set-cookie'][0]).toContain('dashcaddy_session=');
+    expect(exchange.headers['set-cookie'][0]).not.toMatch(/Domain=/i);
+  });
+});
@@ -118,6 +118,67 @@ describe('Caddyfile + utils/http.js — Origin header construction (DC-051)', ()
    expect(offenders).toEqual([]);
  });

+  test('all :2019 call sites in TESTS use fetchT or a mocked fetchT (not raw fetch)', () => {
+    // DC-087 — the same rule, extended into __tests__. The api-code walk above
+    // skips __tests__, which let two mirrored health-handler test files keep a
+    // raw await-fetch caddy probe long after src/app.js moved to fetchT. On a
+    // host where the suite runs alongside a live Caddy admin (the prod box
+    // runs the full jest suite every 30 min via a cron adversarial check),
+    // that Origin-less raw fetch 403-spammed the Caddy journal (~700
+    // client-not-allowed error lines per day) while the tests still passed —
+    // checks.caddy.ok=false was silently accepted as sandbox noise. Mirrors
+    // MUST call fetchT (mocked at buildApp scope for hermeticity). A raw
+    // await-fetch at a Caddy-admin-URL call site in a test is an offender.
+    // NOTE: keep this comment free of backticks — stripComments pairs
+    // backtick spans across lines, and a stray pair shields real code from
+    // the comment stripper (this test self-flagged its first draft).
+    //
+    // Detection is deliberately FILE-LEVEL, not call-window: the historical
+    // drift kept the fetch call itself token-free (the URL came from a
+    // caddyUrl variable defined on a PREVIOUS line from CADDY_ADMIN_URL),
+    // so a call-window regex never fired. Any raw await-fetch in a file
+    // that also references the Caddy admin anywhere is an offender.
+    // Escape hatch for future tests that intentionally assert Origin-less
+    // 403 behavior against their own local listener: put the marker
+    // DC-087-ALLOW-RAW-FETCH in the file and it is skipped.
+    const testsRoot = path.join(__dirname);
+    const offenders = [];
+    const skipped = [];
+    function walk(dir) {
+      for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
+        if (entry.name === 'node_modules') continue;
+        const p = path.join(dir, entry.name);
+        if (entry.isDirectory()) walk(p);
+        else if (entry.name.endsWith('.js')) {
+          const rawText = fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8');
+          // Escape hatch (checked on RAW text so a comment marker works —
+          // comments are stripped below): a file carrying the
+          // DC-087-ALLOW-RAW-FETCH marker declares it intentionally
+          // raw-fetches the Caddy admin (e.g. asserting Origin-less 403
+          // against its own local listener). The guard file itself is
+          // always scanned (never skipped) so the hatch can't be used to
+          // blind this very test.
+          if (p !== __filename && /DC-087-ALLOW-RAW-FETCH/.test(rawText)) {
+            skipped.push(p);
+            continue;
+          }
+          const text = stripComments(rawText);
+          const hasAdminToken = /:2019|adminUrl|admin_api_url|CADDY_ADMIN/.test(text);
+          const hasRawAwaitFetch = /await\s+fetch\(/.test(text);
+          if (hasAdminToken && hasRawAwaitFetch) {
+            offenders.push(`${p}: raw await-fetch in a file referencing the Caddy admin (mock fetchT instead; documented escape-hatch marker available for intentional 403 tests)`);
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    walk(testsRoot);
+    if (skipped.length) {
+      // Visibility for hatch use — shows up in jest output for reviewers.
+      console.info('[DC-087 guard] escape-hatch skipped:', skipped.join(', '));
+    }
+    expect(offenders).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
  test('readiness handler in src/app.js probes the exact URL the watcher needs', () => {
    const raw = fs.readFileSync(
      path.join(__dirname, '../src/app.js'),
@@ -127,9 +188,9 @@ describe('Caddyfile + utils/http.js — Origin header construction (DC-051)', ()
    expect(raw).toMatch(/\/config\/apps\/http\/servers\/srv0\/listen/);
    // Goes through fetchT, NOT bare fetch — that's how the Origin injection
    // takes effect. Look at the 800 chars BEFORE the probe URL on the same
-    // line / call site — the call must be `fetchT(...)`, not `await fetch(...)`.
-    // (We look backward because the URL sits inside the call's argument list,
-    // so the call site comes before the URL token.)
+    // line / call site — the call must be fetchT(...), never a raw await of
+    // the global fetch. (We look backward because the URL sits inside the
+    // call's argument list, so the call site comes before the URL token.)
    const idx = raw.indexOf('srv0/listen');
    const around = raw.substr(Math.max(0, idx - 400), 800);
    expect(around).toMatch(/fetchT\(/);
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ module.exports = function(deps) {
  const router = express.Router();

  // Extract dependencies
-  const { authManager, totpConfig, session, asyncHandler, errorResponse, log, getAppSession, appSessionCache, credentialManager, fetchT, getServiceById, licenseManager, servicesStateManager } = deps;
+  const { authManager, totpConfig, session, asyncHandler, errorResponse, log, getAppSession, appSessionCache, credentialManager, fetchT, getServiceById, licenseManager, servicesStateManager, siteConfig } = deps;

  // Create ctx-like object for compatibility
  const ctx = {
@@ -126,7 +126,12 @@ module.exports = function(deps) {
      try {
        const username = await ctx.credentialManager.retrieve(`service.${serviceId}.username`).catch(() => null);
        const password = await ctx.credentialManager.retrieve(`service.${serviceId}.password`).catch(() => null);
-        if (!username || !password) throw new NotFoundError('[DC-500] No credentials stored');
+        if (!username || !password) {
+          return errorResponse(res, 428, '[DC-500] No credentials stored', {
+            credentialsRequired: true,
+            serviceId,
+          });
+        }
        const service = await ctx.getServiceById(serviceId);
        const baseUrl = service?.url;
        if (!baseUrl) throw new NotFoundError('No service URL');
@@ -181,7 +186,12 @@ module.exports = function(deps) {
        password = await ctx.credentialManager.retrieve(`service.${serviceId}.password`).catch(() => null);
      }

-      if (!username || !password) throw new NotFoundError('[DC-500] No credentials stored');
+      if (!username || !password) {
+        return errorResponse(res, 428, '[DC-500] No credentials stored', {
+          credentialsRequired: true,
+          serviceId,
+        });
+      }

      const appCookies = await getAppSession(serviceId, baseUrl, username, password);
      if (appCookies) {
@@ -203,8 +213,28 @@ module.exports = function(deps) {
    }
  }, 'auth-app-token'));

+  // A browser that already has a valid status.sami session must not be asked
+  // for TOTP again just because it opened another private-TLD service host.
+  // Mint a fresh one-time token that the target host can exchange for its own
+  // host-only cookie. This route is intentionally session-protected both by
+  // the global middleware and here (defence in depth).
+  router.get('/auth/sso-handoff', (req, res) => {
+    res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
+    if (!session.isValid(req)) {
+      return errorResponse(res, 401, 'Session expired or invalid');
+    }
+    const serviceId = String(req.query.serviceId || '');
+    if (!/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/.test(serviceId)) {
+      return errorResponse(res, 400, 'Valid serviceId is required');
+    }
+    const suffix = String(siteConfig?.tld || '.sami');
+    const expectedHost = `${serviceId}${suffix.startsWith('.') ? suffix : `.${suffix}`}`;
+    ok(res, { ssoToken: session.createHandoffToken(expectedHost) });
+  });
+
  // Cross-subdomain SSO handoff: exchanges a short-lived single-use token
-  // (minted by /totp/verify) for a HOST-ONLY session cookie on whichever
+  // (minted by /totp/verify or /auth/sso-handoff) for a HOST-ONLY session
+  // cookie on whichever
  // *.sami origin calls this. Needed because Domain=.sami cookies are
  // silently rejected by real browsers (.sami is an unregistered TLD, so
  // browsers treat "sami" as the effective public suffix and refuse to set
@@ -215,7 +245,9 @@ module.exports = function(deps) {
  router.get('/auth/sso-exchange', (req, res) => {
    res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
    const token = req.query.token;
-    if (!session.redeemHandoffToken(token)) {
+    const forwardedHost = String(req.headers['x-forwarded-host'] || req.headers.host || '')
+      .split(',')[0].trim().replace(/:\d+$/, '').toLowerCase();
+    if (!session.redeemHandoffToken(token, forwardedHost)) {
      return errorResponse(res, 401, 'Invalid or expired handoff token');
    }
    session.setCookieHostOnly(res, totpConfig.sessionDuration);
@@ -237,7 +269,12 @@ module.exports = function(deps) {
  // Serve service-specific auto-login page (auth enforced by Caddy forward_auth upstream)
  router.get('/auth/login-page', (req, res) => {
    const service = (req.query.service || '').replace(/[^a-z]/g, '');
-    const html = buildLoginPage(service);
+    const configuredHost = siteConfig?.dashboardHost;
+    const dashboardOrigin = typeof configuredHost === 'string'
+      && /^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9.-]*$/.test(configuredHost)
+      ? `https://${configuredHost}`
+      : 'https://status.sami';
+    const html = buildLoginPage(service, dashboardOrigin);
    if (!html) return res.status(404).send('Unknown service');
    res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/html; charset=utf-8');
    res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
@@ -255,7 +292,7 @@ module.exports = function(deps) {
  return router;
 };

