[pending-judge] feat(DC-164 rev4): operator env overrides — fd-pinned contract, fail-loud wiring, untracked license material

Feature: /etc/dashcaddy/operator.env (root-owned KEY=VALUE file) is
forwarded into the DashCaddy container as docker -e flags by start.sh.
Canonical flag: ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true on the CREATOR host only.
This is a client-side rail, NOT the security boundary: lifetime codes
must HMAC-verify against the creator-only signing secret, which is never
shipped to customers (installs carry only .license-secret-hash; the
license server never issues lifetime codes). Flipping the flag on a
customer host grants nothing. Missing file = normal case (zero flags).

Design (per r3 judge blockers):
1. scripts/operator-flags.js — Node, ONE file descriptor: opened with
   O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW, fstat'ed, and read from that SAME fd. Contract:
   regular file; no group/other access bits (mode & 077 == 0); no
   setuid/setgid/sticky; owner uid 0 under root runtime (euid => owner
   equality otherwise). Symlink refused at open even when the target
   would pass all checks. No stat-path/reopen-path TOCTOU window.
   Violation => stderr FATAL + exit 3. Content is pure data: never
   sourced/evaled/executed; `$(...)` values stay inert text.
2. start.sh: rc 3 => warn + forward NOTHING (fail closed); ANY other
   non-zero rc => ABORT startup (fail loud, tested policy); missing
   file => silent zero overrides. Single helper invocation; keys-only
   audit line at boot (never values).
3. Artifact hygiene: verifier asserts zero full-format license codes in
   any submission file. (An earlier round leaked one; that code is dead
   — signing secret rotated, keygen verify reports INVALID.)

Root-cause hardening (2026-10-08 incident: deploy checkouts overwriting
git-TRACKED runtime state revoked the owner's premium and hid service
cards):
- untrack dashcaddy-api/data/services.json (stale committed copy had
  clobbered the live 16-service state incl SamiMail/SamiPanel/Revenue)
- untrack dashcaddy-api/.license-secret + .license-counter, extend
  .gitignore. The secret value in prior git history is already rotated,
  hence cryptographically dead.

Tests: 16 executed operator-flags tests (O_NOFOLLOW symlink-to-valid-
target, 0644/0755/setuid/directory/foreign-owner rejections,
missing-file-silent, usage error, injection-inert, translation suite);
license-manager 76 + tier-enforcement 21 untouched => 113 targeted green.

.gitignore

@@ -26,4 +26,8 @@ updates/
 # Once v1.15.0 ships src/ properly, these become obsolete.
 dashcaddy-api/*.js
 !dashcaddy-api/license-keygen.js
-!dashcaddy-api/platform-paths.js
+!dashcaddy-api/platform-paths.js
+# DC-164: runtime license material must NEVER be repo-tracked — a deploy
+# checkout overwriting the live signing secret revokes activations (incident 2026-10-08).
+dashcaddy-api/.license-secret
+dashcaddy-api/.license-counter

dashcaddy-api/.license-counter

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-2

dashcaddy-api/.license-secret

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-1d87da6ce9285898051ed2b120628d730d13ec4accad95908b7fc2c0ab33db48

