The caddy tail worker (DC-112) was 100% dead in prod: no /var/log/caddy mount, no CADDY_ACCESS_LOG env, no global access log in the Caddyfile. Store census 45,912 events, 100% source_type 'api', ZERO 'caddy'. - createTail: firstStartMaxBytes (5 MiB) bounds first-ever-start replay against a long-lived access.log; multi-chunk partial-line discard on the jump; normal restarts resume at exact persisted offset (judge r1 fix-first fold) - worker: self-noise filter drops our own probe UAs (DashCaddy-Probe/1.0, DashCaddy-HealthCheck/1.0) from the derived store — raw log keeps everything; ~50-100 events/min of probe noise would otherwise bury perimeter signal in the 100k-cap store - worker: metadata.host reads request.host (real caddy JSON nests it; verified against live /var/log/caddy/seeds.log — the DC-112 read was always null on live lines); top-level fallback kept - worker: onAppear recovery log (DC-112 judge polish fold) - start.sh: -v /var/log/caddy:/var/log/caddy:ro + CADDY_ACCESS_LOG env - README: dead caddy-api/ dir refs -> dashcaddy-api/ (queue item e) - tests: +12 DC-113 pins (hermetic, real worker + store); DC-112 fixtures corrected to the real nested request.host shape 126 suites / 2841 tests green. Judge: GLM-5.3 round-1 B, round-2 A (SHIP). Verdict urn:ump:mccln523fptotuvrmddlqpf4zpkrxf273tg4kyytuyy3776rj3pq
249 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript
249 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* DC-112 regression pins — caddy access-log worker event naming.
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*
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* Background (found 2026-08-23 while taking queue item (g)):
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* the caddy tail worker named every event `http.<status>`, including
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* forward_auth SSO gate hits — the same defect class as DC-111 defect 1
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* (uniform action names make "who hit the gate?" unanswerable), in a
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* different writer. Caddy gates call the API with the LEGACY pre-shim
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* prefix (/api/auth/gate/<id>), dashboard JS with the canonical
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* /api/v1/... prefix — both must map to the audit logger's ACTION_MAP
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* vocabulary so both writers use the same names for the same request.
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*
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* Also pinned here:
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* - severity escalation for denied gate hits (warn, not notice)
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* - metadata fidelity: caddy logs headers as ARRAYS — the old
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* single-value read always produced user_agent: null
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* - metadata.host (which vhost served the request)
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* - the dead-path visibility warn: when the configured log path is
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* missing, the worker used to be fully silent — in the current DNS2
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* container there is no /var/log/caddy mount and no override, so ALL
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* caddy-source events were silently absent (store census: 45,912
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* events, 100% source_type 'api', zero 'caddy').
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*
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* The worker test exercises the REAL worker: a temp access log written
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* like caddy writes it (JSON lines), a real tail with a short poll
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* interval, and the real event store pointed at a temp jsonl. No mocks
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* of the module under test.
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*/
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const path = require('path');
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const fs = require('fs');
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const os = require('os');
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// Hermetic sinks (same pattern as audit-gate-path-dc111.test.js)
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const TMP_DIR = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'dc112-caddy-'));
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process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE = path.join(TMP_DIR, 'security-events.jsonl');
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process.env.CADDY_ACCESS_LOG = path.join(TMP_DIR, 'access.log');
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process.env.DATA_DIR = TMP_DIR; // platformPaths.dataDir -> state file location
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const { startCaddyWorker, resolveCaddyAction } = require('../src/security/event-workers');
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const { getStore } = require('../src/security/event-store');
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// Silence the module-level logger for the warn test while still capturing it.
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let capturedWarns = [];
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const fakeLogger = {
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warn: (ctx, msg, extra) => capturedWarns.push({ ctx, msg, extra }),
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info: () => {},
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error: () => {},
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};
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const ACCESS_LOG = process.env.CADDY_ACCESS_LOG;
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const STORE_FILE = process.env.SECURITY_EVENT_LOG_FILE;
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function readStored() {
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try {
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return fs.readFileSync(STORE_FILE, 'utf8').trim().split('\n')
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.filter(Boolean).map(l => JSON.parse(l));
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} catch { return []; }
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}
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// Wait until the tail has picked up `n` events (it polls; append to the
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// store is sync after the line is read).