-function buildLoginPage(service) {
+function buildLoginPage(service, dashboardOrigin = 'https://status.sami') {
  // Pre-auth check via <meta http-equiv="refresh"> so it fires even when JS is
  // disabled or blocked. The cookie is sent automatically because we hit the
  // same origin (plex.sami); if the API returns 200 the user has a valid
@@ -266,7 +303,7 @@ function buildLoginPage(service) {
  <style>body{background:__BG__;color:#e0e0e0;font-family:system-ui;display:flex;align-items:center;justify-items:center;height:100vh;margin:0;flex-direction:column;gap:12px}a{color:__ACCENT__}#d{font-size:12px;color:#888;max-width:80vw;overflow:auto;white-wrap:pre-wrap}</style>
  </head><body><p id="m">__TITLE__</p><div id="d"></div>
  <script>(function(){
-  var ls=localStorage,d=document.getElementById('d'),m=document.getElementById('m');
+  var ls=localStorage,d=document.getElementById('d'),m=document.getElementById('m'),dashboardOrigin=__DASHBOARD_ORIGIN__;
  // 2026-07-22 hardening: every fetch now has a hard AbortSignal timeout
  // (default 8s) so a hung upstream can NEVER leave the page stuck on
  // "Signing in to Plex..." indefinitely. Also: if check-session returns
@@ -274,13 +311,16 @@ function buildLoginPage(service) {
  // upstream timeout, etc.), we now ALWAYS redirect to /web/?direct=1 if a
  // stale token exists in localStorage, instead of failing silently.
  function go(u){setTimeout(function(){location.replace(u)},300)}
+  function authUrl(){return dashboardOrigin+'?auth=required&return='+encodeURIComponent(location.href)}
+  function authLink(label){return '<a href="'+authUrl()+'">'+label+'</a>'}
+  function vault(svc){go(dashboardOrigin+'?credentials='+encodeURIComponent(svc)+'&return='+encodeURIComponent(location.href))}
  function fail(msg,info){try{m.innerHTML=msg;d.textContent=info||''}catch(_){}}
  function withTimeout(ms){var c=new AbortController();setTimeout(function(){c.abort()},ms);return c.signal}
  function ft(svc){return fetch('/dashcaddy-api/api/auth/app-token/'+svc,{credentials:'include',signal:withTimeout(8000)})}
  function merge(ck,j,name){try{var c=JSON.parse(ls.getItem(ck)||'{}');if(c.Servers&&c.Servers.length){var s=c.Servers[0];s.AccessToken=j.token;s.UserId=j.userId||s.UserId||'';s.DateLastAccessed=Date.now();ls.setItem(ck,JSON.stringify(c));return}}catch(e){}ls.setItem(ck,JSON.stringify({Servers:[{Id:j.serverId||'',Name:j.serverName||name,UserId:j.userId||'',AccessToken:j.token,ManualAddress:location.origin,LastConnectionMode:2,DateLastAccessed:Date.now()}]}))}
  // Belt-and-suspenders hard timeout: if nothing in this script succeeds
  // within 15s, force-redirect to status.sami so the user can re-auth.
-  var overallTimer=setTimeout(function(){go('https://status.sami?auth=required&return='+encodeURIComponent(location.href))},15000);
+  var overallTimer=setTimeout(function(){go(authUrl())},15000);
  // Cross-subdomain SSO handoff: status.sami can't share its session cookie
  // with this origin (Domain=.sami cookies are silently rejected by real
  // browsers - .sami isn't a registered TLD, so browsers treat "sami" as the
@@ -305,18 +345,17 @@ function buildLoginPage(service) {
  preExchange.then(function(){
  return fetch('/dashcaddy-api/api/auth/totp/check-session',{credentials:'include',cache:'no-store',signal:withTimeout(5000)})
  }).then(function(r){return r.json()}).then(function(st){
-    if(!st||!st.success||!st.authenticated){go('https://status.sami?auth=required&return='+encodeURIComponent(location.href));return}
+    if(!st||!st.success||!st.authenticated){go(authUrl());return}
  ${body}
-  }).catch(function(e){fail('Could not reach DashCaddy. <a href="https://status.sami?auth=required&return='+encodeURIComponent(location.href)+'">Sign in at DashCaddy</a>','Auth check error: '+(e&&e.message||'unknown'))})
+  }).catch(function(e){fail('Could not reach DashCaddy. '+authLink('Sign in at DashCaddy'),'Auth check error: '+(e&&e.message||'unknown'))})
  })()</script></body></html>`;

  const pages = {
    chat: {
      title: 'Signing in...', bg: '#0a0a0a', accent: '#60a5fa',
-      body: `if(ls.getItem('token')){go('/?direct=1');return}
-d.textContent='Fetching token from DashCaddy...';
+      body: `d.textContent='Fetching token from DashCaddy...';
 ft('chat').then(function(r){return r.text()}).then(function(t){
-  try{var j=JSON.parse(t);if(j.token){ls.setItem('token',j.token);go('/?direct=1');return}
+  try{var j=JSON.parse(t);if(j.credentialsRequired){vault('chat');return}if(j.token){ls.setItem('token',j.token);go('/?direct=1');return}
  // No token but chat is reachable — fall through to manual UI link below
  fail('Auto-login unavailable. <a href="/?direct=1">Open Chat manually</a>','No token field: '+t.substring(0,200))}
  catch(e){fail('Auto-login parse error. <a href="/?direct=1">Open Chat manually</a>','Error: '+e.message+' / body: '+t.substring(0,200))}
@@ -324,30 +363,29 @@ ft('chat').then(function(r){return r.text()}).then(function(t){
    },
    plex: {
      title: 'Signing in to Plex...', bg: '#1f1f1f', accent: '#e5a00d',
-      body: `if(ls.getItem('myPlexAccessToken')){go('/web/?direct=1');return}
-ft('plex').then(function(r){return r.json()}).then(function(j){
-  if(j.token){ls.setItem('myPlexAccessToken',j.token);d.textContent='Token stored, redirecting...';go('/web/?direct=1');return}
+      body: `ft('plex').then(function(r){return r.json()}).then(function(j){
+  if(j.credentialsRequired){vault('plex');return}if(j.token){ls.setItem('myPlexAccessToken',j.token);d.textContent='Token stored, redirecting...';go('/web/?direct=1');return}
  // No token returned. Three fallbacks in priority order:
  // 1. Stale token in localStorage — Plex may still accept it.
  if(ls.getItem('myPlexAccessToken')){go('/web/?direct=1');return}
  // 2. Manual link so the user is never trapped on this page.
-  fail('Auto-login unavailable. <a href="/web/?direct=1">Open Plex manually</a> or <a href="https://status.sami?auth=required&return='+encodeURIComponent(location.href)+'">re-authenticate at DashCaddy</a>','API: '+JSON.stringify(j))
+  fail('Auto-login unavailable. <a href="/web/?direct=1">Open Plex manually</a> or '+authLink('re-authenticate at DashCaddy'),'API: '+JSON.stringify(j))
 }).catch(function(e){fail('Could not reach DashCaddy. <a href="/web/?direct=1">Open Plex manually</a>','Error: '+(e&&e.message||'unknown'))})`
    },
    jellyfin: {
      title: 'Signing in to Jellyfin...', bg: '#101014', accent: '#00a4dc',
      body: `ft('jellyfin').then(function(r){return r.json()}).then(function(j){
-  if(j.token){merge('jellyfin_credentials',j,'Jellyfin');merge('_jellyfin_credentials',j,'Jellyfin');d.textContent='Token stored, redirecting...';go('/web/');return}
+  if(j.credentialsRequired){vault('jellyfin');return}if(j.token){merge('jellyfin_credentials',j,'Jellyfin');merge('_jellyfin_credentials',j,'Jellyfin');d.textContent='Token stored, redirecting...';go('/web/');return}
  if(ls.getItem('jellyfin_credentials')||ls.getItem('_jellyfin_credentials')){go('/web/');return}
-  fail('Auto-login unavailable. <a href="/web/">Open Jellyfin manually</a> or <a href="https://status.sami?auth=required&return='+encodeURIComponent(location.href)+'">re-authenticate at DashCaddy</a>','API: '+JSON.stringify(j))
+  fail('Auto-login unavailable. <a href="/web/">Open Jellyfin manually</a> or '+authLink('re-authenticate at DashCaddy'),'API: '+JSON.stringify(j))
 }).catch(function(e){fail('Could not reach DashCaddy. <a href="/web/">Open Jellyfin manually</a>','Error: '+(e&&e.message||'unknown'))})`
    },
    emby: {
      title: 'Signing in to Emby...', bg: '#101014', accent: '#52b54b',
      body: `ft('emby').then(function(r){return r.json()}).then(function(j){
-  if(j.token){merge('emby_credentials',j,'Emby');merge('_emby_credentials',j,'Emby');d.textContent='Token stored, redirecting...';go('/web/');return}
+  if(j.credentialsRequired){vault('emby');return}if(j.token){merge('emby_credentials',j,'Emby');merge('_emby_credentials',j,'Emby');d.textContent='Token stored, redirecting...';go('/web/');return}
  if(ls.getItem('emby_credentials')||ls.getItem('_emby_credentials')){go('/web/');return}
-  fail('Auto-login unavailable. <a href="/web/">Open Emby manually</a> or <a href="https://status.sami?auth=required&return='+encodeURIComponent(location.href)+'">re-authenticate at DashCaddy</a>','API: '+JSON.stringify(j))
+  fail('Auto-login unavailable. <a href="/web/">Open Emby manually</a> or '+authLink('re-authenticate at DashCaddy'),'API: '+JSON.stringify(j))
 }).catch(function(e){fail('Could not reach DashCaddy. <a href="/web/">Open Emby manually</a>','Error: '+(e&&e.message||'unknown'))})`
    },
  };
@@ -357,5 +395,6 @@ ft('plex').then(function(r){return r.json()}).then(function(j){
  return SHELL(cfg.body)
    .replace(/__TITLE__/g, cfg.title)
    .replace('__BG__', cfg.bg)
-    .replace('__ACCENT__', cfg.accent);
+    .replace('__ACCENT__', cfg.accent)
+    .replace('__DASHBOARD_ORIGIN__', JSON.stringify(dashboardOrigin));
 }
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ const { ok, successMessage } = require('../../src/utils/responses');
 * @param {Object} deps.log - Logger instance
 * @returns {express.Router}
 */
-module.exports = function({ authManager, credentialManager, totpConfig, saveTotpConfig, session, asyncHandler, errorResponse, log, renewCSRFToken }) {
+module.exports = function({ authManager, credentialManager, totpConfig, saveTotpConfig, session, asyncHandler, errorResponse, log, renewCSRFToken, siteConfig }) {
  const router = express.Router();
  
  // Ctx shim for backward compatibility
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ module.exports = function({ authManager, credentialManager, totpConfig, saveTotp
    credentialManager,
    totpConfig,
    saveTotpConfig,
-    session
+    session,
+    siteConfig
  };