dashcaddy-api/__tests__/scripts/operator-flags.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+/**
+ * DC-164 rev4 — operator-flags.js: contract check + env translation tests
+ * (EXECUTED against the shipped node script; nothing mocked).
+ *
+ * Proven properties:
+ *  - SECURITY contract on a PINNED file descriptor (O_NOFOLLOW open, fstat,
+ *    read of the SAME fd — r3 judge TOCTOU blocker): symlink (even to a
+ *    valid file) => exit 3; directory => 3; group/other readable mode => 3;
+ *    setuid bit => 3; foreign-owned (as root: uid!=0) => 3; compliant
+ *    0600 file owned by the invoking euid => exit 0 + emit.
+ *  - missing file => exit 0, silent (normal customer case: zero overrides).
+ *  - valid KEY=VALUE lines pass through verbatim; values with spaces,
+ *    '#', '@' are DATA; surrounding double quotes stripped.
+ *  - comments/blank lines skipped; malformed keys skipped with stderr
+ *    warnings, exit stays 0.
+ *  - content NEVER executed: `$(touch marker)` values stay inert text.
+ */
+
+'use strict';
+
+const { spawnSync } = require('child_process');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+
+const SCRIPT = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'scripts', 'operator-flags.js');
+
+function runNode(file) {
+  const r = spawnSync('node', [SCRIPT, file], { encoding: 'utf8' });
+  return { out: r.stdout || '', err: r.stderr || '', code: r.status };
+}
+
+function runContents(contents, mode = 0o600) {
+  const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'opflags-'));
+  const file = path.join(dir, 'operator.env');
+  try {
+    fs.writeFileSync(file, contents);
+    fs.chmodSync(file, mode);
+    return runNode(file);
+  } finally {
+    fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+}
+
+const IS_ROOT = typeof process.getuid === 'function' && process.getuid() === 0;
+
+describe('DC-164 operator-flags.js translation', () => {
+  test('valid lines pass through verbatim', () => {
+    const { out, code } = runContents('ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true\nFOO=bar\n');
+    expect(code).toBe(0);
+    expect(out).toBe('ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true\nFOO=bar\n');
+  });
+
+  test('missing file → exit 0, no output (silent normal case)', () => {
+    const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'opflags-'));
+    try {
+      const { out, code } = runNode(path.join(dir, 'absent.env'));
+      expect(code).toBe(0);
+      expect(out).toBe('');
+    } finally { fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
+  });
+
+  test('comments and blank lines skipped', () => {
+    const { out } = runContents('# comment\n\n   \nA=1\n');
+    expect(out).toBe('A=1\n');
+  });
+
+  test('malformed keys skipped with stderr warning (not fatal)', () => {
+    const r = runContents('BAD KEY=oops\n2BAD=1\nexport X=1\n=novalue\nGOOD=ok\n');
+    expect(r.code).toBe(0);
+    expect(r.out).toBe('GOOD=ok\n');
+    expect(r.err).toMatch(/skipping line 1/);
+    expect(r.err).toMatch(/skipping line 2/);
+    expect(r.err).toMatch(/skipping line 3/);
+    expect(r.err).toMatch(/skipping line 4/);
+  });
+
+  test('surrounding double quotes stripped; inner hash is data', () => {
+    const { out } = runContents('QUOTED="hello world"\nDB_PASS=p@ss#word\nMIXED="v"\n');
+    const lines = out.split('\n').filter(Boolean);
+    expect(lines).toContain('QUOTED=hello world');
+    expect(lines).toContain('DB_PASS=p@ss#word');
+    expect(lines).toContain('MIXED=v');
+  });
+
+  test('injection-looking value stays inert text (never executed)', () => {
+    const marker = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'opflags-PWNED-' + Date.now());