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async function waitForEvents(n, { timeoutMs = 5000 } = {}) {
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const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
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while (Date.now() < deadline) {
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const events = readStored().filter(e => e.source_type === 'caddy');
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if (events.length >= n) return events;
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await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 50));
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}
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throw new Error(`timed out waiting for ${n} caddy events (got ${readStored().length})`);
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}
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beforeEach(() => {
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fs.writeFileSync(STORE_FILE, '', 'utf8');
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fs.writeFileSync(ACCESS_LOG, '', 'utf8');
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// Reset the tail's persisted offset — it lives in TMP_DIR (DATA_DIR) and
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// survives across tests; a stale offset makes the next worker resume
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// mid-line and parse only partial JSON (0 events).
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fs.writeFileSync(path.join(TMP_DIR, '.caddy-tail-offset'), '0', 'utf8');
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capturedWarns = [];
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getStore({ log: fakeLogger }); // fresh singleton pointed at the temp store file
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});
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afterAll(() => {
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try { fs.rmSync(TMP_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch {}
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});
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describe('resolveCaddyAction — action naming parity with the audit logger', () => {
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test.each([
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// Caddy forward_auth shape (legacy pre-shim prefix, what the Caddyfile's
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// dashcaddy_auth snippet sends — see /etc/caddy/Caddyfile line 87)
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['GET', '/api/auth/gate/plex', 401, 'auth.credential-injection'],
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['GET', '/api/auth/gate/jellyfin', 200, 'auth.credential-injection'],
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// Canonical shape (dashboard JS)
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['GET', '/api/v1/auth/gate/plex', 401, 'auth.credential-injection'],
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['GET', '/api/v1/auth/gate/plex?forward=/x', 401, 'auth.credential-injection'],
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// app-token (auto-login pages)
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['GET', '/api/auth/app-token/plex', 200, 'auth.app-token-issue'],
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['GET', '/api/v1/auth/app-token/plex', 200, 'auth.app-token-issue'],
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// sso-exchange is a POST
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['POST', '/api/auth/sso-exchange', 200, 'auth.sso-exchange'],
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['POST', '/api/v1/auth/sso-exchange', 401, 'auth.sso-exchange'],
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// Non-auth traffic keeps the status-derived action
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['GET', '/api/health', 401, 'http.401'],
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['GET', '/index.html', 200, 'http.200'],
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['GET', '/wp-admin/setup-config.php', 404, 'http.404'],
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// Wrong method on auth paths: named only for the verbs the routes use
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['POST', '/api/auth/gate/plex', 401, 'http.401'],
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// Boundary: exact-path match for sso-exchange — lookalike paths must
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// NOT be misnamed (judge polish round)
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['POST', '/api/auth/sso-exchange-x', 404, 'http.404'],
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['POST', '/api/v1/auth/sso-exchange/extra', 404, 'http.404'],
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['POST', '/api/auth/sso-exchange?nonce=1', 200, 'auth.sso-exchange'],
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])('%s %s -> %s', (method, uri, status, expected) => {
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expect(resolveCaddyAction(method, uri, status)).toBe(expected);
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});
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test('does NOT rename non-gate auth traffic (e.g. TOTP verify stays http.<status>)', () => {
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// /api/v1/totp/verify is a credential POST but not in ACTION_MAP's
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// security-logging set; the caddy worker keeps its status action.
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expect(resolveCaddyAction('POST', '/api/v1/totp/verify', 200)).toBe('http.200');
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});
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});
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describe('caddy worker end-to-end (real tail + real store)', () => {
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let worker;
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afterEach(() => { if (worker) { worker.stop(); worker = null; } });
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test('gate hit is named, escalated, and carries array-normalized UA + host', async () => {
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// A realistic forward_auth gate miss, exactly as caddy logs it:
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// headers as arrays, host nested in request, duration in seconds.