  // Get current TOTP config (public route)
@@ -193,11 +194,14 @@ const SETUP_WINDOW_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
  // Login: verify TOTP code and set session cookie
  router.post('/totp/verify', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
    const { authenticator } = require('otplib');
-    const { code } = req.body;
+    const { code, serviceId } = req.body;

    if (!code || !/^\d{6}$/.test(code)) {
      throw new ValidationError('Invalid code format', 'code');
    }
+    if (serviceId != null && !/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/.test(String(serviceId))) {
+      throw new ValidationError('Invalid service ID', 'serviceId');
+    }

    if (!ctx.totpConfig.enabled || !ctx.totpConfig.isSetUp) {
      throw new ValidationError('TOTP is not enabled');
@@ -227,7 +231,12 @@ const SETUP_WINDOW_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
    // URL when bouncing the user back to a gated service. That service's
    // login page exchanges it via /auth/sso-exchange for its own host-only
    // session cookie. Single-use, 60s TTL — see ctx.session.createHandoffToken.
-    const ssoToken = ctx.session.createHandoffToken();
+    let ssoToken = null;
+    if (serviceId) {
+      const suffix = String(ctx.siteConfig?.tld || '.sami');
+      const expectedHost = `${serviceId}${suffix.startsWith('.') ? suffix : `.${suffix}`}`;
+      ssoToken = ctx.session.createHandoffToken(expectedHost);
+    }

    log.debug('auth', 'Session created', { sessions: ctx.session.ipSessions.size });
    ok(res, { message: 'Authenticated successfully', sessionDuration: ctx.totpConfig.sessionDuration, csrfToken: newCsrfToken, ssoToken });
@@ -263,9 +263,10 @@ module.exports = function({
      const arrKey = await credentialManager.retrieve(`arr.${serviceId}.apikey`).catch(() => null);
      const svcKey = await credentialManager.retrieve(`service.${serviceId}.apikey`).catch(() => null);
      const username = await credentialManager.retrieve(`service.${serviceId}.username`).catch(() => null);
+      const password = await credentialManager.retrieve(`service.${serviceId}.password`).catch(() => null);
      success(res, {
        hasApiKey: !!(arrKey || svcKey),
-        hasBasicAuth: !!username,
+        hasBasicAuth: !!username && !!password,
        username: username || null
      });
  }, 'service-creds'));
@@ -43,8 +43,15 @@ const HISTORY_RETENTION_DAYS = parseInt(process.env.HEALTH_HISTORY_RETENTION ||
 //   - UP_THRESHOLD   = N consecutive "up" probes before the badge flips back to green
 // Single probe flips to green on purpose — false-positive-green is much less
 // painful than perpetual-red (operators notice red, ignore green).
-const DOWN_THRESHOLD = Math.max(1, parseInt(process.env.HEALTH_DOWN_THRESHOLD || '2', 10));
-const UP_THRESHOLD = Math.max(1, parseInt(process.env.HEALTH_UP_THRESHOLD || '1', 10));
+function readPositiveIntEnv(name, fallback) {
+  const raw = process.env[name];
+  if (raw === undefined || raw === '') return fallback;
+  const value = Number(raw);
+  return Number.isSafeInteger(value) && value >= 1 ? value : fallback;
+}
+
+const DOWN_THRESHOLD = readPositiveIntEnv('HEALTH_DOWN_THRESHOLD', 2);
+const UP_THRESHOLD = readPositiveIntEnv('HEALTH_UP_THRESHOLD', 1);

 class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
  constructor() {
@@ -63,6 +70,8 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
    this.checkInterval = null;
    this.consecutiveFailures = new Map(); // serviceId -> failure count
    this.serviceTimers = new Map(); // serviceId -> timer for per-service backoff
+    // Invalidate probe completions that race with removal/reconfiguration.
+    this.serviceGenerations = new Map(); // serviceId -> configuration generation
  }

  /**
@@ -135,6 +144,7 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
   */
  async checkService(serviceId, config) {
    const startTime = Date.now();
+    const generation = this.serviceGenerations.get(serviceId) || 0;

    try {
      const result = await this.performHealthCheck(config);
@@ -150,6 +160,10 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
        details: result.details
      };

+      if ((this.serviceGenerations.get(serviceId) || 0) !== generation) {
+        return status;
+      }
+
      // Track consecutive failures for exponential backoff
      if (result.healthy) {
        this.consecutiveFailures.delete(serviceId);
@@ -157,8 +171,9 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
        this.consecutiveFailures.set(serviceId, (this.consecutiveFailures.get(serviceId) || 0) + 1);
      }

+      const previousStatus = this.currentStatus.get(serviceId);
      this.recordStatus(serviceId, status);
-      this.checkForIncidents(serviceId, status, config);
+      this.checkForIncidents(serviceId, status, config, previousStatus);

      return status;
    } catch (error) {
@@ -175,8 +190,13 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
        error: error.message
      };

+      if ((this.serviceGenerations.get(serviceId) || 0) !== generation) {
+        return status;
+      }
+
+      const previousStatus = this.currentStatus.get(serviceId);
      this.recordStatus(serviceId, status);
-      this.checkForIncidents(serviceId, status, config);
+      this.checkForIncidents(serviceId, status, config, previousStatus);

      return status;
    }
@@ -319,7 +339,7 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
    // a brief blip doesn't accumulate against the displayed state.
    if (rawStatus.status === previousStatus) {
      this.consecutiveSinceChange.set(serviceId, 0);
-      return currentDisplayed;
+      return rawStatus;
    }

    // Probe disagrees with displayed. Bump the streak counter — this counts
@@ -334,6 +354,9 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
      // with the displayed "up" state.
      if (previousStatus === 'up' && next < DOWN_THRESHOLD) {
        this.consecutiveSinceChange.set(serviceId, next);
+        // Keep the last internally-consistent displayed snapshot. Mixing the
+        // raw failure metadata with status="up" would expose contradictory
+        // API data (for example statusCode=500 on an "up" service).
        return currentDisplayed;
      }
      // Threshold met (or already down) — flip to red.
@@ -402,8 +425,7 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
  /**
   * Check for incidents (downtime, slow response, etc.)
   */
-  checkForIncidents(serviceId, status, config) {
-    const previous = this.currentStatus.get(serviceId);
+  checkForIncidents(serviceId, status, config, previous = this.currentStatus.get(serviceId)) {
    
    // Check for status change (up -> down or down -> up)
    if (previous && previous.status !== status.status) {
@@ -638,6 +660,7 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
      this.config.services = {};
    }

+    this.serviceGenerations.set(serviceId, (this.serviceGenerations.get(serviceId) || 0) + 1);
    this.config.services[serviceId] = {
      enabled: config.enabled !== false,
      name: config.name || serviceId,
@@ -660,12 +683,19 @@ class HealthChecker extends EventEmitter {
   * Remove service configuration
   */
  removeService(serviceId) {
+    this.serviceGenerations.set(serviceId, (this.serviceGenerations.get(serviceId) || 0) + 1);
    if (this.config.services) {
      delete this.config.services[serviceId];
      this.saveConfig();
    }

    this.currentStatus.delete(serviceId);
+    this.displayedStatus.delete(serviceId);
+    this.consecutiveSinceChange.delete(serviceId);
+    this.consecutiveFailures.delete(serviceId);
+    const timer = this.serviceTimers.get(serviceId);
+    if (timer) clearTimeout(timer);
+    this.serviceTimers.delete(serviceId);
    delete this.history[serviceId];
  }

@@ -330,17 +330,22 @@ module.exports = function configureMiddleware(app, {
  const ssoHandoffTokens = new Map();
  const SSO_HANDOFF_TTL_MS = 60 * 1000;

-  function createHandoffToken() {
+  function createHandoffToken(expectedHost = null) {
    const token = crypto.randomBytes(24).toString('base64url');
-    ssoHandoffTokens.set(token, { exp: Date.now() + SSO_HANDOFF_TTL_MS });
+    ssoHandoffTokens.set(token, {
+      exp: Date.now() + SSO_HANDOFF_TTL_MS,
+      expectedHost: expectedHost ? String(expectedHost).toLowerCase() : null,
+    });
    return token;
  }

-  function redeemHandoffToken(token) {
+  function redeemHandoffToken(token, actualHost = null) {
    if (!token) return false;
    const entry = ssoHandoffTokens.get(token);
    ssoHandoffTokens.delete(token); // one-time use regardless of outcome
-    return !!entry && entry.exp > Date.now();
+    if (!entry || entry.exp <= Date.now()) return false;
+    if (!entry.expectedHost) return true;
+    return !!actualHost && entry.expectedHost === String(actualHost).toLowerCase();
  }

  function setHostOnlySessionCookie(res, durationKey) {
@@ -630,10 +630,15 @@ generate_caddyfile() {
 SNIP

  local auth_snippet="(dashcaddy_auth) {
-  forward_auth localhost:${API_PORT} {
+  @needsAuth not path /dashcaddy-sso
+  forward_auth @needsAuth localhost:${API_PORT} {
    uri /api/v1/auth/gate/{args[0]}
    copy_headers Authorization X-Api-Key X-App-Cookie X-Emby-Token X-Plex-Token
  }
+  handle /dashcaddy-sso {
+    rewrite * /api/v1/auth/sso-exchange
+    reverse_proxy localhost:${API_PORT}
+  }
 }"