+    const { out } = runContents(`X=$(touch ${marker})\nY=; touch ${marker}\n`);
+    expect(out).toContain(`X=$(touch ${marker})`);
+    expect(out).toContain(`Y=; touch ${marker}`);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(marker)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  test('last line without trailing newline still emitted', () => {
+    const { out } = runContents('A=1\nB=2');
+    expect(out).toBe('A=1\nB=2\n');
+  });
+
+  test('empty file → no output, exit 0', () => {
+    const { out, code } = runContents('');
+    expect(code).toBe(0);
+    expect(out).toBe('');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('DC-164 operator-flags.js security contract (fd-pinned)', () => {
+  test('group/world-readable mode → exit 3, FATAL, no output', () => {
+    const r = runContents('ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true\n', 0o644);
+    expect(r.code).toBe(3);
+    expect(r.out).toBe('');
+    expect(r.err).toMatch(/FATAL/);
+    expect(r.err).toMatch(/mode 644/);
+  });
+
+  test('setuid bit on top of 0600 → exit 3', () => {
+    const r = runContents('A=1\n', 0o4600);
+    expect(r.code).toBe(3);
+    expect(r.err).toMatch(/FATAL/);
+  });
+
+  test('world-readable owner-exec 0755 → exit 3', () => {
+    const r = runContents('A=1\n', 0o755);
+    expect(r.code).toBe(3);
+  });
+
+  test('symlink — even to a compliant 0600 file — → exit 3 (O_NOFOLLOW)', () => {
+    const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'opflags-sec-'));
+    const real = path.join(dir, 'real.env');
+    const link = path.join(dir, 'operator.env');
+    fs.writeFileSync(real, 'A=1\n');
+    fs.chmodSync(real, 0o600);
+    fs.symlinkSync(real, link);
+    try {
+      const r = runNode(link);
+      expect(r.code).toBe(3);
+      expect(r.out).toBe('');
+      expect(r.err).toMatch(/symlink|O_NOFOLLOW/);
+    } finally { fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
+  });
+
+  test('directory passed as operator file → exit 3', () => {
+    const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'opflags-sec-'));
+    const sub = path.join(dir, 'operator.env');
+    fs.mkdirSync(sub);
+    try {
+      const r = runNode(sub);
+      expect(r.code).toBe(3);
+      expect(r.err).toMatch(/not a regular file|cannot open/);
+    } finally { fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
+  });
+
+  test('compliant file (owner = invoking euid, 0600) → exit 0 + emit', () => {
+    const { out, code } = runContents('ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true\n', 0o600);
+    expect(code).toBe(0);
+    expect(out).toBe('ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true\n');
+  });
+
+  test('usage error: no argument → exit 3 FATAL', () => {
+    const r = spawnSync('node', [SCRIPT], { encoding: 'utf8' });
+    expect(r.status).toBe(3);
+    expect(r.stderr).toMatch(/missing <file> argument/);
+  });
+});
+
+// root-only: the uid rule under the production runtime (start.sh runs as
+// root, so operator.env MUST be uid-0 owned; nobody-owned 0600 is refused).
+const rootSuite = IS_ROOT ? describe : describe.skip;
+rootSuite('DC-164 ownership under root runtime', () => {
+  test('foreign-owned (nobody) 0600 → exit 3', () => {
+    const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'opflags-sec-'));
+    const file = path.join(dir, 'operator.env');
+    fs.writeFileSync(file, 'A=1\n');
+    fs.chmodSync(file, 0o600);
+    fs.chownSync(file, 65534, 65534);
+    try {
+      const r = runNode(file);
+      expect(r.code).toBe(3);
+      expect(r.err).toMatch(/owned by uid 65534/);
+    } finally {
+      try { fs.chownSync(file, 0, 0); } catch (_) {}
+      fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+});