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fs.appendFileSync(ACCESS_LOG, JSON.stringify({
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ts: 1787500800,
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request: { host: 'plex.sami',
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remote_ip: '10.9.9.9',
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method: 'GET',
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uri: '/api/auth/gate/plex',
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proto: 'HTTP/1.1',
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headers: { 'User-Agent': ['PlexDBRoulette/1.0'] },
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},
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status: 401,
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duration: 0.007,
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size: 42,
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}) + '\n');
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worker = startCaddyWorker({ log: fakeLogger });
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const [ev] = await waitForEvents(1);
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expect(ev.action).toBe('auth.credential-injection');
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expect(ev.outcome).toBe('denied');
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expect(ev.severity).toBe('warn'); // escalated from the 401 mapping
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expect(ev.actor).toBe('10.9.9.9');
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expect(ev.target).toBe('GET /api/auth/gate/plex');
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expect(ev.source_type).toBe('caddy');
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expect(ev.metadata.user_agent).toBe('PlexDBRoulette/1.0'); // was null pre-fix
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expect(ev.metadata.host).toBe('plex.sami'); // new
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expect(ev.metadata.status).toBe(401);
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expect(ev.metadata.duration_seconds).toBe(0.007); // judge polish: true unit
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expect(ev.metadata.duration_ms).toBe(0.007); // legacy field, unchanged semantics
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});
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test('canonical gate hit and sso-exchange POST are named too', async () => {
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fs.appendFileSync(ACCESS_LOG, JSON.stringify({
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ts: 1787500801,
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request: { host: 'status.sami',
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remote_ip: '10.9.9.8', method: 'GET', uri: '/api/v1/auth/gate/sonarr', proto: 'HTTP/2.0', headers: { 'User-Agent': ['Mozilla/5.0'] } },
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status: 401,
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duration: 0.002,
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}) + '\n');
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fs.appendFileSync(ACCESS_LOG, JSON.stringify({
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ts: 1787500802,
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request: { host: 'status.sami',
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remote_ip: '10.9.9.8', method: 'POST', uri: '/api/auth/sso-exchange', proto: 'HTTP/2.0', headers: { 'user-agent': ['DashCaddy-Login/1.0'] } },
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status: 200,
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duration: 0.084,
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}) + '\n');
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worker = startCaddyWorker({ log: fakeLogger });
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const events = await waitForEvents(2);
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const gate = events.find(e => e.action === 'auth.credential-injection');
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const sso = events.find(e => e.action === 'auth.sso-exchange');
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expect(gate).toBeDefined();
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expect(gate.severity).toBe('warn');
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expect(sso).toBeDefined();
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expect(sso.outcome).toBe('success');
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expect(sso.severity).toBe('info');
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expect(sso.metadata.user_agent).toBe('DashCaddy-Login/1.0'); // lowercase-key variant
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});
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test('ordinary traffic keeps http.<status> naming and default severity', async () => {
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fs.appendFileSync(ACCESS_LOG, JSON.stringify({
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ts: 1787500803,
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request: { host: 'status.sami',
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remote_ip: '100.121.150.22', method: 'GET', uri: '/api/health', proto: 'HTTP/2.0', headers: { 'User-Agent': ['watchdog'] } },
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status: 401,
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duration: 0.004,
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}) + '\n');
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worker = startCaddyWorker({ log: fakeLogger });
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const [ev] = await waitForEvents(1);
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expect(ev.action).toBe('http.401');
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expect(ev.severity).toBe('warn'); // 401 mapping, not the sensitive-path escalation
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expect(ev.outcome).toBe('denied');
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});
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test('non-JSON lines are skipped without emitting', async () => {
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fs.appendFileSync(ACCESS_LOG, 'not json at all\n{"ts":1,"request":{"remote_ip":"1.1.1.1","method":"GET","uri":"/"},"status":200}\n');
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worker = startCaddyWorker({ log: fakeLogger });
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const [ev] = await waitForEvents(1);
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expect(readStored().filter(e => e.source_type === 'caddy').length).toBe(1);
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expect(ev.action).toBe('http.200');
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});
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test('restart does not re-emit: offset persistence across worker instances', async () => {
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fs.appendFileSync(ACCESS_LOG, JSON.stringify({
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ts: 1787500804,
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request: { host: 'plex.sami',
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remote_ip: '10.9.9.9', method: 'GET', uri: '/api/auth/gate/plex', headers: {} },
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status: 401,
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}) + '\n');
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worker = startCaddyWorker({ log: fakeLogger });
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await waitForEvents(1);
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worker.stop();
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await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 150)); // let offset persist tick
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// Second worker instance reads the persisted offset state file
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fs.writeFileSync(STORE_FILE, '', 'utf8');
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worker = startCaddyWorker({ log: fakeLogger });
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await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 400));
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expect(readStored().filter(e => e.source_type === 'caddy').length).toBe(0);
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});
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test('warns ONCE when the access log path is missing (dead-path visibility)', async () => {
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fs.rmSync(ACCESS_LOG);
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worker = startCaddyWorker({ log: fakeLogger });
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await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 200));
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expect(capturedWarns.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
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expect(capturedWarns[0].msg).toMatch(/caddy access log not found/);
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expect(capturedWarns[0].msg).toContain('/access.log');
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// Once-only: a second check doesn't re-warn
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await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 200));
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expect(capturedWarns.filter(w => /caddy access log not found/.test(w.msg)).length).toBe(1);
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});
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});
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