  local site_body="  root * ${DASHBOARD_DIR}
@@ -51,10 +51,15 @@ class CaddyfileGenerator {
  _authSnippet(apiPort) {
    return `# DashCaddy SSO auth snippet
 (dashcaddy_auth) {
-  forward_auth localhost:${apiPort} {
+  @needsAuth not path /dashcaddy-sso
+  forward_auth @needsAuth localhost:${apiPort} {
    uri /api/v1/auth/gate/{args[0]}
    copy_headers Authorization X-Api-Key X-App-Cookie X-Emby-Token X-Plex-Token
  }
+  handle /dashcaddy-sso {
+    rewrite * /api/v1/auth/sso-exchange
+    reverse_proxy localhost:${apiPort}
+  }
 }
 `;
  }
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
+const CaddyfileGenerator = require('./caddyfile-generator');
+
+describe('cross-host SSO installer contract', () => {
+  test('generated auth snippet exposes the public one-time exchange landing route', () => {
+    const snippet = new CaddyfileGenerator()._authSnippet(3001);
+    expect(snippet).toContain('@needsAuth not path /dashcaddy-sso');
+    expect(snippet).toContain('handle /dashcaddy-sso');
+    expect(snippet).toContain('rewrite * /api/v1/auth/sso-exchange');
+    expect(snippet).toContain('reverse_proxy localhost:3001');
+  });
+
+  test('shell installer emits the same exchange landing contract', () => {
+    const installer = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'install.sh'), 'utf8');
+    expect(installer).toContain('@needsAuth not path /dashcaddy-sso');
+    expect(installer).toContain('handle /dashcaddy-sso');
+    expect(installer).toContain('rewrite * /api/v1/auth/sso-exchange');
+  });
+
+  test('Caddy parser accepts a complete service config using the generated snippet', () => {
+    const available = spawnSync('caddy', ['version'], { encoding: 'utf8' });
+    if (available.status !== 0) return;
+
+    const generator = new CaddyfileGenerator();
+    const config = `${generator._authSnippet(3001)}\nexample.test {\n  import dashcaddy_auth plex\n  respond "ok" 200\n}\n`;
+    const result = spawnSync('caddy', ['validate', '--config', '-', '--adapter', 'caddyfile'], {
+      input: config,
+      encoding: 'utf8',
+    });
+    expect(result.status).toBe(0);
+    expect(`${result.stdout}\n${result.stderr}`).toContain('Valid configuration');
+  });
+});
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ const bundles = {
    // totp-recovery.js registers window._refreshRecoveryLink which totp-auth.js
    // calls from showTotpOverlay(). Must come after totp-auth.js.
    JS('totp-recovery.js'),
+    JS('credential-vault-handoff.js'),
    JS('service-credentials.js'),
    JS('totp-settings.js'),
    // DC-048 admin panel — modal-overlay UI for user/invite management.
@@ -267,6 +267,46 @@
    }
  }

+  function buildSsoHandoffTarget(returnUrl, token) {
+    const parsed = new URL(returnUrl, window.location.origin);
+    if (parsed.origin === window.location.origin) return parsed.toString();
+
+    const suffix = SITE.tld.startsWith('.') ? SITE.tld : `.${SITE.tld}`;
+    const isPrivateHost = parsed.hostname === suffix.slice(1) || parsed.hostname.endsWith(suffix);
+    if (parsed.protocol !== 'https:' || !isPrivateHost || !token) return null;
+
+    const returnPath = `${parsed.pathname}${parsed.search}${parsed.hash}`;
+    parsed.pathname = '/dashcaddy-sso';
+    parsed.search = '';
+    parsed.hash = '';
+    parsed.searchParams.set('token', token);
+    parsed.searchParams.set('return', returnPath);
+    return parsed.toString();
+  }
+
+  async function resumeExistingSession(returnUrl) {
+    if (!returnUrl || !isAllowedReturnUrl(returnUrl)) return false;
+    try {
+      const parsedReturn = new URL(returnUrl, window.location.origin);
+      const suffix = SITE.tld.startsWith('.') ? SITE.tld : `.${SITE.tld}`;
+      const serviceId = parsedReturn.hostname.slice(0, -suffix.length);
+      if (!/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/.test(serviceId)) return false;
+      const res = await fetch(`/api/v1/auth/sso-handoff?serviceId=${encodeURIComponent(serviceId)}`, {
+        credentials: 'include',
+        cache: 'no-store',
+      });
+      if (!res.ok) return false;
+      const data = await res.json();
+      const target = data.success && buildSsoHandoffTarget(returnUrl, data.ssoToken);
+      if (!target) return false;
+      try { sessionStorage.removeItem('totp_redirect'); } catch (_) {}
+      window.location.replace(target);
+      return true;
+    } catch (_) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
  const urlParams = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
  if (urlParams.get('auth') === 'required') {
    // Preserve the gated service destination so submitTotpCode() can append
@@ -277,8 +317,12 @@
    }
    // Clean URL — happens after we've captured the redirect
    window.history.replaceState({}, '', window.location.pathname);
-    // Show on next tick so the DOM (the .totp-card) is ready
-    setTimeout(show, 0);
+    // Reuse the valid status.sami session first. Only show the TOTP/provider
+    // challenge when that session is genuinely absent or expired.
+    setTimeout(async () => {
+      if (await resumeExistingSession(returnUrl)) return;
+      await show();
+    }, 0);
  }

  // Expose for hot-trigger from other modules (e.g. logout)
@@ -33,6 +33,20 @@
    return server?.name || dnsId.toUpperCase();
  }

+  async function requireSuccessfulDnsMutation(response, label) {
+    if (!response) throw new Error(`${label} failed: no response`);
+    let data;
+    try {
+      data = await response.json();
+    } catch (_) {
+      throw new Error(`${label} failed: invalid server response`);
+    }
+    if (!response.ok || data?.success !== true) {
+      throw new Error(data?.error || `${label} failed (${response.status || 'unknown status'})`);
+    }
+    return data;
+  }
+
  /** Build per-server credential form sections from SITE.dnsServers */
  function buildCredentialSections() {
    const container = document.getElementById('dns-cred-sections');
@@ -258,14 +272,6 @@
  document.getElementById('token-save')?.addEventListener('click', async () => {
    const dnsIds = getDnsIds();

-    // Save all to localStorage
-    dnsIds.forEach(dnsId => {
-      setUsername(dnsId, 'readonly', document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-readonly-username`).value.trim());
-      setToken(dnsId, 'readonly', document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-readonly-token`).value.trim());
-      setUsername(dnsId, 'admin', document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-admin-username`).value.trim());
-      setToken(dnsId, 'admin', document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-admin-token`).value.trim());
-    });
-
    // Build per-server credentials payload for backend sync
    const servers = {};
    let hasAnyCreds = false;
@@ -304,45 +310,36 @@
          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
          body: JSON.stringify({ servers })
        });
-        const data = await res.json();
-
+        const data = await requireSuccessfulDnsMutation(res, 'DNS credential save');
        if (data.results) {
-          dnsIds.forEach(dnsId => {
-            const statusEl = document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`);
-            if (!servers[dnsId]) { statusEl.textContent = ''; return; }
-            const result = data.results[dnsId];
-            if (result?.success) {
-              statusEl.textContent = '\u2713 Verified & saved';
-              statusEl.className = 'token-status success';
-            } else if (result?.partial) {
-              statusEl.textContent = '\u2713 ' + result.partial;
-              statusEl.className = 'token-status success';
-            } else {
-              statusEl.textContent = '\u2717 ' + (result?.error || 'Login failed');
-              statusEl.className = 'token-status error';
-            }
-          });
-        } else if (data.success) {
-          dnsIds.forEach(dnsId => {
-            if (servers[dnsId]) {
-              document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`).textContent = '\u2713 Saved';
-              document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`).className = 'token-status success';
-            }
-          });
-        } else {
-          dnsIds.forEach(dnsId => {
-            if (servers[dnsId]) {
-              document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`).textContent = '\u2717 ' + (data.error || 'Failed');
-              document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`).className = 'token-status error';
-            }
-          });
+          const failed = Object.keys(servers).filter(dnsId => data.results[dnsId]?.success !== true);
+          if (failed.length) {
+            const details = failed.map(dnsId => data.results[dnsId]?.error || `${dnsId} failed`).join('; ');
+            throw new Error(details);
+          }
        }
+
+        // Cache locally only after the encrypted server vault confirms success.
+        dnsIds.forEach(dnsId => {
+          setUsername(dnsId, 'readonly', document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-readonly-username`).value.trim());
+          setToken(dnsId, 'readonly', document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-readonly-token`).value.trim());
+          setUsername(dnsId, 'admin', document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-admin-username`).value.trim());
+          setToken(dnsId, 'admin', document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-admin-token`).value.trim());
+        });
+
+        dnsIds.forEach(dnsId => {
+          const statusEl = document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`);
+          if (!servers[dnsId]) { statusEl.textContent = ''; return; }
+          const result = data.results?.[dnsId];
+          statusEl.textContent = result?.partial ? '\u2713 ' + result.partial : '\u2713 Verified & saved';
+          statusEl.className = 'token-status success';
+        });
      } catch (e) {
        console.error('Failed to sync DNS credentials to backend:', e);
        dnsIds.forEach(dnsId => {
          if (servers[dnsId]) {
-            document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`).textContent = '\u2713 Saved locally (sync failed)';
-            document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`).className = 'token-status';
+            document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`).textContent = '\u2717 ' + (e.message || 'Save failed');
+            document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`).className = 'token-status error';
          }
        });
      }
@@ -368,18 +365,24 @@

  document.getElementById('token-clear-all')?.addEventListener('click', async () => {
    if (confirm('Clear all stored DNS credentials? This cannot be undone.')) {
-      clearAllCredentials();
-      getDnsIds().forEach(dnsId => {
-        document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-readonly-username`).value = '';
-        document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-readonly-token`).value = '';
-        document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-admin-username`).value = '';
-        document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-admin-token`).value = '';
-        document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`).textContent = '\u2713 Cleared';
-        document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`).className = 'token-status success';
-      });
      try {
-        await secureFetch('/api/v1/dns/credentials', { method: 'DELETE' });
-      } catch (_) {}
+        const response = await secureFetch('/api/v1/dns/credentials', { method: 'DELETE' });
+        await requireSuccessfulDnsMutation(response, 'DNS credential removal');
+        clearAllCredentials();
+        getDnsIds().forEach(dnsId => {
+          document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-readonly-username`).value = '';
+          document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-readonly-token`).value = '';
+          document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-admin-username`).value = '';
+          document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-admin-token`).value = '';
+          document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`).textContent = '\u2713 Cleared';
+          document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`).className = 'token-status success';
+        });
+      } catch (e) {
+        getDnsIds().forEach(dnsId => {
+          document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`).textContent = '\u2717 ' + (e.message || 'Clear failed');
+          document.getElementById(`${dnsId}-token-status`).className = 'token-status error';
+        });
+      }
    }
  });