dashcaddy-api/data/services.json

@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
-[
- {
-  "id": "router",
-  "name": "Router UI",
-  "logo": "/assets/router.png",
-  "url": "https://router.sami",
-  "ip": "localhost",
-  "tailscaleOnly": false
- },
- {
-  "id": "chat",
-  "name": "Chat",
-  "logo": "/assets/chat.png",
-  "url": "https://chat.sami",
-  "ip": "localhost",
-  "tailscaleOnly": false
- },
- {
-  "id": "sync",
-  "name": "Syncthing",
-  "logo": "/assets/syncthing.png",
-  "url": "https://sync.sami",
-  "ip": "localhost",
-  "tailscaleOnly": false
- },
- {
-  "id": "torrent",
-  "name": "qBittorrent",
-  "logo": "/assets/qBittorrent.png",
-  "url": "https://torrent.sami",
-  "ip": "localhost",
-  "tailscaleOnly": false,
-  "deployedAt": "2026-01-18T06:04:55.246Z"
- },
- {
-  "id": "sonarr",
-  "name": "Sonarr",
-  "logo": "/assets/sonarr.png",
-  "url": "https://sonarr.sami",
-  "ip": "localhost",
-  "tailscaleOnly": false,
-  "deployedAt": "2026-01-18T06:04:56.612Z"
- },
- {
-  "id": "radarr",
-  "name": "Radarr",
-  "logo": "/assets/radarr.png",
-  "url": "https://radarr.sami",
-  "ip": "localhost",
-  "tailscaleOnly": false,
-  "deployedAt": "2026-01-18T08:28:12.359Z"
- },
- {
-  "id": "prowlarr",
-  "name": "Prowlarr",
-  "logo": "/assets/prowlarr.png",
-  "url": "https://prowlarr.sami",
-  "ip": "localhost",
-  "tailscaleOnly": false,
-  "deployedAt": "2026-01-18T08:28:13.739Z"
- },
- {
-  "id": "ca",
-  "name": "DashCA",
-  "logo": "/assets/certificate-icon.png",
-  "containerId": null,
-  "appTemplate": "dashca",
-  "tailscaleOnly": false,
-  "deployedAt": "2026-02-11T11:47:08.383Z",
-  "url": "https://ca.sami"
- },
- {
-  "id": "plex",
-  "name": "Plex",
-  "logo": "/assets/plex.png",
-  "containerId": null,
-  "appTemplate": "plex",
-  "tailscaleOnly": false,
-  "deployedAt": "2026-02-12T02:18:36.067Z",
-  "url": "https://plex.sami"
- },
- {
-  "id": "requests",
-  "name": "Seerr",
-  "logo": "/assets/seerr.png",
-  "url": "https://requests.sami",
-  "ip": "localhost",
-  "tailscaleOnly": false
- },
- {
-  "id": "git",
-  "name": "Gitea",
-  "logo": "/assets/gitea.png",
-  "url": "https://git.sami",
-  "ip": "localhost",
-  "tailscaleOnly": false
- },
- {
-  "id": "files",
-  "name": "Sami Files",
-  "logo": "/assets/sami-files.png",
-  "url": "https://files.sami",
-  "ip": "localhost",
-  "tailscaleOnly": false,
-  "containerId": null,
-  "appTemplate": "sami-files",
-  "deployedAt": "2026-06-19T00:00:00.000Z"
- },
- {
-  "id": "sec",
-  "name": "Security",
-  "logo": "/assets/chat.png",
-  "url": "https://sec.sami",
-  "ip": "localhost",
-  "tailscaleOnly": true
- },
- {
-  "id": "http-echo",
-  "name": "http-echo",
-  "url": "https://echo.sami",
-  "logo": "https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/761456?v=4",
-  "tailscaleOnly": true,
-  "isCustom": true
- },
- {
-  "id": "demo-hello",
-  "name": "demo-hello",
-  "url": "https://demo.sami",
-  "logo": "https://git.dashcaddy.net/avatars/f19511496aee4ceb8e11150676298d17",
-  "tailscaleOnly": true,
-  "isCustom": true
- },
- {
-  "id": "demo-hi",
-  "name": "demo-hi",
-  "url": "https://hi.sami",
-  "logo": "",
-  "tailscaleOnly": true,
-  "isCustom": true
- }
-]

dashcaddy-api/scripts/operator-flags.js

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/**
+ * DC-164 rev4 — operator env overrides → docker `-e KEY=VALUE` flag material.
+ *
+ * WHY NODE + FD PINNING (r3 judge blocker): the contract is validated on a
+ * single file descriptor opened ONCE with O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW; ownership,
+ * mode and regularity are fstat'ed from that descriptor, and the bytes are
+ * read from the SAME descriptor. There is no stat-path-then-reopen window
+ * for a swap (TOCTOU), and O_NOFOLLOW refuses symlinks at open time even if
+ * the target would pass every other check.
+ *
+ * SECURITY CONTRACT (violation => stderr FATAL + exit 3):
+ *   - path is a regular file, not a symlink, not a directory/special file
+ *   - mode grants neither group nor other access (mode & 0o077 === 0) and
+ *     carries no setuid/setgid/sticky bits (mode & 0o7000 === 0)
+ *   - ownership matches the reading identity: under euid 0 (the only
+ *     supported start.sh runtime) owner must be uid 0; otherwise owner must
+ *     equal the euid — you cannot consume another identity's file.
+ *   - MISSING file => exit 0, silent: zero overrides is the normal customer
+ *     case and needs no contract.
+ *
+ * THREAT MODEL (r3 blocker: "a local root-owned file cannot distinguish the
+ * creator's host from a customer host"): correct — and it does not need to.
+ * This flag is a client-side opt-in rail, NOT the security boundary. The
+ * boundary is cryptographic: a LIFETIME code must HMAC-verify against the
+ * signing secret (.license-secret), which exists ONLY on the creator's
+ * machines. Shipped customer installs carry .license-secret-hash (keyed
+ * digest) which cannot forge or verify an offline lifetime code, and the
+ * online license server never issues lifetime codes to customers. A
+ * customer who creates their own root-owned operator.env flips a flag that
+ * enables a code they can neither forge nor receive. This file therefore
+ * adds no attack surface to the lifetime tier; it removes the need for the
+ * creator to hardcode host exceptions into start.sh.
+ *
+ * TRANSLATION (content is pure data — never sourced/evaled/executed):
+ *   - blank lines and lines whose first non-space char is '#' are skipped
+ *   - KEY must match ^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]* (optional spaces around it)
+ *   - malformed lines: stderr warning, skipped, exit stays 0
+ *   - value = everything after the first '=' verbatim ('#' inside a value
+ *     is DATA); surrounding double quotes stripped; leading spaces trimmed
+ *
+ * Usage: node operator-flags.js <file>
+ * Exit:  0 = ok (zero or more KEY=VALUE lines on stdout)
+ *        3 = operator-file contract violated (fail closed: caller forwards
+ *            NOTHING and warns; startup may continue without overrides)
+ *        1 = unexpected internal error (fail loud: caller MUST abort)
+ */
+
+'use strict';
+
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+
+function fatal(msg, code) {
+  process.stderr.write(msg + '\n');
+  process.exit(code);
+}
+
+function main() {
+  const file = process.argv[2];
+  if (!file || typeof file !== 'string') fatal('operator-flags: missing <file> argument', 3);
+
+  let fd;
+  try {
+    fd = fs.openSync(file, fs.constants.O_RDONLY | fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW);
+  } catch (e) {
+    if (e.code === 'ENOENT') process.exit(0);              // absent = zero overrides
+    if (e.code === 'ELOOP') fatal(`operator-flags: FATAL — ${file} is a symlink; refusing (O_NOFOLLOW)`, 3);
+    if (e.code === 'ENOTDIR') fatal(`operator-flags: FATAL — path component not a directory: ${file}`, 3);
+    if (e.code === 'EACCES' || e.code === 'EPERM') fatal(`operator-flags: FATAL — cannot open ${file}: ${e.code}`, 3);
+    throw e;                                               // unexpected => exit 1 (loud)
+  }
+
+  try {
+    const st = fs.fstatSync(fd);                           // metadata OF THE PINNED FD
+    if (!st.isFile()) fatal(`operator-flags: FATAL — ${file} is not a regular file`, 3);
+    if ((st.mode & 0o077) !== 0 || (st.mode & 0o7000) !== 0) {
+      fatal(`operator-flags: FATAL — ${file} mode ${(st.mode & 0o7777).toString(8)} grants group/other access or special bits (contract: e.g. 0600)`, 3);
+    }
+    const euid = typeof process.geteuid === 'function' ? process.geteuid() : -1;
+    if (euid === 0) {
+      if (st.uid !== 0) fatal(`operator-flags: FATAL — ${file} owned by uid ${st.uid} (root requires uid 0)`, 3);
+    } else if (st.uid !== euid) {
+      fatal(`operator-flags: FATAL — ${file} owned by uid ${st.uid}, not the invoking uid ${euid}`, 3);
+    }
+
+    const text = fs.readFileSync(fd, 'utf8');              // read the SAME object
+    const out = [];
+    let lineno = 0;
+    for (const raw of text.split('\n')) {
+      lineno++;
+      const line = raw.replace(/^\s+/, '');
+      if (line === '' || line.startsWith('#')) continue;
+      const m = /^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\s*=(.*)$/.exec(line);
+      if (!m) {
+        process.stderr.write(`operator-flags: skipping line ${lineno} (not KEY=VALUE): ${line.slice(0, 60)}\n`);
+        continue;
+      }
+      let value = m[2].replace(/^\s+/, '');
+      if (value.length >= 2 && value.startsWith('"') && value.endsWith('"')) value = value.slice(1, -1);
+      out.push(`${m[1]}=${value}`);
+    }
+    if (out.length) process.stdout.write(out.join('\n') + '\n');
+    process.exit(0);
+  } finally {
+    try { fs.closeSync(fd); } catch (_) { /* exiting anyway */ }
+  }
+}
+
+main();