@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@
    await window.loadServices();
    await loadTemplateCategories();
    window.buildGrid();
+    if (typeof window.openRequestedCredentialForm === 'function') {
+      window.openRequestedCredentialForm();
+    }
    animateTopCards();
    window.refreshAll();
    setInterval(() => {
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+// ===== ENCRYPTED VAULT -> SERVICE SSO HANDOFF =====
+(function() {
+  function isAllowedReturnUrl(returnUrl, expectedServiceId) {
+    if (!returnUrl || !expectedServiceId || !/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/.test(expectedServiceId)) return false;
+    try {
+      const parsed = new URL(returnUrl, window.location.origin);
+      const suffix = SITE.tld.startsWith('.') ? SITE.tld : `.${SITE.tld}`;
+      const expectedHost = `${expectedServiceId}${suffix}`;
+      return parsed.protocol === 'https:' && parsed.hostname === expectedHost;
+    } catch (_) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  function buildHandoffTarget(returnUrl, token, expectedServiceId) {
+    if (!isAllowedReturnUrl(returnUrl, expectedServiceId)) return null;
+    const parsed = new URL(returnUrl, window.location.origin);
+    if (!token) return null;
+
+    const returnPath = `${parsed.pathname}${parsed.search}${parsed.hash}`;
+    // The shared (dashcaddy_auth) Caddy snippet installs this public landing
+    // route on every protected host. It rewrites to /api/v1/auth/sso-exchange.
+    parsed.pathname = '/dashcaddy-sso';
+    parsed.search = '';
+    parsed.hash = '';
+    parsed.searchParams.set('token', token);
+    parsed.searchParams.set('return', returnPath);
+    return parsed.toString();
+  }
+
+  async function resume(returnUrl, expectedServiceId, runtime = {}) {
+    if (!isAllowedReturnUrl(returnUrl, expectedServiceId)) return false;
+    const fetchFn = runtime.fetch || window.fetch.bind(window);
+    const locationObj = runtime.location || window.location;
+    try {
+      const response = await fetchFn(`/api/v1/auth/sso-handoff?serviceId=${encodeURIComponent(expectedServiceId)}`, {
+        credentials: 'include',
+        cache: 'no-store',
+      });
+      if (!response.ok) return false;
+      const data = await response.json();
+      const target = data.success && buildHandoffTarget(returnUrl, data.ssoToken, expectedServiceId);
+      if (!target) return false;
+      locationObj.replace(target);
+      return true;
+    } catch (_) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  window.DCCredentialVault = { isAllowedReturnUrl, buildHandoffTarget, resume };
+})();
@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@

  injectModal('service-creds-modal', `<div id="service-creds-modal">
    <div class="service-creds-content">
-      <h3 id="svc-creds-title" style="margin: 0 0 4px; font-size: 1.05rem;">Service Credentials</h3>
-      <p id="svc-creds-desc" style="font-size: 0.75rem; color: var(--muted); margin: 0 0 14px;">Credentials are injected automatically when accessing this service.</p>
+      <h3 id="svc-creds-title" style="margin: 0 0 4px; font-size: 1.05rem;">Encrypted Credential Vault</h3>
+      <p id="svc-creds-desc" style="font-size: 0.75rem; color: var(--muted); margin: 0 0 14px;">Passwords are encrypted at rest and used automatically when you open this service.</p>

      <!-- Status indicator -->
      <div style="display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 6px; margin-bottom: 12px;">
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
      <!-- Buttons -->
      <div style="display: flex; gap: 8px; margin-top: 14px;">
        <button id="svc-creds-save" class="btn-accent-solid" style="flex: 1; padding: 9px; border: none; border-radius: 6px; cursor: pointer; font-weight: 600; font-size: 0.85rem;">
-          Save
+          Save to encrypted vault
        </button>
        <button id="svc-creds-clear" style="padding: 9px 14px; background: transparent; color: var(--bad-fg, #ff9aa3); border: 1px solid var(--bad-fg, #ff9aa3); border-radius: 6px; cursor: pointer; font-size: 0.85rem; display: none;">
          Clear
@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@

  const modal = document.getElementById('service-creds-modal');
  let currentService = null;
+  let credentialReturnUrl = null;
+  let currentServiceHadCreds = false;
  const arrServices = ['sonarr', 'radarr', 'prowlarr', 'overseerr'];
  const qualityProfileServices = ['sonarr', 'radarr'];

@@ -124,8 +126,28 @@
    el.style.display = 'none';
  }

-  window.openServiceCredsModal = async function(service) {
+  async function requireSuccessfulWrite(response, label) {
+    if (!response) throw new Error(`${label} failed: no response`);
+    let data;
+    try {
+      data = await response.json();
+    } catch (_) {
+      throw new Error(`${label} failed: invalid server response`);
+    }
+    if (!response.ok || data?.success !== true) {
+      throw new Error(data?.error || `${label} failed (${response.status || 'unknown status'})`);
+    }
+    return data;
+  }
+
+  function isAllowedCredentialReturnUrl(returnUrl, serviceId) {
+    return !!window.DCCredentialVault?.isAllowedReturnUrl(returnUrl, serviceId);
+  }
+
+  window.openServiceCredsModal = async function(service, options = {}) {
    currentService = service;
+    credentialReturnUrl = isAllowedCredentialReturnUrl(options.returnUrl, service.id) ? options.returnUrl : null;
+    currentServiceHadCreds = false;
    hideError();
    const title = document.getElementById('svc-creds-title');
    const desc = document.getElementById('svc-creds-desc');
@@ -134,7 +156,10 @@
    const basicSection = document.getElementById('svc-creds-basic');
    const qualitySection = document.getElementById('svc-creds-quality');

-    title.textContent = service.name + ' Credentials';
+    title.textContent = service.name + ' — Encrypted Vault';
+    document.getElementById('svc-creds-save').textContent = credentialReturnUrl
+      ? 'Save to vault & open service'
+      : 'Save to encrypted vault';
    // Determine which sections to show
    const isExt = !!service.isExternal;
    const isArr = arrServices.includes(service.id) || arrServices.includes(service.appTemplate);
@@ -214,6 +239,7 @@
    }

    if (hasCreds) {
+      currentServiceHadCreds = true;
      dot.style.background = 'var(--ok-fg, #74dfc4)';
      status.style.color = 'var(--ok-fg, #74dfc4)';
      status.textContent = 'Credentials stored';
@@ -352,16 +378,35 @@
      const isArr = arrServices.includes(currentService.id) || arrServices.includes(currentService.appTemplate);
      const svcId = currentService.id || currentService.appTemplate;

+      if (credentialReturnUrl && !currentServiceHadCreds) {
+        const externalUser = document.getElementById('svc-seedhost-user').value.trim();
+        const externalPass = document.getElementById('svc-seedhost-pass').value;
+        const apiKeyInput = document.getElementById('svc-apikey-input');
+        const requestedApiKey = apiKeyInput?.value.trim();
+        const basicUser = document.getElementById('svc-basic-user').value.trim();
+        const basicPass = document.getElementById('svc-basic-pass').value;
+        const hasExternalLogin = currentService.isExternal && externalUser && externalPass;
+        const hasApiKey = isArr && requestedApiKey && requestedApiKey !== '••••••••';
+        const hasBasicLogin = !currentService.isExternal && basicUser && basicPass;
+        if (!hasExternalLogin && !hasApiKey && !hasBasicLogin) {
+          showError('Enter the login or API key DashCaddy should store for this service.');
+          saveBtn.textContent = 'Save to vault & open service';
+          saveBtn.disabled = false;
+          return;
+        }
+      }
+
      // Save seedhost creds (shared username + per-service password)
      if (currentService.isExternal) {
        const user = document.getElementById('svc-seedhost-user').value.trim();
        const pass = document.getElementById('svc-seedhost-pass').value;
        if (user) {
-          await secureFetch('/api/v1/seedhost-creds', {
+          const response = await secureFetch('/api/v1/seedhost-creds', {
            method: 'POST',
            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
            body: JSON.stringify({ username: user, password: pass || undefined, serviceId: currentService.id })
          });
+          await requireSuccessfulWrite(response, 'Seedhost credential save');
        }
      }

@@ -387,23 +432,18 @@
              qualityProfileName: qualityProfileName || undefined
            })
          });
-          const data = await res.json();
-          if (!data.success) {
-            showError(data.error || 'Failed to save API key');
-            saveBtn.textContent = 'Save';
-            saveBtn.disabled = false;
-            return;
-          }
+          const data = await requireSuccessfulWrite(res, 'ARR credential save');
          if (data.connectionTest && !data.connectionTest.success) {
            showError(`API key saved but connection test failed: ${data.connectionTest.error}`);
          }
        } else {
          // Non-arr services use the generic endpoint
-          await secureFetch(`/api/v1/services/${currentService.id}/credentials`, {
+          const response = await secureFetch(`/api/v1/services/${currentService.id}/credentials`, {
            method: 'POST',
            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
            body: JSON.stringify({ apiKey })
          });
+          await requireSuccessfulWrite(response, 'API key save');
        }
      } else if (isArr && qualityProfileServices.includes(svcId)) {
        // API key unchanged but user may have changed quality profile — save profile only
@@ -411,11 +451,12 @@
        const qualityProfileId = qualSelect?.value ? parseInt(qualSelect.value) : undefined;
        const qualityProfileName = qualSelect?.selectedOptions?.[0]?.textContent || undefined;
        if (qualityProfileId) {
-          await secureFetch('/api/v1/arr/quality-profiles', {
+          const response = await secureFetch('/api/v1/arr/quality-profiles', {
            method: 'POST',
            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
            body: JSON.stringify({ service: svcId, qualityProfileId, qualityProfileName })
          });
+          await requireSuccessfulWrite(response, 'Quality profile save');
        }
      }

@@ -424,20 +465,28 @@
        const user = document.getElementById('svc-basic-user').value.trim();
        const pass = document.getElementById('svc-basic-pass').value;
        if (user && pass) {
-          await secureFetch(`/api/v1/services/${currentService.id}/credentials`, {
+          const response = await secureFetch(`/api/v1/services/${currentService.id}/credentials`, {
            method: 'POST',
            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
            body: JSON.stringify({ username: user, password: pass })
          });
+          await requireSuccessfulWrite(response, 'Service credential save');
        }
      }

      await loadServiceCreds(currentService);
+      if (credentialReturnUrl) {
+        const returnUrl = credentialReturnUrl;
+        const resumed = await window.DCCredentialVault?.resume(returnUrl, currentService.id);
+        if (!resumed) throw new Error('Credential saved, but the secure service handoff failed. Try opening the service again.');
+        credentialReturnUrl = null;
+        return;
+      }
    } catch (e) {
      errorHandler.logError('[ServiceCredentials] Save', e, { function: 'saveCredentials' });
      showError('Failed to save: ' + (e.message || 'Unknown error'));
    }
-    saveBtn.textContent = 'Save';
+    saveBtn.textContent = credentialReturnUrl ? 'Save to vault & open service' : 'Save to encrypted vault';
    saveBtn.disabled = false;
  });

@@ -450,12 +499,15 @@
      const svcId = currentService.id || currentService.appTemplate;
      const isArr = arrServices.includes(svcId);
      if (currentService.isExternal) {
-        await secureFetch(`/api/v1/seedhost-creds?serviceId=${currentService.id}`, { method: 'DELETE' });
+        const response = await secureFetch(`/api/v1/seedhost-creds?serviceId=${currentService.id}`, { method: 'DELETE' });
+        await requireSuccessfulWrite(response, 'Seedhost credential removal');
      }
      // Delete from both namespaces
-      await secureFetch(`/api/v1/services/${currentService.id}/credentials`, { method: 'DELETE' });
+      const response = await secureFetch(`/api/v1/services/${currentService.id}/credentials`, { method: 'DELETE' });
+      await requireSuccessfulWrite(response, 'Service credential removal');
      if (isArr) {
-        await secureFetch(`/api/v1/arr/credentials/${svcId}`, { method: 'DELETE' });
+        const arrResponse = await secureFetch(`/api/v1/arr/credentials/${svcId}`, { method: 'DELETE' });
+        await requireSuccessfulWrite(arrResponse, 'ARR credential removal');
      }
      const btn = document.getElementById(`creds-btn-${currentService.id}`);
      if (btn) btn.classList.remove('has-creds');
@@ -470,11 +522,13 @@
  document.getElementById('svc-creds-close')?.addEventListener('click', () => {
    modal.classList.remove('show');
    currentService = null;
+    credentialReturnUrl = null;
  });
  modal?.addEventListener('click', (e) => {
    if (e.target === modal) {
      modal.classList.remove('show');
      currentService = null;
+      credentialReturnUrl = null;
    }
  });

@@ -501,4 +555,18 @@
      }
    } catch (e) { /* ignore */ }
  };
+
+  // Protected service login pages send missing credentials here. Reuse the
+  // normal vault form, then resume through the existing one-time SSO handoff.
+  window.openRequestedCredentialForm = function() {
+    const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
+    const serviceId = params.get('credentials');
+    if (!serviceId) return false;
+    const service = (window.APPS || []).find(app => app.id === serviceId || app.appTemplate === serviceId);
+    if (!service) return false;
+    const returnUrl = params.get('return');
+    window.history.replaceState({}, '', window.location.pathname);
+    window.openServiceCredsModal(service, { returnUrl });
+    return true;
+  };
 })();
@@ -90,11 +90,22 @@
    errorEl.textContent = 'Verifying...';
    errorEl.className = 'totp-error verifying';

+    const redirect = safeSessionGet('totp_redirect');
+    let serviceId = null;
+    if (redirect) {
+      try {
+        const parsed = new URL(redirect, window.location.origin);
+        const suffix = SITE.tld.startsWith('.') ? SITE.tld : `.${SITE.tld}`;
+        const candidate = parsed.hostname.slice(0, -suffix.length);
+        if (parsed.hostname.endsWith(suffix) && /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*$/.test(candidate)) serviceId = candidate;
+      } catch (_) { /* invalid redirect is handled by the normal auth flow */ }
+    }
+
    try {
      const res = await secureFetch('/api/v1/totp/verify', {
        method: 'POST',
        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-        body: JSON.stringify({ code })
+        body: JSON.stringify({ code, serviceId })
      });
      const data = await res.json();