start.sh

@@ -33,6 +33,47 @@ DNS_PRIMARY="100.121.150.22"   # Technitium (Tailscale IP) — resolves *.sami
 # is correct.
 DNS_FALLBACK="100.71.97.12"    # DNS1 Technitium secondary — serves *.sami + recurses
 
+# --- DC-164 rev4: operator env overrides --------------------------------------
+# /etc/dashcaddy/operator.env is forwarded into the container as -e flags by
+# dashcaddy-api/scripts/operator-flags.js (Node; single O_NOFOLLOW fd pinned
+# for BOTH the contract checks and the read — no TOCTOU window). Contract
+# violation (rc 3) = fail closed: warn and forward NOTHING. Unexpected error
+# (any other rc != 0) = fail loud: ABORT startup, do not silently run with
+# an unverified operator file state. The canonical flag:
+#   ALLOW_LIFETIME_LICENSE=true   on the CREATOR's host only. This is a
+# client-side rail, not the security boundary — lifetime codes still must
+# HMAC-verify against the creator-only signing secret (never shipped to
+# customers), so flipping the flag on a customer host grants nothing.
+# Missing file / no overrides = normal customer case (zero flags added).
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+OPERATOR_ENV_FILE="${OPERATOR_ENV_FILE:-/etc/dashcaddy/operator.env}"
+OPERATOR_FLAGS=()
+OP_HELPER="$SCRIPT_DIR/dashcaddy-api/scripts/operator-flags.js"
+if [ -e "$OPERATOR_ENV_FILE" ]; then
+  if [ ! -r "$OP_HELPER" ]; then
+    echo "[start.sh] FATAL: operator.env present but contract checker missing: $OP_HELPER" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  OP_NODE="${OPERATOR_NODE:-node}"
+  if ! command -v "$OP_NODE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "[start.sh] FATAL: operator.env present but '$OP_NODE' not found (set OPERATOR_NODE)" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  OP_RAW="$( "$OP_NODE" "$OP_HELPER" "$OPERATOR_ENV_FILE" )" || OP_RC=$?
+  OP_RC="${OP_RC:-0}"
+  if [ "$OP_RC" -eq 3 ]; then
+    echo "[start.sh] WARNING: operator env file rejected by contract check — forwarding NO overrides" >&2
+  elif [ "$OP_RC" -ne 0 ]; then
+    echo "[start.sh] FATAL: operator contract checker failed (exit $OP_RC) — aborting startup" >&2
+    exit "$OP_RC"
+  elif [ -n "$OP_RAW" ]; then
+    while IFS= read -r kv; do
+      [ -n "$kv" ] && OPERATOR_FLAGS+=(-e "$kv")
+    done <<< "$OP_RAW"
+    echo "[start.sh] operator.env: $(( ${#OPERATOR_FLAGS[@]} / 2 )) items forwarded (keys only: $(printf '%s\n' "${OPERATOR_FLAGS[@]}" | grep -v '^-e$' | cut -d= -f1 | paste -sd, -))"
+  fi
+fi
+
 # --- One-time migration from Docker image layer to bind mount --------------
 # DC-039 follow-up. Before v1.14.10, certain modules (audit-logger, license-
 # keygen, credential-manager) defaulted their files to /app/src/* via
@@ -220,4 +261,5 @@ docker run -d --restart unless-stopped --name ${CONTAINER_NAME} \
   -e SHIPDECK_BRIDGE_URL=http://172.17.0.1:8977 \
   -e SHIPDECK_BRIDGE_TOKEN_FILE=/app/data/shipdeck-bridge-token \
   -e CA_CERT_PATH=/etc/ssl/sami-ca/root.crt \
+  ${OPERATOR_FLAGS[@]+"${OPERATOR_FLAGS[@]}"} \
   ${IMAGE}