@@ -106,7 +117,6 @@
        }
        hideTotpOverlay();
        // Check if redirected here from another service
-        const redirect = safeSessionGet('totp_redirect');
        if (redirect) {
          try { sessionStorage.removeItem('totp_redirect'); } catch (_) {}
          // .sami is an unregistered TLD, so browsers silently drop the
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-const CACHE = 'dashcaddy-shell-a24ef15882';
+const CACHE = 'dashcaddy-shell-497e1f671c';
 const PRECACHE = [
  '/',
  '/index.html',
@@ -93,3 +93,41 @@ test('same-origin and tokenless destinations keep their direct URL', () => {
  assert.equal(buildHandoffTarget('/settings', 'one-time'), 'https://status.sami/settings');
  assert.equal(buildHandoffTarget('https://router.sami/config', ''), 'https://router.sami/config');
 });
+
+test('an existing status.sami session returns to a service without another TOTP prompt', async () => {
+  const query = new URLSearchParams({ auth: 'required', return: 'https://plex.sami/web/' });
+  let scheduled;
+  let redirected;
+  const location = {
+    origin: 'https://status.sami',
+    pathname: '/',
+    search: `?${query.toString()}`,
+    replace(value) { redirected = value; },
+  };
+  const context = {
+    URL,
+    URLSearchParams,
+    SITE: { tld: '.sami' },
+    sessionStorage: { setItem() {} },
+    document: { getElementById() { return null; } },
+    setTimeout(fn) { scheduled = fn; },
+    console,
+    fetch: async (url) => {
+      assert.equal(url, '/api/v1/auth/sso-handoff?serviceId=plex');
+      return { ok: true, json: async () => ({ success: true, ssoToken: 'existing-session-token' }) };
+    },
+    window: {
+      location,
+      history: { replaceState() {} },
+    },
+  };
+  context.window.window = context.window;
+  vm.runInNewContext(source, context, { filename: 'auth-gate.js' });
+
+  assert.equal(typeof scheduled, 'function');
+  await scheduled();
+  assert.equal(
+    redirected,
+    'https://plex.sami/dashcaddy-sso?token=existing-session-token&return=%2Fweb%2F',
+  );
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+const fs = require('node:fs');
+const path = require('node:path');
+const vm = require('node:vm');
+const { JSDOM } = require('jsdom');
+const test = require('node:test');
+const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
+
+const handoffSource = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '..', 'js', 'credential-vault-handoff.js'), 'utf8');
+const formSource = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '..', 'js', 'service-credentials.js'), 'utf8');
+const initSource = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '..', 'js', 'core', 'init.js'), 'utf8');
+
+function loadVault() {
+  const window = { location: { origin: 'https://status.sami' } };
+  const context = vm.createContext({ window, SITE: { tld: '.sami' }, URL });
+  vm.runInContext(handoffSource, context);
+  return window.DCCredentialVault;
+}
+
+async function exerciseFailedModalWrite({
+  service,
+  fetchJson,
+  setupInputs,
+  expectedEndpoint,
+  writeResponse,
+  expectedError = /vault write rejected/,
+}) {
+  const dom = new JSDOM('<!doctype html><body></body>', {
+    url: 'https://status.sami/',
+    runScripts: 'outside-only',
+  });
+  const { window } = dom;
+  const writeUrls = [];
+  let resumeCalls = 0;
+  window.ErrorHandler = class { logError() {} };
+  window.SITE = { tld: '.sami' };
+  window.injectModal = (_id, html) => window.document.body.insertAdjacentHTML('beforeend', html);
+  window.fetch = async (url) => ({ ok: true, json: async () => fetchJson(url) });
+  window.secureFetch = async (url) => {
+    writeUrls.push(url);
+    return writeResponse || {
+      ok: false,
+      status: 500,
+      json: async () => ({ success: false, error: 'vault write rejected' }),
+    };
+  };
+  window.DCCredentialVault = {
+    isAllowedReturnUrl: () => true,
+    resume: async () => { resumeCalls++; return true; },
+  };
+  window.confirm = () => true;
+  window.eval(formSource);
+
+  await window.openServiceCredsModal(service, { returnUrl: `https://${service.id}.sami/` });
+  setupInputs(window.document);
+  window.document.getElementById('svc-creds-save').click();
+  await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 20));
+
+  assert.equal(writeUrls[0], expectedEndpoint);
+  assert.equal(resumeCalls, 0);
+  assert.match(window.document.getElementById('svc-creds-error').textContent, expectedError);
+}
+
+test('existing dashboard session mints a one-time token and resumes on the target host', async () => {
+  const vault = loadVault();
+  const calls = [];
+  const replacements = [];
+  const resumed = await vault.resume('https://plex.sami/web/?direct=1#home', 'plex', {
+    fetch: async (url, options) => {
+      calls.push({ url, options });
+      return {
+        ok: true,
+        json: async () => ({ success: true, ssoToken: 'one-time-token' }),
+      };
+    },
+    location: { replace: (target) => replacements.push(target) },
+  });
+
+  assert.equal(resumed, true);
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 1);
+  assert.equal(calls[0].url, '/api/v1/auth/sso-handoff?serviceId=plex');
+  assert.equal(calls[0].options.credentials, 'include');
+  assert.equal(calls[0].options.cache, 'no-store');
+  assert.equal(
+    replacements[0],
+    'https://plex.sami/dashcaddy-sso?token=one-time-token&return=%2Fweb%2F%3Fdirect%3D1%23home',
+  );
+});
+
+test('vault handoff rejects an external return URL before minting a token', async () => {
+  const vault = loadVault();
+  let fetchCalled = false;
+  const resumed = await vault.resume('https://plex.sami.evil.example/phish', 'plex', {
+    fetch: async () => { fetchCalled = true; },
+    location: { replace: () => assert.fail('must not navigate') },
+  });
+
+  assert.equal(resumed, false);
+  assert.equal(fetchCalled, false);
+});
+
+test('credential request opens the form and save path calls the tested handoff helper', () => {
+  assert.match(formSource, /params\.get\('credentials'\)/);
+  assert.match(formSource, /openServiceCredsModal\(service, \{ returnUrl \}\)/);
+  assert.match(formSource, /DCCredentialVault\?\.resume\(returnUrl, currentService\.id\)/);
+  assert.match(initSource, /openRequestedCredentialForm\(\)/);
+  assert.match(formSource, /Save to vault & open service/);
+});
+
+test('actual vault modal save handler stores credentials then resumes the handoff', async () => {
+  const dom = new JSDOM('<!doctype html><body></body>', {
+    url: 'https://status.sami/?credentials=plex&return=https%3A%2F%2Fplex.sami%2Fweb%2F',
+    runScripts: 'outside-only',
+  });
+  const { window } = dom;
+  let stored = false;
+  const writes = [];
+  const resumed = [];
+  window.ErrorHandler = class { logError() {} };
+  window.SITE = { tld: '.sami' };
+  window.APPS = [{ id: 'plex', name: 'Plex', appTemplate: 'plex', url: 'https://plex.sami' }];
+  window.injectModal = (_id, html) => window.document.body.insertAdjacentHTML('beforeend', html);
+  window.fetch = async () => ({
+    ok: true,
+    json: async () => ({
+      success: true,
+      hasApiKey: false,
+      hasBasicAuth: stored,
+      username: stored ? 'vault-user' : null,
+    }),
+  });
+  window.secureFetch = async (url, options) => {
+    writes.push({ url, body: JSON.parse(options.body) });
+    stored = true;
+    return { ok: true, json: async () => ({ success: true }) };
+  };
+  window.DCCredentialVault = {
+    isAllowedReturnUrl: () => true,
+    resume: async (returnUrl, serviceId) => { resumed.push({ returnUrl, serviceId }); return true; },
+  };
+  window.confirm = () => true;
+  window.eval(formSource);
+
+  await window.openServiceCredsModal(window.APPS[0], { returnUrl: 'https://plex.sami/web/' });
+  window.document.getElementById('svc-basic-user').value = 'vault-user';
+  window.document.getElementById('svc-basic-pass').value = 'vault-password';
+  window.document.getElementById('svc-creds-save').click();
+  await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 20));
+
+  assert.deepEqual(writes, [{
+    url: '/api/v1/services/plex/credentials',
+    body: { username: 'vault-user', password: 'vault-password' },
+  }]);
+  assert.deepEqual(resumed, [{ returnUrl: 'https://plex.sami/web/', serviceId: 'plex' }]);
+});
+
+test('failed credential write does not mint a handoff or navigate', async () => {
+  const dom = new JSDOM('<!doctype html><body></body>', {
+    url: 'https://status.sami/',
+    runScripts: 'outside-only',
+  });
+  const { window } = dom;
+  let resumeCalls = 0;
+  window.ErrorHandler = class { logError() {} };
+  window.SITE = { tld: '.sami' };
+  window.injectModal = (_id, html) => window.document.body.insertAdjacentHTML('beforeend', html);
+  window.fetch = async () => ({
+    ok: true,
+    json: async () => ({ success: true, hasApiKey: false, hasBasicAuth: false, username: null }),
+  });
+  window.secureFetch = async () => ({
+    ok: false,
+    status: 500,
+    json: async () => ({ success: false, error: 'vault write rejected' }),
+  });
+  window.DCCredentialVault = {
+    isAllowedReturnUrl: () => true,
+    resume: async () => { resumeCalls++; return true; },
+  };
+  window.confirm = () => true;
+  window.eval(formSource);
+
+  const service = { id: 'plex', name: 'Plex', appTemplate: 'plex', url: 'https://plex.sami' };
+  await window.openServiceCredsModal(service, { returnUrl: 'https://plex.sami/web/' });
+  window.document.getElementById('svc-basic-user').value = 'vault-user';
+  window.document.getElementById('svc-basic-pass').value = 'vault-password';
+  window.document.getElementById('svc-creds-save').click();
+  await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 20));
+
+  assert.equal(resumeCalls, 0);
+  assert.match(window.document.getElementById('svc-creds-error').textContent, /vault write rejected/);
+});
+
+test('failed ARR credential write does not mint a handoff or navigate', async () => {
+  await exerciseFailedModalWrite({
+    service: { id: 'radarr', name: 'Radarr', appTemplate: 'radarr', url: 'https://radarr.sami' },
+    fetchJson: (url) => url.includes('/services/')
+      ? { success: true, hasApiKey: false, hasBasicAuth: false, username: null }
+      : { success: true, profiles: [] },
+    setupInputs: (document) => { document.getElementById('svc-apikey-input').value = 'arr-key'; },
+    expectedEndpoint: '/api/v1/arr/credentials',
+  });
+});
+
+test('failed ARR quality-profile write does not mint a handoff or navigate', async () => {
+  await exerciseFailedModalWrite({
+    service: { id: 'radarr', name: 'Radarr', appTemplate: 'radarr', url: 'https://radarr.sami' },
+    fetchJson: (url) => url.includes('/services/')
+      ? { success: true, hasApiKey: true, hasBasicAuth: false, username: null }
+      : { success: true, profiles: [{ id: 1, name: 'Default' }], storedProfileId: 1 },
+    setupInputs: () => {},
+    expectedEndpoint: '/api/v1/arr/quality-profiles',
+  });
+});
+
+test('failed seedhost write does not mint a handoff or navigate', async () => {
+  await exerciseFailedModalWrite({
+    service: { id: 'torrent', name: 'qBittorrent', isExternal: true, externalUrl: 'https://torrent.sami' },
+    fetchJson: (url) => url.includes('/seedhost-creds')
+      ? { success: true, hasCredentials: false, username: null }
+      : { success: true, hasApiKey: false, hasBasicAuth: false, username: null },
+    setupInputs: (document) => {
+      document.getElementById('svc-seedhost-user').value = 'seed-user';
+      document.getElementById('svc-seedhost-pass').value = 'seed-password';
+    },
+    expectedEndpoint: '/api/v1/seedhost-creds',
+  });
+});
+
+test('failed generic API-key write does not mint a handoff or navigate', async () => {
+  await exerciseFailedModalWrite({
+    service: { id: 'custom', name: 'Custom', url: 'https://custom.sami' },
+    fetchJson: () => ({ success: true, hasApiKey: false, hasBasicAuth: false, username: null }),
+    setupInputs: (document) => {
+      document.getElementById('svc-apikey-input').value = 'custom-key';
+      document.getElementById('svc-basic-user').value = 'user';
+      document.getElementById('svc-basic-pass').value = 'password';
+    },
+    expectedEndpoint: '/api/v1/services/custom/credentials',
+  });
+});
+
+test('HTTP 2xx with malformed JSON does not mint a handoff or navigate', async () => {
+  await exerciseFailedModalWrite({
+    service: { id: 'plex', name: 'Plex', appTemplate: 'plex', url: 'https://plex.sami' },
+    fetchJson: () => ({ success: true, hasApiKey: false, hasBasicAuth: false, username: null }),
+    setupInputs: (document) => {
+      document.getElementById('svc-basic-user').value = 'user';
+      document.getElementById('svc-basic-pass').value = 'password';
+    },
+    expectedEndpoint: '/api/v1/services/plex/credentials',
+    writeResponse: { ok: true, status: 200, json: async () => { throw new Error('bad json'); } },
+    expectedError: /invalid server response/,
+  });
+});
+
+test('HTTP 2xx without success:true does not mint a handoff or navigate', async () => {
+  await exerciseFailedModalWrite({
+    service: { id: 'plex', name: 'Plex', appTemplate: 'plex', url: 'https://plex.sami' },
+    fetchJson: () => ({ success: true, hasApiKey: false, hasBasicAuth: false, username: null }),
+    setupInputs: (document) => {
+      document.getElementById('svc-basic-user').value = 'user';
+      document.getElementById('svc-basic-pass').value = 'password';
+    },
+    expectedEndpoint: '/api/v1/services/plex/credentials',
+    writeResponse: { ok: true, status: 200, json: async () => ({ message: 'ambiguous' }) },
+    expectedError: /failed \(200\)/,
+  });
+});
+
+test('failed credential clear remains visibly failed and keeps stored-state UI', async () => {
+  const dom = new JSDOM('<!doctype html><body><button id="creds-btn-plex" class="has-creds"></button></body>', {
+    url: 'https://status.sami/',
+    runScripts: 'outside-only',
+  });
+  const { window } = dom;
+  window.ErrorHandler = class { logError() {} };
+  window.SITE = { tld: '.sami' };
+  window.injectModal = (_id, html) => window.document.body.insertAdjacentHTML('beforeend', html);
+  window.fetch = async () => ({
+    ok: true,
+    json: async () => ({ success: true, hasApiKey: false, hasBasicAuth: true, username: 'vault-user' }),
+  });
+  window.secureFetch = async () => ({
+    ok: false,
+    status: 500,
+    json: async () => ({ success: false, error: 'clear rejected' }),
+  });
+  window.DCCredentialVault = { isAllowedReturnUrl: () => false };
+  window.confirm = () => true;
+  window.eval(formSource);
+
+  const service = { id: 'plex', name: 'Plex', appTemplate: 'plex', url: 'https://plex.sami' };
+  await window.openServiceCredsModal(service);
+  window.document.getElementById('svc-creds-clear').click();
+  await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 20));
+
+  assert.match(window.document.getElementById('svc-creds-error').textContent, /clear rejected/);
+  assert.equal(window.document.getElementById('creds-btn-plex').classList.contains('has-creds'), true);
+});
+
+test('handoff rejects a private-TLD host that is not the requested protected service', async () => {
+  const vault = loadVault();
+  let fetchCalled = false;
+  const resumed = await vault.resume('https://dns1.sami/', 'plex', {
+    fetch: async () => { fetchCalled = true; },
+    location: { replace: () => assert.fail('must not navigate') },
+  });
+
+  assert.equal(resumed, false);
+  assert.equal(fetchCalled, false);
+});
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+const fs = require('node:fs');
+const path = require('node:path');
+const { JSDOM } = require('jsdom');
+const test = require('node:test');
+const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
+
+const source = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '..', 'js', 'core', 'credentials.js'), 'utf8');
+
+function buildDnsCredentialUi() {
+  const dom = new JSDOM('<!doctype html><body><button id="manage-tokens"></button></body>', {
+    url: 'https://status.sami/',
+    runScripts: 'outside-only',
+  });
+  const { window } = dom;
+  const local = new Map();
+  const session = new Map();
+  window.SITE = { dnsServers: { dns1: { name: 'Primary DNS' } } };
+  window.injectModal = (_id, html) => window.document.body.insertAdjacentHTML('beforeend', html);
+  window.safeGet = key => local.get(key) || null;
+  window.safeSet = (key, value) => local.set(key, value);
+  window.safeRemove = key => local.delete(key);
+  window.safeSessionGet = key => session.get(key) || null;
+  window.safeSessionSet = (key, value) => session.set(key, value);
+  window.closeModal = () => {};
+  window.confirm = () => true;
+  window.TextEncoder = TextEncoder;
+  window.setTimeout = () => 1;
+  window.eval(source);
+  window.document.getElementById('manage-tokens').click();
+  return { window, local };
+}
+
+test('failed DNS credential save never populates browser cache or success UI', async () => {
+  const { window, local } = buildDnsCredentialUi();
+  window.secureFetch = async () => ({
+    ok: false,
+    status: 500,
+    json: async () => ({ success: false, error: 'DNS vault rejected' }),
+  });
+  window.document.getElementById('dns1-admin-username').value = 'dns-admin';
+  window.document.getElementById('dns1-admin-token').value = 'dns-password';
+  window.document.getElementById('token-save').click();
+  await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 20));
+
+  assert.equal(local.has('dns1-admin-username-enc'), false);
+  assert.equal(local.has('dns1-admin-token-enc'), false);
+  assert.match(window.document.getElementById('dns1-token-status').textContent, /DNS vault rejected/);
+  assert.equal(window.document.getElementById('dns1-token-status').classList.contains('success'), false);
+});
+
+test('failed DNS credential clear preserves cached state and shows error', async () => {
+  const { window, local } = buildDnsCredentialUi();
+  local.set('dns1-admin-username-enc', 'existing-user');
+  local.set('dns1-admin-token-enc', 'existing-password');
+  window.secureFetch = async () => ({
+    ok: true,
+    status: 200,
+    json: async () => ({ message: 'ambiguous response' }),
+  });
+  window.document.getElementById('token-clear-all').click();
+  await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 20));
+
+  assert.equal(local.has('dns1-admin-username-enc'), true);
+  assert.equal(local.has('dns1-admin-token-enc'), true);
+  assert.match(window.document.getElementById('dns1-token-status').textContent, /DNS credential removal failed/);
+  assert.equal(window.document.getElementById('dns1-token-status').classList.contains('success'), false);
+});
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Hermes	f2285a2550	test(api): DC-087 hermetic caddy-admin health mirrors + file-level raw-fetch guard [glm-grade=B] Two mirrored health-handler test suites (health-endpoints, health-probe-aliases) probed the Caddy admin API with raw Origin-less native fetch. On the prod host the adversarial cron runs the full jest suite every 30 min against a live Caddy admin with enforce_origin: 12 journal 403 lines per run (~700/day of 'client is not allowed to access from origin' spam) while tests stayed green. - Mirrors now call fetchT (byte-identical to src/app.js:930 probe) with fetchT jest.spyOn-mocked at buildApp scope; caddyOk-configurable in both suites - New guard test in utils-http-caddy-admin-origin.test.js: any __tests__ file pairing a raw await-fetch with a Caddy-admin token (:2019\|adminUrl\| CADDY_ADMIN) fails the suite — file-level pairing catches the historical cross-line drift shape a call-window regex missed - DC-087-ALLOW-RAW-FETCH comment escape hatch (raw-text marker, guard file never self-exempts, skips logged to jest output) Judge: GLM-5.3 cold read via delegate_task deleg_4d384dea (round 1 C -> round 2 B, zero blockers, polish folded). Verdict URN: urn:ump:azrv2xp72koiwi5r4yb6ureu4aqqloqq64sgmftsajh6ci2mzj2q Mutation probes: historical drift reintroduction -> guard red; hatch marker -> skipped+logged; restore -> 33/33. Full suite 2603/2603.	2026-08-22 15:14:25 -07:00
Hermes	54a1df5ac4	[glm-grade=A] build(status): rebuild dist + sw — DC-085 link-first invite frontend bundle CI / Test & Lint (push) Canceled after 0s Details CI / Security audit (push) Canceled after 0s Details	2026-08-22 14:28:21 -07:00
Hermes	eb546bf468	Merge dc/DC-085-link-first-invite-dc-086-flicker-fix: DC-085 link-first invite + DC-086 badge flicker hysteresis + race hardening [glm-grade=A] CI / Test & Lint (push) Canceled after 0s Details CI / Security audit (push) Canceled after 0s Details	2026-08-22 14:27:54 -07:00
Hermes	84e051d975	Merge earlier-tick staging branch (duplicate DC-085/086 cherry-picks + auth-gate/vault tests) — content identical to eab2b00/f8b99f9 # Conflicts: # dashcaddy-api/__tests__/health-checker-hysteresis.test.js # dashcaddy-api/src/monitoring/health-checker.js	2026-08-22 14:27:40 -07:00
Hermes	628bbe32f6	[glm-grade=A] fix(monitoring): DC-086 round-2 — probe/config race hardening + env parse + incident compare Round-2 folds the judge-round fixes into DC-086: - serviceGenerations map: checkService captures the config generation at entry and re-validates it before ANY state write (success + error paths). In-flight probes that resolve after removeService/updateService are discarded — deleted services can no longer resurrect status entries, fire incidents, or poke consecutiveFailures from beyond the grave. - removeService now purges ALL per-service state: displayedStatus, consecutiveSinceChange, consecutiveFailures, pending backoff timers, and the serviceTimers entry (leaked a live setTimeout before). - readPositiveIntEnv(): HEALTH_DOWN_THRESHOLD / HEALTH_UP_THRESHOLD parsing hardened — empty, non-numeric, fractional, zero, and negative values all fall back to defaults instead of Math.max(1, NaN)=NaN. - previousStatus is captured BEFORE recordStatus() writes the new probe, so checkForIncidents() compares against the true prior state instead of the just-overwritten one (latent incident-suppression bug). - Same-status hysteresis path returns the raw consistent snapshot (not the stale displayed one) so timestamps stay current without mixing contradictory fields. - Tests: +14 (86 total across the two suites). New coverage: streak reset on agreement, malformed env fallbacks (each.of not-a-number/0/ -2/1.5), in-flight probe after removeService does not resurrect state, getCurrentStatus serves internally-consistent displayed snapshot while raw currentStatus keeps the suppressed failure. Full suite 2601/2601. Judge: GLM-5.3 cold-read via delegate_task (deleg_c9fd5900 task-0), grade A round 1, zero blocking issues. Verdict URN: urn:ump:quhs33ph2hhmsxjti63eg3ro4aiy34r6nws7z66ofk3bg3rcb3ca (Codex primary quota-walled until 2026-08-29; GLM-4.6 direct 401; stand-in chain per codex-as-judge SKILL.md, Sami 2026-08-17.)	2026-08-22 14:23:25 -07:00
Hermes	f8b99f9b5a	DC-086 service-status flicker fix — asymmetric hysteresis Dashboard badges perpetually flip green/red for a few seconds at a time, never stable. Root cause: health-checker emitted 'status-check' on every probe (every 30s) and dashboard-ws forwarded every one as 'status-change' to the browser with no diff; live-events.js then unconditionally called setBadge(). A single transient 5xx (Caddy reload, container restart, TLS handshake blip) flipped the badge and the next green probe flipped back. Fix: _computeDisplayedStatus applies asymmetric hysteresis — DOWN_THRESHOLD (default 2, env-tunable HEALTH_DOWN_THRESHOLD) consecutive probes that disagree with the displayed 'up' state flip to red; UP_THRESHOLD (default 1, HEALTH_UP_THRESHOLD) flips back to green. History and consecutiveFailures still record every raw probe so postmortem analysis is unchanged. Only the SSE broadcast is filtered. getCurrentStatus now returns the displayed status so a page reload shows the same badge as the live stream. 10 new tests cover first-emit, same-status-dedup, the actual flicker bug (one-down-then-up keeps green), two-down flips red, one-up recovers fast, long-steady-green produces exactly one emit, and env-var tuning. All 63 existing health-checker tests still pass. Full suite: 2484/2484.	2026-08-22 06:14:48 -07:00
Hermes	eab2b00b13	DC-085 link-first invite — Discord-style share it however you want Flip POST /api/v1/auth/admin/invites default to no email; always return the link. Operators copy + share via iMessage/WhatsApp/SMS/Signal/Telegram/ Discord/paste-in-email. Email becomes an opt-in checkbox (was the default). Add shareText field with pre-formatted message for one-tap paste. Stop logging raw invite URLs to error.log when SMTP is unconfigured (was just a dev fallback — link is now in the response). Frontend flips the checkbox default to unchecked and renders shareText + native share sheet button (navigator.share) alongside the raw copy-link button. 9 new tests covering default-no-send, link-always-returned, shareText-shape, opt-in SMTP send, failed-SMTP-no-leak. Full suite: 2474/2474 + 9 new = 2483.	2026-08-22 06:14:47 -07:00
Hermes	84edb035e3	[grade=B] feat(auth): onboard missing credentials into encrypted vault CI / Test & Lint (push) Canceled after 0s Details CI / Security audit (push) Canceled after 0s Details	2026-08-22 05:41:38 -07:00
Hermes	d313b1e872	[grade=B] fix(auth): reuse valid session for cross-host SSO CI / Test & Lint (push) Canceled after 0s Details CI / Security audit (push) Canceled after 0s Details	2026-08-22 04:06:27 -07:00